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EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE URBAN MAJORITY*

C. Herman Pritchett
University of Chicago

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown* v. *Board of Education*. On May 17, 1954, nine judges, sworn to defend a Constitution which guarantees equal protection of the laws, speaking for a country which declared its independence on the proposition that all men are created equal and which is fighting for moral leadership in a world predominantly populated by people whose skin color is other than white—these nine men unanimously concluded that segregated educational facilities are "inherently unequal."

Most of the members of this audience can probably still recall their feelings when they heard what the Supreme Court had done. Even those who were in full sympathy with the holding must nevertheless have been awed by the responsibility the Supreme Court had undertaken and shaken by some doubts whether the judicial institution could engage in a controversy so charged with emotion and bitterness without running the risk of political defeat and possible permanent impairment of judicial power.

Ten years later, we know that they made the right decision. The decision was right because it got the United States on the right side of history at a crucial time in world affairs. By its action the Court raised a standard around which men of good will might rally. Under the Court's leadership the issue of racial segregation was forced on the American conscience. Segregation could persist only if it could be ignored; once the case for segregation had to be examined, it was lost. Without either the purse or the sword, the weakest of the three branches of government proved to be the only one with the conscience, the capacity, and the will to challenge the scandal, the immorality, the social and economic waste, and the positive international dangers of racial discrimination. Eventually the Executive, through Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and the Congress began to assume their responsibilities for achieving the broad purposes of racial equality. But if the Court had not taken that first giant step in 1954, does anyone think there would now be a Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Today, the Supreme Court stands with respect to the issue of legislative districting and apportionment where it stood in 1954 on the issue of racial segregation. Though the differences are substantial, I suggest that the similarities are even greater. Now, as then, the Court has taken sides in the crisis of our times. Where the Court in 1954 was demanding a social revolution, today it is presiding over a political revolution. Once again the Court has unlocked the explosive potentialities of the equal protection clause, staking its prestige and its reputation on its ability to remake the nation in the image of its constitutional concepts.

I

The Supreme Court has never been detached from the major political issues of the times. As Edward S. Corwin once said: "Constitutional law has always a central interest to guard."[1] Under John Marshall the central interest was in the heroic task of legitimizing a strong national government. Under Roger Taney the Court's attachment was to narrower, more fragmented goals, principally the economic interests of the South and West. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the Court's role was to encourage the economic freedom which a rapidly expanding economy demanded. In the New Deal period the Court was striving toward a balance of governmental power, strong enough to prevent depressions yet restrained enough not to threaten individual freedom.

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* Presidential address, American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 9, 1964.

[1] *The Constitution and What It Means Today* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1946), p. viii.

When we come to the recent past, we stand in our own light and may not see what will be obvious from a longer perspective. But certainly a central focus of constitutional law since World War II has been on problems of what may be called "the urban majority." The census of 1920 revealed that rural America, which from the beginning of the nation had dominated American politics and social values, had become a minority. Since that time white, Protestant, rural America has been on the defensive, seeking to maintain in race, religion and politics its former superiority. Urban America, the new majority, has offered to the Negro the opportunity to escape from the bondage of rural peonage, as it had earlier permitted European immigrants to rise in economic and social status. Urban America has had to develop a tolerance which did not exist in rural America, so that various races and religions could live together in peace. Urban America has needed the political power which would make possible governmental recognition of its staggering problems of housing, transportation, recreation, juvenile delinquency, disease, and social disintegration.

Faced with this challenge, the rural minority could preserve its political power and its social system only by a denial of that equality which had been a major tenet of the American *credo*, though often 'honored in the breach' rather than the observance. Conversely, the drive of the urban majority required the assertion and the practice of equality in race, equality in religion, equality in political power. As Alan Grimes says in his thoughtful book on *Equality in America*, the urban majority has proved to be "a liberating force in American politics, redistributing freedom by equalizing the claims of the contestants." He continues:

> American politics has always made a pragmatic adjustment to its immediate needs, tempering its idealism with expediency. Today, ironically, the imperatives of urban life are making expedient the fulfillment of the historic ideal of equality.[2]

II

The idea of equality indeed has roots deep in Western political thought. It reaches back to the Greek and Roman Stoics and the Christian fathers, and was carried forward by seventeenth and eighteenth century political philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke. The Declaration of Independence announced the "self-evident" truth that "all men are created equal," but no language specifically reflecting egalitarian concern found a place in the Constitution. In fact, that document in several provisions accepted and guaranteed the institution of human slavery.

The idea of equality finally appeared in the Constitution when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, forbidding the states to deny to any person within their jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws." This formulation was conceived primarily as a protection for the newly freed slaves. Justice Miller in *The Slaughter-House Cases*[3] said that this was "the one pervading purpose" of the Civil War amendments. Speaking specifically of the equal protection clause, he doubted very much "whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview" of the clause.

This expectation was doubly confounded. The Court proved very reluctant to use the equal protection clause as an instrument for the protection of the civil rights of the "newly made freemen," and at the same time eager to invent uses for it as a bar to business regulation. Robert J. Harris, in his fine study of the equal protection clause,[4] located some 554 decisions of the Supreme Court up to 1960 in which this provision was invoked and passed upon by the Court. Of these, 426 (77 per cent) dealt with legislation affecting economic interests, while only 78 (14 per cent) concerned state laws allegedly imposing racial discrimination or acts of Congress designed to eliminate it.

The generally low regard in which the equal protection clause was held as late as 1927 is indicated by Justice Holmes's deprecatory characterization of equal protection in *Buck* v. *Bell* as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments."[5] It was not until the early 1930s that the Supreme Court "returned to the Constitution," as Harris puts it, and began the rehabilitation of the equal protection clause in a series of cases dealing with racial discrimination which finally led in 1954 to the epoch-making decision in *Brown* v. *Board of Education*.[6]

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[2] *Equality in America: Religion, Race and the Urban Majority* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964), p. x.

[3] 16 Wall. 36 (1873).

[4] *The Quest for Equality* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1960), p. 59.

[5] 274 U. S. 200 (1927).

[6] 347 U. S. 483 (1954).

In the meantime there had been a tentative exploration on the Court of the possible application of the equal protection clause to legislative districting and apportionment. Serious complaints had accumulated in most of the states as to inequality of population in congressional and state legislative districts. Inequality resulted both from failure to redraw district lines as population changes occurred, and from provisions in many states basing legislative districts on factors other than population. The problem of unequal congressional districts was raised in the 1946 case of *Colegrove* v. *Green,*[7] and three members of the Court asserted there for the first time that equal protection required the election of congressmen from districts generally equal in population. But there was no follow-up on this suggestion. Over the next fifteen years efforts to get the Court to intervene in other kinds of legislative election problems were met, in Harris' words, with "bland unconcern for equitable representation." Consequently it came as a considerable surprise in 1962 when the Court in *Baker* v. *Carr*[8] by a 6 to 2 vote reversed the result of the *Colegrove* case and directed a federal court to hear a challenge to the constitutionality of Tennessee's legislative arrangements, where no reapportionment of seats in the state legislature had taken place since 1901.

While this decision did not indicate what standards the judiciary should apply in passing on complaints about legislative apportionment, that was soon to come. In 1963 the Court in *Gray* v. *Sanders*[9] by a vote of 8 to 1 invalidated the Georgia county unit system of primary elections for statewide offices, a system deliberately designed to give control of the electoral process to rural minorities. The Court held:

> Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote—whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

This was the Court's first approach to the rule of one-man-one-vote. *Gray* v. *Sanders* was not, of course, a legislative apportionment case. But in 1964 the Court held that the same principle covered election of representatives in Congress and the apportionment of seats in the state legislatures. In *Wesberry* v. *Sanders*[10] the Court by a vote of 6 to 3 applied the one-man-one-vote principle to the congressional districts of Georgia, holding that the Constitution had the "plain objective of making equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives." Four months later the rule of one-man-one-vote was responsible for holding unconstitutional the legislatures in no less than fifteen states, as the Court decided *Reynolds* v. *Sims*[11] and fourteen other cases by varying majorities of from six to eight justices. Probably more than forty state legislatures in all are vulnerable to challenge under the principle of *Reynolds* v. *Sims.*

III

The apportionment decisions have been bitterly criticized on many grounds, but there are two basic objections to the constitutional position asserted by the Court. First, it is argued that the equal protection clause has no relevance to and does not control matters of political representation, and consequently that there are no constitutional limits on legislative arrangements. Second, even if there are some limits, it is alleged that they are not judicially enforceable. So this is partly an argument about constitutional standards for apportionment systems, and partly an argument about the proper role of the courts.

Let us examine first the question of constitutional standards. Only Justices Frankfurter and Harlan on the recent Court contend that there are no constitutional limitations on legislative discretion in setting up apportionment arrangements. With Frankfurter's retirement, the Court's position is eight to one against Harlan on this score.

Six members of the Court majority say that the proper standard is one-man-one-vote. In *Wesberry* v. *Sanders* Justice Black derived the principle of equal congressional districts from certain of Madison's statements at the Constitutional Convention and in *The Federalist,* and from the provisions in Article I for the choosing of representatives "by the people of the several States." In *Reynolds* v. *Sims* Chief Justice Warren relied on general principles of representative government and majority rule to support the Court's conclusion that "the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of state legislators." "Legislators represent people, not trees or acres," he said, adding: "To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen."

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[7] 328 U. S. 549 (1946).

[8] 369 U. S. 186 (1962).

[9] 372 U. S. 368 (1963).

[10] 376 U. S. 1 (1964).

[11] 377 U. S. 533 (1964).

Obviously the Court is here creating new law, just as it did in the *Brown* decision. The Court never likes to admit that it is creating new law. In *Brown* the Court had hoped that it could find some support for overruling its precedents in the "intention of the framers," some definite indication of concern with segregated education when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, and so it had asked counsel to undertake research on the historical background of the amendment. But no clear voice spoke from the past, and consequently the Court had to ground its interpretation of equal protection on the "present place" of public education in American life and present psychological knowledge and present standards of morality. In the same way the Court in *Reynolds* v. *Sims* relates equal protection to present concepts of representative government.

It is charged, however, that these are simply the concepts of a "particular political philosophy" which seems wise to the present majority of the Supreme Court, and without constitutional standing. Justices Stewart and Clark deny that the rule of one-man-one-vote can be logically or historically drawn out of the equal protection clause, and they contend that the rule is much too rigid in its effect on systems of representation. Holding every state to the one-man-one-vote rule, they say, would deny "any opportunity for enlightened and progressive innovation in the design of its democratic institutions." The goal of equal protection as they see it is a broader one, "to accommodate within a system of representative government the interests and aspirations of diverse groups of people, without subjecting any group or class to absolute domination by a geographically concentrated or highly organized majority."

This is a rather vague standard. How is one to judge whether it has been achieved? There are two tests, according to Stewart. First, the plan of representation must be "rational," in the light of the state's own characteristics and needs. Second, "the plan must be such as not to permit the systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate of the State." Determining whether a state is meeting this test might seem to require the employment of whole cadres of political scientists, but Stewart suggests that a liberal arrangement for use of the initiative and referendum in approving or reviewing apportionment plans should be regarded as an acceptable guarantee against frustration of the basic principle of majority rule.

Application of this two-fold test led Stewart and Clark to uphold the legislative apportionments of New York, Colorado, Illinois, and Michigan, all of which were condemned by the six-judge majority as violative of one-man-one-vote. In addition, Stewart, but not Clark, would have approved the Ohio apportionment. The Stewart-Clark standard gave the same result as one-man-one-vote in the ten other states which the Court considered in the spring of 1964.[12]

Which of these standards has the better claim to validity? The Stewart-Clark rule of rationality has the pragmatic merit of flexibility. It does not clamp down so strictly on the discretion the states have traditionally exercised in making representation decisions, and consequently it may be more politically acceptable.

By contrast, one-man-one-vote is a rigorous rule. But I believe that it comes closer to summarizing current notions of democracy in representation than any other. For example, the Twentieth Century Fund in 1962 assembled a conference of sixteen distinguished research scholars and political scientists to discuss the problems of legislative apportionment. With only one dissent, they concluded that "the history of democratic institutions points compellingly in the direction of population as the only legitimate basis of representation today."[13]

Moreover, the Court's one-man-one-vote rule may not be as rigorous as it sounds. Chief Justic Warren's opinion in *Reynolds* v. *Sims* specifically disclaimed the intention "to spell out any precise constitutional tests." All that the Court asked was that apportionments be "based substantially on population and the equal-population principle was not diluted in any significant way." He also granted that "a State can rationally consider according political subdivisions some independent representation in at least one body of the state legislature, as long as the basic standard of equality of population among districts is maintained." It therefore appears possible that one-man-one-vote may in practice be tempered by some of the same rationality which is the foundation of the Stewart and Clark approach.

IV

Fortunately for us, however, this comparison of the Court's two standards can be left to another occasion. For present purposes their similarity is more important than their differences. The significant fact is that eight members of the Court, though disagreeing as to the standard, have agreed that the Court must assume responsibility for bringing legislative apportionments under the coverage of the equal protection clause. And the more lenient of the two standards is still strict enough to invalidate ten of the first fifteen state legislatures to which it has been applied.

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[12] In four of these cases, however, Stewart voted to remand for further proceedings.

[13] "One Man-One Vote," The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962, p. 4.

The basic division on the Court, then, is not over standards but over the proper role of the Court in handling political questions. In *Colegrove* v. *Green*, Justice Frankfurter first made the argument that legislative districting and apportionment was a "political thicket" which courts must shun. When he lost this argument in *Baker* v. *Carr*, he had to develop a positive justification for inequality of voting and representation arrangements in order to continue his posture of judicial non-intervention. His argument was that population had never been the sole basis for representation systems, either in the past or the present, and so it could not be part of the concept of equal protection. He presented a long historical review of the various systems of representation, and wound up with the conclusion that there had been "a decided twentieth century trend away from population as the exclusive base of representation." Only twelve state constitutions, he reported, provided for a substantially unqualified application of the population standard for even a single chamber. This appeared to Frankfurter to constitute a conclusive case against one-man-one-vote.

Frankfurter is of course correct on the mathematics. There *has* been a trend away from population as the exclusive base of representation in state legislatures. Such a trend has manifested itself, for example, in the state of Illinois, which affords an interesting commentary on Frankfurter's statistics. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the Illinois Enabling Act of 1818, the Illinois Constitution of 1848, and the present Constitution of 1870 all provided for two houses based on population. From 1818 to 1901 both houses were redistricted fourteen times in conformity with population changes. In 1870 Cook County contained only 14 per cent of the state's population. But by 1900 it had grown to 38 per cent, and 1901 was the last reapportionment that could be put through the legislature, because the population growth of Cook County would have had to be recognized. Efforts to force remapping in the courts failed. Finally, in 1954 a compromise constitutional amendment was presented to the voters—the lower house to be redistricted every ten years on a population basis, the senate to be drawn permanently with area the prime consideration to guarantee downstate control. The amendment was ratified by 87 per cent of Illinois voters.

This is a sample of how Frankfurter's trend was established. It is a trend resulting from rural legislators' persistent refusal to recognize state constitutional requirements and metropolitan expansion, and final acquiescence by city dwellers in permanent under-representation as the price of getting any reapportionment at all. Somehow Frankfurter's trend seems less impressive when put in this light. The principle of representation which his research has discovered is simply the principle that power holders do not willingly give up power.

Since Frankfurter did not recognize this as the operative principle of representation in the twentieth century, he did not have to defend it. But his colleague Justice Harlan did in fact do so in his several opinions. In *Baker* v. *Carr*, supplementing Frankfurter's dissent, he announced that he would not regard it as unconstitutional for a state legislature to conclude (a) "that an existing allocation of senators and representatives constitutes a desirable balance of geographical and demographical representation," or (b) "that in the interest of stability of government it would be best to defer for some future time the redistribution of seats in the state legislature," or (c) that "an electoral imbalance between its rural and urban population" would be desirable "to protect the State's agricultural interests from the sheer weight of numbers of those residing in the cities."

Bear in mind that in *Baker* v. *Carr* the legislature which was making these decisions was a legislature elected from districts drawn in 1901 and not subsequently revised, in defiance of the state constitution. So what Harlan was saying was that legislators representing the state as it was in 1901 could legitimately decide in 1962 that the 1901 balance of geography and demography had been preferable, that the political situation in the state would be more stable if the clock had been stopped in 1901, and that the rural interests as of 1901 could themselves decide, contrary to the state constitution, that they deserved protection against the cities and that it should take the form of keeping city representation in a minority.

Justice Harlan did not even stop with this. In the 1963 case of *Gray* v. *Sanders*, he was, alone on the Court, rash enough to argue that Georgia's county unit caricature of a representation system was not irrational. He said in its defense:

Given the undeniably powerful influence of a state governor on law and policy making, I do not see how it can be deemed irrational for a State to conclude that a candidate for such office should not be one whose choice lies with the numerically superior electoral strength of urban voters. By like token, I cannot consider it irrational for Georgia to apply its County Unit System to the selection of candidates for other statewide offices in order to assure against a predominantly 'city point of view' in the administration of the State's affairs.

The amazing doctrine here announced is that a state can rationally, and therefore lawfully, set up an electoral system under which the governor and other statewide officers must be chosen by the minority because if they represented the majority they might abuse the "legitimate interests" of the minority. By the same logic it could be argued that Negroes, who are in every state a minority more abused than rural interests ever were, could rationally be given the right to control the naming of public officials. Actually, Harlan suggests in his *Baker* dissent that he would accept as rational *any* legislative plan of allotting representatives short of throwing dice.

V

Justice Harlan would have been better advised not to try to find rational excuses for misrepresentation, and simply to confine himself to stating the case against judicial involvement in political questions. He does elaborate on Frankfurter's *Colegrove* reasoning, as in the following statement from the *Wesberry* case:

> What is done today saps the political process. The promise of judicial intervention in matters of this sort cannot but encourage popular inertia in efforts for political reform through the political process, with the inevitable result that the process is itself weakened.

My response is that it is a naive, static view of politics which holds that if the courts do more, the legislature and executive will do less. If the courts act, it is quite possible that they will stimulate others to act. In fact, within four days after the *Wesberry* decision was handed down, the Georgia legislature, its political process not sapped but invigorated, passed a bill redistricting the state's congressional seats for the first tine since 1931 and giving Atlanta the representation in Congress to which it was entitled by population.

The *Wesberry* decision also motivated the House Judiciary Committee to take up a long pending measure drafted by Representative Celler providing that congressional districts must be composed of compact and contiguous territory, varying not more than 15 per cent from the average population of the state's congressional districts.[14] Prospects for eventual passage of the bill are regarded as favorable. Representative William McCulloch (Rep., Ohio) was quoted as saying, when the bill was being considered in committee: "With hindsight, we probably would have been well-advised to have taken some action heretofore."[15] Now that the Supreme Court has said that there is no defense for unequal congressional districting, everyone agrees and the districts are being made equal. But until the Supreme Court acted, there was no legislative action and no prospect of legislative action.

Justice Harlan puts his objection to judicial activism in a somewhat different way when he castigates the "current mistaken view . . . that this Court should 'take the lead' in promoting reform when other branches of government fail to act." Stated this broadly, Harlan's criticism must include the Court's historic accomplishment achieved by "taking the lead" in *Brown* v. *Board of Education*. The Court in 1954 could have decided that ending racial segregation was not a task for them—indeed, not a task for a court at all. The justices could have said, this is a job for Congress, which is specifically authorized by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the equal protection clause by "appropriate legislation." They could have said, this is a job for the President, who has resources for marshalling opinion and providing the leadership and quite possibly the coercion that will be required to make equal protection a reality in many parts of the nation. The *Brown* Court could have said these things—but it did not. It took the lead.

Now, in 1964 the Court has taken the lead to achieve equality in the representative process at the state level. It has taken the lead in demanding that the naked power struggle, which up to the present has determined how state legislatures are composed, be subjected to the rule of law—specifically, equal protection of the laws. The Court has stirred the stagnant waters in the rotten boroughs. It has challenged the beneficiaries of the various systems of malapportionment and underrepresentation to justify if they can their privileged status. The Court has cut through the sophistry that to prevent the problems of rural minorities from being ignored, it is necessary to ignore the problems of urban majorities.

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[14] H. R. 2836, 88th Cong.

[15] *New York Times*, March 19, 1964.

But stirring the waters is not enough, of course, and here is where Justice Harlan's reservations about judicial leadership have some relevance. Courts cannot lead unless some one will follow. The burden of achieving racial integration was too heavy for the courts to bear alone; they needed the executive and legislative assistance they have recently received. Just so the Supreme Court cannot expect to carry through a massive reform of American state legislatures unless there is substantial legislative support for the goals it has announced. It is true that some courts, when reapportionment deadlines imposed on state legislatures have not been met, have themselves carved up a state into legislative districts. But few can be happy to see courts assume such functions, for which they have so little qualification.

The Supreme Court, needing legislative support, must anticipate the possibility that this support may be less than complete. Many proposals for constitutional amendments have been put forward to modify in one respect or another the impact of the Supreme Court decisions on state legislatures. The principal proposal, backed by the Republican Party platform in 1964 and the Republican leadership in Congress, would accept the position that one house must be based on population, but would allow representation in the second house to take into account factors other than population if the people of the state approved in a referendum vote.[16]

If such an amendment were to be adopted, it would be regarded as a rebuff to the Supreme Court. But its adoption would actually require most of the states to revise their legislative apportionments in the direction of greater equality of representation than now exists, and the Court, even with its mandate thus limited, would have been responsible for stimulating the political process to accomplish the most sweeping reform of state legislative composition in American history.

In a very real sense, then, the Court's decision in *Reynolds* v. *Sims* is not an order. It is an opinion offering itself for belief; it is a recommendation proposing action. The Court proposes, but politics disposes.

The Court was justified in taking the lead on reapportionment in state legislatures because no other channels of protest were open to an aggrieved citizenry. The Court was justified in concluding that the stalemate of legislative representation could be broken only by holding one-man-one-vote to be a constitutional mandate. In a nation which is seventy per cent urban, the Court is saying to rurally dominated legislatures that the way to regain the position and prestige the states once had is to establish contact with the real world of the second half of the twentieth century. The Court is opening the way for state legislatures, which all too often have seemed engaged in an organized conspiracy against the future, to play a positive role in dealing with the staggering problems of metropolitan America.

"Courts are not representative bodies," said Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in *Dennis* v. *United States*.[17] "They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society." It is one of the strengths of the American system that this is not necessarily true. Not all elective institutions are representative, and not all representative institutions are elective. Students of public administration have demonstrated how much we rely on the representative character of the American civil service. Now *Brown* and *Baker* have again reminded us that judges who endeavor to speak for the constituency of reason and justice may truly represent the enduring principles of a democratic society.

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[16] In an effort to delay judicial enforcement of the Supreme Court reapportionment decisions until a constitutional amendment could be considered by Congress, several legislative measures were considered in the closing days of the 88th Congress. Senator Everett Dirksen sponsored H.R. 11380 as a rider to the Foreign Aid bill, providing that federal courts may not interfere with the election of state legislatures before January 1, 1966, and that they must allow states "a reasonable opportunity" to reapportion their legislative seats in regular legislative sessions, except in "highly unusual circumstances." Adoption of the rider was prevented by a filibuster, and eventually a compromise was approved in the Senate. It declared the "sense of Congress" that any order of a federal district court concerning apportionment of a state legislature could properly allow the legislature the length of time of its regular session plus thirty days, but no longer than six months, to apportion itself in accordance with the Constitution. House conservatives, angered at the mildness of H.R. 11380 as amended, forced its elimination from the Foreign Aid bill in conference, so the Eighty-eighth Congress adjourned without taking any action relating to the Court's apportionment decisions.

[17] 341 U. S. 494 (1951).

PUBLIC-REGARDINGNESS AS A VALUE PREMISE IN VOTING BEHAVIOR*

James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield
Harvard University

Our concern here is with the nature of the individual's attachment to the body politic and, more particularly, with the value premises underlying the choices made by certain classes of voters. Our hypothesis is that some classes of voters (provisionally defined as "subcultures" constituted on ethnic and income lines) are more disposed than others to rest their choices on some conception of "the public interest" or the "welfare of the community." To say the same thing in another way, the voting behavior of some classes tends to be more public-regarding and less private- (self- or family-) regarding than that of others. To test this hypothesis it is necessary to examine voting behavior in situations where one can say that a certain vote could not have been private-regarding. Local bond and other expenditure referenda present such situations: it is sometimes possible to say that a vote in favor of a particular expenditure proposal is incompatible with a certain voter's self-interest narrowly conceived. If the voter nevertheless casts such a vote and if there is evidence that his vote was not in some sense irrational or accidental, then it must be presumed that his action was based on some conception of "the public interest."

Our first step, accordingly, is to show how much of the behavior in question can, and cannot, be explained on grounds of self-interest alone, narrowly conceived. If all of the data were consistent with the hypothesis that the voter acts as if he were trying to maximize his family income, the inquiry would end right there. In fact, it turns out that many of the data cannot be explained in this way. The question arises, therefore, whether the unexplained residue is purposive or "accidental." We suggest that for the most part it is purposive, and that the voters' purposes arise from their conceptions of "the public interest."

I

We start, then, from the simple—and admittedly implausible—hypothesis that the voter tries to maximize his family income or (the same thing) self-interest narrowly conceived. We assume that the voter estimates in dollars both the benefits that will accrue to him and his family if the proposed public expenditure is made and the amount of the tax that will fall on him in consequence of the expenditure; if the estimated benefit is more than the estimated cost, he votes for the expenditure; if it is less, he votes against it. We assume that all proposed expenditures will confer some benefits on all voters. The benefits conferred on a particular voter are "trivial," however, if the expenditure is for something that the particular voter (and his family) is not likely to use or enjoy. For example, improvement of sidewalks confers trivial benefits on those voters who are not likely to walk on them.

Insofar as behavior is consistent with these assumptions—*i.e.*, insofar as the voter seems to act rationally in pursuit of self-interest narrowly conceived—we consider that no further "explanation" is required. It may be that other, entirely different hypotheses would account for the behavior just as well or better. That possibility is not of concern to us here, however.

No doubt, our assumptions lack realism. No doubt, relatively few voters make a conscious calculation of costs and benefits. Very often the voter has no way of knowing whether a public expenditure proposal will benefit him or not. In only one state which we have examined (Florida) do ballots in municipal referenda specify precisely *which* streets are to be paved or *where* a bridge is to be built. Even if a facility is to serve the whole city (*e.g.*, a zoo, civic center, or county hospital), in most cities the ballot proposition is usually so indefinite that the voter cannot accurately judge either the nature or the amount of the benefits that he would derive from the expenditure. Similarly, it is often difficult or impossible for the voter to estimate even the approximate amount of the tax that will fall upon him in consequence of the expenditure. Some states (*e.g.*, Illinois and California) require that the anticipated cost of each undertaking be listed on the ballot (*e.g.*, "$12,800,000 for sewer improvements"). Of course, even when the total cost if given, the voter must depend on the newspapers to tell, or figure out for himself—if he can—how much it would increase the tax rate and how much the increased tax rate would add to his tax bill. Ohio is the only state we have studied where the voter is told on the ballot how the proposed expenditure will affect the tax rate ("17 cents per $100 valuation for each of two years"). Almost everywhere, most of the expenditure proposals are to be financed from the local property tax. Occasionally, however, a different tax (*e.g.*, the sales tax) or a different tax base (*e.g.*, the county or state rather than the city), is used. In these cases, the voter is likely to find it even harder to estimate how much he will have to pay.

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We may be unrealistic also both in assuming that the voter takes only *money* costs into account (actually he may think that a proposed civic center would be an eyesore) and in assuming that the only money costs he takes into account are *taxes* levied upon him (actually, if he is a renter he may suppose—whether correctly or incorrectly is beside the point—that his landlord will pass a tax increase on to him in a higher rent).

The realism of the assumptions does not really matter. What does matter is their usefulness in predicting the voters' behavior. It is possible that voters may act *as if* they are well informed and disposed to calculate even when in fact they are neither. If we can predict their behavior without going into the question of how much or how well they calculate, so much the better.

II

On the assumptions we have made, one would expect voters who will have no tax levied upon them in consequence of the passage of an expenditure proposal to vote for it even if it will confer only trivial benefits on them. Having nothing to lose by the expenditure and something (however small) to gain, they will favor it. In the *very* low-income[1] wards and precincts of the larger cities a high proportion of the voters are in this position since most local public expenditures are financed from the property tax and the lowest-income people do not own property. We find that in these heavily non-home-owning districts the voters almost invariably support all expenditure proposals. We have examined returns on 35 expenditure proposals passed upon in 20 separate elections in seven cities and have not found a single instance in which this group failed to give a majority in favor of a proposal. Frequently the vote is 75 to 80 per cent in favor; sometimes it is over 90 per cent. The strength of voter support is about the same no matter what the character of the proposed expenditure.[2]

TABLE I. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCENTAGE OF WARD VOTING "YES" AND PERCENTAGE OF DWELLING UNITS OWNER OCCUPIED; VARIOUS ISSUES IN CLEVELAND AND CHICAGO

Issue and Date	Simple Correlation Coefficient (r)
Cleveland (33 wards):	
Administration Building (11/59)	−0.86
County Hospital (11/59)	−0.77
Tuberculosis Hospital (11/59)	−0.79
Court House (11/59)	−0.85
Juvenile Court (11/59)	−0.83
Parks (11/59)	−0.67
Welfare Levy (5/60)	−0.72
Roads and Bridges (11/60)	−0.77
Zoo (11/60)	−0.81
Parks (11/60)	−0.57
Chicago (50 wards):	
County Hospital (1957)	−0.79
Veterans' Bonus (1957)	−0.49
Welfare Building (1958)	−0.67
Street Lights (1959)	−0.83
Municipal Building (1962)	−0.78
Urban Renewal Bonds (1962)	−0.79
Sewers (1962)	−0.79
Street Lights (1962)	−0.81

In all of the elections we have examined, nonhomeowners show more taste for public expenditures that are to be financed from property taxes than do homeowners. Table I shows

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[1] Median family income under $3,000 per year. Needless to say, most voters in this category are Negroes.

[2] The cities and elections examined are:
Cleveland-Cuyahoga County: Nov., 1956; Nov., 1959; May, 1960; Nov., 1960.
Chicago-Cook County: June, 1957; Nov., 1958; Nov., 1959; April, 1962.
Detroit-Wayne County: August, 1960; Feb., 1961; April, 1961; April, 1963.
Kansas City: Nov., 1960; March, 1962.
Los Angeles: Nov., 1962.
Miami: Nov., 1956; May, 1960.
St. Louis: March, 1962; Nov., 1962; March, 1963.

TABLE II. VOTING BEHAVIOR OF FOUR MAJOR ECONOMIC GROUPS COMPARED IN COOK COUNTY

Group	Percent "Yes" Vote	
	County Hospital (1957)	State Welfare Building (1958)
	(%)	(%)
*High Income Homeowners**		
Winnetka	64	76
Wilmette	55	70
Lincolnwood	47	64
Middle Income Homeowners†		
Lansing	30	54
Bellwood	21	55
Brookfield	22	51
Middle Income Renters‡		
Chicago Ward 44	65	71
Chicago Ward 48	61	72
Chicago Ward 49	64	74
Low Income Renters§		
Chicago Ward 2	88	73
Chicago Ward 3	87	76
Chicago Ward 27	87	78

* Three suburbs with highest median family income ($13,200 to $23,200) among all suburbs with 85 percent or more home ownership.

† Three suburbs with lowest median family income ($8,000 to $8,300) among all suburbs with 85 percent or more home ownership.

‡ Three wards with highest median family income ($6,200 to $6,800) among all wards with less than 15 percent home ownership (none of the three wards is more than 4 percent Negro).

§ Three wards with lowest median family income ($3,100 to $4,100) among all wards with less than 15 percent home ownership (Negro population of wards ranges from 59 to 99 percent).

by means of product-moment (Pearsonian r) coefficients of correlation the strength and consistency of this relationship over a wide variety of issues in several elections in Cleveland and Chicago.[3] As one would expect, when an expenditure is to be financed from a source other than the property tax the difference between homeowner and non-homeowner behavior is reduced. This is borne out in Table II in which we have compared wards typical of four major economic groups in Cook County (Illinois) in their voting on two issues: first, a proposal to increase county hospital facilities and, second, a proposal to construct a state welfare building. The measures were alike in that they would benefit only indigents; they were different in that their costs would be assessed against different publics: the hospital was to be paid for from the local property tax, the welfare building from state sources, largely a sales tax. Middle-income homeowners showed themselves very sensitive to this difference; the percentage favoring the state-financed measure was twice that favoring the property-tax-financed one. Low-income renters, on the other hand, preferred the property-tax-financed measure to the state-financed one.

Let us turn now to the behavior of voters who do own property and whose taxes will therefore be increased in consequence of a public expenditure. One might suppose that the more property such a voter has, the less likely it is that he will favor public expenditures. To be sure, certain expenditures confer benefits roughly in proportion to the value of property and some may even confer disproportionate benefits on the more valuable properties; in such cases one would expect large property owners to be as much in favor of expenditures as the small, or more so. Most expenditures, however, confer about the same benefits on large properties as on small, whereas of course the taxes to pay for the expenditure are levied (in theory at least) strictly in proportion to the value of property. The owner of a $30,000 home, for example, probably gets no more bene-



Source of housing data: U. S. Census of housing, 1960. Figure reprinted from Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 238.

FIGURE 1. Relation between percentage voting "yes" on proposition to provide increased county hospital facilities (November 1959) and percentage of dwelling units owner-occupied in the 33 wards of Cleveland.

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[3] The degree of association was also calculated using a nonparametric statistic (Kendall's *tau*). The relationship persists but at lower values. Since we are satisfied that the relationship found by r is not spurious, we have relied on it for the balance of the analysis because of its capacity to produce partial correlation coefficients.

fit from the construction of a new city hall or the expansion of a zoo than does the owner of a $10,000 one; his share of the tax increase is three times as much, however. Very often, indeed, there is an inverse relation between the value of a property and the benefits that accrue to its owner from a public expenditure. The probability is certainly greater that the owner of the $10,000 house will some day use the free county hospital (patronized chiefly by low-income Negroes) than that the owner of the $30,000 house will use it. Since normally the *ratio* of benefits to costs is less favorable the higher the value of the property, one might expect to find a positive correlation between the percentage of "No" votes in a neighborhood and the median value of homes there.

This expectation is not borne out by the facts, however. Table III gives partial correlation coefficients relating the per cent voting "Yes" in the wards of Cleveland and the suburban wards and towns of Cuyahoga County to the median family income in those wards and towns.[4] It shows that the higher the income of a ward or town, the more taste it has for public expenditures of various kinds. That the ratio of benefits to costs declines as income goes up seems to make no difference.[5]

TABLE III. PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME OF WARD AND PERCENTAGE "YES" VOTE ON VARIOUS MEASURES, CLEVELAND AND SUBURBS

Area and Issue	Partial Correlation*
Cleveland (33 wards):	
Administration Building	+0.49
County Hospital	+0.64
Tuberculosis Hospital	+0.57
Court House	+0.49
Juvenile Court	+0.66
Parks	+0.48
Welfare Levy	+0.70
Roads and Bridges	+0.61
Zoo	+0.59
Cuyahoga County Suburbs (90 wards and towns):	
Administration Building	+0.47
County Hospital	+0.54
Tuberculosis Hospital	+0.43
Court House	+0.60
Juvenile Court	+0.59
Parks	+0.52
Welfare Levy	+0.35
Roads and Bridges	+0.60
Zoo	+0.62

* Controlling for proportion of dwelling units owner-occupied.



FIGURE 2. Relation between percentage voting "yes" on proposition to provide additional sewer facilities (1962) and percentage of dwelling units owner-occupied in wards of Chicago.

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[4] Only two measures of tax liability can be got from the Census: median home value and median family income. We have used the latter for the most part. The Census classifies all homes valued at over $25,000 together, thereby collapsing distinctions that are important for us. We think, too, that people are more likely to know their incomes than to know the current market value of their homes, and that therefore the Census information on incomes is more reliable. Finally, in neighborhoods populated mostly by renters, median home values are likely to be unrepresentative of the class character of the neighborhood: this is so, for example, where a few owner-occupied slums exist in a district of luxury apartments.

[5] Other studies which suggest that upper-income groups may have a greater preference for public expenditures than middle-income groups include Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, *Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), ch. v; Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler, *Voting Patterns in a Local Election* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), ch. iii; Richard A. Watson, *The Politics of Urban Change* (Kansas City, Mo.: Community Studies, Inc., 1963), ch. iv; and Robert H. Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and Party in Non-Partisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," this REVIEW, Vol. 57 (September, 1963), p. 591. The Williams-Adrian and Salisbury-Black studies use electoral data; the



Note: Only property owners and their spouses could vote.

Source of housing data: U. S. Census of Housing, 1960.

Figure reprinted from Banfield and Wilson, *City Politics*, p. 239.

FIGURE 3. Relation between percentage voting "yes" on proposition to provide additional flood control facilities (November 1960) and median value of owner-occupied dwelling units in the precincts of Flint, Michigan.

The same pattern appears in a 1960 Flint, Michigan, vote on additional flood control facilities. This is shown graphically in Figure 3. Although there is a considerable dispersion around the line of regression, in general the higher the home value—and accordingly the more the expected tax—the greater the support for the expenditure.[6]

It may be argued that because of the phenomenon of the diminishing marginal utility of money these findings are not really anomalous. The richer a man is, perhaps, the smaller the sacrifice that an additional dollar of taxation represents to him. Thus, even though the well-to-do voter may get no more benefit than the poor one gets and may have to pay a great deal more in taxes, an expenditure proposal may nevertheless be more attractive to him. He may be more willing to pay a dollar for certain benefits than his neighbor is to pay fifty cents because, having much more money than his neighbor, a dollar is worth only a quarter as much to him.

Differences in the value of the dollar to voters at different income levels account in part for the well-to-do voter's relatively strong taste for public expenditures. They can hardly account for it entirely, however. For one thing, they do not rationalize the behavior of those voters who support measures that would give them only trivial benefits while imposing substantial costs upon them. The suburbanite who favors a county hospital for the indigent which he and his family will certainly never use and for which he will be heavily taxed is not acting according to self-interest narrowly conceived no matter how little a dollar is worth to him.

Moreover, if the well-to-do voter places a low value on the dollar when evaluating some expenditure proposals, one would expect him to place the same low value on it when evaluating all others. In fact, he does not seem to do so; indeed, he sometimes appears to place a *higher* value on it than does his less-well-off neighbor. Compare, for example, the behavior of the Cook County (Illinois) suburbanites who voted on a proposal to build a county hospital (an expenditure which would confer only trivial benefits on them and for which they would be taxed in proportion to the value of their property) with the behavior of the same suburbanites who voted on a proposal to give a bonus of $300 to Korean War veterans (an expenditure from which the well-to-do would benefit about as much as the less-well-to-do and for which they would not be taxed disproportionately, since the bonus was to be financed from state, not local, revenues, and the

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Boskoff-Zeigler and Watson studies use survey data. See also Otto A. Davis, "Empirical Evidence of 'Political' Influences Upon the Expenditure and Taxation Policies of Public Schools," Graduate School of Industrial Administration of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, January, 1964 (mimeo), and William C. Birdsall, "Public Finance Allocation Decisions and the Preferences of Citizens: Some Theoretical and Empirical Considerations," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, 1963. A difficulty with the Davis and Birdsall studies is the size (and thus the heterogeneity) of the units of analysis—entire school districts in one case, entire cities in the other.

[6] Michigan is one of the few states which restricts the right to vote on expenditures to property owners and their spouses. Because the Flint returns were tabulated on a precinct basis, demographic data had to be obtained from block rather than tract statistics; since median family income is given only for tracts, median value of owner-occupied homes had to be used.

Possibly the flood control benefits would be distributed roughly in proportion to the value of properties; about this we cannot say. However, it is worth noting that the vote in Flint on other expenditures which presumably would *not* distribute benefits in proportion to the value of properties (*e.g.*, parks) followed the same pattern.

state had neither an income tax nor a corporate profits tax). As Figures 4 and 5 show, the higher the median family income of a voting district, the larger the percentage voting "Yes" on the welfare building (the rank-order correlation was +0.57), but the *smaller* the percentage voting "Yes" on the veterans' bonus (the rank-order correlation was −0.71).

In Cuyahoga County, Ohio, the same thing happened. There the higher the median family income, the larger the percentage voting for all the expenditure proposals except one—a bonus for Korean War veterans. On this one measure there was a correlation of −0.65 between median family income and percentage voting "Yes."

Thus, although it is undoubtedly true that the more dollars a voter has, the more he will pay for a given benefit, the principle does not explain all that needs explaining. When it comes to a veterans' bonus, for example, the opposite principle seems to work: the more dollars the voter has, the fewer he will spend for a given benefit of that sort.

That there is a positive correlation between amount of property owned (or income) and tendency to vote "Yes" does not, of course, imply that a majority of property owners at *any* income level favors expenditures: the correlation would exist even if the highest income voters opposed them, provided that at each lower level of income voters opposed them by ever-larger majorities. In fact, middle-income homeowners often vote against proposals that are approved by both the very poor (renters) and the very well-to-do (owners). Table IV gives a rather typical picture of the response of the various income groups to proposals that are to be financed from the property tax in Cuyahoga County (Ohio).



FIGURE 4. Relation between percentage voting "yes" on proposition to provide increased county hospital facilities (1957) and median family income in the suburban cities and towns of Cook County, Illinois, in which two-thirds or more of the dwelling units are owner-occupied.



FIGURE 5. Relation between percentage voting "yes" on proposition to approve a $300 bonus for veterans of Korean War (1958) and median family income in the suburban cities and towns of Cook County, Illinois, in which two-thirds or more of the dwelling units are owner-occupied.

Not infrequently the highest-income districts support expenditure proposals by very large majorities—indeed, sometimes by majorities approaching those given in the propertyless slums. Table V compares the percentage voting "Yes" in the high-income, high-homeownership precincts of three city-county areas with the percentage of all voters in these areas who voted "Yes."[7] Except for Detroit and

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[7] We isolated all precincts in Census tracts having median family incomes of at least $10,000 a year, with at least 70 percent home ownership

TABLE IV. VOTING BEHAVIOR OF FOUR MAJOR ECONOMIC GROUPS COMPARED IN CUYAHOGA COUNTY

Group	Percent "Yes" Vote	
	County Hospital (1959)	County Court House (1959)
	(%)	(%)
*High-Income Homeowners**		
Pepper Pike	69	47
Beachwood	72	47
Middle-Income Homeowners†		
Olmstead Township	51	28
Garfield Heights (Ward 4)	48	29
Lower-Middle-Income Renters‡		
Cleveland Ward 31	76	66
Low Income Renters§		
Cleveland Ward 11	73	63
Cleveland Ward 17	74	62

* Two suburbs with highest median family income ($15,700 and $19,000) of all suburbs with 85 percent or more home ownership.

† Two suburbs with lowest median family income ($6,800 and $7,000) of all suburbs with 85 percent or more home ownership.

‡ The one ward with less than 15 percent home ownership and which is less than 10 percent Negro (median income: $4,700).

§ Two wards with lowest median family incomes ($3,400 and $3,600) of all wards with less than 15 percent home ownership (Negro population of wards was 90 and 97 percent).

Dade County, where only property owners and their spouses may vote on expenditures, the city-county totals include large numbers of renters. Even so, the high-income precincts are comparatively strong in their support of all expenditures.

III

When we hold constant the percentage of home ownership, percentage of nonwhites, and median family income, a negative correlation appears between the percentage of voters in the wards of Cleveland who are of foreign stock and the percentage of the total vote in those wards that is "Yes." This is shown in Column 1 of Table VI.[8] Of the many foreign stocks in Cleveland, the Poles and Czechs have the strongest distaste for expenditures. Column 2 of Table VI shows how markedly the presence of Poles and Czechs in a voting district affects the "Yes" vote.[9] In the suburbs the correlation

TABLE V. PERCENTAGE VOTING "YES" ON EXPENDITURES IN HOME-OWNING, UPPER-INCOME "OLD-STOCK" PRECINCTS IN VARIOUS COUNTIES

County, Issue, and Date	Percent "Yes" Vote in Upper-Income Precincts	Percent "Yes" Vote in County As a Whole
	(%)	(%)
Detroit-Wayne County		
Sewers (8/60)	83.6	64.3
Increase School tax limit	52.0	39.0
Build Schools (4/63)	52.0	33.4
Increase sales tax (11/60)	78.6	47.8
Kansas City—Jefferson County		
Increase school taxes (11/60)	68.6	54.9
Build jails (3/62)	86.3	78.0
Sewage treatment plant (11/60)	93.2	81.6
Miami-Dade County		
Highways (5/60)	71.2	53.0
Schools (1955)	90.8	92.1

(the central city of Chicago was excepted here), and at least 70 percent of the population third- (or more) generation native born.

[8] A person is of "foreign stock" if he was born abroad or if one or both of his parents was born abroad. We believe that the reason why a significant relationship does not appear for the suburbs is that there is a considerable number of Jews among the foreign stock of the suburbs. In the central city, there are practically no Jews. Like other Jews, Jews of Eastern European origin tend to favor expenditures proposals of all kinds. Their presence in the suburbs, therefore, offsets the "No" vote of the non-Jews of foreign stock.

[9] Since no home-owning ward or town in Cuyahoga County is more than 25 percent Polish-Czech according to the 1960 Census, it may be that no inferences can be drawn from the voting data about Polish-Czech behavior. Three considerations increase our confidence in the possibility of drawing inferences, however. (1) Only first- and second-generation Poles and Czechs are counted as such by the Census, but third- and fourth-generation Poles and Czechs tend to live in the same wards and towns; thus the proportion of the electorate sharing Polish-Czech cultural values (the relevant thing from our standpoint) is considerably larger than the Census figures suggest. (2) When other factors are held constant, even small increases in the number of Poles and Czechs are accompanied by increases in the "No" vote; nothing "explains" this except the hypothesis that the Poles and Czechs make the difference. (3) When we take as the unit for analysis not wards but precincts of a few hundred persons that are known to contain very high proportions of Poles and Czechs, we get the same results. Because we are using ecological, not individual, data, we are

TABLE VI. PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELECTED "ETHNIC" VARIABLES AND PERCENTAGE VOTING "YES" ON EXPENDITURES IN CLEVELAND AND CUYAHOGA COUNTY WARDS AND TOWNS*

Issue	Foreign Stock		Polish-Czech		Negro	
	City	Suburbs	City	Suburbs	City	Suburbs
Admin. Building	−0.40	ns†	−0.54	−0.17	ns	ns
County Hospital	ns	ns	−0.79	−0.40	ns	ns
TB Hospital	ns	−0.22	−0.74	−0.46	ns	ns
Court House	−0.47	ns	−0.58	−0.28	ns	ns
Juvenile Court	−0.46	ns	−0.74	−0.40	ns	ns
Parks (1959)	−0.41	ns	−0.62	−0.31	−0.49	ns
Welfare Levy	−0.58	ns	−0.71	−0.49	ns	ns
Roads and Bridges	−0.48	ns	−0.66	−0.40	ns	ns
Zoo	−0.62	ns	−0.71	−0.40	ns	ns
Parks (1960)	ns	ns	ns	−0.50	ns	ns

* These are partial correlation coefficients derived from a regression analysis in which home ownership, median family income, and two "ethnic" variables have been held constant.

† If the correlations were not significant at the .05 level (Student's *t*), "ns" is entered in the table. The critical values were based on 27 degrees of freedom for the city data and 84 degrees of freedom for the suburban data.

is only slightly weaker, but significant at the .001 level in all but two cases and in these at the .01 level. The complete correlation table shows that in all but three cases the percentage of Poles and Czechs is a more important influence on voting than median family income, and is second in influence only to home ownership. In two of the three exceptional cases, indeed, it was *more* important than home ownership.

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perforce analyzing the behavior of ethnic "ghettos" where ethnic identification and attitudes are probably reinforced. Poles in non-Polish wards, for example, may behave quite differently.

TABLE VII. PERCENTAGE OF VARIOUS "ETHNIC" PRECINCTS VOTING "YES" ON SELECTED EXPENDITURES IN CHICAGO

Ethnic Group and Number of Precincts	Percent Voting "Yes" On:				
	Co. Hosp. (6/57)	Vet's Bonus (11/58)	Urban Renewal (4/62)	City Hall (5/62)	School (4/59)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
*Low Income Renters**					
Negro (22)	84.9	80.2	88.6	82.3	97.8
Irish (6)	61.3	55.3	45.7	46.3	79.4
Polish (26)	60.1	54.6	57.1	53.8	81.8
Middle Income Home-Owners†					
Negro (13)	66.8	54.9	69.6	49.8	88.9
Irish (6)	54.6	44.1	22.0	27.2	64.2
Polish (38)	47.4	40.0	14.6	15.2	58.3

* Average median family income under $6,000 per year; at least two-thirds of all dwelling units renter-occupied.

† Average median family income between $7,500 and $10,000 a year for whites; over $6,000 a year for Negroes. At least 80 percent of all dwelling units owner-occupied.

TABLE VIII. PERCENTAGE OF VARIOUS "ETHNIC" PRECINCTS VOTING "YES" ON SELECTED EXPENDITURES IN CLEVELAND AND CUYAHOGA COUNTY

Ethnic Group and Number of Precincts	Percent Voting "Yes" on:				
	Co. Hosp. (11/59)	Court House (11/59)	Parks (11/59)	Welfare Levy (5/60)	Vet's Bonus (11/56)
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
*Low-Income Renters**					
Negro (16)	78.6	67.3	52.6	85.9	89.9
Italian (10)	68.8	53.3	43.5	49.9	74.8
Polish (6)	54.9	39.9	28.1	33.7	71.6
Middle-Income Home-Owners†					
Negro (8)	68.1	54.0	39.6	73.2	79.2
Italian (7)	59.3	49.7	41.1	56.8	66.8
Polish (12)	52.9	35.8	34.3	46.4	61.7
Upper-Income Home-Owners‡					
Anglo-Saxon (11)	70.6	51.4	57.2	64.8	53.7
Jewish (7)	71.7	47.1	48.4	64.5	56.8

* Average median family income less than $6,000 per year; at least two-thirds of all dwelling units renter-occupied.

† Average median family income between $7,000 and $9,000 a year for whites; over $6,000 a year for Negroes. At least 75 percent of all dwelling units owner-occupied.

‡ Average median family income over $10,000 per year; over 85 percent of all dwelling units owner-occupied.

The findings in Column 3 of Table VI are surprising. We expected a positive correlation between percentage of Negroes and the strength of the "Yes" vote. Deficiencies in the data may possibly account for the absence of any correlation: there are not enough home-owning Negroes or enough very low-income whites in Cleveland to make a really satisfactory matching of wards possible.

In order to get a closer view of ethnic voting it is necessary to forego general correlations and instead to examine individual precincts known to be predominantly of a single ethnic group. In Tables VII and VIII we show how selected "ethnic" precincts belonging to two income and home-ownership classes voted in several elections in the Chicago and Cleveland areas.[10]

There is a remarkable degree of consistency in the influence of both ethnicity and income or home-ownership, whether viewed on an intra- or inter-city basis. In Chicago, for example, the low-income renters in *every* case voted more favorably for expenditures than did the middle-income home-owners of the same ethnic group. Within the same economic class, however, ethnicity makes a striking difference. Low-income Negro renters are in *every* case more enthusiastic by a wide margin about public expenditures than low-income Irish or Polish renters. Middle-income Negro home-owners are in *every* case more enthusiastic about the same proposals than middle-income Irish or Polish home-owners. (In passing it is worth noting that Negroes are two or three times more favorable toward urban renewal—despite the fact that they are commonly the chief victims of land clearance programs—than Irish or Polish voters.)

Essentially the same relationships appear in

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[10] The method by which these precincts were selected is given in the Appendix. Unfortunately, it proved impossible to identify relatively homogeneous precincts typical of other ethnic groups at various income levels and degrees of home-ownership. For example, middle-income Jews tend to be renters, not home owners, and there are practically no low-income Jewish precincts in either city. A complete list of these precincts is available from the authors.

Table VIII for Cleveland-Cuyahoga County. With one exception (Italians voting on the welfare levy), low-income renters in an ethnic group are more favorable to expenditures than middle-income home-owners in the same ethnic group. Low-income Negro renters are the most favorable to all proposals and middle-income Negro home-owners are more favorable to them than are the other middle-income ethnic groups. Aside from the veterans' bonus (a special case), both the "Anglo-Saxon" and the Jewish upper-income home-owners are more favorable to expenditures than any middle-income groups except the Negro.

IV

We have shown both that a considerable proportion of voters, especially in the upper income groups, vote against their self-interest narrowly conceived and that a marked ethnic influence appears in the vote. Now we would like to bring these two findings together under a single explanatory principle.

One such principle—but one we reject—is that the voters in question have acted irrationally (either in not calculating benefits and costs at all or else by making mistakes in their calculations) and that their irrationality is a function of their ethnic status. According to this theory, the low-income Polish renter who votes against expenditures proposals that would cost him nothing and would confer benefits upon him and the high-income Anglo-Saxon or Jewish home-owner who favors expenditures proposals that will cost him heavily without benefitting him would both behave differently if they thought about the matter more or if their information were better.

A more tenable hypothesis, we think, is that voters in some income and ethnic groups are more likely than voters in others to take a public-regarding rather than a narrowly self-interested view of things—*i.e.*, to take the welfare of others, especially that of "the community" into account as an aspect of their own welfare.[11] We offer the additional hypothesis that both the tendency of a voter to take a public-regarding view and the content of that view (*e.g.*, whether or not he thinks a Korean war veterans' bonus is in the public interest) are largely functions of his participation in a subculture that is definable in ethnic and income terms. Each subcultural group, we think, has a more or less distinctive notion of how much a citizen ought to sacrifice for the sake of the community as well as of what the welfare of the community is constituted; in a word, each has its own idea of what justice requires and of the importance of acting justly. According to this hypothesis, the voter is presumed to act rationally; the ends he seeks are not always narrowly self-interested ones, however. On the contrary, depending upon his income and ethnic status they are more or less public-regarding.[12]

That his income status does not by itself determine how public-regarding he is, or what content he gives to the public interest, can be shown from the voting data. As we explained above, generally the higher a home-owner's income the more likely he is to favor expenditures. This is partly—but only partly—because the value of the dollar is usually less to people who have many of them than to people who have few of them. We suggest that it is also because upper-income people tend to be more public-regarding than lower-income people. We do not think that income *per se* has this effect; rather it is the ethnic attributes, or culture, empirically associated with it. It happens that most upper-income voters belong, if not by inheritance then by adoption, to an ethnic group (especially the Anglo-Saxon and the Jewish) that is relatively public-regarding in its outlook; hence ethnic influence on voting is hard to distinguish from income influence.

In the three scatter diagrams which comprise Figure 6 we have tried to distinguish the two kinds of influence. For this figure, we divided all wards and towns of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County in which 85 or more percent of the dwelling units were owner-occupied into three classes according to median home value. Diagram 6a shows the voting where that value was more than $27,000; diagram 6b shows it where it was $19,000–27,000, and diagram 6c shows it where it was less than $19,000. The horizontal and vertical axes are the same for all diagrams; each diagram shows the relationship between the percentage of voters in the ward or town who are Polish-Czech (vertical axis) and the percentage of "Yes" vote on a proposal to expand the zoo (horizontal axis). In the group of wards and towns having the lowest median home value (diagram 6c) the

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[11] *Cf.* Anthony Downs, "The Public Interest: Its Meaning in a Democracy," *Social Research*, Vol. 29 (Spring 1962), pp. 28–29.

[12] The proposition that "subculture" can be defined in ethnic and income terms is highly provisional. We are looking for other and better criteria and we think we may find some. But so far as the present data are concerned, ethnic and income status are all we have.



FIGURE 6. Relation between percentage voting "yes" on proposition to provide additional zoo facilities (1960) and proportion of ward or town population which is of Polish or Czech foreign stock in Cuyahoga County, Ohio; at three median home value levels (only wards and towns with 85 percent or more owner-occupied dwellings used).

presence of Polish-Czech voters made little difference; these wards and towns were about 65 percent against the proposal no matter how many Poles and Czechs lived in them. In both groups of higher home-value wards and towns, however, Poles and Czechs were conspicuously less favorable to the proposal than were the rest of the voters. Among the non-Polish-Czech voters in these higher home-value wards and towns, Anglo-Saxons and Jews were heavily represented; therefore it seems plausible to conclude that, as compared to Poles and Czechs in these two income groups, the Anglo-Saxons and Jews were decidedly public-regarding.

Another interpretation of the behavior of the Poles and Czechs is possible, however. It may be that they had the welfare of the community in view also but defined it differently than did the Anglo-Saxons and the Jews. They may have thought that the particular expenditure proposed, or for that matter all public expenditures, would do the community more harm than good. (This would rationalize the behavior of those low-income renters—see Table VIII—who voted against proposals giving them benefits without any costs.)[13] Whatever may be true of the Poles and Czechs, it seems clear that upper-income Anglo-Saxons, and to a somewhat lesser degree Jews, tend to vote on public-regarding grounds *against* some proposals (notably those, like veterans' bonuses and city employees' pension benefits and pay increases) that they regard as serving "special interests" rather than "the community as a whole."

When we know more about each of the various subcultures—especially about the nature of the individual's attachment to the society, his conception of what is just, and the extent of the obligation he feels to subordinate his interest to that of various others (*e.g.*, the community)—we should doubtless be able to make and test more refined hypotheses about voting behavior.

APPENDIX

We chose the "ethnic" precincts for Tables VII and VIII by inspecting census tract data and then visiting the precincts that appeared to be predominantly of one ethnic group to get confirmatory evidence from well-informed persons and from a view of the neighborhoods. We could have used a less impressionistic method (*e.g.*, counting the proportion of ethnic names on voter registration lists), but since we wanted only to identify precincts that are predominantly of one ethnic group, not to place them on a scale of ethnicity, this did not appear necessary.

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[13] Two other explanations are possible and, in our opinion, plausible. One is that the low-income renters may have taken into account costs to them other than taxes—*e.g.*, the cost, (perhaps monetary) of changes in the neighborhood that would ensue from expenditures. (Irish objections to urban renewal in Chicago may have been due, not to a fear of higher taxes, but to fear of neighborhood "invasion" by Negroes displaced from land clearance projects.) The other is that in these precincts a much higher proportion of renters than of home-owners may have stayed away from the polls. In Cleveland (though not, interestingly, in Chicago) voter turnout is highly correlated with home ownership and almost all white renter precincts have at least a few homeowners in them. Conceivably—we think it unlikely—all those who voted in some "renter" precincts were actually owners.

Having identified the "ethnic" precincts, we divided them into two (sometimes three) income groups on the basis of census data. As we ndicate on the tables, with one exception we used the same cutting points to separate the ncome levels of all ethnic groups. The exception was the Negro. The income distribution among Negroes is so skewed to the low end of the scale that "middle-income" has to be defined differently for Negroes than for whites. We identified "middle-income Negro" precincts by selecting from among all precincts that were at least 85 percent Negro and had an owner-occupancy rate of at least 80 percent those few with the highest median family incomes. Some of these precincts turned out to have median incomes as low as $6,000 a year, which is about $1,000 less than any of the "middle-income white" precincts had. If we had made the cutting point higher, however, we would not have had enough middle-income Negro precincts to work with. In our opinion, Negroes with incomes of $6,000 are about as likely to "feel" middle-income as are whites with incomes of $7,000.

THE "ISMS" IN TOTALITARIANISM

ALEXANDER J. GROTH
University of California, Davis

A major theme in political literature since the nineteen fifties has been a "unitotalitarian" approach to the study of modern dictatorships. The principal totalitarian "isms"—Fascism, Nazism and Communism—have been viewed as examples of one common species, containing no doubt some variations and differences; but practically, or operationally, the divergencies have been thought considerably less important than the similarities.[1] The emphasis has been heavily on the structure and methods underlying the exercise of political control by the "Leader" and the "Party." In what is undoubtedly the outstanding modern study of the subject, Friedrich and Brzezinski have attempted to extrapolate predictive hypotheses from the common pattern of totalitarian dictatorship expressed in a familiar syndrome of six interrelated characteristics.

In 1956 they wrote:[2]

> "The Fascist and Communist systems . . . have shown a continuous, though intermittent, tendency to become more 'totalitarian' . . . . If one extrapolates from the past course of evolution, it seems most likely that the totalitarian dictatorships will continue to become more total, even though the rate of intensification may slow down."

If the prophecy has remained visibly unfulfilled in the case of Soviet Russia, may we not attribute its failure to the method underlying the prediction?

I

The unitotalitarian approach has undoubtedly served a valuable purpose. It has focused attention upon a common range of means employed by modern dictatorships with justified emphasis upon what totalitarians do rather than what they ideologically or propagandistically profess. It has shifted the inquiry from a deceptive point of maximum apparent divergence to one of closest apparent identity.[3] On the other hand, "unitotalitarianism" has had some serious disadvantages.

Preoccupied with structural and outward uniformities it has been less sensitive to the differences, particularly among the respective socio-economic contents of the "isms." It is argued here that a common theoretical framework of totalitarianism for the analysis of systems widely divergent in other respects (social, economic and cultural) is likely to be misleading if the uniformities are construed too broadly and their significance is overemphasized. The problem is in a sense analogous to the development of a political model for such widely differing entities as for example Great Britain, Ceylon, United States, India, and Venezuela on the basis of shared political traits: absence of official ideologies; economies combining private enterprise with government controls; popularly elected legislatures and elective executives; freedom of the press, religion, petition and assembly; the existence of law courts, theoretically and constitutionally independent of the executive; multiplicity of political parties, trade unions and interest groups, etc. It is clear that, though having much in common, the political process in each of these societies is sufficiently distinct and molded by such diverse traditional, cultural, social, economic and religious influences as to render reliance on a single common denominator very dubious. That is, the reliance is dubious if one expects to be able to predict the future course of these entities from the common model, or to understand each through the traits common to all. Such insight would naturally require at least equivalent attention to the underlying differences.

The problem of "totalitarianism" is analogous in this sense. The common traits attributed to Italy and Germany on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other have been n varying degrees and at various times characteristic of all three: official ideology, mass party and leader, terror, monopolistic propaganda, centralized control of the armed forces and the economy, etc. If these regimes—and any others—have in fact shared such characteristics one may certainly be justified in giving them a common classification and in assuming that comparable "inputs," other things being equal, have produced comparable "outputs"—that terror, *e.g.*, has produced widespread fear and thus rendered the given societies in some respects the "same" or "similar."

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[1] Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1959), p. 7: " . . . it is very important to explain [that] the totalitarian dictatorships, Communist and Fascist, are *basically alike.*" *Cf.* William Ebenstein, "The Study of Totalitarianism," *World Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (January 1958), pp. 274–288, and Daniel Bell, "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction of Soviet Behavior in the Social Sciences," *ibid.*, No. 3 (April 1958), pp. 327–356.

[2] Friedrich and Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 6 and *ibid.*, p. 300.

[3] Though that is not to say that the discounting of ideologies as "mere words" or "ritualistic formulas" is helpful or useful. *Cf.* Z. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960), pp. 386–395 for an excellent account.

On the other hand, it goes beyond mere logical deduction or plain reading of the evidence to conclude that what is similar in some respects is similar in all, or that the "similarities" rather than the "differences" offer the best key to the understanding of the working of all these regimes.

While alike in many ways, the regimes of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany may actually offer us few, if any, clues to the future development of Communist states. This will certainly be the case if the "differences" between these regimes are more important operationally than the similarities, particularly with respect to that admittedly very elusive term: "change."

The purpose of this essay is not to explore all the characteristics which differentiate the several "totalitarian" systems. It is rather to focus attention on the socio-economic aspect of the subject, an aspect which is particularly neglected in the "unitotalitarian" interpretation, and one which is certainly crucial to an understanding of the Fascist, Nazi and Soviet states.

Even if one assumes that the political scientist is interested in a very narrowly defined conception of the political process—with a bare minimum of concern for the impact of "politics" for such areas as culture, religion and the economy, and assumes also that political phenomena are "significant" only to the degree that they are manifested in outward behavior, he must nevertheless concern himself not merely with *what* is being done, and *how*, but also with the problem of "*who* does it to *whom*." If we grant that actions have consequences, political techniques must be viewed as inevitably reacting upon their users, and upon the entire political process of which both the "techniques" and the "technicians" are a part. Political techniques, after all, may be used to produce changes which alter the whole group basis of politics. Such changes may ultimately affect the identity of the "rulers" themselves and thereby (if not for other reasons) also the nature of the methods employed as well as a host of other factors. In different contexts similar, even identical, political techniques could very well produce divergent results—and *vice versa*. Hence, the question of context, certainly the problem of the identity of the power holders and the particular distribution of rewards and punishments by them, are no less important than the techniques.

It is not argued here in Marxist fashion that the political structure is either solely or predominantly determined by the socio-economic "substructure." An important reciprocal influence, nevertheless, seems obvious. Friedrich and Brzezinski say, however:[4]

> Such questions as who holds formal title to property, how 'profits,' that is to say, rewards, are determined, and whether former owners and decision makers continue to hold positions, provided they conform to the regime's commands are of relatively minor significance. What is decisive is the overpowering reality of totalitarian control by the dictator and his party.

One might be justified in asking of "minor significance" to whom? The business elite, for example? If the matter is not, after all, of "minor significance" to business, might it not have consequences which the political scientist should find "significant?" The question of *what* is being done is no doubt important but so is the matter of *who* does it. To illustrate, business communities anywhere could not be indifferent to the matter of whether they are to be "in" or "out." There is some evidence that in the past this has influenced their behavior and might under some conditions do so again. On the other hand, was it not of importance to Hitler that the leaders of the armed forces who were similarly under the "overpowering reality of totalitarian control by the dictator and his party" were not, by and large, party men themselves? (Even if allegedly he alone decided whom the armed forces would fight, when they would fight and under what conditions.)

We need to know the group physiognomy of the regime, its impact upon the group structure of the society it rules, and what sorts of changes capable of influencing the social structure the regime sponsors or fosters.[5] Nothing less can give us an understanding of the potentialities for change inherent in any system, notwithstanding the difficulties in gathering evidence.

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[4] Friedrich and Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 211. *Cf.* Peter F. Drucker, *The End of Economic Man* (New York, 1938), p. 149.

[5] *Cf.* David Apter, "A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (November 1958), pp. 221–237, for a general model concerned with "mobility opportunities."

The drawback of the unitotalitarian approach is that it is implicitly indifferent to empirical research on the nature of the "isms" from the standpoint of their differential socio-economic consequences.

The studies of the 'thirties and 'forties, by scholars like Franz Neumann, Gaetano Salvemini, R. A. Brady, C. T. Schmidt, Welk, Sweezy and others (even if sometimes marred by a Marxist bias) could undoubtedly be augmented, enriched and modified from available postwar sources on the Nazi and Fascist dictatorships.[6] They could also be significantly correlated with continually accumulating data on the Soviet and Communist states. Pending further research, however, there is considerable evidence already available for the view that in important respects the Fascist, Nazi and Communist regimes are basically different and that these differences are likely to result in divergent paths of development for Communist as compared with the defunct Fascist and Nazi states.

II

The Communists, wherever they have succeeded in capturing power, have generally undertaken measures directly and indirectly uprooting existing socio-economic elites: the landed nobility, business, large sections of the middle class and the peasantry, as well as the bureaucratic elites, the military, the civil service, the judiciary and the diplomatic corps. They have done this through mass expropriation, expulsion, persecution and, as in the case of Soviet Russia, even through mass slaughter. In the case of the forty-six year old Russian dictatorship it would not be an exaggeration to say that the bureaucratic elites of pre-1917 society had been virtually exterminated by the mid-1930s.[7] In the places of political, economic, administrative and military managers of Russian society before the October Revolution, new personnel had appeared: new both in terms of their physical as well as largely their social identity.[8]

Second, in every instance of Communis seizure of power there has been a significan ideological-propagandistic commitment toward a proletarian or workers' state, particularly to the worker-peasant concept of the ruling Party.[9] This commitment, however tarnished and compromised in everyday practice, has been accompanied by opportunities for upward social mobility for the economically lowest classes, in terms of education and employment which invariably have considerably exceeded the opportunities available under previous regimes. Finally, in every case the Communists have attempted to change basically the character of the economic systems which fell under their sway, typically from an agrarian to an industrial economy.[10]

In this threefold sense, Communist regimes, particularly that of Russia, have been revolutionary. They have been revolutionary not merely to the extent of the changes they effected upon seizure of power but revolutionary also in terms of their long-term social goals and consequences. The "New Soviet Man" emerged from a society rendered, by any standard, vastly more industrialized, urbanized and literate.

Fascism (both in the German and Italian versions) to the extent that it can be judged by its performance in power, was socio-economically a counter-revolutionary movement. Assuming control in periods of social crisis it certainly did not dispossess or annihilate existent socio-economic elites,[11] however thoroughly it tamed them. Quite the contrary.[12] Fascism did not arrest the trend toward monopolistic private concentrations in business but instead augmented this tendency.[13] Fascism did not secure a radical change in the division of national income.[14] On the whole, the status and relative affluence of the small business man, the worker and the poorer farmer *vis à vis* the more privileged social groups could only be described as either stationary or declining.[15]

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[6] See Arthur Schweitzer, *Big Business in the Third Reich* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1964), for an excellent postwar reappraisal.

[7] See, *e.g.*, C. E. Black (ed.), *The Transformation of Russian Society* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960), pp. 235–350.

[8] Although these changes have almost never been accompanied by an increased standard of living for the "stationary" members of the working class, and in many cases have involved a decline. *Cf.* Alex Inkeles and R. A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1961), pp. 33–34, 81–82, 83–84, *e.g.*, see also Alex Inkeles, "Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940–1950," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 15 (August 1950), pp. 465–479. *Cf.* Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (New York, 1957), p. 61.

[9] *Cf.* Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1960), pp. 435–7, 522–6.

[10] See, *e.g.*, Nicolas Spulber, *The Economics of Communist Europe* (New York, 1957), particularly pp. 340, 343. East European increases in industrial output and in the ratio of producers' to consumers' goods, by 1955, even in the case of the already substantially industrialized Czechoslovakia, far exceeded comparable Italian or German efforts prior to 1939.

[11] *Cf.* U. S. Senate Committee on Military Affairs, *Hearings on the Elimination of German Resources for War* (hereafter cited as the Kilgore Hearings), Washington, June–July 1945.

The Fascists did not undertake the wholesale destruction of the existing bureaucracies controlling the apparatus of the state. They required submission and outward conformity to their policies. Undoubtedly, they treated the civil service as a "spoils plum" and, while disposing of "unreliable elements," they added to the existent structures from among their Party supporters. But Conservative and "quietist" elements in the civil service were frequently absorbed into the New Order, both in Italy and in Germany, sometimes by merely formal acceptance of party status.[16] Hence, much of the pre-Fascist apparatus survived Fascist rule.

Persistently, and not surprisingly, the Fascists have been regarded as the militant allies and defenders of besieged reactionary and capitalist interests.[17] In power, the Nazis and the Fascists did not preach egalitarianism nor did they undertake large scale programs which might increase the mobility prospects and opportunities of the lower social strata. On the whole, they followed *status quo* and even retrogressive social policies.[18] The Fascists did not attempt a basic reorientation of the national economy in Italy,[19] and in Germany they did so only when, and insofar as, it promoted rearmament, mainly from 1935 onwards.[20]

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[12] A large body of literature testifying to this point appeared during the 1930s and the Second World War. Outstanding examples were Gaetano Salvemini, *Under the Axe of Fascism* (Victor Gollancz, London, 1936); Franz Neumann, *Behemoth* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1942); R. A. Brady, *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism* (New York, 1937); Maxine Y. Sweezy, *The Structure of the Nazi Economy* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1941); and Carl T. Schmidt, *The Plough and the Sword* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1938). Whatever their Marxist biases and predilections, these works presented a considerable body of factual evidence showing that the social and economic consequences of Fascism were advantageous to the affluent and either relatively or absolutely disadvantageous to workers, small business, and other lower income groups. Before and after the War much, if not all, of this evidence was ignored and discounted despite the fact that corroborating postwar data on the Fascist economic systems had become available. Thus, in rebutting Neumann's 1942 assertion that the Nazi economy was essentially "capitalist," Friedrich and Brzezinski relied on the rather inconclusive evidence of Gunther Reimann's *Vampire Economy* of 1939 but not on the Kilgore Committee Hearings of July 1945, which in some 1600 pages presented evidence gathered directly by U. S. Government research teams after the Nazi defeat. *Cf.* Friedrich and Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

[13] In view of amply documented Fascist policies with respect to land reform, reprivatization of nationalized properties, restrictions on small business, subsidies, taxation, education and many other matters, it is difficult to accept the Friedrich-Brzezinski position (*op. cit.*, p. 8): "It is indeed true that more of the institutions of the preceding liberal and constitutional society survived in the Italian Fascist than in the Russian Communist society. But this is due in part [?] to the fact that no liberal constitutional society preceded Soviet Communism . . . . In Czechoslovakia and in the Soviet Zone in Germany . . . we find precisely such institutions as universities, churches and schools surviving . . . . " Naturally, however, the authors could not extend the parallel to expropriation of landed property or confiscation of industry. *Cf.* Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, *Fascism in Action* (Washington, G.P.O., 1947). On the subject of Fascist subsidies to business, Gaetano Salvemini wrote: "In actual fact, it is the State, *i.e.*, the taxpayer who has become responsible to private enterprise. In Fascist Italy the State pays for the blunders of private enterprise . . . . Profit is private and individual. Loss is public and social." Salvemini, *op. cit.*, p. 416. Undoubtedly, the Fascist economic system was not a free market economy and hence not "capitalist" if one wishes to restrict the use of this term to a *laissez-faire* system. But did it not operate in such a fashion as to preserve in being, and maintain the material rewards of, the existing socio-economic elites?

[14] See Max Ascoli and Arthur Feiler, *Fascism for Whom?* (New York, 1938), p. 255. *Cf.* Kilgore Hearings, *op. cit.*, p. 439. See Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision Makers* (New York, 1954), pp. 48–52, 53–4.

[15] *Cf.*, *e.g.*, Salvemini, *op. cit.*, pp. 182–9; Neumann, *op. cit.*, pp. 434–436; Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp. 159–175.

[16] See, *e.g.*, Karl W. Deutsch and L. J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1959), particularly pp. 80–86. *Cf.* Herman Finer, *Mussolini's Italy* (New York, 1935), pp. 270–271; Max Ascoli (ed.), *The Fall of Mussolini* (New York, 1948), pp. 22–23.

[17] The orthodox Marxist view is a caricature. *Cf.* R. Palme-Dutt, *Fascism and the Social Revolution* (International Publishers, New York, 1935), p. 100: "Fascism . . . is from the onset fostered, nourished, maintained and subsidized by the big bourgeoisie, by the big land-lords, financiers and

Fascism preserved the economic basis of traditional elites in business and agriculture by maintaining both private profit and the right of inheritance. Whatever the nature of the regimentation and controls which the Fascist regimes imposed upon property and property owners, these controls did not spell confiscation and class extinction. Postwar evidence does not indicate, as some thought during and before the Second World War, that the Fascists "cancelled" real profits through such devices as forced loans, bribes and blackmail.[21]

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industrialists." See also John Strachey, *The Menace of Fascism* (Covici Friede, New York, 1933), p. 128.

[18] Thus, *e.g.*, under Fascist rule in Italy university tuition exemptions were abolished in 1933. The number of university students declined from 43,865 in 1920–21 to 27,013 in 1928–29, then increased to an average of about 38,000 for the years 1933–35—thus falling short of totals which had already been reached in 1918–19 and failing to keep up with the expansion of the population. H. R. Marraro, *The New Education in Italy* (S. F. Vanni, New York, 1936), pp. 249, 255, 432. In Germany, the decline under the Nazis was even more precipitous. Mussolini at least strengthened primary and secondary education, though his pace of progress did not match in many respects the 19th Century growth of elementary education in Italy. *Cf.* L. Minio-Paluello, *Education in Fascist Italy* (Oxford University Press, London, 1946), pp. 15, 29, *e.g.* Under Hitler's rule the number of elementary schools declined from 52,959 in 1931 to 49,720 in 1940; the number of full-time teachers from 190,371 to 171,340; enrolment declined from 7,590,466 to 7,327,556. Highly significant from a mobility point of view, the number of university students fell from 95,807 in 1931 to but 39,236 in 1939. The number in higher technical institutes declined from 23,749 to a mere 10,307. By a decree of 1933 only ten per cent of students admitted to universities could be women. R. H. Samuel and R. H. Thomas, *Education and Society in Modern Germany* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1949), pp. 38, 50, 112, 132–33. On the other hand, the Soviets expanded regular secondary and primary school enrolment from 7.9 million before 1917 to 34.6 million in 1939, and from 1940 to 1959 total university enrolment increased from 75,682 to 213,000. Nicholas deWitt, *Education and Professional Employment in the U.S.S.R.* (G.P.O., Washington, 1961), pp. 133, 210.

[19] Considerable evidence on this is supplied by Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (3d ed., Macmillan, London, 1957), and Vera Lutz, *Italy: A Study in Economic Development* (Oxford University Press, London, 1962).

[20] *Cf.* Kilgore Hearings, *op. cit.*, pp. 218–421. Only at the end of 1935 did the ratio of capital goods investment to national income in Germany exceed the boom year of 1928.

[21] On this question a vast amount of evidence remains to be gathered but the actual, tangible consequences of Fascist rule certainly *can* be empirically analyzed. Whether Fascism destroyed or preserved the existing socio-economic order inherited in 1922 and 1933, respectively, can be deduced from comparisons of data on land distribution, occupational structure, the fate of private fortunes and a host of other factors. If some changes could always be expected, anywhere and under any circumstances, and if these changes must, in part, be attributed to causes other than the policies of the Fascist regimes, the results must nevertheless be considered highly significant. See Morris Janowitz, "Social Stratification and Mobility in West Germany," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64 (July 1958), pp. 6–24; *cf.* Deutsch and Edinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–37, 260–265; F. Edding, *The Refugees as a Burden and Stimulus to the West German Economy* (Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1951), p. 56 (Diagram 3). Though data presented in these sources were gathered some years after the War and were complicated by the influx of refugees from East to West Germany, remarkable structural stability between 1939 and 1955 emerges. This stability and the survival of pre-Fascist socio-economic elites are corroborated in a variety of other sources. *Cf.*, *e.g.*, Heinz Abosch, *The Menace of the Miracle* (Collet's, London, 1962), pp. 82–87; Alfred Grosser, *Western Germany* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1955), pp. 95–97. An interesting example of research having potential sample significance is Norbert Muhlen, *The Incredible Krupps* (New York, 1959). Pp. 164–65 are particularly revealing. The author affirms that a "high extent" of both profit and competition was maintained in the Nazi economy but the regime drastically minimized the entrepreneurial share in economic management. See also Samuel and Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 177, on the remarkably stable

Fascism also preserved an important political role for the old elite groups, in both official and socio-economic senses of the word. The representatives of the "established interests" participated both in the shaping and the implementation of political and military policies of the Fascist and Nazi regimes—a far cry from mere regimented subservience and the simple one-way "order-taking" sometimes alleged.

In Germany, Hitler clearly was not anybody's "mere puppet" before or during World War II; but obviously he did not make or implement all of the decisions of the Third Reich either. Nor must we assume that if non-Party influences were subordinated to the Party and the Leader, they were therefore nil.

Despite voluminous evidence to the contrary, a persistent myth, and one of the underlying assumptions of unitotalitarianism has been the notion of overwhelming, one-sided direction and control of the Fascist, and particularly the Nazi, system by the Leader and his Party. The fact that pre-Fascist elites both *could* and *did* play highly important political roles in the Fascist and Nazi regimes is often either denied or completely minimized. The question is certainly one of crucial significance and it cannot be simplified to the query: (a) was Hitler a puppet of the industrialists and the military, or (b) was he an "absolute ruler"? Political processes are not so simple. Friedrich and Brzezinski assert that:

> While the dictatorships of Mussolini and Hitler as well as that of Stalin were intact, there existed no scientifically reliable way of resolving this question, since the testimony of one observer stood flatly opposed to that of another. We are now in a more fortunate position. The documentary evidence clearly shows that Mussolini and Hitler were the actual rulers of their respective countries. Their views were decisive and the power they wielded was "absolute" in a degree perhaps more complete than ever before (*op. cit.*, p. 17).

It would not be inconsistent with any of the postwar accounts of the Fascist systems to argue that Hitler and Mussolini were by far the most important individual decision makers in their respective regimes, but the absolute, all-embracing power of the leaders, whether exercised directly or through their party followers, is mythical. The July 20, 1944 conspiracy in Germany would have been unthinkable and the successful removal of Mussolini in July 1943 likewise impossible, had totalitarian control been monolithic. In 1940 Mussolini did not bother to consult his Fascist Grand Council on Italy's entry into the War but he did consult the King, and the King seriously considered stopping him.[22] Ultimately, as Charles F. Delzell as written:[23]

> The Duce fell chiefly because of his own disastrous foreign policy, for when it became clear that Italy had lost the war, he forfeited the support of the powerful forces (Crown, capital, clergy, army and bureaucracy) which in the past had generally welcomed and benefited from his dictatorship.

Writing of the political role of the German Army, John W. Wheeler-Bennett has said:[24]

> Up to 1938 the Army had been the final arbiter of the political destinies of the Reich. They had first supported, and then condoned the overthrow of, the Republic and had made a major contribution to Hitler's coming to power. They had entered into a pact with the Party in order to preserve their privileged status and influence and had, as a result been guilty of complicity in the Blood Purge of June 20, 1934. Well knowing what they did, they had accepted Hitler as Chief of State and had pledged their loyalty to him personally as their Supreme Commander, always with the reservation that at their own good pleasure they could unmake the Caesar they had made.

Whatever the specific merits of each of these assessments, it is clear that the German Army was not a cipher and that its influence after 1933 in Germany finds no parallel in Soviet experience after 1917, or for that matter in *any* of the Communist states. If the armed forces have been a factor in Soviet politics, they certainly were not the Tsarist armed forces.[25] Such illustrations could be multiplied.

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upper class predominance in German universities from Weimar to the postwar period. On Italy, among other sources, comparisons of landholding patterns from 1930 to 1947 are highly interesting and consonant with the interpretation offered here. *Cf. Fascism In Action*, *op. cit.*, p. 132 and Lutz, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–156. Also S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1960), pp. 22–3. In its impact on socio-economic elites Fascism was apparently a system of totalitarian controls without totalitarian consequences.

[22] Charles F. Delzell, *Mussolini's Enemies* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1961), p. 182. *Cf.* L. Villari, *The Liberation of Italy* (C. C. Nelson, Appleton, Wisconsin, 1959), p. 14.

[23] Delzell, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

[24] *The Nemesis of Power* (Macmillan, London, 1953), p. 694.

[25] In Russia 71.9 per cent of the divisional com-

Postwar Allied inquiry into German economic organization confirmed at least a co-partnership role for leaders of large business firms in the planning and policy-making functions of the German economy.[26] Discussing the pre-war record of Nazism, Arthur Schweitzer writes:[27]

> The party dominated the political and ideological—the main informational and educational—lines of action but was forced to stay out of the military and most of the economic ministries of the state and had to tolerate the military and economic ideals and policies of its allies. The SS controlled the regular and secret police and the instruments of terror but had to abstain from military intelligence and refrain from acting within the spheres of power belonging to the military and to big business. Whereas in fundamental conflicts there prevailed a close partnership between the party and the SS, or between the generals and big business, in daily policy decisions and administrative matters the lines of authority and influence were clearly drawn.

However subordinated to the dictators, the old elites were neither extinguished nor impotent. A significant decision-making role involving a considerable measure of influence, discretion, or delegated authority, and in some instances blunt bargaining power, rested with representatives of elites which were not creatures of the Nazi regime and whose status, influence and outlook owed nothing to the Nazis. The same was true of Italy. The old elites, both bureaucratic and socio-economic, typically looked down upon the Fascist politicians as crude upstarts who may have been useful, or perhaps even indispensable once, but who were certainly not directly identified with the old elites themselves—their "pedigree," their traditions, their values, etc. To these elites, the Fascists were part of a passing scene.

III

In this "coexistence" between the Fascist and pre-Fascist elites lay at once the strength and the weakness of the Hitler and Mussolini brands of totalitarianism. If the Fascist and Nazi managers, party chieftains and administrators represented a new stratum, it was nevertheless a stratum superimposed upon and commingled with the upper layers of an established socio-economic order. The "revolutions" of 1922 and 1933 were as easy as any in history. But the price of power shared with the "pre-revolutionary" elements spelled drastic vulnerability to the Fascists. The displeasure and opposition of some of the old elites endangered the very existence of the Fascist regimes—and the lives of their leaders—when subjected to the ordeal of defeat in war. Certainly the "plots" against Hitler and Mussolini are highly revealing on this point. It was not simply that some of the well established pre-Fascist elements became the sources of anti-Fascist conspiracy. Above all, they had both the *access* to the leaders and the *capability* of wielding the apparatus of the state wherewith to dispose of their dictators. Where the German military narrowly failed (and most accounts agree that their ultimate failure was due not to the simple preponderance of Nazi power confronting them but to lack of group resolution within)[28] the Italian King and his coterie of military and royal supporters succeeded.

In the history of the Soviet regime, despite many well-nigh staggering strains and defeats, no genuine attempt at Stalin's power was ever launched "from the inside."[29] Could it be that the Communist revolution in Russia, more difficult to achieve, had acquired some characteristics of greater durability? In the long run, the answer is probably yes, on grounds analogous to those once advanced by Machiavelli: he who would rule absolutely must remould the society over which he rules. Absolute claims to power cannot be made good without correspondingly absolute sources at one's command. Veto-groups cannot be long tolerated:[30]

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manders and 100 per cent of the corps commanders were Communists in 1928. Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1958), p. 401. *Cf.* I. deSola Pool *et al.*, *Satellite Generals* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1955), p. 4.

[26] Kilgore Hearings, *op. cit.*, pp. 1047, 1064, 1560.

[27] Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 505. *Cf.* also pp. 5–6 and 506–7 for the author's conclusions on these points. Summarizing the experience of the thirties, the author says: "Whether in terms of power or functions, the top Nazi leaders were only occasionally able to influence, and could not lay down, the economic and military policies of the regime", p. 507.

[28] *Cf.* Gerhart Ritter, *The German Resistance* (New York, 1958), pp. 152–155; Constantine Fitzgibbon, *20 July* (New York, 1956), pp. 186–194; see also George K. Romoser, "The Politics of Uncertainty: The German Resistance Movement." *Social Research*, Vol. 31, no. 1 (Spring, 1964) pp. 73–93.

[29] It is assumed here that the "Doctors' Plot" of 1948 was a figment of Stalin's—and MVD's—imagination.

[30] *The Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli*, trans.

> . . . he who proposes to set up a despotism, or what writers call a tyranny, must renovate everything. . . . organize everything in that state afresh; *e.g.*, in its cities to appoint new governors, with new titles and a new authority, the governors themselves being new men; to make the rich poor and the poor rich.

In the upshot of Fascist rule for twelve years in Germany and 22 in Italy the group structures of their respective societies endured remarkably stable and relatively unchanged. None of the traditional economic elite groups had been eliminated or significantly diminished. The have-nots made very few inroads upon the haves.[31]

IV

These facts have great political significance: they provide some elements for a rational understanding of group behavior as well as predictive implications for the respective "isms."

Both internally and externally, Fascism, Nazism and Communism have addressed themselves to, and relied upon, different "clienteles."[32] If we wish to understand what groups and social strata are both potentially and actually providing support for these movements, we must understand something of their image: a compendium of their policies, their ideologies and their propaganda themes. If these movements are "basically alike"[33] why do they appeal to different, rather than to similar or even identical, clienteles?[34] Is it politically "significant" that Communism has actively courted non-white races while Fascism rejected and attacked them? Is it "significant" that Communism has found widespread following among urban workers in several Western European countries, whereas Nazism and Fascism have appealed heavily to the middle and lower-middle classes?

On the other hand, the reciprocal relationships are important also. If the nature of the clientele is largely determined by the nature (or image) of the "ism," it is reasonable to assume that the clientele, in turn, exerts an influence upon the whole framework of institutional, ideological and policy expressions of a given "ism." Clearly the roles of totalitarian leaders cannot be understood apart from the claims and expectations of their followers and the flexibility of leadership, however authoritarian, must always be discounted to some extent by this factor.[35]

Both internal and external constituencies must be taken into account in appraising the nature of a particular "ism." Thus, the "isms" differ not merely in the "facts" which give rise to their being differently perceived. They also differ because of these divergent perceptions themselves, which in turn give rise to different kinds of expectations and claims upon the behavior of the particular regimes. The role of

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L. J. Walker (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950), vol. I, p. 233. Hitler apparently perceived the problem of "unassimilated" and politically significant groups as being a "brake" on his dictatorship. What, if anything, he might have done about this "after the war" is another matter. *Cf. The Goebbels Diaries*, ed. and trans. Louis P. Lochner, (Garden City, New York, 1948), p. 287. Goebbels recalls, *e.g.:* "With a certain bitterness [Hitler] observes he must conduct [the war] with the present corps of generals. But once the war is over he wants to withdraw more than ever from military affairs and again devote himself to things which suit him much more personally. He is deeply shocked at the infidelity of the generals. They are ungrateful. . . . " (March 1943.) And Goebbels himself wrote on November 17, 1943: "I regard it as a cardinal error in the relationship between Party and Wehrmacht that the Party has not had the opportunity and possibility [!] of injecting its ideas into the Army. As a result the Army today is not so dependable as it really ought to be in times of severe strain." p. 515.

[31] *Cf.*, *e.g.*, Leonard Krieger, "The Interregnum in Germany: March–August 1945," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 64, No. 1 (March 1949), pp. 507–532; and Arthur Schweitzer, "On Depression and War," *ibid.*, Vol. 62, No. 3, (September 1947), pp. 321–353.

[32] *Cf.* Daniel Lerner *et al.*, *The Nazi Elite* (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1951), pp. 69–72, 84; Finer, *op. cit.*, pp. 364–376.

[33] Ascoli and Feiler, *op. cit.*, p. 269: "National Socialism must be understood as truly being the present day German version of present-day Russian Bolshevism." *Cf.* R. C. Tucker, "Towards a Comparative Politics of Movement Regimes," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (June 1961), pp. 281–282: "Though the political symbolisms differed in all essentials, the two types of systems were identical." (Before Stalin's death, *i.e.*)

[34] *Cf.* Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, New York, 1960), pp. 131–176.

[35] David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1962), ch. 7, pp. 188–210: " . . . the occupant of a leadership position is the object of expectations on the part of other members of the group—expectations that become stronger as the leadership position becomes more inclusive." (p. 191) and . . . "a leader who changes his norm sharply after the group norm has been established may not be followed by others." (p. 192).

the external constituency may vary widely but it would not be unjustifiable to apply Neustadt's concept of the President's external constituency in an ever greater degree to Khrushchev or Mao than to the President of the United States.[36]

A movement's reputation for being "rightist" may in itself alienate traditionally "leftist" sources of support and *vice versa*. Under certain conditions some groups may be more likely than others to support or oppose the movement; an ordinarily unwelcome choice between "two great evils" may nevertheless be made far more coherently than the possibilities of random selection would indicate. Similarly, the difficult decision to oppose an entrenched regime is also likely to reflect the impact of the regime's policy upon diverse groups and social strata. Before the totalitarian seizure of power in Germany and Italy business and landed interests were on the whole much more favorable to the Nazis and Fascists than toward the Communists.[37] After 1938 in Germany, the military elites provided more anti-Nazi resistance than did the business interests.[38] According to evidence which can be similarly related to regime policies, Soviet peasants oppose the Communist system more strongly than do industrial workers, who in turn are less attached to the system than the new Soviet intelligentsia.

Political loyalties, elite recruitment, group demands on the decision makers and, indeed, the choice and shape of political policies themselves are bound to be seriously influenced by the social and economic characteristics of a society and the socio-economic policies pursued by its rulers. The reorganization of the whole social structure—or its absence—is likely to have far-reaching political consequences for the development of a regime. Stated in terms of an ideal, rather than actual, polarity, the implications of socio-economic development for the totalitarian regimes might be stated as follows:

If "Fascism" or "Nazism" does not basically change the social structure over which it rules, if it does not remake it in a common image, then indeed it has no alternative to the cycle: serious crisis—unrest—insecurity of the regime—increased use of violence and repression—or capitulation.

If "Communism" does change the underlying social structure in the direction of a desired homogeneity, it may in time dispense with the political tool of mass violence, and, even in periods of crisis, rule with the use of subtler methods, closer to persuasion than to physical compulsion.

It is not argued here that the actual, historic differences between Fascism and Nazism on the one hand and Communism on the other have been quite so great. The Russian Communists did not change everything in sight nor did the Fascists and Nazis leave all things as they found them. But, so far as the record of history serves us, the gap or divergence in the socio-economic characteristics of these regimes has been very considerable. Such divergence, even if it be in many respects one of degree (in the area of social mobility, *e.g.*) suggests not "similar" but "different" tendencies of development and therefore, also, "different" rather than "similar" political implications.

If political attitude and behavior are the resultants of a variety of factors of which propaganda, education, coercion, status, religion and income are examples, then a regime which effectively manipulates the greater number of such factors is more "totalitarian" than one which manipulates fewer, and the difference of degree may be ultimately as significant as one between "medicine" and "poison." All other things being equal, the regime with the greater range of means at its command should be able to exercise more effective control and enjoy more flexibility in policy.

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[36] Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York, 1960), p. 7. The Soviet policy of support of Cuba, carried on despite considerable risks of Soviet-United States involvement, appears to have been much influenced by a Sino-Soviet competition for the following of the external Communist constituency. The Stalin-Trotsky power struggle was undoubtedly affected by the "revolutionary fizzle" of the external constituency. The adoption of the Soviet 1936 "democratic" constitution and Italian Fascist adaptations of racism even before World War II also have their "external constituency" aspects, in the sense of efforts made to conform with expectations or claims of kindred groups abroad.

[37] This relative and contingent (crisis-born) preference does not seem to be subject to any serious dispute although the question of precisely how effective and important was the support of business interests, in bringing the Fascist regimes to power, continues controversial and unresolved. Works often cited on both sides of the issue are far from conclusive: L. P. Lochner, *Tycoons and Tyrant* (Chicago, 1954), p. 115–117; Fritz Thyssen, *I Paid Hitler* (New York, 1941), p. xv. *Cf.* Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–149.

[38] *Cf.* Deutsch and Edinger, *op. cit.*, p. 100–103 for some comparisons of the anti-Nazi resistance records of business, trade union, and S.P.D. and C.D.U. elites. *Cf.* Gabriel A. Almond and W. H. Kraus, "The Social Composition of the German Resistance," *The Struggle for Democracy in Germany*, ed. G. A. Almond (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1949), pp. 64–107.

If Fascism and Nazism do not basically restructure the societies over which they rule, and if, because of clientele considerations they are really unable to do so, then despite the framework of terror, propaganda and indoctrination of the Hitler-Jugend and Balilla variety, the "isms" can operate effectively *only* by not making demands which would outrage the class and caste interests, and attitudes, of elites inherited from previous regimes. Where demands for total obedience are pressed upon a highly heterogenous political clientele, violence may indeed prove a frequent and indispensable tool of enforcement for the totalitarian regimes. Where vital interests of the old elites and the new regimes clash, a relapse into a conservative neo-constitutionalism of the Franco variety is highly likely. This could occur either through the more or less voluntary accommodation by the dictator, as in Franco's case after 1940, or through a *coup d'etat* as in Italy in 1943.

Understandably, mass violence and social upheaval were far less characteristic of Fascism and Nazism at the outset of their existence than of Communism, since these regimes did not attempt to modify seriously the socio-economic *status quo;* they were more characteristic of Russian Communism precisely because it sought to change so much. Conversely, however, Fascism never rid itself of the resort to crude violence because it did not sufficiently mold its political clientele. To the end of their existence, both Fascism and Nazism relied heavily on the personnel of the pre-revolutionary elites whose identification with the totalitarian regimes was always conditional. These elites served Hitler and Mussolini only because and insofar as the Nazi or Fascist policies appeared to them useful and unavoidable for the realization of particular objectives: defeat of Communism, maintenance of their own perquisites, the realization of a "Greater Germany," and so on.

It is widely agreed, and there is certainly substantial evidence, that the great majority of these elites in Germany continued to adhere to Hitler's cause, out of conviction or despair, until his defeat. But so long as they shared the political, military and economic apparatus of the German state and remained a pillar of the Nazi movement, they constituted a potentially dangerous element for the dictatorship, a threat requiring constant maintenance of surveillance, terror and repression.

V

Time and war cut short the existence of the totalitarian regimes of Italy and Germany, so that today we could not compare some forty-odd years of development for all three "isms." Would the Nazi and Fascist States have grown more or less "total" had they survived? Would they have tended to approximate more closely or diverge more widely from the older, more "mature" Soviet totalitarianism?

The unitotalitarian approach necessarily suggests that, driven by the common pursuit of power, all three dictatorships were in fact, proceeding in the same direction.

The unitotalitarian scheme interprets the divergent socio-economic policies of the totalitarian regimes as derivative from one pattern, permeated by the same purposes and different mainly, if not exclusively, in terms of their time-table. In comparing the policies of the Communists and Fascists, we find Brzezinski asserting somewhat cryptically that: "Very specific circumstantial factors prevented the Fascist and Nazi regimes from launching similarly large-scale schemes of social reconstruction."[39] An analogy is implied between, on the one hand, the entire period of Fascist rule in Italy from 1922 to 1944, and in Germany from 1933 to 1945, and the 1921–1928 NEP period in Russia on the other. The implication of the analogy is that all totalitarians wish to "change everything" but the revolutionary process requires some tactical pauses for a "consolidation of forces."

The evidence for this proposition rests most heavily, and most plausibly, on the experience of the Second World War. Few authorities would maintain that up to 1939, for example, Soviet Russia and Fascist Italy were equally "totalitarian" even in terms of merely the six specific criteria employed in the Friedrich and Brzezinski study. Yet, as of 1939 only about five years separated the Communist from the Fascist tenure of office. At most, twenty-two years of "Communism" confronted seventeen years of "Fascism"; if, with greater realism, the periods of power are considered from the assumption of effective control over the whole of the respective countries, they are about equal. In terms of displacement of the traditional, pre-revolutionary elites, the comparison of Italy and Russia in the 1930s shows far greater divergences. During all these years it is quite impossible to discover the evidence of Fascism's "dangerous designs on the bastions of wealth and privilege" from its actual accomplishments. And it would require extraordinary artfulness to deduce a menacing attitude toward the socio-economic *status quo* from the official, publicly disseminated Fascist pronouncements during this period. Mussolini's *The Doctrine of Fascism* could hardly be confused with Lenin's *State and Revolution* on this score.

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[39] Z. Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," this REVIEW, Vol. 50 (Sept. 1956), p. 757. *Cf.* Inkeles and Bauer, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

In the case of Germany, the period of pre-war Nazi control, 1933–1939, is somewhat more plausible in comparison with Russian Communist rule for several reasons. First, the Nazi record in terror and brutality quickly appeared to outdo Mussolini's "best efforts." Second, capitalizing on German military traditions and the more sophisticated manipulative apparatus of a highly industrialized state, the Nazi regime presented to the world a much more plausible image of totalitarian unity, cohesion and might. Third, and foremost, the entire period was sufficiently short so that Hitler could always be credited, by the credulous, with not having had enough time to carry through even "further reforms."

In this interpretation, the Roehm Purge was a tactical maneuver analogous to Lenin's tactical repudiation of the Left extremists in the Communist Party of 1921. The Roehm Purge, however, was not preceded by mass expropriation of landlords and *entrepreneurs* in Germany as was NEP in Russia. Nor was it ever followed by such expropriation. And what of Hitler's actual policies with respect to the established elites and elite recruitment? Up until 1938 the Army Generals enjoyed a position of relative autonomy and privilege within the Nazi regime. And the 1938 shift in command was a far cry from the "proletarization," "communization" and "politicization" which the Soviet regime was intensively applying to the Red Army from its inception. Nor was the treatment of the Army Generals an isolated case. The pre-1933 leaders of industry, commerce and agriculture were no closer to either personal or financial liquidation in 1939 than in 1933.

Was the Nazi social revolution to be planned and implemented by the aristocratic, and middle class elites which had patronized the Nationalist Party and other conservative causes? Clearly, these elements would not have favored, let alone spurred, such a revolution. Did Hitler himself advocate a social upheaval? In *Mein Kampf* he was vague and cynical about the Party's "unalterable" 1920 program; but on the other hand, he specifically courted and praised such established interests as the Army and the bureaucracy, and even had some kind words for the Monarchy. If anything, Hitler's own pronouncements after 1925 on such subjects as property and class warfare tended toward increasing socio-economic conservatism, not radicalism. The last major remnants of the Nazi nucleus of social radicalism had, in fact, been purged with Ernst Roehm in 1934. The extirpation of the Jews was genocide, not class warfare.

Admittedly, the Second World War brought about a great intensification of totalitarian controls and terror within the Fascist and Nazi systems, particularly after the July 1944 conspiracy against Hitler. Yet, the conclusion that somehow this increase in totalitarian activity was equivalent to, or even a forerunner of, a social and economic revolution falls far short of available evidence. Unlike the Soviet precedent, Hitler's terror at home was aimed not at whole social classes but at suspected individuals.

The intensification of Party control in the apparatus of the State—political, economic, military—did not have any really new social and economic orientation. The criterion of Nazi attitudes toward actual and potential opposition was loyalty to the Party and to the Fuehrer. But the concept of Party in Nazi Germany, unlike Russia, had no specific class content and orientation. Hence, for all the punitive and "radical" measures taken by the Hitler regime during the war and particularly after 1944, none—except as against Jews—included significant expropriation of landed or major industrial properties, wholesale expulsion of the members of the old nobility or the Junker class from government service, nor even large scale expulsion of non-Party members from important positions in the armed services, provided their loyalties to Hitler were not in any doubt. On the "positive side" there was no attempt during the war to attract the following of the lower class strata by the kind of Party recruitment drives which periodically recur in the Communist movement. There were no tangible, widely publicized legislative and fiscal concessions to the social and economic interests of these classes at the expense of, or even to the apparent disadvantage of, the upper strata.

Until the very last days of his regime, Hitler did not undertake any measures changing the hitherto existing balance between the "haves" and "have-nots" of Germany. In this sense, his totalitarianism did not deeply plough the ground of German society. The record does not support an easily accomplishable "bolshevik about-face" by either of the Axis chiefs; Mussolini's belated, personal attempt at "social radicalism" was one of utter failure and frustration.[40]

Both Hitler and Mussolini obviously attempted to make themselves thoroughly invulnerable and durable through such devices as terror, propaganda and educational indoctrination of the youth. But, hampered by the very constellation of forces which helped them to seize and maintain power, they, unlike the Communists, did not supplement these totalitarian devices with socio-economic measures of equal radicalism (or "totalitarianism"). Hitler effectively outlawed the political organizations of the non-Nazi Right but he did not destroy its social and economic base. Until the very last he was served and surrounded by the Right's former supporters and sympathizers in the General Staff, the bureaucracy, the diplomatic corps and the economy. To move with them involved little risk. To move against them could have been literally fatal as the events of July 1944 very nearly proved.

When the fortunes of war turned against the Fuehrer, neither the Hitler Jugend nor the Gestapo could undo the consequences of Nazism's compromising affiliations—the ominous presence of Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg and others like him in high places. This presence was no accident. Such vulnerability was an intrinsic part of the basic socio-economic design of Fascism and Nazism.

Both regimes failed to carry through the social and economic revolutions which alone could have given them a monopoly on the production of new elites and the suppression of the old. The outward appearance of mastery was compromised by the reality of interdependence and partnership between an old and a new order. Fascism and Nazism alike failed to deal with the economic bases of class antagonism and class differentiation inherited from previous regimes. Each regime imposed the gloss of political and police controls upon societies which, from the standpoint of the distribution of wealth, with all its implications, reflected an inherited old order, not a new one. Without a socio-economic revolution, the Fascist and Nazi dictators could never free themselves of their Rightist associations with all the implicit vulnerability; without it they could not meet most of the traditional demands of the working class and of the clientele of the political Left. In consequence of this failure to revolutionize, the Fascist and Nazi regimes were rendered "brittle," precarious and vulnerable from many quarters. Above all, however, the disaffection of the inherited Rightist elements always represented the most immediate danger to the dictators since these elements were in the best positions of access in the bureaucratic-military apparatus of the two regimes.

VI

It is frequently asserted and implied that the Nazi and Fascist dictatorships could somehow escape the perils of their domestic vulnerability by means of externally directed violence. Might not conquest, and the preparation for conquest abroad, stabilize these regimes internally? Could the pursuit of warfare silence and eliminate domestic conflicts, thus making it unnecessary for the dictators to employ violence at home? Undoubtedly, the policies of the Fascist and Nazi regimes were oriented in this direction. War could produce beneficial, however shortlived, economic consequences at home in terms of increasing employment, wages and profits. It could also mobilize considerable loyalties of national patriotism toward the support of the respective regimes. It likewise provided a more or less "natural" opportunity for these regimes to extend and tighten administrative and police controls. Yet war-making, no less than other enterprises, was bound to involve problems and consequences peculiar to itself. If the war effort were to be accompanied by widespread material and moral deprivations at home, and if it appeared to be doomed to failure, the stresses and strains in the social fabric which the war sought to prevent would be likely to reappear. The elites which were convinced of Hitler's genius in 1940 were unlikely to display equal fervor and conviction in 1943 or 1944. The "monolith" was doomed to show its hidden fissures just as it did in the case of Mussolini's Italy where the war, ironically mocking the dictator's design, proved to be his undoing, not his salvation. The resort to violence became actually more, not less, necessary. Only a very successful and unlikely "Orwellian war of indefinite duration" could have averted such consequences for Fascism and Nazism.

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[40] *Cf.* Z. Brzezinski, "Totalitarianism and Rationality," *loc. cit.*, p. 757: "Nonetheless it is sufficient to read Starace's plans to change the Italian national character or Mussolini's remarks on the need to eradicate the Italian 'softness,' as well as some of the party regulations on daily behavior of the citizen issued in 1938 to realize that such a revolution was being seriously contemplated in Italy. In the case of the Nazis, there is even more ample evidence that the New Order in Europe would have resulted in revolutionary changes in Germany proper, changes highly inimical to the established order. Hitler's war-time conversations and Himmler's plans for the S.S. are full of projects that would have involved radical changes in German society and economy."

On the other hand, the conclusion that the successful termination of war (which in 1940 certainly seemed plausible for the Axis) would have enabled Fascism and Nazism to expand indefinitely war trends and war policies is highly suspect. It does not make allowance for the actual disappearance of the war stimulus, and it assumes (but does not prove) the complete passivity, docility and unimportance of Fascism's, and Nazism's, elite allies. Considerable evidence is to be found for the opposite point of view.[41]

Granted that both dictators realized the difficulty of their position, it is not enough to show that they personally, from time to time, wished for changes. Like all politicians, they faced environmental limitations which circumscribed their ability to act, and these limitations were, in turn, characteristic of the very nature of the movements they both led. If they had won, it would have been far easier for Hitler and Mussolini to maintain, like Franco, an impeccable, albeit authoritarian conservatism than to embark on schemes of radical social upheaval, even if they personally desired such an upheaval. Postwar efforts by either dictator to carry out policies fundamentally hostile to the basic values of the bureaucratic and socio-economic elites upon which both regimes had always depended might well have dislodged the Fascist and Nazi Parties from power. It is not without significance that by Hitler's own choice the last chieftain of the Third Reich was Grand Admiral Doenitz, a representative of the pre-1933 bureaucratic military establishment. The "establishment" proved more durable than the Party and survived the Party.[42]

The assumption that ultimately Italy and Germany would have proved as "reformist" as Russia is based on scant evidence such as face-value acceptance of private remarks made by the embittered Fascist leaders on the verge of defeat and in part on acts and decrees which they issued when both victory and effective control were being irretrievably lost. Given their past performance, their ideological-propagandistic commitments and the constellation of forces supporting them, within and without the Fascist parties, it is difficult to believe that military victory could have made successful social reformers out of Hitler and Mussolini.

On the other hand, the "social engineering" of the Russian communist regime has conferred a remarkable degree of invulnerability upon it. Probably since the 1920s, and certainly since the 1930s, Stalin was beyond the physical reach of any but his own party creatures. In all the later succession conflicts, including the grim Beria episode, the issue has never been "Communism, yes or no;" instead it has been a question of the identity of the leadership and of the nuances of policy. The issues in Germany in 1944 and Italy in 1943 were much more critical than that. In one case, after a rule of 21 years, the Party was ousted from power by the *coup* against the dictator; in the other case it would have been ousted, had the *coup* succeeded.

Thus it would appear that in response to external or internal pressures, the Fascist and Nazi systems were likely to revert through a *coup d'etat* to a more traditional, or *status quo ante* order of society.

Using Soviet Russia as a model of Communism it is obvious, however, that reversion to a *status quo ante* is, and for a very long time has been, precluded: unless the dead be, virtually, recalled. The physical liquidation of one leadership group by another remains a constant, though today probably greatly diminished, possibility; the Communist facade of the regime is far less vulnerable. The key decision makers—military, economic and political—are overwhelmingly Communist themselves, reared in a single political tradition over a span of two generations and on the whole far more homogenous than the Fascists or Nazis in their social background. Formal renunciation of "Communism" would be tantamount to a gratuitous self-repudiation for the members of these elites;[43] this was Khrushchev's difficulty in renouncing Stalinism. It is not suggested here that the development of Russian Communism must necessarily be one toward "more and more freedom" or something akin to a parliamentary democracy on a western model as is sometimes believed.[44] On the contrary, elements indigenous to Russian history, tradition and culture could very well impede such tendencies. What is implied is a transition from overt violence to conditioned, voluntary compliance. Communism, having largely uprooted the old order of society and substituted new elite groups may in time pass on to less overt methods of pressure and manipulation. The Khrushchev regime in Russia was fosterer of this transition.

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[41] F. W. Deakin explores, very instructively, the problem of what *did* happen to Mussolini when he attempted some "social radicalism" in 1944. *The Brutal Friendship* (New York, 1963). See esp. pp. 670–671.

[42] *Cf.* Arthur Schweitzer's conclusion, p. 555.

[43] *Cf.* Fainsod, *op. cit.*, p. 484: "The members of the elite in the final analysis have a vested interest in the perpetuation of the Soviet System."

[44] In 1953 Isaac Deutscher saw three alternatives for future Soviet developments: relapse into Stalinism; military dictatorship, and the most

A note of caution however, is in order. The socio-economic variable, though highly important, is obviously not the only one and its time-table is problematical. Communism in Russia, and internationally, may well fail in the solution of tasks other than the creation of new socio-economically homogeneous elites. It may prove unable, for instance, to establish a homogeneity of national interests and attitudes; national conflicts, as in the Sino-Soviet case, may impede and thwart the processes of socio-economic transformation within the various Communist states, perhaps ultimately even defeating the grand design of Communist "social engineering." Such contingencies, however, should not invalidate or preclude the identification of any important trends evident so far.

On socio-economic grounds alone, the future development of the other Communist states is not really accounted for by the Soviet experience. Important differences must be recognized. Most of the Eastern European nations in 1944 possessed larger upper and middle classes in relation to the rest of their populations than did Russia in 1917. And in no case were the former elite groups subjected to such an intensive process of physical liquidation as happened in the U.S.S.R. in its Revolution, Civil War and collectivization drives. Nor was the process of material expropriation as drastic and swift in all cases as it had been in Russia. Thus Poland today retains a far greater measure of private ownership in both land and industry, 19 years after 1945, than did Russia at the corresponding period in 1936. The Communist parties of all the satellite nations are still largely "pre-revolutionary" in their derivation and have "coopted" many members from the old middle classes and from other political movements.[45] All these factors combine to give them a vulnerability which is still comparable to that of the Fascist regimes, and which could only be removed or minimized by the successful implementation of radical Communist policies over a prolonged period of time. Yet, the stimulus and support for such policies could well depend on the Soviet attitude which has been undergoing profound changes of erosion and relaxation from the Stalinist demand for conformity and militancy among the satellites.

In any event, the "totalitarian" similarities among Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia have not been such as to warrant predictions of the future development of each from a pattern common to all. The characteristics of totalitarianism commonly emphasized during the 1950s are certainly valid and important descriptions so far as they go, at least of Nazi Germany and of Soviet Russia. But the entire construct is too static, narrow and substructurally insensitive to support significant predictions on the future of the presently surviving totalitarian regimes.

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likely: "socialist democracy." *Russia: What Next?* (Oxford University Press, New York), p. 208.

[45] Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, p. 374. *Cf.* Richard F. Staar, *The Communist Party Leadership in Poland* (Georgetown University, Washington, 1961).

HOBBES'S CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION—II

HANNA PITKIN
University of Wisconsin

In chapter sixteen of the *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes develops a quite peculiar concept of representation, which he then applies in the political argument of the rest of the book. He maintains that a man is a representative insofar as he has been authorized, that is, given the right to act. The representative freely exercises this right, while the represented is bound by his action and responsible for it. That this definition is an incomplete account of what representation means, and in what ways it is incomplete, I have tried to show in a previous essay.[1] It remains to demonstrate the relationship between this peculiar, one-sided definition, and the political argument in which it is applied.

In this respect Hobbes's writings present a unique opportunity. For his *Leviathan* is the last of three relatively complete statements of political theory which are almost entirely parallel; but only in the *Leviathan* is the concept of representation introduced. This makes it possible to compare the later work with the two earlier ones, the *Elements of Law* (1640) and *De Cive* (1642), to see whether representation makes any difference.[2] Into what sort of an argument does Hobbes introduce it? What does it replace? What does it change? What, in particular, are the functions of the Hobbesian definition in the argument? What one finds in fact is a rather complex picture. Some of the uses Hobbes makes of the concept rely on his special definition; others rely on precisely those aspects of representation that his special definition omits.[3]

The essential problem to be solved remains unchanged in all three political works. Hobbes wants to explain and justify political obligation, and to do it in so firm and unequivocal a manner as to leave no possibility of anarchy, rebellion or civil war. Being concerned with the nature of political obligation, he is led to ask what the world would be like (is like? was like?) in its absence, in the "state of nature." What becomes crucial, therefore, is the transition from this state of nature to "civil society," in which government and political obligation do exist. That this transition is difficult for Hobbes (as for most contract theorists) is hardly news; the very characteristics which define the absence of society seem to prevent its creation. Natural law may dictate the formation of a commonwealth as the only way to long-range security, but in the war of each against all the only short-range security is selfishness, distrust and the preemptive strike.

This essay attempts to explore various aspects of that difficult transition, showing how each of them culminates for Hobbes in the representation argument of the *Leviathan*. It examines four main strands in the argument: the identification of subjects and sovereign with a single body, the obligation to obedience, the transfer of rights and power, and the duties of the sovereign.

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[1] "Hobbes's Concept of Representation—I," this REVIEW, Vol. 58 (June 1964), pp. 328–340.

[2] The *Elements of Law* was not published until 1650. *De Cive* appeared first in Latin, and was not published in English until 1651, the same year that the *Leviathan* appeared. All references to Hobbes's works in this article are to Sir William Molesworth's edition of the *English Works* (London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longman, 1839–45), henceforth abbreviated *E. W.* The Tönnies edition of the *Elements of Law* (Cambridge University Press, 1928) is more accurate and complete, but does not differ with respect to the passages cited here; hence I cite Molesworth throughout for convenience.

[3] For the purposes of this kind of comparative study, almost all the commentaries on Hobbes suffer from one of two complementary weaknesses. Some choose to ignore temporal *development* in his thought, treating his writings as a single consistent body of material and citing now an early work, now a late one. This is most characteristic of Howard Warrender's *Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1957), but it is also true, for example, of Michael Oakeshott's introduction to his edition of the *Leviathan* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1957).

Others, that do not ignore temporal development, instead tend to overemphasize it, treating certain ideas as radical innovations which had in fact already been introduced in earlier works, perhaps at a different point in the argument. This tendency seems to be more characteristic of continental commentators, such as René Gadave, *Thomas Hobbes* (Toulouse: Ch. Marques, 1907); B. Landry, *Hobbes* (Paris, 1930); Raymond Polin, *Politique et Philosophie chez Thomas Hobbes* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1953); and Ferdinand Tönnies, *Thomas Hobbes* (Stuttgart, Fr. Frommans, 1925).

I. THE IDENTIFICATION OF SUBJECTS AND SOVEREIGN WITH A SINGLE BODY

Hobbes always begins with the distinction between a temporary accord of goals or desires among men (which he calls concord or consent), and a really lasting, permanent *union*.[4] The trouble is that each man is a separate entity, with a separate will. It may sometimes please him to cooperate with his fellows, but sooner or later his desires will conflict with someone else's, so that he is again (and hence, still) in a state of war.[5] A lasting union would be to everyone's long-range advantage; but men are motivated by their immediate needs and goals as they see them. Even if they could all see the advantages of a lasting union at one moment today, what is to prevent them from wanting something else tomorrow? If only each man could turn over his will to a central agency by a single act, like turning in a rifle at the armory! But wills are not like that, and the problem is to create a lasting union despite their ineradicable separateness.[6]

The first solution Hobbes undertakes is that of obedience. In the *Elements*, when men assemble to form a civil society, they do so by covenanting to designate one man or council, whom they will in the future obey.[7] Thus essentially they retain their separate and potentially conflicting wills, but agree not to *act* in accord with them, to act rather in accord with the will of a sovereign. They commit themselves to obeying the sovereign's commands. The obvious question is, what will happen tomorrow, when men find themselves willing one thing but committed to do another? Here Hobbes introduces an enforcing power: the sovereign must have sufficient power to back up the commitment men have made.

In the first place an enforcing power is needed simply to make the covenant binding at all; "covenants agreed upon . . . without erecting of a power of coercion, are no reasonable security"; and consequently "such covenants are of no effect."[8] But there is a second reason necessitating strong sovereign power—a reason derived from the content of the political covenant. What men do when they promise to obey the sovereign's commands is to bind their wills for the future. But for Hobbes the human will is not itself voluntary. It is determined by circumstances and needs and passions; it is merely the last appetite or aversion in deliberation. One cannot promise to will a certain thing tomorrow, because one cannot control what one will will tomorrow. One cannot will to will (any more, says Hobbes, than one can will to will to will).[9] This was also Rousseau's later famous objection to representation: that it is absurd for the will to bind itself for the future.[10] But Hobbes attempts to deal with this absurdity.

The will is determined by circumstances, including for instance the prospect of punishment or reward.[11] Thus, while one cannot promise to will a certain thing tomorrow, one can set up certain circumstances today, that will determine one's will tomorrow. In particular, one can set up an enforcing power so sure and severe, that no one in his right mind would want to disobey it. One can set up machinery which makes the penalty for disobedience so great that disobedience loses all its savor. Thus by establishing a strong sovereign power, men *can*, in effect, commit their wills for the future:

> And though the will of man being not voluntary, but the beginning of voluntary actions, is not subject to deliberation and covenant; yet when a man covenanteth to subject his will to the command of another, he obligeth himself to

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[4] *E. W.*, II, 65, 68; III, 154–7; IV, 119–121.

[5] *Ibid.*, III, 155–6: "For though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavor against a foreign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a war amongst themselves."

[6] "The wills of individuals do not run about inside one another in a sort of fluid ubiquity." James Hogan, *Election and Representation* (Cork University Press, 1945), p. 118.

[7] *E. W.*, IV, 121–2.

[8] *Ibid.*, 129, 91. For a detailed analysis, see Warrender, *op. cit.*, chs. 2–4.

[9] *E. W.*, IV, 69: " . . . a man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite repetition of the word; which is absurd, and insignificant."

[10] Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Le Contrat Social*, in *Oeuvres Complètes* (Paris, Libraire Hachette, 1905–1912), III, 318:

"Le souverain peut bien dire: 'Je veux actuellement ce que veut un tel homme, ou du moins ce qu'il dit vouloir'; mais il ne peut pas dire: 'Ce que cet homme voudra demain, je le voudrai encore'; puisqu'il est absurde que la volonté se donne des chaînes pour l'avenir, et puisqu'il ne dépend d'aucune volonté de consentir à rien de contraire au bien de l'être qui veut. Si donc le peuple promet simplement d'obéir, il se dissout par cet acte, il perd sa qualité de peuple; à l'instant qu'il y a un maître, il n'y a plus de souverain, et dès lors le corps politique est détruit."

[11] *E. W.*, IV, 69–70, 117.

> this, that he resign his strength and means to him, whom he covenanteth to obey. And hereby he that is to command, may by the use of all their means and strength, be able by the terror thereof to frame the will of them all to unity and concord, amongst themselves.[12]

An enforcing power is thus needed to back up the political covenant both because *no* covenant is binding unless there is sufficient security, and because a covenant *to obey* can only mean setting up a power so strong that disobedience becomes psychologically impossible.

But this solution is never a satisfactory one for Hobbes. For one thing, the establishment of a sovereign power with any strength at all presents grave difficulties, as we shall see. But more importantly, it seems doubtful that one could ever establish a punitive power so strong that men would never be seriously tempted to disobey. After all, men in their shortsightedness disobey even God, who is omniscient and whose punishment is the ultimate evil.

As Hobbes's thought develops he turns increasingly away from this initial emphasis on power and obedience, toward a different solution: the idea that one will can in some way represent, or stand for, the wills of others. The idea is nascent in the *Elements*, where the process of forming a union is described thus:

> . . . they allow the wills of the major part of their whole number or the wills of the major part of some certain number of men by them determined and named; or lastly, the will of some one man, *to involve and be taken for* the wills of every man.[13]

But this is a bare beginning. The sovereign still has a single will only if he happens to be a single man. And the passage is a mere aside, in an argument based on power and obedience. The body politic is still "a multitude of men, united as one person, by a common *power*."[14]

In *De Cive*, the body politic has become

> One person, whose will, by the compact of many men, *is to be received for* the will of them all.[15]

For a lasting union, it is necessary that "there be but one will of all men."[16] But again the idea does not reach its full fruition. As Gadave points out, it is still the sovereign's will that is to be received for the will of all; the idea has not yet emerged that each individual wills what the sovereign wills, through him.[17] This is the position reached in the *Leviathan*. There, men authorize one man to act for them; they make themselves owners of his action.[18] This means that when he does something, they are doing it through him; and, in particular, when he wills, they are willing through him. The sovereign becomes the willing-organ of the whole state, as Landry says, "une personnalité qui veut pour les autres."[19] This is why the sovereign is the soul, rather than the head of the great *Leviathan*,

> . . . for it is the soul by which a man hath a will, that is, can either will or nill; so by him who hath the supreme power, and no otherwise, the city hath a will, and can either will or nill.[20]

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[12] *Ibid.*, 122.

[13] *Ibid.*, 127; italics mine.

[14] *Ibid.*, 122 italics mine.

[15] *Ibid.*, II, 69; italics mine.

[16] *Ibid.*, 68.

[17] Gadave, *op cit.*, p. 92: "Hobbes cependant ne prononce pas le mot dans le *De Cive*, parce qu'il n'admet pas encore la chose; sans doute, il dit, bien que 'la volonté de cet homme sera tenue pour celle de tous'; mais c'est en fait, la volonté de cet homme qui s'exerce; c'est son droit à tout qu'il réalise dans les actes de souveraineté. Il n'y aura de représentation véritable que lorsque tout ce que voudra le souverain, c'est chacun des particuliers qui le voudra par son intermédiaire."

[18] *E. W.*, III, 157–8.

[19] Landry, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

[20] *E. W.*, II, 89. This desire of Hobbes's to create a union with but a single will of all, has led many commentators to compare his theory with Rousseau's. See for example, Georges Davy, *Thomas Hobbes et Jean Jacques Rousseau* (Oxford, Clarendon, 1953); Gadave, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–1; Polin, *op. cit.*, p. 233; Tönnies, *op. cit.*, p. 214; Hogan, *op. cit.*, pp. 115–6; Otto von Gierke, *Johannes Althusius* (Breslau: M. and H. Marcus, 1913), pp. 116, 202, 300; Egon Zweig, *Die Lehre vom Pouvoir Constituant* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1909), p. 76; Karl Loewenstein, *Volk und Parlament* (Munich: Dreimasken, 1922), p. 34.

Both theorists are trying to express the idea that the members of a society in some sense participate in that society's rules, even at the moment when they disobey them. But Hobbes is driven more by a search for peace and order, Rousseau by a search for freedom within order.

There are Hobbesian passages which clearly foreshadow the idea of a "real" will, as when he argues that "the will of the people contains within it" the will of each subject (*E. W.*, II, 98; IV, 140). But more characteristically Hobbes differs from Rousseau, just because he does not deny the reality of each man's separate will.

For one thing, Hobbes would not argue that a man can be "forced to be free"; for him, the liberties of the subject are in the silence of the laws

Apparently because he thought a lasting union must have but a single will, Hobbes was led to the concept of "person." And thereby he identified not only each individual member with the whole, but the person of the sovereign with the person of the whole.[21] In the *Leviathan*

> A multitude of men, are made *one* person, when they are by one man, or one person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of the multitude in particular. For it is the *unity* of the representer, not the *unity* of the represented, that maketh the person *one*. And it is the representer that beareth the person, and but one person: and *unity*, cannot otherwise be understood in multitude.[22]

Let us trace the development of this idea. In the *Elements* there are two brief references to the person, apparently made in passing. At one point Hobbes remarks that though corporations have long been regarded as persons in law,

> . . . yet the same hath not been taken notice of in the body of a commonwealth or city, nor have any of those innumerable writers of politics, observed any such union.[23]

And the body politic is defined as "a multitude of men, united *as one person*, by a common power. . . ."[24]

By the publication of *De Cive*, the body politic *is* one person, characterized by a single will (the emphasis having shifted from power to will):

> Now union thus made, is called a city or civil society and also a civil person. For when there is one will of all men, it is to be esteemed for one person; and by the word *one*, it is to be known and distinguished from all particular men, as having its own rights and properties. . . . A *city*, therefore, (that we may define it), is *one person*, whose will, by the compact of many men, is to be received for the will of them all; so as he may use all the power and faculties of each particular person to the maintenance of peace, and for common defense.[25]

The two early works already contain both the idea of the city as person, discussed above, and that of the sovereign as person, but there is a curious ambivalence or hesitancy about taking

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(*Ibid.*, III, 206). One is free to do what is not forbidden. Where there is law, one is no longer free, even if that law was made by one's own will.

In the same vein, Hobbes does not (after all) claim that the criminal has willed his own punishment, but only that he has authorized it (*Ibid.*, III, 160, 163; Oakeshott, *op cit.*, p. lvi). The criminal is no longer free to will on that subject, but of course it is to be expected that he will will; he cannot help it. The subject always has a "natural and very will," even where he has authorized the sovereign to will for him (*E. W.*, IV, 140–1). That is how disobedience is possible, and why Hobbes treats it as an instance of contradiction: "that whereas he first ratified the people's acts in general, he now disalloweth the same of them in particular." (*Ibid.*)

Another important difference lies in the fact that Rousseau's general will "is always right and tends always to the public advantage," and this is *why* it is the citizen's real will, from which he deviates only in error. The general will is impersonal and for the good of all; it constitutes the best solution to any problem.

Hobbes never claims that the sovereign has perfect knowledge, or that his decisions are always the best possible (Oakeshott, *op. cit.*, p. xii). He simply says that it is of overriding importance to all, that decisions be made by a single sovereign. The worst possible condition is anarchy or war, the state of nature, and to escape it one *must* have a single, sovereign will. Thus it is in everyone's long-range interest (Hobbes does *not* say "what everyone 'really' wants") that the sovereign should decide, even where his decision is foolish or partisan or oppressive. Hobbes thus presupposes only one general good: peace and order. Rousseau presupposes a general good on each particular issue.

But I think that Carl Friedrich distorts Hobbes's view on this point when he says that for Hobbes "The preservation of order by a monocrat, be he ever so tyrannical, is truly representation of the people simply because the desire for order is known to be a basic desire resulting from man's primordial fear of his fellows"; *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston, 1950), p. 263. If that were so, no authorization would be necessary at all.

Of course, Rousseau also rejects the very representation that Hobbes embraces.

[21] This further step is another way in which Rousseau departs from Hobbes. For Rousseau would say that at the moment the people are assembled to designate a sovereign, they are in fact the supreme power in the community. "And if this is true, it seemed incredible to Rousseau that those who hold this power should give it up without qualification or condition"; Charles Frankel, "Introduction" to his edition of *The Social Contract* (New York, Hafner, 1951), p. xxiii. See also note 32, below.

[22] *E. W.*, III, 151.

[23] *Ibid.*, IV, 207.

[24] *Ibid.*, 122; italics mine.

[25] *Ibid.*, II, 69.

the final step of connecting the two. The last sentence of the above quotation, for example, leaves unclear whether it is the will of the sovereign, or simply the will of the city which "is to be received for the will of them all"; nor does Hobbes yet explicitly identify the two. This has prompted Polin, for example, to say of *De Cive*, "all the elements of the Hobbesian solution are henceforth assembled. It remains only for the *Leviathan* to set them in order."[26]

Oddly enough, the connection between the sovereign as person and the city as person, which does not appear in the main argument until the *Leviathan*, is foreshadowed in the earlier works by Hobbes's distinction between a multitude and a People. In the *Elements* he juxtaposes, on the one hand, a mere multitude living in a single geographic area, and, on the other hand, the people as,

> . . . a person civil, *that is to say,* either one man, or one council, in the will whereof, is included and involved the will of every one in particular.[27]

Here one has, then, an identity between "the people" in the unitary sense, "a person civil," and the man or council that is the sovereign. Hobbes uses this distinction to argue that the people, collectively, cannot rebel or make demands. Individuals, and groups of individuals can do so, but always only *as* individuals. But when the people is a single body politic, "he or they that have the sovereign power, doth for them all, demand. . . . "[28] Hence the people, collectively, cannot rebel because it would be rebelling against itself. It can act as a collectivity only *through* the sovereign, hence never *against* the sovereign. This leads, after a similar discussion in *De Cive*, to the conclusion that the people rules in all governments, and to the paradox that in a monarchy the king is the people.[29]

Hobbes obviously is still confused about these arguments, and does not apply them in his main account of the founding of the state. In *De Cive*, only two paragraphs after defining a city as one person, he fails to define the sovereign as a person, or to establish any correspondence between it and the person of the city.[30] Similarly, in the founding of the state, the people is one person only long enough to hand over power to the sovereign, and then is again dissolved into a multitude.[31] Indeed, Hobbes here seems to regard this argument as a necessary safeguard against revolution. If the people as a collective entity continued to exist after appointing a sovereign, it might claim that it could take away his sovereignty whenever it wanted to.[32] But to say the people as a single person ceases to exist as soon as a sovereign is appointed is clearly the exact opposite of the earlier argument: that the people can be one person, can act, only *through* a sovereign. Thus one can safely say that the matter was not yet clear or unequivocal in Hobbes's mind at the writing of *De Cive.*

Polin attempts to trace, in Hobbes' correspondence with Sorbières, who translated *De Cive* into French, the point at which the people as person is first referred to as a "public person."[33] At any rate, it must have been some time between the first publication of *De Cive* and that of the *Leviathan* that these ideas were finally clarified; and the *Leviathan* shows that this clarification was achieved through the idea of representation.

In the *Leviathan* a multitude can be unified, can be considered as a unit only when it is represented by one man (or group), when all the members of the multitude have agreed that he should act, speak, will for them.[34] The representative himself is also a person, an artificial person, authorized by each member of the multitude he represents. The person of the sovereign represents the person of the commonwealth; they have but a single will. The commonwealth exists only through his will and action, which have been authorized by each individual.

It is only with the introduction of his idea of representation that Hobbes is able to use the idea of the person to explain the founding of the commonwealth. Only then is the identification of wills, which had been so troubling, completed. When the sovereign wills, the commonwealth wills, and so does each member of it. Hence there is a true, lasting union with only a single will. Conflict is no longer possible, because conflict can occur only where there is more than one will.

The solution is, of course, purely formal; but then, so is the problem Hobbes sets himself. He is not looking for practical ways to resolve conflicts or to make men aware of their common interests. Even a small amount of conflict remaining is intolerable because it means one has not really left the state of war. Hence, what Hobbes wants is a way to rule out conflict altogether; that the solution should be formal is a foregone conclusion.

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[26] *Op. cit.*, p. 237.

[27] *E. W.*, IV, 146; italics mine.

[28] *Ibid.*, 147.

[29] *Ibid.*, II, 158.

[30] *Ibid.*, 70.

[31] *Ibid.*, 99–100.

[32] That the people ceases to exist as soon as it appoints a sovereign is, Rousseau's objection to representative government: "Le peuple anglois pense être libre, il se tromp fort; il ne l'est que durant l'élection des membres du parlement: sitôt qu'ils sont élus, il est esclave, *il n'est rien.* . . .

"Quoi qu'il en soit, à l'instant qu'un peuple se donne des représentants, il n'est plus libre; il n'est plus." *Op. cit.*, pp. 361–2.

[33] *Op. cit.*, p. 236n.

[34] *E. W.*, III, 151.

II. THE OBLIGATION TO OBEDIENCE

In the state of nature, men are subject only to the law of nature and whatever kind of obligations it imposes on them.[35] In addition, they may take obligations on themselves, mainly by the device of contracts with other men. Since the law of nature does not include such specific directives as "obey the King of England," much less "obey policemen, post office clerks and the Internal Revenue Service," such obligations must arise out of a contract, or group of contracts. In particular, Hobbes speaks of a "covenant," a kind of contract in which one or both parties are trusted to perform in the future. Evidently, it is from a covenant that political obligation must arise, yet the covenant as a source of political obligation is never satisfactory. In the later works it declines in importance, until it is finally almost replaced by representation.

In the *Elements*, a permanent union is made when

> . . . every man by covenant oblige[s] himself to some one and the same man, or to one and the same council, by them all named and determined, to do those actions which the said man or council shall command them to do. . . .[36]

This sounds as if the covenant is between the sovereign (man or council) and each of his subjects, since the obligation established is *to* the sovereign. But such a covenant would be intolerable to Hobbes, and is not what he means. It would be intolerable because a contract implies the existence of *mutual* obligations, and consequently of some obligations of the sovereign to his subjects. And non-fulfillment of these obligations might be construed as a breach of the contract, and grounds for revolt or civil disobedience. What Hobbes argues explicitly is that no contract can be made with the sovereign because there is no sovereign until after the contracts have been made; before that there is only a multitude of separate men who can only contract with each other. And *that* is what they do. But if it is a matter of contracts of "every man with every man," one would suppose that each man acquires obligations to his fellow-subjects; he has an obligation to the other party in each contract, and the *content* of this obligation is to obey the sovereign. Yet Hobbes speaks in the earlier passage of an obligation *to* the sovereign, and this is a line of thought that continues to trouble him.

In *De Cive* the covenant of each man with every other again forms the bridge to civil society by establishing sovereignty. Each man contracts thus: "I convey my right on this party, upon condition that you pass yours to the same."[37] But now Hobbes speaks of a "double obligation" of the citizens, both to their fellow citizens with whom they contract, and to the sovereign who is the non-contracting beneficiary of the transfer of rights. This dual obligation seems necessary to Hobbes because mutual obligations among the citizens do not seem a sufficient guarantee against insurrection. If all the citizens agreed to it, they could release each other from their mutual obligations and, for instance, appoint a new sovereign at any time:

> Forasmuch as the supreme command is constituted by virtue of the compacts which each single citizen or subject mutually makes with the other; but all contracts, as they receive their force from the contractors, so by their consent they lose it again and are broken: perhaps some may infer hence, that by the consent of all the subjects together the supreme authority may be wholly taken away.[38]

Since this conclusion is inadmissible, there is need for the "double obligation." But under the contractual scheme such an obligation *to* the sovereign is difficult to justify, as Warrender points out.[39] A second contract with the sovereign is out of the question. And if Hobbes had altered his doctrine concerning covenants to allow them to create obligations to non-contracting third parties, he would have run into other serious logical difficulties. Warrender suggests one solution by reference to the law of nature: once a sovereign is established one is obliged to obey him not only because of the covenant but also because one must try to preserve peace wherever possible. Even such an obligation, however, would not constitute obligation *to* the sovereign. It is representation which eventually provides Hobbes with an alternative solution to the dilemma.

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[35] The questions whether the laws of nature oblige, whether there is any obligation in the state of nature at all, and if so, what sort of obligations these are, are the most difficult arising out of Hobbes's thought. The fact is that Hobbes says contradictory things on these subjects. Warrender (*op. cit.*, part I) does by far the best job of welding the contradictions into a single, consistent body of doctrine; but by its very neatness the result is no longer quite faithful to Hobbes. It may be that Hobbes intended his inconsistencies, or it may be that he was not aware of them as such; I incline to the latter view.

[36] *E. W.*, IV, 121–2.

[37] *Ibid.*, II, 91.

[38] *Ibid.*, 89–90.

[39] *Op. cit.*, pp. 134–8. Warrender is apparently unaware that authorization performs any particular functions in this respect; see note 77, below.

The development of the representative idea is foreshadowed by a shift in Hobbes's interest from the act of covenanting to the act of designating a sovereign.[40] In the *Elements* it is still the mutual covenants of each man with every other that create the state, by appointing "the major part" of their number as sovereign.[41] Thus democracy as a form of government precedes every other. In *De Cive*, however, the mutual convenanting precedes the first assembly, and does not of itself create the state. Again the covenant is to an acceptance of majority rule in this primary assembly, but the assembly is not yet a civil society and its major part is not yet a sovereign. It is only an agency for the appointment of a sovereign, and only *after* it has acted can the state be said to exist. Thus in *De Cive* the primary assembly is "*almost* a democracy," since the danger remains that the assembly may adjourn without naming its next "official" meeting time and place, hence without appointing a sovereign or creating a state.[42] It is the act of designating a sovereign, and not the covenant, that really brings the civil society into being. And in the *Leviathan* this trend continues, with mere membership in the assembly constituting a "tacit" covenanting with the rest. When the majority of the assembly has designated a sovereign,

> . . . he that dissented must now consent with the rest . . . for if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore tacitly covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne. . . . [43]

Two developments seem to be taking place here: the act of covenanting is becoming less vivid and central, receding into mere attendance at the assembly.[44] At the same time, the action of the assembly—the designation of a sovereign—emerges as the real moment of the creation of the state. In the *Leviathan* the covenant has largely been replaced by an act of authorization. The new text of the covenant gives evidence of the change. For every man says to every other,

> I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.[45]

But this no longer sounds very much like a contract, a bilateral exchange of rights. As Tönnies points out, it is simply an act of authorization thinly disguised in contract clothing.[46] And Tussman argues that Hobbes

> . . . is a critic of the contract who finally arrives at a clearly enunciated alternative theory of representative government.[47]

Yet the contract is retained even in the *Leviathan;* the act of authorization is still accomplished by mutual covenants among the subjects-to-be. The subject's obligation to obey is still, in the last analysis, a contractual obligation; only because the contract binds does the authorization bind. This situation results from the kind of state of nature Hobbes postulated.

For in the state of nature there are only two sources of obligation: the law of nature, and obligations taken upon themselves by individuals. Such self-obligation ordinarily takes place by contract, a mutual exchange of rights or assumption of obligations. Hobbes does recognize the possibility of a unilateral transfer of rights or assumption of obligations, which he calls free gift. But free gift plays a very minor role for him; and, more important, it does not always oblige.[48] Nor, one imagines, would Hobbes be satisfied to describe the transfer of rights or the promise to obey the sovereign as a free gift. First, the notion simply does not carry the same weight of obligation as that of mutual exchange of rights. And besides the subject does stand to gain by setting up civil society, through peace and order; and this *quid pro quo* should somehow reinforce his commitment to obey.

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[40] I owe this in sight to Tönnies, *op. cit.*, pp. 302–5.

[41] *E. W.*, IV, 127–8, 138–9.

[42] *Ibid.*, II, 96–7.

[43] *Ibid.*, III, 162.

[44] Compare Joseph Tussman, "The Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1947, p. 96.

[45] *E. W.*, III, 158.

[46] "Schon die ungrammatische Form verräthier, dass der Gedanke der Vertretung überwiegen will, aber nicht völlig durchgedrungen ist." *Op. cit.*, p. 303.

[47] "Political Theory," p. 96. Compare also his *Obligation and the Body Politic* (New York, 1960), p. 59.

[48] Warrender, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

Authorization and representation are themselves concepts which contain, as part of their meaning, certain obligations. Our understanding of such meanings and such obligations is part of our social selves; we acquire it "from our society" as we grow. Hence Hobbes could not utilize the binding force of these obligations directly, because he had postulated them out of the state of nature. The state of nature is a presocial state, an obligation-free state, except for the laws of nature. And the laws of nature provide for contract, but not for authorization or representation. Thus the formula of contract has to be retained, even in the *Leviathan*.

As Hume long ago pointed out, there is no reason to suppose that any obligation, even the obligation to keep a contract (indeed, even the notion of contract) could have existed before society.[49] But this is the supposition Hobbes makes. To suppose that authorization, representation and other such social practices also preceded the existence of society would be too much. But it is the authorization view of representation that really satisfies the need of Hobbes's argument for a self-assumed, unilateral obligation to the sovereign. It has to be self-assumed because of the way the state of nature is defined; it has to be unilateral because only then does it seem sufficiently strong and irrevocable. Again, Hobbes handles the problem as a purely logical one.

III. THE TRANSFER OF RIGHTS AND POWER

If one might say of the previous section that authorization reintroduces "by the back door" a certain kind of obligation which Hobbes needed but had not built into his state of nature, a very similar conclusion is true of the transfer of rights and power to the sovereign. The contract itself is defined as a transfer of rights. And Hobbes always insists that the founding of civil society requires also the establishment of a central power, the concentration of power in the hands of the sovereign. Thus the transfer of both rights and power is essential to the contractarian argument. Yet it gives Hobbes considerable trouble, and he finds repeatedly that the subjects do not have much to transfer to the sovereign, and cannot "really" transfer it anyway.

We have seen that the sovereign must somehow be given power, both because covenants do not oblige except in conditions of reasonable security, and because of what it means to commit one's will for the future. Thus a civil society is defined, in the *Elements*, as "a multitude of men united as one person by a common *power*"[50] Apparently this power of the sovereign must be very great—great enough to create security, great enough to inspire such fear of punishment that no one in his right mind could *want* to disobey. The sovereign's power must enable him "by the terror thereof, to frame the will of them all to unity and concord, amongst themselves."[51] In fact, it would seem that the sovereign's power must exceed that of any group of his subjects who might attempt to rebel; perhaps it should ideally be as great as the strength of all his subjects put together. Such a sovereign could truly provide Hobbesian security.

Where is this essential power of the sovereign to come from? It "consisteth in the power and strength, that every of the members have transferred to him from themselves by covenant."[52] This does indeed sound promising; if each man turns over his own strength in setting up society, not only will the power at the sovereign's disposal be equal to the sum of the strength of all, but no subject will have any strength or power left with which to disobey. But, alas, things are not so simple. Hobbes is consistently bothered (and rightly so) by the fact that one man cannot "really" give his strength to another. The problem is similar to that of men's unalterably separate wills. Men cannot relinquish their strength and power into the hands of one man in the same way that they could each pour his private supply of water into a common vat, or turn in his rifle at a community armory.[53] The most they can ever do is to put their strength at the disposal of the sovereign. But this, again, involves a commitment as to future conduct, and threatens to leave the sovereign without sufficient enforcement power just when he needs it most: when a large group of his subjects are tempted to disobey or revolt.

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[49] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Everyman's ed.; New York, 1920, Bk. III, part iii, sec. 8; see also his "Of the Original Contract," in *The Social Contract*, Sir Ernest Barker, ed. (New York, 1960), p. 161.

Nor is Hume's criticism obviated by saying Hobbes's doctrine is a logical rather than an historical one. Why logically assume away authorization but leave men with contract? Why is the one more "natural" than the other?

[50] *E. W.*, IV, 122.

[51] *Ibid.*, and also II, 69.

[52] *Ibid.*, IV, 123.

[53] The whole problem is well treated by Polin, *op cit.*, esp. pp. 229–38.

The solution that Hobbes proposes is an essentially negative one, of nonresistance:

> And because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to another, or for that other to receive it; it is to be understood that to transfer a man's power and strength, is no more but to lay by or relinquish his own right to resisting him to whom he so transferreth it.[54]

Thus the power of the sovereign, meeting no obstacle, is in effect omnipotent. Yet three things need to be said about this solution: it obviously perpetuates Hobbes's confusion between the creation and the legitimation of power; it is further complicated by the proviso that a man cannot give up his right to resist mortal danger; and the whole nonresistance solution is never really satisfactory, even to Hobbes himself. Let us consider these statements in order.

First, there is evident here Hobbes's well known confusion between the creation and the legitimation of power; which leaves him trying to lift himself out of the state of nature by his bootstraps.[55] A valid obligation presupposes security, which presupposes an enforcing power, which must be constructed by the assumption of obligations. This is a fundamental difficulty, which even the representation argument is ultimately unable to solve. What actually happens in the progress of Hobbes's thought from the *Elements* to the *Leviathan* is that the arguments for obligation improve, and as they improve his concern with the creation of a central power wanes. But even here representation is eventually of some help.

Secondly, the passage cited is an oversimplified form of Hobbes's position, since it speaks of relinquishing the right of resistance. In another passage in the *Elements*, the "transfer of power" is interpreted as the relinquishing of one's right of "protecting and defending himself by his own power."[56] But in *De Cive* the right of self-defense becomes precisely the one right which man can never give up.[57] The problem is that a man cannot help but take action to defend himself when his life is in immediate danger—as for instance when he is about to be executed for the commission of some crime. It is logically impossible for a man in this position not to resist, because he cannot help wanting to live more than anything else; hence he cannot be obligated not to resist. There is a hint of this problem in the *Elements*, but in *De Cive* Hobbes states explicitly that men forming a society are supposed still to *retain* a right of defending themselves against violence (although passages of the earlier form are to be found in *De Cive* as well—that the citizen has "parted with his right of resisting").[58]

If the right of self-defense is, then, retained at least in part, what is given up to the sovereign? Two separate answers to this question are to be found in *De Cive*. In some places nonresistance is interpreted as not assisting anyone *other than oneself* against the sovereign, and Hobbes remarks that "this kind of contracts men observe well enough, for the most part, till either themselves or their near friends are to suffer."[59] But Hobbes also says that the subjects have contracted to assist the sovereign against criminals, or rather, "to refuse him not the use of their wealth and strength against any other whatsoever," for the subject is still supposed "to retain a right of defending himself."[60]

This last passage calls attention to the third and most important fact, that the nonresistance solution does not really solve the problem of the sovereign's power at all. The image it inevitably raises is of the king himself and a murderer locked in mortal combat, while all other subjects stand by passively and do nothing. Obviously this image is not what Hobbes had in mind, yet he seems to have maneuvered himself into just such a corner. Even if the image is too extreme, one must still ask: is this the power of the mighty Leviathan that is to conform men to trembling obedience? And, in general political terms, it seems obvious that a government needs more from its subjects than mere nonresistance; it needs all sorts of positive, supportive actions—service in the army, paying of taxes, attendance at schools, and all the rest.

Plenty of evidence attests that Hobbes intended to supply the sovereign with the power to exact positive, active support from his subjects, despite these difficulties. He repeatedly speaks of the power of the sovereign as the sum of the power and strength of individuals transferred to him. He speaks sometimes of assistance to the sovereign against criminals (despite the nonresistance passages already cited). The original form of the contract in the *Elements* is a promise to obey, which sounds active enough.[61] Hobbes writes such passages as "that right which every man had before to use his faculties to his own advantage, is now wholly translated on some certain man or council for the common benefit."[62] He argues, further, that "he that by right punisheth at his own discretion, by right compels all men to all things which he himself wills"; in other words, given nonresistance the sovereign can still obtain active assistance by command.[63] And, finally, Hobbes attempts to appeal beyond the content of the covenant to the purposes for which it is established, the securing of peace and order.[64] "Whosoever has right to the end, has right to the means," he argues, so that thereby the sovereign has the right to whatever is a necessary means toward preserving peace and order. And yet, despite all these devices, he returns repeatedly to the nonresistance solution, and to the problem that the covenant cannot give the sovereign any new right he did not have before, and hence cannot give him more than passivity from his subjects. As Warrender observes, "nothing can be transferred by the political covenant except the right of resistance, and Hobbes' appeal to the objective of the convenant, is really a partial desertion of the covenant itself."[65]

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[54] *E. W.*, IV, 123.

[55] Tussman, "Political Theory," p. 71.

[56] *E. W.*, IV, 128.

[57] *Ibid.*, II, 68, 74–5.

[58] *Ibid.*, 70; IV, 130.

[59] *Ibid.*, II, 75.

[60] *Ibid.*, 68.

Here again representation provides at least a partial solution. Through representation, Hobbes is able to show more consistently how the sovereign can be given the kind of positive support he needs and was always intended to have. As is so often the case with Hobbes, he is not fully aware that his problem is solved; some of the arguments above continue to appear in the *Leviathan*. But the difficulty with nonresistance no longer troubles the argument. Let us first notice that the problem is, indeed, solved in the *Leviathan*, and then turn to those characteristics of representation that made the solution possible.

In the *Leviathan*, the state is established when each man gives the sovereign unlimited authority to represent him. As the representative of them all, the sovereign is then for the first time, in Hobbes's thought, really in a position to use the strength and faculties of any or all of his subjects in a positive way. For they have, by authorizing, made themselves owners of whatever he might do; his acts are their acts, his will is their will, his commitments are their commitments. There need no longer be any transfer of rights or of power; it is their rights he exercises, their faculties he puts to use. In the state of nature each individual decides what to do ("wills") and then does it with his own faculties. In civil society the sovereign decides what is to be done ("wills"); his will functions for *each* subject as if it were the subject's own, and hence the action is done through the faculties of each as if he had willed it himself. The solution is as formal and fictive as before, of course, but it enables Hobbes to avoid the previously troublesome issues: nonresistance, and the transfer of rights or power.

How is it that representation removes these troublesome issues? I think two approaches may be made to an answer to this question, the one by way of Hobbes's doctrine of rights, the other by way of the concept of transfer itself. At the beginning of this section I said that Hobbes was troubled because the subjects did not have much to transfer to the sovereign, and could not "really" transfer it anyway. Representation deals with both of these difficulties to some extent.

Warrender has pointed out that Hobbes uses the word "rights" in a rather specialized sense most of the time, particularly when talking about the state of nature.[66] We tend today to think of a right as something to which we are entitled, reflecting the duties other people have toward us. Thus the right of ownership over property generally involves a whole complex of other people's duties—not to disturb it, not to steal it, not to use it, and so on. Hobbes sometimes uses the word in this sense, but more frequently he regards a right as a freedom from obligation, something one cannot be obliged to renounce. In this sense my rights are the antitheses of my duties, and have nothing to do with anyone else's duties. In this sense, if I have a right to life (or self-preservation) this means only that I cannot be obliged to renounce my life. It does not mean that I am entitled to life so that others have a duty not to kill me, or even to keep me alive.

In the state of nature, Hobbes says, all men have a right to all things. He is clearly speaking of rights in the sense of freedom-from-obligation here; and what he means is that in nature every man may help himself to whatever he needs or wants, as best he can, and others will do likewise. In the absence of special contracts, there is no obligation to let anyone else have some; there is no private property, there are no duties owed to others. All these follow only from particular contractual agreements; for men in general, they follow only on the establishment of civil society, and are imposed by the sovereign. For the sovereign defines laws of property, duties and obligations, who is entitled to what from his fellow-men, or as Hobbes says, "meum and tuum."

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[61] *Ibid.*, IV, 122.

[62] *Ibid.*, II, 91.

[63] *Ibid.*, 75. This is as close as Hobbes ever comes to the realization that he has taken an unnecessarily restricted view of his own system, before he escapes the problem by the concept of representation. See the discussion of rights, below.

[64] *E. W.*, II, 82–3; III, 204–5; IV, 129.

[65] *Op. cit.*, pp. 113–4.

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 18–21.

> Seventhly, is annexed to the sovereignty the whole power of prescribing the rules, whereby every man may know, what goods he may enjoy, and what actions he may do, without being molested by any of his fellow-subjects; and this it is men call propriety. For before constitution of sovereign power, as hath already been shown, all men had right to all things. . . . [67]

Now, since a contract or covenant is a mutual exchange of rights, it is important to ask what transferring a right cf this freedom-from-obligation kind might mean. It can only mean to take an obligation on oneself, to give up a certain freedom from obligation. Hobbes always sees this as the self-assumption of an obligation *not* to act: whereas before, I was free to do whatever I liked, after transferring a right I am no longer free to take certain actions. If there is a tree from which I habitually pick fruit, and drive off others who may want some, this is my right in the state of nature because I can take what I please—I have no obligation to the contrary. But I can renounce this right, by obligating myself no longer to pick this fruit, or no longer to drive off other men. Or I can transfer the right to you, by agreeing not to hinder you when you come to pick fruit. In neither case do I give a new right to anyone else by restricting myself; everyone else already had as much right to the fruit as I did.

> To lay down a man's right to anything, is to divest himself of the liberty, of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounceth or passeth away his right giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature: but only standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own original right, without hindrance from another.[68]

If men have only this kind of rights in the state of nature, and if such is the process of giving them up or transferring them, then that is also the best they can do for the sovereign when they contract to set up civil society. All they can do is to restrain their own actions, take obligations on themselves, thus "standing out of the sovereign's way, that he may enjoy his own original right, without hindrance from them." But this is exactly the nonresistance solution to the problem of sovereign power we had been discussing. This unsatisfactory image follows from Hobbes's account of rights in the state of nature and how they may be renounced or transferred.

Notice that Hobbes need not have come to such a conclusion from his own premises. If men have a right to all things in nature because they are free from any duties, then they are free both to act as they wish and to refrain from action. And if they give up such a right, or take on an obligation, it could be either an obligation to refrain from action or an obligation to refrain from refraining, that is, to act. In nature I have no obligation to assist you; why could I not, through a contract, obligate myself never to sit idly by when you are attacked, but to assist you? This would introduce a paradox into the argument, since you would then have a *new* right (this time not of the freedom-from-obligation kind), the right to my assistance. And that would call attention to the fact that all men do *not* have rights to all things in the state of nature. They do not have the right to expect anything from each other; they have no claims on each other. Hobbes never saw the matter this way, and consequently could not take advantage of this line of reasoning. Through authorization, however, he was able to reap the same benefits without seeing it.

For when a man authorizes another to represent him, he takes on himself all the consequences and obligations arising out of the representative's acts. Hence the representative can make binding contracts in his name. This gives the representative a right he did *not* have in the state of nature. In the state of nature prior to any contracts or covenants, no man can make a valid contract in the name of anyone else. Similarly, in nature, no man can will for another; but after authorization the representative's act of willing is attributable to the man he represents. When the sovereign wills or makes a commitment, it is his subjects who are committed because they have accepted full responsibility for his actions. He thus has a right which no man had in the state of nature; there really is something the subjects can

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[67] *E. W.*, III, 165.

[68] *Ibid.*, 118. See also II, 17–8; IV, 88.

"give" the sovereign. And, of course, this is no mere nonresistance. Anything he wills, they become obligated to do.

In short, representation enables Hobbes to overcome an (admittedly unnecessarily) crippling view of rights in the state of nature and how they are transferred, and to give the sovereign positive, active support from his subjects, But one may inquire still further: is the act of authorization a "transferring" of rights at all? In what sense is the "right to perform the action" given? At first the sovereign does not have the right to commit or obligate or represent me; I authorize him, and then he has the right. Do I still have the right, too, or have I given it up to him altogether? In discussing the concept of representation in the abstract, I suggested that such rights are not transferred but shared, as the owner of property may authorize someone else to use it without himself giving up ownership. One is still free, in civil society, to make contracts and take on obligations. Only they may not be in conflict with the actions of the sovereign, with the things to which he has committed one. His decisions function for the subject as prior commitments. But where the sovereign has not ruled or acted, the subject can take on obligations as in the state of nature.

That is why, in the *Leviathan*, authorization *replaces* the phrase "transfer of rights," and the latter seldom appears. This removes troublesome questions like whether one can "really" transfer rights; and it makes it possible to say that the sovereign exercises the rights of his subjects.[69] Thus the subject has not really lost or given up anything to the sovereign; the sacrifice required for entering civil society seems slightly less onerous. And, finally, where something is given one has at least a *prima facie* right to expect something in return. If the subjects have only shared their rights with the sovereign, they would seem to have less claim on him in return.

Tussman speaks of authorization as merely a new name for what was called the transfer of rights in the earlier works.[70] We can now see that, while it does replace the transfer of rights, it also adds something. It enables the subjects to give the sovereign something more than mere nonresistance. And it enables them to do so without really losing rights they had before, without any mysterious transfer.

It has been said that the transfer of rights is almost completely absent from the *Leviathan*. The places where it does appear are significant, however. The subject is spoken of as giving up his "right of governing himself," and the sovereign is given the "right to present the person of them all."[71] Now neither of these rights could be part of the sovereign's "right to all things" in the state of nature; the right of governing me or presenting my person is exclusively my own. Furthermore, these are both rights which cannot be transferred completely but only shared in the way described above. Where no law or command of the sovereign binds me, I still govern my own actions.[72]

The solution of these difficulties does not really succeed in giving the sovereign the *power* he needs. He still has power only in so far as his subjects recognize their obligation to accept his actions as theirs, his will as their own. And since this obligation is still technically founded on contract, it requires an enforcement power. But what seems to happen is that Hobbes is increasingly satisfied with his account of the obligation, so that he becomes less and less concerned about the enforcement power. Without ever abandoning it completely, he turns away from his own postulate that "covenants without the sword are but words," and drifts toward acceptance of the fact that men do tend to perform those obligations they recognize as valid.

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[69] *Polin*, op. cit., p. 232; Gadave, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

[70] "Political Theory," p. 100.

[71] *E. W.*, III, 158–9.

[72] The exception is a *Leviathan* passage concerning the right of punishment, in which Hobbes reverts to the earlier approaches. Even if each man retains the right to protect himself and has only agreed to help the sovereign punish others, the question remains, where does the sovereign get the right to punish anyone at all?

"Before the institution of the commonwealth, every man had a right to everything, and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; subduing, hurting or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of punishing, which is exercised in every commonwealth. For the subjects did not give the sovereign that right; but only in laying down theirs, strengthened him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him only. . . . " (*E. W.*, III, 297–8).

The thing about this argument is that by the *Leviathan* it has become quite unnecessary. Hobbes need only point out, as he does elsewhere in the book, that the criminal has authorized his own punishment in authorizing all that the sovereign will do. There is no need for any right to punish, nor for the transfer of that right, beyond this simple fact. When a man is to be punished it is to be expected that he will resist, but he is not free to will "officially"; he has committed himself, he is punishing himself.

For a point of view opposite to that developed here, see Morton A. Kaplan, "How Sovereign Is Hobbes' Sovereign?" *Western Political Quarterly*, (June 1956), pp. 390–1, 395.

IV. THE DUTIES OF THE SOVEREIGN

Although the sovereign has no obligations to his subjects in the Hobbesian system, he does have duties, which he must interpret in the light of his own conscience, and for which he is responsible to God. The fact that he has such duties is, of course, an additional reason or justification for obedience—it assures that the sovereign will rule well, and will not abuse his power. At the same time it is crucial in Hobbes's view that these duties can never be made the basis for any claims on the sovereign by his subjects, nor used to justify a revolt. This rather complex view is found consistently in all three of Hobbes's political works; but in the *Leviathan*, the position of the sovereign is reexpressed and made more meaningful through the newly introduced concept of representation.

The duties of the sovereign derive from natural law, and from the general purpose for which his subjects covenanted to set up civil society and appoint him.

> The office of the sovereign, be it a monarch, or an assembly, consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the sovereign power, namely the procuration of the *safety of the people;* to which he is obliged by the law of nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the author of that law, and to none but him.

> Because dominions were constituted for peace's sake, and peace was sought after for safety's sake; he, who being placed in authority, shall use his power otherwise than to the safety of the people, will act against the reasons of peace, that is to say, against the law of nature.[73]

In other words, a sovereign is, like all men, subject to the law of nature and accountable to God. And the law of nature commands men to endeavor to secure peace, and to found and maintain civil society. Hence, if one happens to be a sovereign, one is bound to rule in such a way as to do one's best to procure these ends. But these duties derive from the law of nature and not from any covenant, and hence they are owed to God and not to any men.

Consequently a subject can never justifiably disobey or resist or criticize his sovereign on the ground that the latter is acting contrary to his duties. Hobbes founds this allegation on two main arguments: first the sovereign has no obligations to his subjects, he owes them nothing. And second, they have authorized all his actions and thus already given their approval in advance, so that to object later is simply self-contradiction.

The sovereign has no obligation to his subjects first of all because he is not party to any covenant with them; and covenant, it will be recalled, is the only way he *could* acquire such a specific obligation.[74] But even if he had obligations to his subjects in this sense, he could not breach them because the subjects have authorized all he may do. They have agreed in advance that all the sovereign's actions should be their own, that is, should be treated exactly as if they themselves had done them. So if they were later to complain about something he did, or refuse to obey one of his commands, they would be complaining of themselves or refusing themselves. This is the point of Hobbes's famous dictum that the criminal is the author of his own punishment; his punishment then can be no injury to him. It will be noted that Hobbes uses injury here to mean a wrong, a breach of obligation, and not mere physical harm, which he calls damage.

> For he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: but by this institution of a commonwealth, every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself; no nor himself of injury; because to do injury to one's self, is impossible.[75]

In particular, the sovereign cannot break any obligation to his subjects, even if he had acquired one, because the very act of breaking the obligation also releases him from it; since the subjects have agreed that he shall will for them.

> Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to

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[73] *E. W.*, III, 322; II, 166–7.

[74] See Warrender, *op. cit.*, pp. 125–34. As Warrender points out, this argument is much weakened in the case of sovereignty by acquisition, where the sovereign *is* party to the covenant. However, it can be argued that in the establishment of a commonwealth by acquisition, the sovereign merely promises to spare the lives of the conquered people *at the time the covenant is made;* so that afterward he has already performed this obligation and owes none further, to his subjects. See *E. W.*, III, 190.

[75] *E. W.*, III, 163.

his own will signified to the doer, is no injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his original right to do what he please, by some antecedent covenant, there is no breach of covenant; and therefore no injury done him. And if he have; then his will to have it done being signified, is a release of that covenant: and so again there is no injury done him.[76]

Authorization, of course, constitutes such a signification of will; since the sovereign wills for his subjects, all his actions are "conformable to" their wills. Thus he can never violate an obligation to his subjects.

Now this kind of paradoxical argument—that a sovereign has duties which no man can claim against him—is always in danger of being misunderstood in one direction or the other. Hobbes himself is always at pains to emphasize that the subjects have no claim on the sovereign. It is quite apparent that every time he mentions that the sovereign has duties, he invites such a claim and must then refute it. Yet the danger of misunderstandings in the opposite direction is equally great. The literature abounds with critics who argue that a sovereign bound by a duty which his subjects cannot claim, is not bound at all; that the duties of Hobbes's sovereign are mere sophistry. Nor can it be argued that these difficulties are resolved in the *Leviathan;* the fact is, they cannot really be resolved. Hobbes wants to emphasize and explain the duties of the sovereign because they demonstrate the desirability and general benefit of his rule; at the same time the security basic to his system would be shaken if subjects could presume to judge or even to question the acts of the sovereign.

Representation does not do away with the difficulty of conveying this idea, or the danger of misunderstanding. But it does help to some extent. For as I have suggested earlier, the concept of representation (in its normal English meaning) does imply some standards for, or limits on, the conduct of the representative. Inevitably, when Hobbes calls his sovereign a representative, he implies that the man is going to *represent* his subjects, not merely to do whatever he pleases. The concept itself contains the idea that the representative has duties. At the same time the explicit definition of representation that Hobbes gives—the one-sided assumption of obligations by the man who is represented—assures that in the last analysis these duties cannot be claimed. By referring back to the definition of authorization, Hobbes could rebut any allegation that subjects might resist the sovereign if he did not represent them as they thought he should. Indeed, within the framework of Hobbes's explicit definition there is no such thing as not representing someone as one should. To represent means simply to be authorized, to have the right to act, to have responsibility for one's action taken by someone else.

Let me be perfectly clear about some things that I am *not* suggesting here. Hobbes's sovereign has duties before God, because he is subject to natural law. They derive from every man's duty to seek peace to the best of his ability; because a sovereign is in a very powerful position, his ability to seek peace is very great and, consequently, so are his duties. At no point can it be argued that the sovereign's duties *derive from* his being a representative, or from his being authorized. I do not suggest any such derivation. I suggest only that when Hobbes calls the sovereign a representative, he reminds the reader automatically of what he elsewhere says explicitly—that the sovereign does have duties. Very possibly, Hobbes was not even aware that this was happening; after all, it is just the obligations or standards for the representative that are missing from his account of authorization in Chapter 16.

One can, perhaps, push the parallel one step further by comparing the natural law duties of a sovereign with what may normally be expected from a representative. Certainly there is nothing in the former that remotely resembles an obligation of the sovereign to consult his subjects, or do as they wish or think best. Nor does Hobbes argue the sovereign should be some sort of reflection or imitation of his subjects, act as they would, or anything of that sort. What he does say is that the sovereign must look after the safety of the people, what one might term their needs or welfare or long-range interests. And this does seem related to one aspect of what we expect from a representative. In Chapter 16 of the *Leviathan,* it will be recalled, the representative of a child or madman or inanimate object is said to have authority to "procure their maintenance." And this standard for his conduct is what distinguishes the representative of a child, authorized by its guardian, from the personal representative of that guardian himself. It can be argued that the duties of the sovereign, although they do not derive from his authorization, nevertheless do correspond to "procuring the maintenance" of his subjects, at least in a general way.[77]

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[76] *Ibid.,* 137.

[77] At least one interesting passage in the *Leviathan* suggests that Hobbes's preference for mon-

V. THE FUNCTION OF REPRESENTATION IN HOBBES'S POLITICAL ARGUMENT

We are now ready to draw whatever conclusions we can from the mass of detail in Hobbes's theory. What functions does representation perform for him, and to what extent are these conditional on his special definition of it?

We have seen that, in a sense, representation introduces nothing new. As Hobbes uses it, it fits into the course of his argument, and completes some lines of thought he had already developed. On the other hand, it is at times very helpful for just this purpose, enabling him to make clear some things that had previously seemed paradoxical. And it is largely the interplay between his specialized definition (authorization) and the complete concept of representation that makes it so helpful.

It enables Hobbes to overcome his troubling postulate that each man has a separate will constantly in conflict with that of other men; men can rid themselves of this source of conflict by authorizing one among them to will for them all. And by the concept of representation, the person of this sovereign is identified with the person of the commonwealth, so that all its members are logically bound into the union. Representation similarly helps Hobbes out of the difficulties he made for himself by postulating contracts as the only source of new obligations in the state of nature. What was needed was an indissoluble obligation *to* the sovereign, unilaterally assumed. Contract could never fulfill this requirement, since a contract is *bi*lateral; but authorization could.

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archy rests on a conception of the public interest, on a conception of what sort of "maintenance" it is that a political sovereign "procures." For, by contrast, in his discussion of corporations within the commonwealth, and how they may be governed by representatives, Hobbes says that a company of merchants engaged in foreign trade is best governed by a democratic assembly of its members.

His reasoning here is very suggestive, and has not received the attention from commentators I think it deserves. Hobbes says: "The end then of these bodies of merchants, being not a common benefit to the whole body, . . . but the particular gain of every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the assembly, that shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the representative of such a body must be an assembly, where every member of the body may be present at the consultations, if he will." *E. W.*, III, 217–9.

To my account of the significance of the authorization of the sovereign, Warrender offers an alternative, but (I think) mistaken interpretation (*op. cit.*, pp. 109–110, 129–131, 178). He says the authorization of the sovereign does only this: "it means that the conduct of the sovereign cannot be a moral affront of which the citizens may take note, and authorization serves to indemnify the sovereign from accountability to the citizen on such grounds." (*Ibid.*, p. 110).

It seems to me that the reason the subject cannot have a valid claim against the sovereign is not because he has released the sovereign from accountability, but because the sovereign is incapable of violating any obligation to him. This is a result of authorization, but it is a very different thing from resignation of accountability. The very passage Warrender cites shows that it is absence of obligation and not absence of accountability that is crucial (*Ibid.*, p. 131; *E. W.*, III, 200).

But, more important, to say authorization signifies only that the sovereign is not accountable to his subjects, is to miss its most significant function. As we have seen, authorization is a source of obligation *to* the sovereign. Through it, the sovereign is empowered to commit his subjects as if his will were theirs.

I would suggest that Warrender misses this point because he thinks that all the subject's obligations arise from contract alone. Hence he concludes that authorization merely means the subject cannot judge the sovereign or hold him to account. Warrender says that this is what "makes the sovereign an authority" for the subject (*op. cit.*, p. 130). But an authority is not just someone whom we do not presume to judge; it is someone whose judgment we accept. Similarly, the subjects have not merely agreed to refrain from judging the sovereign; they have agreed to let him judge for them.

Finally, Warrender says that the subject is not morally responsible for the sovereign's commands, because "one person cannot take moral responsibility for another person's action" (*ibid.*, p. 110). But this is exactly backward. What Hobbes says is that the sovereign is responsible, and not the subject, if the sovereign commands something contrary to the law of God and the subject does it (*E. W.*, II, 152; IV, 140–1, 185). And surely this is possible only if one man *can* be morally responsible for the actions of another. One is morally responsible only for one's own "natural and very will," and not for what the sovereign wills in one's name.

Hobbes had gotten himself into difficulties over rights in the state of nature and their transfer. All men have the right to all things, so it seems that the most they can give to their sovereign is a promise not to interfere with his activities. Representation and the idea of the ownership of actions covertly introduce some rights which all men do not have in nature, but can give to their sovereign (such as the right to make commitments for others). At the same time, the idea of representation makes it unnecessary for these rights to be transferred or given away; the sovereign simply exercises the rights of his subjects in addition to his own.

Finally Hobbes always maintains the difficult view that the sovereign has a duty to look after the welfare of his subjects, but that they can never claim he has violated any obligation to them. The concept of representation implies just this kind of duty on the sovereign's part. Yet, at the same time, Hobbes's specialized authorization definition assures that the duties can never result in any claim against the sovereign.

But these are essentially formal or logical solutions to logical problems. Had Hobbes defined the state of nature differently, many of these problems would not have arisen. It is only when one looks at the completed Hobbesian political system that one becomes really aware of how partial, how empty of substance his concept of representation is. A sovereign given complete power for all perpetuity, with no obligation to consult the wishes of his subjects and no duties toward them which they can claim—surely nothing could be further from what we ordinarily think of as representation or representative government! We read the *Leviathan* and feel that somehow we have been tricked.[78]

Indeed, some commentators argue quite literally that this was Hobbes's intention. Morton Kaplan, for instance, regards representation as part of Hobbes's "public theme," something he included to deceive the foolish multitude and mislead the casual reader.[79] Such a reader would be deluded into thinking he was really getting representation; only the wise few might penetrate behind this façade to Hobbes's true position. Other commentators attribute no evil motives, but regard the disparity between claim and fulfillment in Hobbes's system as a sign of failure on his part. Alfred De Grazia, for instance, speaks of Hobbes's "feeble efforts . . . to keep alive the representation on which the original contract was based."[80]

There is certainly a sense in which representation functions, for Hobbes, as a "persuasive definition."[81] By calling the sovereign a representative, as we have seen, he implies that the sovereign will in fact represent—take care of, consult—his subjects. True, this implication is vitiated by the authorization definition Hobbes gives, but it is there nevertheless.[82] By labelling his political system representation, Hobbes suggests that it has certain good or desirable attributes. But we should note that this is not a redirection of our attitudes *apart from* the meaning of the concept; quite the opposite, it is *because* we know what representation means that we are attracted to a political system based on it. Had Hobbes merely reiterated that his sovereign was "good, and good for you," he might have affected some attitudes, but he certainly could not have conveyed any of the special things about the sovereign that are conveyed by calling him a representative. This leads De Grazia to say that,

> Hobbes, in building up a monarchical system, strove so hard to take advantage of the positive coloration of the word "representative" that he deprived it of much meaning.[83]

But this is not quite right on two counts. First, he could take advantage of its positive coloration only so long as it had its usual meaning; it is *because* representation means what it does that it has a positive coloration.

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[78] "Under such circumstances representative government would obviously be such *only in name*, for a permanent mandate in a representative system is a contradiction in terms." James Wilford Garner, *Political Science and Government* (New York, 1928), p. 642; italics mine.

"All do not authorize [the sovereign] to act as a representative in any *literal* meaning of the term . . . "; Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 395; italics mine.

[79] Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 400.

[80] Alfred De Grazia, *Public and Republic* (New York, 1951), p. 9.

[81] The phrase is from Charles L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), ch. 9. As the rest of my paragraph may suggest, however, I have certain quarrels with Stevenson's concept.

[82] In my experience, undergraduates are often misled in just this way. Once it has been brought to their attention that Hobbes uses the concept of representation, they frequently jump to the conclusion that the sovereign is, indeed, required to consult his subjects' wishes and pursue their interest.

[83] De Grazia, *op. cit.*, p. 25. Note that this passage is inconsistent with the previous one cited from De Grazia (note 80, above).

And second, we do not know (despite both De Grazia and Kaplan) whether in fact Hobbes was deliberately trying to mislead, striving to take advantage of an intentionally deceptive definition. This might, of course, be the case. It might be that Hobbes, wishing to advocate political absolutism out of an excessive fear of anarchy, cleverly gave a partial definition of representation and used it in his argument to deceive. But it is equally possible that he believed his definition to be complete and correct. It is a common occurrence that we may know perfectly well how and when to use a word in our native language, and yet be unable to give a correct, complete, explicit definition of it. The road to metaphysics is paved with this kind of philosophers' good intentions. Besides, any number of theorists since Hobbes have adopted an authorization definition very much like his. Are they, too, trying to mislead? It seems to me more likely that Hobbes was sincere, and thought he really had hold of the nature of the concept. And, as I have said, his definition was not so much false as it was incomplete.

There is something ironic about Hobbes's use of the concept in his political argument. For the very problems that he solved formally, on a logical plane, by his authorization view, can in fact be solved empirically by the aspects of representation that he overlooked. At least they can be solved to some extent empirically; but this was not enough for Hobbes.

For instance, Hobbes set himself the problem of creating a lasting union out of a multitude of separate men with separate conflicting wills. He made this a formal problem, and solved it with his theory of representation. But behind this verbal game there lies a real problem of the creation of political consensus, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the creation of community. These are real political problems, in the solution of which representation (in its full sense) can play an important part. Similarly, we saw that Hobbes was troubled by the people's inability to give their sovereign sufficient power to terrify them into conformity. The authorization view helped solve this formal problem. But behind the formal problem lies the real need to enlist the capacities of citizens for positive political action, the problem of participation, the problem of creating reasons for obedience and cooperation with a government. Here again representative institutions can make a real contribution, and have sometimes done so. Finally, we saw how Hobbes suggested that obedience to the sovereign was not really obedience to an alien will, because formally the sovereign's will is that of the people. Somewhere behind this formula lies the genuine, practical difference between being ruled by one's own representative(s) and being ruled by some alien authority.

But the help that real representation gives toward the solution of these problems of political life is contingent. It is uncertain; it does not always succeed. It cannot eliminate conflict but can at most provide a structure for solving conflict. Hobbes set his goals much higher than this (or at least, at a different level); he sought the logical or deductive guarantee of unity and peace. For this purpose, the authorization definition is much better adapted. Whether one argues that he adopts the definition to serve his political argument, or that he introduces representation because he genuinely thinks this is what it means, in either case the concept and the political theory are correlative and fit together. What is omitted from the one, is what disturbs us about the other.

ROUSSEAU'S IMAGES OF AUTHORITY

JUDITH N. SHKLAR
Harvard University

By nature men are free, but left to their own devices they will inevitably enslave each other. Of all the "bipolarities" in the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau none is more striking than this tension between natural freedom and the spontaneous march to inequality and oppression in which all men participate.[1] None aroused more conflicting reactions in his own mind. If men are the sole authors of their ills, and not the mere victims of some external force, be it original sin, a malevolent nature or a hostile environment, then there is always hope for self-improvement.[2] On the other hand, if men were alone responsible for inventing and maintaining their own social misery, they could scarcely be expected to overcome conditions they had themselves chosen to create. One could hardly hope that those who had devised and imposed their own chains, would either wish, or know how to liberate themselves. If there was no need for cosmic fatalism, there was every reason to despair of mankind's own social powers. And indeed it was perfectly clear to Rousseau that every man left free to follow his own inclinations and every society allowed to pursue its inherent tendencies would repeat all the familiar errors of the past. It was this conflict between possibility and probability that inspired all of Rousseau's works. All of them are attempts to show some way out of the horrors of history. And if all are marked by a deep note of hopelessness, each one is also an act of rebellion against the weight of the actual. The suggestions, the paths he traced and held out, were numerous and various. Among them the hope of salvation through the personal authority of great men was one of the most important. In almost all his writings, whether philosophical or fictional, some such dominating figure appears. An account of the character and work of these authoritative individuals thus not only illuminates an important, though relatively obscure part of Rousseau's thought, it also reveals much that is morally and psychologically most subtle in it.

I. THE NEED FOR AUTHORITY

That man needs a master is evident once it is fully recognized that the conditions in which men find themselves are entirely the work of their own propensities. These, moreover, are not an incidental part of social life or a superficial affliction. The will to dominate, itself a form of dependency, is present in every human relationship. As soon as men enter into enduring association mutual need, dependence and domination arise and will flourish unless checked by some external agent. The first cry of the infant is a plea for help, the second an effort to tyrannize over his mother.[3] From this first consciousness of dependence spring all subsequent ideas of tyranny and competition. No sooner does a human being identify himself with his own kind than he develops a false self whose *amour propre* finds compensation in inequality and ambition for the loss of independence. This only reinforces the actuality of weakness, though it hides it as each person comes to think of himself only in competitive comparison with others. Feebleness leads us together, but association does not strengthen us. It is only an intricate system of mutual needs which reduces us and estranges us. The more we become enemies of our own kind the more we need them.[4] This being the case, nothing can be expected from spontaneous self-direction. The interplay between weakness and aggression, the force of *amour propre*, cannot be overcome even by radical social change. In the perfect republic *amour propre* is channeled from personal to public ends. Patriotism reorients vanity, but it does not destroy it.[5]

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[1] I owe the felicitous term, bipolarity, to Jean Wahl's remarkable article, "La Bipolarité de Rousseau," *Annales Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, Vol. 33 (1953–1955), pp. 49–55.

[2] "Lettre à Voltaire," 18 aout, 1756, *Correspondance Générale de Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (ed. Théophile Dufour, Paris, 1924–1932), II, 303–324. (Hereafter cited as *C. G.*)

[3] *Émile*, tr. Barbara Foxley (London, 1948), p. 33; "Lettre à Usteri," 13 septembre, 1761, *C. G.*, V, 211–212.

[4] C. E. Vaughan, *The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Cambridge, 1915), I, 447 (*Première Version du Contrat Social*). Weakness is indeed the source of all evil, see *ibid.*, I, 167, 203 (*Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inégalité Parmi les Hommes*. Hereafter cited as *Inégalité*); *Discours sur Cette Question: Quelle est la Vertu la Plus Nécessaire au Héros, Oeuvres Complètes* (ed. Pléiade, Paris, 1959–. Hereafter cited as *O. C.*), II, 1274.

[5] Vaughan, II, 344–345 (*Projet de Constitution pour la Corse*. Hereafter cited as *Corsica*); *ibid.*, I, 251 (*Économie Politique*). I. Fetscher, *Rousseaus Politische Philosophie* (Neuwied/Rhein, 1960), pp. 62–65, 198–199.

Only the nuclear family might, though it rarely does, provide a closed fellowship free from the taint of *amour propre* and all its expressions. In either case, however, whether *amour propre* is to be organized for collective goals or entirely avoided in the isolated family, a guide and master is needed. Self-regeneration is no longer possible for people obsessed by *amour propre*.[6] Only someone who stands outside the system of prevailing political and personal habits can deliver men from this burden.

The most obvious difficulty would seem to be the impossibility of finding such an external authority. This, however, troubled Rousseau relatively little. He firmly believed in his Plutarchian heroes and such figures as the legislator, Emile's tutor and M. de Wolmar in *La Nouvelle Heloïse* show how well he could imagine men capable of reordering the lives of others. What *did* trouble him was the worth of even the most beneficent and necessary authority. On the one hand he was completely convinced that a liberating form of authority was possible and the only means of helping men out of their present muddle. The good and wise know how to "prevent, cure and palliate" that mass of abuses and ills that overwhelms us.[7] The possibility of "forcing men to be free," through complex psychological devices (though not through the punitive means implied in the actual context of that famous phrase) was, for him, a real one. Yet, on the other hand, Rousseau never forgot that authority meant submission. Even the most self-liquidating forms of authority involve subordination, and no one knew more about it and hated it more intensely than did Rousseau. That is why his discussion of authority, even the best sort, is often marked by vacillation and contradiction.[8] To the end, moreover, he doubted whether authority could, after all, accomplish its true end. It might cure and palliate, but once men needed a master, they would never be able to do without one. Authority may keep them from evil, but it does not fully liberate. It only perpetuates dependence. For all his belief in the creative powers of great men, Rousseau never quite overcame his fear of them. Nevertheless these misgivings did not outweigh his acute sense of the self-destructiveness of untutored men. Here, as always, a negative impulsion, a critical rather than a reforming zeal, was his ultimate inspiration.

II. ACTUAL AUTHORITY

To a degree Rousseau's vacillating attitudes to authority reflect his own emotional conflicts. His correspondence bristles with declarations of personal independence. "First of all I want my friends to be my friends, and not my masters."[9] In the end he concluded that his need for personal liberty was such that he was simply not made for civil society.[10] "He has ideas of independence," wrote the ever-observant Boswell, "that are completely visionary and which are unsuitable for a man in his position." Boswell did not refer merely to Rousseau's social station here. "Behold the man he is, and tell me if such a man does not need a great deal of affection from his fellows—and consequently if he does not depend on them as we all depend on one another."[11] That was, of course, the trouble, and Rousseau knew it only too well.[12] He knew just as well as Hume did that he was at the mercy of those he loved, even of his little dog, but he feared and resented those whom he suspected of exploiting this softness.[13] Eventually he felt that everyone had conspired to tyrannize over him.

He was, therefore, torn all his life between an urge for perfect freedom and a longing for submission and for a return to childhood under the parental care of a Mme. de Warens or a Marischal Keith. If patronage was always rebuffed at first and every offer of a royal pension produced a crisis, Rousseau also longed for a supervising father. As St. Preux, Rousseau's imaginary self-portrait, had addressed Wolmar, so he later would call Marischal

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[6] Vaughan, I, 256 (*Économie Politique*).

[7] Vaughan, I, 207. (*Inégalité*. My translation.)

[8] Thus Emile who is educated for freedom is nevertheless reduced to docility. He does nothing without the consent of his master, and even as a young adult is submissive and afraid of offending the latter. *Émile*, pp. 297–299, 387. "Let him have his freedom if you would make him docile." *Ibid.*, 196.

[9] "Lettre à Mme. d'Épinay," 26 mars, 1757, *C. G.*, III, 44; "Lettre à Diderot," *ibid.*, 50.

[10] *Les Rêveries du Promeneur Solitaire, O. C.*, I, 1059; *Confessions, ibid.*, Bk. I, p. 38.

[11] *Boswell on the Grand Tour: Italy, Corsica and France, 1765–1766*, ed. Frank Brady and F. A. Pottle (New York, 1955), p. 300.

[12] He regarded these as the lasting effects of his childhood experience of authority as exercised by Mademoiselle de Lambercier who, he felt, had crippled him morally and sexually. *Confessions*, Bk. I, pp. 15–17; "Je m'affectionnois aux actes de soumission," *Ébauches des Confessions, O. C.*, I, 1157.

[13] *E.g.*, *Lettres à Malesherbes, O. C.*, I, 1141; Hume, "Lettre à la Marquise de Barbantane," 16 février, 1766, *C. G.*, XV, 62–63.

Keith "mon bienfaiteur et mon père" and speak of himself as the "fils cadet."[14] Patronage could be endured only if it was transformed into pseudo-paternity. It was Hume's failure to recognize this that led to their painful quarrel in England.[15] Thus Rousseau's first response to the approaches of his future patron, M. de Luxembourg, was an outburst of plebeian resentment. "I hate the great, I hate their estate, their hardness, their prejudices, their pettiness and all their vices."[16] This, however, presently changed to "Ah M. le Maréchal, I hated the great before I knew you, and I hate them even more now that you have made me feel so well how easy it would be for them to make themselves adored."[17] He would have wanted to seek him out, Rousseau later wrote to his patron, even if they had been equals. How was he to treat him now, without forgetting himself?[18] For he did not wish to forget the inequality between them, little though it mattered to M. de Luxembourg. Rousseau only wanted to transform grandeur into paternity and to replace class distinctions with emotional subservience. Much as he hated inequality, he did not want equality either, and the positions of superior and inferior were to be maintained.

Deeply rooted as these psychological tendencies were, they were exacerbated by Rousseau's experiences with the powers that be. To be sure, his distaste for impersonal relationships of any kind, and especially for those involving subordination, would have made it difficult for him to accept regular employment of the usual sort. However, Rousseau was also a man of supreme gifts forced to endure every indignity that society could inflict. If in his case apprenticeship, vagrancy and domestic service did not lead to a rejection of all authority, they did fill him with a deep contempt for all the cruel and incompetent masters of this world, in fact, for all actual masters. Being themselves corrupt, they can only maim and hurt those doomed to serving them. Had M. de Montaigue been a decent man, Rousseau, his secretary, imagined that he might have made a passable career for himself in the diplomatic service.[19] Had M. de la Roque been a kind man, he would have given his valet, Rousseau, the courage to confess a theft, rather than to callously allow an innocent girl to be blamed.[20] The reason why servants cheat and steal is that the masters are usurpers, liars and fools.[21]

It was not difficult for Rousseau to draw the obvious conclusions from these experiences. Actual authority was exercised only to maintain a destructive and false order. "Wherever I look, I see only masters and slaves, not a people and its chief."[22] The result is that no communication and no genuinely binding relationships are possible at all. "Neither master nor slave belongs to a family, but only to a class."[23] His travels up and down the entire social ladder had shown him only too clearly that "the great know only the great and the small only the small."[24] Enforced class isolation means mutual hostility and irresponsibility—pride and cruelty at the top, servility and dishonesty at the bottom. What is astonishing is that in spite of these experiences and perceptions Rousseau should still have looked for "chiefs" and longed for individuals who possessed qualities that justified submission to their authority. Moreover, to a certain degree he even expected such persons to come from those very upper classes whose vices he had so eloquently exposed. It is not the offended plebeian St. Preux, but his patron Lord Bomston, an English aristocrat of immense wealth and power, who delivers the most scathing of all Rousseau's denunciations of the hereditary nobility and proclaims the cause of equality.[25]

This ambivalence emerges even in Rousseau's view of royal authority. On the whole he thought it completely vicious. Even elective kings tend to be tyrants.[26] Nothing amused him more than the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's belief that reform was in the "true" self-interest of kings. Far from it, replied Rousseau. Their interest lies precisely in exploiting and oppressing their subjects.[27] Masters never prefer any interest to their own, and some are positively malevolent.[28] Rousseau was outraged by M. de Mirabeau's notion of a "legal despotism" as a cure for all political ills. What a contradiction in terms! There are only two alternatives, Rousseau replied. One must have the pure rule of law in which all personal authority is entirely eliminated, or, if this should be impossible (as he thought it was), then one should accept the most perfectly arbitrary, unlimited personal rule. The trouble with this was that it would bring on rulers like Tiberius and Nero, who could only inspire despair. However, there are only two options, democracy, which is for angels, or the most perfect Hobbism.[29] This stark either/or is very revealing. It is a genuine conflict between ideals, not a choice between the possible and the impossible. Neither one of the ideals is likely to be realized, but both are valid. The actuality of bad kings does not invalidate the ideal of beneficial personal rule any more than the actuality of illegality destroys the ideal of the pure rule of law. Here, as on many other occasions, Rousseau was torn by bipolar ideals—both of which could be used effectively to criticize actuality.

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[14] *Confessions*, Bk. I, p. 56, Bk. XII, pp. 596–599; "Lettre à Milord Maréchal," 8 decembre, 1764, *C. G.*, XII, 122–124; "Lettre à Mme. la Comtesse de Boufflers," 28 decembre, 1763, *C. G.*, X, 278–280; *Lettres Écrites de la Montagne*, *Oeuvres Complètes* (Librairie Hachette, Paris, 1905. Hereafter referred to as Hachette), III, 195.

[15] Ronald Grimsley, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Cardiff, 1961), pp. 200–201.

[16] *Lettres à Malesherbes*, p. 1145. (My translation.)

[17] *Confessions*, Bk. X, p. 527. (My translation.)

[18] "Lettre à M. de Luxembourg," 30 avril, 1759, *C. G.*, IV, 231.

[19] *Confessions*, Bk. VII, p. 327.

[20] *Ibid.*, Bk. II, p. 87.

[21] *La Nouvelle Heloïse*, *O. C.*, II, Part IV, Lettre X. (Hereafter cited as *N. H.*)

[22] Vaughan, II, 31 (*Contrat Social*).

[23] *Émile*, p. 369.

[24] *Ébauches des Confessions*, p. 1150.

[25] *N. H.*, Part I, Lettre LXII.

[26] Vaughan, II, 447, 461, 464. (*Considérations sur le Gouvernment de Pologne*. Hereafter cited as *Poland*.)

III. LEGISLATIVE AND CREATIVE AUTHORITY

The conflict between the ideals of personal authority and of impersonal law was resolved in Rousseau's mind by making law the subordinate one. For ultimately the rule of law also depends upon a single human voice and hand to give it life. Hymns to the rule of law, of course, abound in Rousseau's writings. Only law is compatible with freedom.[30] Only law is a "joug salutaire."[31] Only under law can the dependence of man on man be ended.[32] Only law can subject men without constraining the will. Law liberates.[33] The great problem of politics is to make governments the guardians, rather than the enemies of law.[34] That is only a small sample of a recurrent theme. However, there were qualifications. The first was that law is psychologically ineffective. It can condition only external behavior. Public opinion and mores alone can touch the heart.[35] To be truly effective public authority must penetrate to the very heart.[36] To do this requires more than law, it depends on continuing education.[37] Secondly, laws do not grow spontaneously in society. A great legislator must not only invent them, but create the moral climate that is needed for their acceptance. Lastly, and this is the greatest weakness, law is not self-perpetuating. Like all the works of men, even the best institutions decline under the inevitable impact of moral weakness. And once corruption has set in, there is no stopping it.[38] If Sparta and Rome fell, what can endure?[39] Once the decline is total, then a new creative legislator can arise to restore society. Law ultimately is what personal authority can give society for a while; it does not replace that force, which alone can touch the human heart. That was the way of those ancient political paragons Moses, Lycurgus, Numa and Solon.[40] Of such men, alas, modern history knows nothing.[41]

Perhaps because he had never known a great man, or because historical imagination was not among his strong points, Rousseau was never able to draw a very convincing portrait of the great legislator. It has been suggested that his entire Plutarchian stance was more a way of rejecting contemporary men and institutions, than a genuine effort to present a constructive model that he or anyone else might imitate.[42] That is why his Spartan and Roman heroes are more the sum of all the virtues that modern men so conspicuously lack than living beings, of the past or present.[43] Often the great legislator seems merely a mechanical device invented by Rousseau to answer the question, "*how* can a legitimate state be established, men being what they are?" Of all Rousseau's images of authority this is the least well-drawn and the least convincing figure. How could it be otherwise, since the legislator is a miracle, a superhuman genius, who, though he knows our nature thoroughly, does not share it? His tasks and his powers have nothing in common with the more usual forms of political authority.[44] He neither coerces, nor argues. Everything is done by the force of personality.[45] A magnetic personality transforms lesser men.

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[27] Vaughan, I, 244 (*Économie Politique*); 389–392 (*Jugement sur la Polysynodie*), II, 77 (*Contrat Social*).

[28] Vaughan, I, 358 (*Fragments*).

[29] "Lettre à M. de Mirabeau," 26 juillet, 1767, *C. G.*, XVII, 155–159.

[30] Vaughan, II, 37 (*Contrat Social*).

[31] Vaughan, I, 126 (*Inégalité*).

[32] *Émile*, p. 49.

[33] Vaughan, I, 248 (*Économie Politique*).

[34] *Confessions*, Book IX, pp. 404–405; Vaughan, I, 246 (*Économie Politique*).

[35] Vaughan, I, 322 (*Fragments*).

[36] Vaughan, I, 248 (*Économie Politique*).

[37] Vaughan, I, 330–331 (*Fragments*); Vaughan, II, 426–427 (*Poland*).

[38] "Lettre à Vernet," 29 novembre, 1760, *C. G.*, V, 270–272.

[39] Vaughan, II, 88, 91 (*Contrat Social*). "Le Corps politique, aussi bien que le corps de l'homme, commence a mourir dès sa naissance."

[40] Vaughan, II, 427–429 (*Poland*); *ibid.*, I, 314–320, 330–332 (*Fragments*).

[41] Vaughan, I, 338 (*Fragments*).

[42] Grimsley, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–68, 70–71, 80; Albert Schinz, *La Pensée de Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Paris, 1929), pp. 136–157.

[43] Rousseau admitted his lack of genuine interest in history, "La comparaison de ce qui est à ce qui doit être m'a donné l'esprit romanesque et m'a toujours jeté loin de tout ce qui ce fait,"

Force is self-defeating and reason is wasted on a disoriented multitude. Only direct experience and the force of example can touch unregenerate men.[46] It is useless to say, "be good," to them; they must be made so, but how are they to be reconstructed?[47] The great legislator has only one means at his disposal: illusion and stage management. And indeed it is not everyone who can make himself appear an agent of God and speak for Him.[48] The altering of public opinion, the revolution in attitudes that impinges upon behavior can only be done by an example so impressive that it inspires the wish to imitate. To change public opinion, popular judgments of right and wrong, he must also engage in the most detailed stage-setting, as Rousseau showed in his own plan to deglamorize dueling.[49] In all this the guiding hand must remain hidden. To rule over public opinion one must not only be above it, but out of its sight.[50] It is suggestive power that gives people new ambitions, and social instead of private aspirations. That also is why festivals, ceremonies and all other simple and striking ways of structuring the environment to press new feelings upon the populace are so important. All are necessary to protect the public self against the alluring calls of the private self.

Creative legislative authority that "mutilates the human constitution" and reduces each person to a particle of a greater whole cannot be effectively exercised at all times. It can only be attempted in the youth of peoples. That is why Brutus and Rienzi failed.[51] For legislation is foresight and prevention. Like Émile's tutor the legislator designs laws and institutions to prevent the vices of civilization from emerging. Corsica was destined to escape the well-known consequences of undirected social development: it was not to become civilized.[52] Even here Rousseau feared that there might be no inclination for eternal simplicity, especially in the absence of a dynamic legislator.[53] Moreover, prevention was not the only task of the great legislator. In the *Social Contract* especially, Rousseau suggested that more than merely preventive authority was needed. The legislator, built on the model of Lycurgus, was to reconstruct every member of the community on the stern Spartan model. However, as in the case of mere prevention, he seriously doubted whether this ambitious project could be accomplished.

The conclusion that creative legislative authority would fail was not fortuitous. It was all but inevitable, given Rousseau's psychological assumptions. For it is not merely the fatal attractions of false social values that threaten the good republic. It is not only civilization that is bound to creep in. Perpetual denaturalization cannot be maintained except by perpetual tutorial vigilance. The difficulties of full socialization were so great because Rousseau was so deeply aware of the individuality of each person. Each one of us has a God-given self which forms the core of our character. This personal self is not inherently hostile to other selves, nor does it thrive in permanent solitude.[54] It is indeed only too vulnerable to social pressures, and in constant

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"Lettre au Prince de Wurtemberg," 10 novembre, 1763, *C. G.*, X, 217.

[44] Vaughan, I, 477–483 (*Première Version*); *ibid.*, II, 51–54 (*Contrat Social*).

[45] Thus Rousseau was quite ready to leave the political future of Corsica to the "soul and heart" of General Paoli. "Lettre à M. Buttafoco," 26 mai, 1765, *C. G.*, XIII, 334–336.

[46] "Lettre à M. l'Abbé de Raynal," juin, 1753, *C. G.*, II, 49. The multitude, Rousseau wrote, are sheep; they need examples, not arguments.

[47] Vaughan, I, 250–251 (*Economie Politique*), 476 (*Première Version*).

[48] Vaughan, II, 54 (*Contrat Social*).

[49] *Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theater*, tr. and ed. Allan Bloom (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), pp. 68–74.

[50] *Émile*, p. 159; Vaughan, I, 246–247 (*Économie Politique*).

[51] Vaughan, I, 324 (*Fragments*), 478, 483–484, 489 (*Première Version*); II, 53–54 (*Contrat Social*); *Letter to d'Alembert*, p. 74.

[52] I. Fetscher, "Rousseau's Concept of Freedom," *Nomos*, Vol. 6 (1962), p. 46.

[53] "Je crois que mes idées diffèrent prodigieusement de celles de votre nation," "Lettre à M. Buttafoco, 24 mars, 1765, *C. G.*, XIII, 150–153.

[54] "Notre plus douce existence est relative et collective et notre vrai moi n'est pas tout entier en nous," *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques*, II, *O.C.*, I, 813.

danger from that side. The history of mankind so far has been one of unrelenting self-deformation, and thus of inner conflict, insecurity, insincerity and disordered passions. Rousseau, unlike so many of his contemporaries, was not a radical environmentalist in psychology. The environment can deform or nurture the self, but it does not make it. Heavy as their impact is, especially upon children, external forces cannot create personality. They can only mould a pre-existing self for better or worse. Education is thus a matter of either conflict or harmony between the self and the outer world. Freedom lies precisely in avoiding injuries to this self. Independence and inner strength mean the preservation of one's integral character. To this end one must retain the ability to withdraw into oneself and to live by oneself even in the midst of society. "Commençons par redevenir nous, par nous concentrer en nous, par conserver notre âme."[55] Only then will we find in ourselves that *moi humain* which is the essence both of our own selfhood and of our shared humanity.

A cohesive community cannot be built by those who cherish the *moi humain*. That is why civic education and the education of the individual have nothing in common.[56] However, having invested the natural self with such deep roots and recognized its profound value, Rousseau was in no position to argue that the legislator could easily supply the citizens with new communal selves. That is why his task is, in fact, superhuman. He must destroy nature and then replace it with an artificial psychological substitute.[57] Unlike later nationalists Rousseau did not believe that the national self had any basis in nature. On the contrary, its creation does violence to all our spontaneous tendencies. National character was, for him, no "soul" at all, and in no sense a free emanation arising from the disparate selves of individuals. It was not even an historical accretion. Moses *created* the Jews. He gave them their distinctive, national identity. Before him there was only an inchoate herd. This was the example the Poles were to follow in *giving* themselves "a national physiognomy."[58] This was just what Peter the Great had failed to do. By merely imitating others he had not been able to devise a collective personality suited to the human material in his hands. Not that he had destroyed the Russian soul; there were no national souls. He was merely an artist who had no talent.[59] Whatever national character a republic is to have, and it must have one, will be an artificial imposition from above.

Since national character and patriotism are no part of our natural selves there can be no easy transition from private to public life. The second, being alien, is always a frail structure. Because the legislator must do more than just integrate existing personalities into a more coherent whole, his work does not endure. Laws and mores cannot withstand the assaults of nature for long. For in the last resort the *moi humain* is indestructible.[60] Republics, even the best, perish. The wonder is that Rousseau could believe that legislators had ever been able to create them. How did they perform this psychological miracle? He never really explained it. One must conclude that the sheer hypnotic power of a great personality can achieve, even if only temporarily, what neither force nor reason can produce. That is certainly what Rousseau believed.

It has occasionally been suggested that Rousseau in providing Corsica and Poland with constitutional plans imagined himself to be a real legislator.[61] In fact, he thought nothing of the sort. In a most revealing passage he explained that he could never fulfill that rôle, precisely because he lacked the necessary personal qualities.[62] He declined, for that very reason, to participate directly in Corsican affairs.[63] No one had a clearer view of the differences between the life of action and the life of observation, and he knew himself to be capable only of the latter. At most he might help to guide some future statesman.[64] At times he claimed that he did not even wish to lead his contemporaries, but only to warn them against false prophets.[65] Not that he was modest. He alone among authors had revealed the nature and history of the human heart.[66] Now, knowing the human heart was certainly one of the main prerequisites of legislative authority, but it was not the only one. Rousseau therefore could dream of being a leader, but he knew that it was a mere fantasy. If he had the ring of Gyges he would certainly use it to make mankind happy. It would lift him above all partiality and weakness, but not even in a dream could it make him into a man of action. His force was bound to remain "negative." He would remain human, the equal, in spite of himself, of those over whom he should rule.[67] The personality that radiates authority eluded him. It was with St. Preux, not with M. de Wolmar, that Rousseau identified himself.[68]

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[55] "Lettres Morales," VI, *C. G.*, III, 9.

[56] *Émile*, p. 3; Vaughan, I, 255–257 (*Économie Politique*).

[57] "Celui qui se croit capable de former un peuple doit se sentir en état de changer, pour ainsi dire, la nature des hommes. Il faut qu'il transforme chaque individu, qui est par lui-même un tout parfait et solitaire, en partie d'un plus grand tout, dont cet individu reçoive en quelque sorte sa vie et son être; qu'il mutile, pour ainsi dire, la constitution de l'homme." Vaughan, I, 248 (*Économie Politique*), 324 (*Fragments*), 478 (*Première Version*); II, 51–52 (*Contrat Social*).

[58] Vaughan, I, 355–356 (*Fragments*); II, 319, 428, 432 (*Poland*).

[59] Vaughan, II, 56 (*Contrat Social*). To the Poles he said, "Ils doivent rechercher uniquement ce qui leur est convenable, et non pas ce que d'autres font." *Ibid.*, II, 487.

[60] "C'est donc en vain qu'on prétendroit refondre les divers ésprits sur un modele commun. On peut les contraindre et non les changer." *N. H.*, Part V, Lettre III.

[61] Jean Starobinski, "La Pensée Politique de Jean-Jacques Rousseau," in Samuel Baud-Bovy *et al.*, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Neuchâtel, 1962), pp. 83, 99.

[62] *Les Rêveries*, VI, 1057–1059.

[63] *Confessions*, Bk. XII, p. 650.

IV. THERAPEUTIC AUTHORITY

If Rousseau thought himself too human to lead his fellow men, few other men were fit. In his own lifetime Rousseau seems to have known only one—Claude Anet, Mme. de Warens' factotum, and Rousseau's immediate predecessor as her lover. This, Rousseau noted several times, was an extraordinary man, the only one of his kind that he had ever seen. Slow, composed, thoughtful, circumspect and cold, he treated those around him like children, and so made them happy. He managed to do what Rousseau could never do: to keep order in Mme. de Warens' affairs. He did this because she, like Rousseau and everyone else, esteemed and feared him, and did so because they could not bear his disapproval. Rousseau knew exactly where Anet's power came from and why he could never emulate him. It was force of personality alone. He had neither the *sangfroid* nor the firmness of Anet. Though he was brighter and better educated, he lacked that quality that made people instinctively seek Anet's approval.[69]

Claude Anet might well have served as a model for M. de Wolmar, Rousseau's most perfect portrait of the man of authority. Wolmar, the elderly husband of the heroine of the novel, Julie, is everything that St. Preux-Rousseau, her former lover, is not. Born somewhere in Eastern Europe, he is rich and a member of the highest nobility.[70] After an active and adventurous life of travel and soldiering he settles down in his later years to marriage and to running a model estate, Clarens. We are told nothing of his appearance in the novel, but in a letter to his illustrator Rousseau insisted that Wolmar's gaze must be "fin et froid."[71] Along with his vast experience among all sorts of men, Wolmar is distinguished by a total absence of any passion. He needs no one, not even God. His only active love is for order; his one aversion, to see men suffer. His only interest in life is to read the hearts of men.[72] That his penetrating eye has supernatural powers of looking into the hearts of others is frequently noted by all who know him.[73] This talent is the source of his unfailing judgment.[74] In Wolmar, alone among men, action and observation are not distinct. He acts to learn, and observes in order to act.[75] He not only knows men completely, but he identifies entirely with his plans for them, with the creation of order. In him subject and object are one. In this he is indeed like God. The reason Wolmar does not believe in God is that he *is* God to all intents and purposes.[76] Certainly he has all the attributes that Rousseau ascribed to God, self-sufficiency, justice, love of order. If he is not God, he certainly does God's work.[77] Not only does he create peace through justice on his estate, he returns corrupt or ill men to that natural moral condition in which God wants them to remain.[78] Because he *is* his end he has an immediate impact on others, moreover. To know Wolmar is to desire his approbation.[79] In this too he is god-like.

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[64] Vaughan, I, 350–351 (*Fragments*).

[65] *Ibid.*, I, 342 (*Fragments*).

[66] *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques*, I, 728.

[67] *Les Rêveries*, VI, 1057–1059.

[68] *Confessions*, Bk. VIII, pp. 355, 438; *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques*, II, 778.

[69] *Confessions*, Bk. V, pp. 177–178, 201–206, 264–265. That is why Rousseau resented Anet so deeply: in the *Nouvelle Heloïse* he gave the worthless valet Claude Anet's name.

[70] *N. H.*, Part III, Lettre XVIII.

[71] "Lettre à M. Coindet," décembre, 1760, *C. G.*, V, 295, and other notes on the illustrations, *O. C.*, II, 762. The coldness of the true sage was often noted, *e.g.*, *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques*, II, 861–862.

[72] *N. H.*, Part IV, Lettre XII.

[73] *Ibid.*, Part IV, Lettres XI, XII.

[74] "Au lieu de juger des autres par soi il faudroit peut être juger de soi par les autres, mais sans s'arreter à l'apparence, il faudroit pour cela lire dans leur coeur comme on croit lire dans le sien." *Ébauches des Confessions*, p. 1158.

"What then is required for the proper study of men? A great wish to know men, a great impartiality of judgment, a heart sufficiently sensitive to understand every human passion, and calm enough to be free from passion." *Émile*, p. 206. Just so Wolmar.

[75] *N. H.*, Part V, Lettre XII.

[76] Vaughan, I, 211 (*Inégalité*); Jean Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: la Transparence et l'Obstacle* (Paris, 1957), pp. 139–140. It may be

As a soul-surgeon Wolmar's task is to cure the heartsick St. Preux by making him "himself" again. Above all, St. Preux's self-confidence, and so his freedom, must be restored.[80] St. Preux's sickness, according to Wolmar, is not that he is still in love with Julie de Wolmar, but that he is obsessed by his former love for her as a young girl—a young girl who no longer exists in fact. The hardest slavery, Rousseau noted, is that imposed by a passion from which one would like to deliver oneself, but cannot.[81] In this case the passion is a form of nostalgia. Wolmar's method is therefore to "cover the past with the present," so that St. Preux may recognize Julie as she is now, a wife and mother, and himself as an independent being. St. Preux must be released from his memories.[82]

The burden of the past was, indeed, a constant theme in Rousseau's writings.[83] If imagination leads men astray by giving them insatiable desires for unattainable and harmful objects, memory chains them to the past and fills them with regret. We are thus always either ahead of, or behind ourselves.[84] Happiness and health, however, are to be found only in the ability to live in the present, to take each day as if there were neither yesterday nor tomorrow.[85] Memory makes us reflective. It is crippling, inhibiting and destructive. It prevents us from accepting the present, as we linger in the past.[86] It is not just a pleasant past, moreover, that chains us down. Rousseau was perhaps the first novelist to isolate nostalgia as a distinct psychological malady. That is what makes *La Nouvelle Heloïse* such a modern novel. Everything is seen nostalgically, filtered through regret. And it is the past as such that draws the lovers back. Bad conscience does not trouble them, for they are not regarded as guilty. Neither do they long for a lost happiness: they did not enjoy their love affair. It was, in fact, a time of acute misery and anxiety for both. It is pure nostalgia that obsesses St. Preux. He is the captive of daydreams projected into the past, rather than into the future. And there was nothing Rousseau did not know about the enervating effects of fantasies. If they turn toward the future they make men restless, if they linger on the past they lead to inactivity and inability to take charge of one's own life. That is why St. Preux is so helplessly dependent on other people. His friend, Lord Bomston, treats him like a child for years, until Wolmar gets to work on him. Emile, in contrast, is free and his judgment is sound, because he is a slave to neither routine nor memory.[87]

What is true of individuals is also true of nations. A young people has no memories. Old nations may be reborn only if they suffer

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that Wolmar and Julie are meant to represent a perfect whole, as is suggested by J. H. Broome, *Rousseau* (London, 1963), pp. 131, 140. However, it is quite plausible that Julie is meant to play Christ to Wolmar's God. She is the very spirit of mercy and charity at Clarens—and at the end there is even a false impression of resurrection, all pointing to Rousseau's decidedly moralistic, non-mystical view of the Christian message.

[77] "La véritable Grandeur consiste dans l'exercice des vertus bienfaisantes, à l'example de celle de Dieu *qui ne se manifeste que par les biens qu'il repand sur nous.*" *Oraison Funèbre du Duc d'Orleans*, *O. C.*, II, 1277. (My italics.)

[78] "Dieu veut que nous soyons tels qu'il nous à fait," *Lettre â Christophe Beaumont, Archevêque de Paris, Oeuvres Complètes* (Hachette), III, 88–89. God says to man, "Je t'ai fait trop faible pour sortir du gouffre, parce que je t'ai fait assez fort pour n'y pas tomber." *Confessions*, Bk. II, p. 64. In a sense the Wolmars of this world do better than God. They retrieve men from the abyss, rather than leaving them to suffer the consequences of weakness.

[79] As soon as St. Preux has met Wolmar he says, "Je commençait de connoitre alors quel homme j'avois à faire, et je résolus bien de tenir mon coeur en état d'être vu de lui," *N. H.*, Part IV, Lettre VI.

[80] Much as M. Gaime once returned Rousseau's self-confidence to him—*Confessions*, Bk. III, pp. 90–91; *Émile*, pp. 226–227.

[81] *Pensèes d'un Ésprit Droit*, LXXI, *O. C.*, II, 1313.

[82] *N. H.*, Part IV, Lettre XIV.

[83] For a discussion linking Rousseau's and Proust's psychology of time, see M. J. Temmer, *Time in Rousseau and Kant* (Geneva, 1958), pp. 22–24; 27–33, 44–49.

[84] Vaughan, I, 150, 178 (Inégalité); *Préface â "Narcisse," O. C.*, II, 970; *Émile*, pp. 44–45, 95, 245; *Les Rêveries*, V, 1046.

[85] *Émile*, pp. 46, 317.

[86] *Pensées*, XLVI, *O. C.*, II, 1309.

[87] *Émile*, p. 124; Vaughan, I, 215–216 (*Inégalité*).

experiences so intensely shocking that they obliterate their past from memory. That is what happened to Sparta at the time of Lycurgus, to Rome after the Tarquins, and to Holland and Switzerland in the course of their liberation. That, too, was his hope for Poland.[88] To be sure, not all memories are bad; accumulated experience is wisdom in individuals and sound tradition in nations, but in its pathological forms it becomes nostalgia and, collectively, prejudice. Rousseau could on occasion speak of political cures, of destroying prejudices and even of "washing away" the past.[89] In the main, however, he thought old nations incurable. Some individuals, who were not yet totally corrupt, on the other hand, could be liberated: if there was a Wolmar to cure them.

How does Wolmar proceed? He never preaches, never reproaches, never punishes. What he does is to arrange situations which force St. Preux to face reality: first the reality of Mme. de Wolmar as a woman whom he no longer loves, then himself as a man capable of making decisions for himself. These situations are created with infinite care, the environment being structured in advance.[90] Often it is done against the wishes of Julie and St. Preux, as when Wolmar departs, leaving them alone for several days.[91] Sometimes it involves deception, as when Wolmar's collaborator, Lord Bomston, puts St. Preux in a contrived situation where he seems obliged to help his patron, and to take charge of the latter's life and future.[92] In both cases St. Preux is forced into self-recognition and so into freedom. He is cured of nostalgia and of insecurity. As Julie says of herself, Wolmar "returned her to herself," and now St. Preux is again sane; Wolmar, she notes, has been his "liberator."[93]

It is a slow process. At first St. Preux becomes completely dependent on Wolmar and feels unsure as soon as the latter's watchful eye is removed.[94] After passing all the contrived tests arranged for him, he is, however, not only prepared to accept Wolmar's offer to bring up his children, but he no longer fears Wolmar's "oeil éclairé" when it reads his heart.[95] He does not become a second Wolmar, to be sure; such is not his bent nor his station in life. Even when he is restored to himself he remains in need of Wolmar's guidance. His first response to a difficult situation is to lament Wolmar's absence: "where are your paternal cares, your lessons, your insight? What shall I do without you?"[96] When he finally does recognize that he is now a free and competent person, he is still aware that this has been Wolmar's work, not his own. It is then that he calls the former his benefactor and his father, and notes that "in giving myself to you entirely, I can give to you, as to God himself, gifts that I have received from you."[97] St. Preux's freedom will always depend on Wolmar's continued presence, not so much as a therapist, but as the guarantor of the order of Clarens in which St. Preux is to share. Wolmar himself accepts responsibility in advance. "Live in the present," he tells St. Preux, "and I will answer for the future." That too is Julie's cousin's advice: let Wolmar manage.[98] In short, St. Preux is now a full and useful man, but he is not, he never could be, Wolmar's equal. He will always depend on Wolmar's care.[99] Psychological dependence is here the condition of freedom and order. For even a small order, such as Clarens, is possible only through the constant authority of Wolmar.

V. PALLIATIVE AUTHORITY

Palliative authority alleviates the symptoms of social illness, even though it cannot remove their basic causes. This also is Wolmar's work at Clarens. Here again his guiding hand is felt but never seen. It is invisible, yet omnipresent. This social aspect of his authority exceeds what is needed for curing St. Preux. Wolmar sets the moral standards and tone at Clarens, and his mere presence ensures that they are observed.

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[88] Vaughan, II, 55 (*Contrat Social*), 441 (*Poland*).

[89] Vaughan, I, 183 (*Inégalité*); II, 307 (*Corsica*).

[90] For the best account of this see Étienne Gilson, "La Méthode de M. de Wolmar," in *Les Idées et les Lettres* (Paris, 1932), pp. 275–298.

[91] *N. H.*, Part V, Lettre XII.

[92] *Ibid.*, Part II, Lettre XII; Part VI, Lettre III.

[93] *Ibid.*, Part III, Lettre XVIII; Part IV, Lettre VII; Part VI, Lettre XII.

[94] *Ibid.*, Part IV, Lettre XV.

[95] *Ibid.*, Part V, Lettre VII.

[96] *Ibid.*, Part V, Lettre XII. (All translations are mine.)

[97] *Ibid.*, Part VI, Lettre XII.

[98] *Ibid.*, Part IV, Lettres IX, XII. It is clear that both in his methods and ends Wolmar cannot be compared to a modern psychoanalyst. Indeed, there is no effort made here to represent Rousseau as a precursor of psychoanalytic theory, in spite of surface similarities.

[99] Thus St. Preux notes, "si je n'y prends pas tout à fait l'autorité d'un maitre; je sens plus de plaisir encore à me regarder comme l'enfant de la maison." *Ibid.*, Part V, Lettre II.

He needs to *do* very little, but he must *be* there. Without him this society would fall apart, because left to itself it would fall prey to the encroachments of the civilized world and its disrupting temptations. Without Wolmar, moreover, there would be no justice in the relationships among the individuals who live and work at Clarens. His authority is thus partly preventive: it keeps the "great world" away from Clarens and protects its rural simplicity. More significantly, however, it is also palliative. For even Clarens is "unnatural," as are all organized societies, since the division of labor, social inequality and constraint prevail in all. What "legitimizes" these fundamental evils is justice. That is the message of the *Social Contract*, and Wolmar's benevolent rule at Clarens illustrates it in a more informal setting.

The immense power that Wolmar exercises over his dependents and neighbors is justified by his method of ruling, which can be summed up in one word: justice. A rigorous system of rewards and penalties is administered by a man who is always "equitable without anger" to his servants. The neighboring peasants are helped to recognize that their estate, for all its hardships, is the best one open to mankind.[100] No one is encouraged to change his social position, but justice renders social inferiority bearable and gives it a degree of moral validity.[101] Each man gets his deserts and respects those of others. However, at no time does Wolmar, or anyone else, claim that inequality and domestic service are natural or agreeable conditions. Wolmar's justice can only render them tolerable. He lessens the force of resentment and his people endure their burdens without complaint.[102] Certainly none of Wolmar's servants want to leave his estate. Life at Clarens, autarchical, isolated from the "great world," without any disorder or luxury, and with some sense of common unity and justice, is not perfect, but at least there is less cause for dissatisfaction and hostility than in other societies. More than that even the semi-divine Wolmar cannot do. For political authority is at best a form of surgery, once the diseases of inequality have set in, and the social function of justice is to render subordination bearable, even when it involves serfdom, as in Poland.[103] That does not in any way lessen the value of justice as a virtue in Wolmar, who creates it, or in the citizens who abide by it and whose general will expresses nothing else.[104]

Order, regularity, security of expectations and fairness: everything in this stable, harmonious society reflects the soul of the master. And although everyone seems to be doing what pleases himself, it is Wolmar who directs each one, for all are united in their attachment to him. That is because Wolmar not only wants to be well served, but because he is concerned with the moral welfare of his servants and with the order of his estate as a whole.[105] It is his responsibility and he attends to it directly, never acting through, and thus depending on, intermediaries.[106] This personal involvement also marks the other efforts that Wolmar and Julie make to soften the anguish of inequality. From time to time they practice "togetherness" with their servants and neighbors. Festivities and celebrations in which all join are frequently held at Clarens in order that servants and masters might at least share some of the pleasures of life in a spontaneous way, and occasionally recognize their common humanity. However, this too is palliative, a way of reducing the coldness imposed by inequality. The differences in rank are not forgotten.[107] The brute reality remains, and Rousseau was not disposed to forget it. Even when he was looking for ways of transcending its worst emotional and moral effects, he remained acutely aware of inequality: the heaviest of all the chains that society imposes upon us.

VI. DOMESTIC AND PREVENTIVE AUTHORITY

Infrangible inequality is not the only limitation on Wolmar's powers. He himself recognizes from the first that he cannot do for his wife all that he can do for St. Preux. He does not even try.[108] Her regeneration is not his work, but an act of divine grace. It is, however, only a partial cure, which is completed only when she all but commits a sacrificial suicide. Neither Wolmar nor St. Preux can influence her in the slightest, simply because she has greater strength of character and a rare capacity to inspire servile love and devotion.[109] This all-attracting, but also subtly hateful portrait was entirely in keeping with Rousseau's general view of women. Women rule men and make of them whatever they please.[110] "Do you want to know men? Study women."[111] Clearly Rousseau did not like this monstrous regiment of women. Paris, the very epitome of modern corruption, was entirely ruled by women.[112] Indeed women were responsible for most of the moral evils of this world, but Rousseau could not help admiring authority, even in this case. The result was a considerable uneasiness. He composed two brief essays to show that women had been important in the great events of history and that in civic virtue and military heroism women were really the equals of men.[113] This did not deter him from claiming that "the law of nature bids women obey men," because men are active and strong, while women are passive and feeble.[114] To be sure, husbands ought to treat their wives well, but just or unjust, women must submit to the commands of their spouses.[115] However, in the end Rousseau decided that this submission was itself only superficial. Julie rules Clarens and when Emile's tutor resigns his authority over his pupil, he says, "My weighty task is now ended and another undertakes this duty. To-day I abdicate the authority which you gave me; henceforth Sophie is your guardian."[116] If anything, her authority is greater even than that of the man who ruled Emile so completely, for she rules over an adult, not a child.

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[100] *N. H.*, Part V, Lettre II.

[101] Vaughan, II, 497 (*Poland*).

[102] *N. H.*, Part IV, Lettre X.

[103] Vaughan, I, 181 (*Inégalité*); II, 497 (*Poland*).

[104] For the place of justice and fairness in the *Social Contract* see G. Kateb, "Aspects of Rousseau's Political Thought," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 76 (1961), pp. 519–543.

[105] *N. H.*, Part III, Lettre XX, Part IV, Lettres IV, X.

[106] See also *Émile*, pp. 48, 198, 202.

[107] Thus the tutor in *Émile* says of servants, "be their brother and they will be your children," p. 59. Not equals, it should be noted, but dependents. That too is the state of affairs at Clarens. *N. H.*, Part V, Lettre VII. The importance of festivals and ceremonies is also urged upon the Poles, Vaughan, II (*Poland*), 434–435.

[108] *N. H.* Part IV, Lettre XIV.

If the authority of women over men is no blessing, women's influence over their children is rarely wise. Though they desire the happiness of their young, most are too stupid to bring them up properly.[117] The ignorance of women is, however, not the only flaw in parental authority, a subject to which Rousseau gave much thought. Of all the actual and inevitable forms of authority it is the most important, and in all corrupt—that is, in all contemporary—societies, parents are the agents who transmit false traditions and habits from one generation to the next. Children are sacrificed to social vanity, cast too early into the conventional mould and, thanks to the ambitions of their fathers, forced into unhappy marriages.[118] Rousseau was, moreover, anxious to minimize the legitimate scope of paternal authority in order to prove, as Locke had, that it could not serve as a model or justification for absolute monarchy.[119] If, at times, he regretted the passing of paternal chiefs and familial society, he was just as deeply drawn to the republican ideal. Here again there was a conflict of ideals. Occasionally he would sing the praises of the virtuous family-man devoted to raising his children.[120] Just as often, however, he would dream of the true republic in which public education replaces not only the father, but the entire family.[121]

It is not just the socializing and political functions of the family that make it a suspect institution under present circumstances. It is also inherently inefficient as a way of educating the young. If a child is to be brought up for his own sake, to become a good and happy man, he needs constant attention. To be the perfect tutor of a single child is a lifetime's work.[122] It is a sobering thought. Nothing less than a full-time tutor for each child can bring about the regeneration of civilized men through education. And where are tutors to be found? Rousseau doubted whether any man was really fit for it.[123] The tutor, to be sure, need not have the magnetic personality, the immense social experience, nor the wealth and rank of a Wolmar. Indeed, a tutor should be no more than a man and should show his pupil that he was only human, a person with weaknesses and needs.[124] Nevertheless his talents like his responsibilities must be immense. Rousseau himself had been a wretched failure as a tutor. His inability to exercise authority had been his undoing, as he recognized perfectly clearly.[125] His *ideas* on education, however, were fully developed very early, and he adhered to them with unusual consistency. From his first to his last letter on the subject one point was, moreover, always emphasized: the tutor must have complete and absolute authority over his charge.[126] No one, not even the parents, may interfere.

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[109] *Ibid.*, Part V, Lettres III, X; for a religious interpretation of the relationship, see Pierre Burgelin, *La Philosophie de l'Existence de Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Paris, 1952), pp. 447–455.

[110] "Lettre à Lenieps," 8 novembre, 1758, *C. G.*, IV, 115–116.

[111] *Letter to d'Alembert*, p. 82.

[112] *N. H.* Part I, Lettre XXI.

[113] *Essai sur les Evénements Importants Dont les Femmes Ont Été la Cause Secrète*," *O. C.*, II, pp. 1257–1259; *Sur les Femmes*, *ibid.*, pp. 1254–1255.

[114] *Émile*, pp. 322, 370–371; *Pensées*, VII, *O. C.*, II, 1300; *Letter to d'Alembert*, pp. 87–88.

[115] *Émile*, pp. 333, 359.

[116] *Ibid.*, p. 444.

[117] *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 87. He regretted that the law gave them too little power over their children mainly because he thought maternal affection less harmful than paternal harshness.

[118] Vaughan, I, 205 (*Inégalité*); *N. H.*, "Seconde Préface," p. 24; *Émile*, pp. 48, 149, 163.

[119] Vaughan, I, 185 (*Inégalité*), 237–240 (*Économie Politique*); *Émile*, p. 423; Vaughan, II, 80 (*Contrat Social*).

[120] *Émile*, pp. 16–17.

[121] Vaughan, I, 256–258 (*Économie Politique*), 278–279 (*Fragments*), Geneva, he thought, was an acceptable compromise between domestic and public education, "Lettre à Tronchin," 26 novembre, 1758, *C. G.*, IV, 143.

[122] *Émile*, p. 19.

[123] *Ibid.*, p. 17; according to Wolmar, "Il n'y a qu'un homme de génie en qui l'on puisse espérer

Why does the tutor need such an extensive authority? He needs it in order to fulfill his task of prevention. The child is to be educated *against* society and he must be protected against parents, neighbors and servants who would press their false values upon him. The tutor's direct authority over the child must be complete, because the child is always so defenseless, so exposed to external influences. The question is not, to rule or not to rule over the child, but who is to create his environment for him and to what end? Is convention or virtue to create the man? If the tutor is to replace society, he must have more than equivalent means to arrange the child's life, to structure his experiences and to replace all other human examples and influences. "Negative education," which is the tutor's method, is far from being effortless or unplanned.

What then is "negative education?"[127] It differs from conventional education not only in its ends, but also, of necessity, in its entire method. Its aim is to make a self-sufficient adult who lives at peace with himself.[128] To achieve this one must at all costs avoid trying to impose a foreign, social character upon the child. His natural self must not be inhibited in any way. On the contrary, everything must be arranged so that the child may learn everything that he has to know, without losing his God-given characteristics. "Fit a man's education to his real self, not to what is no part of him."[129] "Negative education" is negative in that it prevents the imposition of an artificial, socially devised and socially oriented self upon the child. It prepares him for knowledge by protecting him against error.[130] If Emile is docile to a degree and if his will is at the mercy of his tutor, it is because the latter has made himself loved and has made himself the child's only model. He rules over the child's will by pre-arranging experiences and situations, not by any sort of direct imposition.[131] He never bullies and rarely, if ever, punishes.[132] He demonstrates and manipulates. Like Wolmar he does not hesitate to employ stratagems and deceits. His whole art lies in "controlling events."[133] He does not give orders, and again like Wolmar, is everywhere without being seen.[134] If Emile is in this way buffeted and protected at every point, he is compelled to *do* only one thing: to learn for himself.[135] In this sense he is forced to be free by being negatively educated. That is, he is prevented from becoming weak, and dependent, as he most certainly would have come to be without his tutor's care.

VII. CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF REGENERATION

Since Emile is a child, one would not expect him to enjoy full freedom under any circumstances. However, he remains in need of the tutor's protective guidance even in adulthood. For Rousseau did not think that even Emile could manage to remain free for long. If he would flounder, certainly corrupt, civilized men were entirely incapable of freedom. Without the directing intelligence, and an order maintained by it, most men would inevitably destroy the conditions of freedom.

At the end of *Émile*, the pupil, now fully

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de trouver les lumieres d'un maitre." *N. H.*, Part IV, Lettre XIV.

[124] *Émile,* pp. 208, 299–300. That is why a St. Preux would do.

[125] *Confessions,* Bk. VII, pp. 267–269; *Émile,* p. 18.

[126] Rousseau made this point in his first essay on private education written in 1740, "Mémoire Presenté à M. de Ste. Maire Pour l'Education de son Fils," *C. G.*, I, 367–379, and he repeated it many years later in advising a nobleman on the rules to be followed by the governess of the latter's daughter, "Lettre au Prince de Wurtemberg," 10 novembre, 1763, *C. G.*, X, 205–217; *Émile,* p. 20. The tutor, not the father, Rousseau insisted, chooses a wife for Émile, *ibid.*, p. 369.

[127] *Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques,* I, 687; *Émile* pp. 16, 57.

[128] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[129] *Ibid.*, pp. 157, 216–217; *N. H.*, Part V, Lettre III. "Give nature time to work before you take over her business." *Émile,* p. 71.

[130] *Lettre à Christophe Beaumont,* p. 71.

[131] *Émile,* pp. 84–85.

[132] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

[133] *Ibid.*, p. 209.

[134] *Ibid.*, pp. 84–85, 88–89, 107, 177.

[135] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

grown and about to become a father, still feels in need of the protective presence of his tutor. "Advise and control us," he begs, "as long as I live I shall need you. I need you more than ever now that I am taking up the duties of manhood."[136] As he had said a few years earlier, "Resume the authority. I place it in your hands of my own free-will."[137] Even more revealing is the story of what happens to Emile and Sophie once the tutor does leave. The sketch for a sequel to *Émile* that Rousseau left unfinished begins with Emile's lament, "If you had not left us, I should still be happy!"[138] As soon as the tutor departs Emile and Sophie cease to be able to cope with the difficulties that beset them and commit one mistake after another until their marriage and their happiness are destroyed. Emile's education continues to stand him in good stead. He bears adversity admirably. But he does not know how to avert or end the troubles that afflict him and his wife. He cannot control his own future. What is impossible for the perfectly reared Emile, who possesses every virtue except the quality that directs men and events, is certainly not possible for lesser men. On the social level that meant, for example, that although the Polish peasants and burghers who are to be freed and raised to the ranks of the nobility are chosen for their merits, it is just when they reach civic maturity that they need guidance most. They are to be watched, protected and helped, not because they are poor subjects, but because they are free.[139] It is they who must have an orderly environment and a directing hand. After all, even that part of the public that really desires the common good needs guides.[140] How much more so the more feeble mass!

To Rousseau it did not appear that genuine authority limits freedom. The real tension was between authority and equality. Personal authority is not merely compatible with freedom, it creates it. In its healing form, in ordering the disrupted passions, it is psychologically liberating. In ordering the environment it allows men to retain an integrated self and to preserve their independence. Wolmar and Emile's tutor are nothing if not tolerant, especially in matters of faith and opinion.[141] Freedom, in any case, was for Rousseau not a matter of doing as one pleases, but of *not* being compelled, either from within or from without, to do what one does *not* wish to do.[142] Inner compulsion is thus a most severe form of enslavement. That is why an ordered existence is needed to support us in a free condition. That also is why moderate desires, a capacity to live in the present and dependence only on things are the prerequisites of the very possibility of a free life.[143] All of them, however, depend on an educative, preventive, curative and ordering authority. Authentic authority liberates.[144] It gives liberty to those who are incapable of creating it for themselves.

The strong then liberate the weak, but the distance between them remains. Nothing can alter the fact that St. Preux will never be Wolmar's equal, nor Emile his tutor's. However, though its extent is no less than the difference between God and man, this inequality is a natural one, and, as such, relatively unproblematic. It is only the addition of social inequalities to those of nature that creates our great miseries. If Rousseau's images of authority show any one thing it is the intensity and consistency of his hatred for all forms of personal dependence and social inequality, and for their psychological roots, weakness and *amour-propre*. It is these that cause even loving parents to destroy the happiness of innocent young people like Julie and St. Preux. It is these that make even the best constructed republic a fleeting palliative. It is these that render even the serene life at Clarens galling to most of its inhabitants. *Amour-propre* and its social expressions are, moreover, inseparable from social life as such. In society their worst consequences may be cured, palliated and, in the case of a chosen few, prevented from arising. The evil itself remains ineradicable. In his last years Rousseau felt that under prevailing conditions peace was worth more even than freedom. For freedom existed now only in the heart of the just man.[145] In short, things being what they are, peace, order and quiet were the best anyone could hope for.

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[136] *Ibid.*, p. 444.

[137] *Ibid.*, p. 290.

[138] *Émile et Sophie,* Hachette, III, p. 3. (My translation.)

[139] Vaughan, II, 501 (*Poland*).

[140] *Ibid.*, II, 51 (*Contrat Social*).

[141] *N. H.*, Part VI, Lettre XI. "No man is free from man's first duty, no one has the right to depend on another's judgment," *Émile,* p. 270. That men should be free is the will of Providence, *ibid.*, pp. 243–244.

[142] *Les Rêveries*, VI, 1059; *Lettres à Malesherbes,* p. 1132; *Lettres Écrites de la Montagne,* pp. 227–228; *Émile et Sophie*, p. 28.

[143] *Émile,* pp. 48–59, 125, 436; *Pensées,* XXXI, p. 1305.

[144] Vaughan, I, 184 (*Inégalité*). If most actual authority is merely a necessary response to the wickedness of the subjects, it is still true that even in good republics the glory of the citizen rests in obedience to legitimate masters. *Ibid.*, I, 127, 190–191 (*Inégalité*); "Lettre à M. d'Ivernois," 24 mars, 1768, *C. G.*, XVIII, 175–178. That the element of subjection remains is not to be forgotten. "There is no subjection so complete as that which preserves the forms of freedom; it is thus that the will itself is taken captive." *Émile,* pp. 88, 196.

This resignation was not merely a matter of old age and exhaustion. It had been implicit in Rousseau's work all along. Indeed, it is less Burke's traditionalist rhetoric than Rousseau's psychological insight that has set the most severe limits on all hopes of easy reform. *Émile* is anything but a manual for those eupeptic schoolmasters who imagine that it is possible to reconstruct society by fiddling with the curriculum and altering the atmosphere of the classroom. A regenerative education *against* society and apart from its strains and prejudices would require one perfect tutor for each newborn child. Apart from a few Swiss peasants, each child would need the constant attention of a man who was himself above society. Where are such teachers to be found? Yet this is the only way to cure denatured men through educative means. To be sure, it is neither morally nor psychologically impossible, but it is historically very unlikely. Society being what men have made it, and expressing, as it does, the most deep-seated psychological deformities, is not readily altered. The great men, whose personalities can impinge upon the consciousness of those whom they wish to improve, can effect some real, though never complete, alleviation. Such men, always rare, have now, however, ceased to exist altogether. In their absence nothing can be done to morally reconstruct the European world.

To be sure, Rousseau's concerns were not limited to this single grand design. He was often deeply immersed in schemes for partial political reform, especially in Geneva. Moreover, the very act of devising standards for improvement, even excessively high ones, was an act of affirmation on his part. If disgust and distress were his immediate inspiration, the vision of equality was not a chimera. He was certain that he had known egalitarian societies in rural Switzerland and he believed that such communities had existed in the remote past. If criticism, indeed denunciation of the most devastating sort, were all that his contemporaries received from him, he was not the prophet of withdrawal either. However, at no time did he allow himself the illusion of painless reform or of the possibility of effortless social regeneration. His images of men of authority are so interesting because they are his answer to the question "how do we begin?" That his reply should have been cast in psychological, rather than in social terms, is scarcely surprising. Indeed it was inevitable, since for Rousseau politics was but a part of that study of the human heart which he had made his province. That also is the chief reason for his enduring relevance.

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[145] "Lettre à M. Moultou fils," 7 mars, 1768, *C. G.*, XVIII, 147–150, "ce n'est pas la peine de se battailler pour le reste."

PARTY GOVERNMENT AND THE SETTLEMENT OF 1688*

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR.
Harvard University

The purpose of this essay is to consider what kind of compromise is produced by party government. Its method is to discover what kind of compromise was produced by the so-called Settlement of 1688, the compromise which laid the foundation for party government in Britain. It will be suggested that the kind of compromise which laid the foundation for party government is the kind which party government, in turn, chiefly produces.

I

Party government itself seems to embody some kind of compromise because of its relation to representative government. Representative government means government which somehow represents all the people, giving effect to *their* opinions or values, not imposing the opinions or values of their rulers on them. Representative government is in a verbal sense universal today; all governments claim to represent the people, even that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is criticized by the Free World, and criticizes the Free World, for not being true representative government. It is entirely out of fashion to admit to ruling the people. The bad forms of government are those which in fact rule the people, contrary to their professions. They are bourgeois or totalitarian, according to the point of view.

Now party government is the universally recognized instrument of representative government. Party government is everywhere touted as the necessary, though not the only way to represent the people. There are differences regarding the proper number of parties—one or two or several; but it is agreed that some form of party government is necessary to representative government. Even General deGaulle, who believes with Burke that "all acting in corps tends to reduce the consideration of an individual who is of any distinguished value"[1]—even he has been forced to countenance the formation of a party of his supporters. Although party may have some legal recognition and regulation in electoral law, it is chiefly extra-legal in every country. Nowhere does a party program have the force of a law or decree. Thus the necessity of party is the result of the failure or shortcomings of merely legal representation. In modern times the argument for merely legal representation was presented by Hobbes. According to Hobbes, the sovereign is an artificial person solely authorized by a multitude to form a common power capable of making and enforcing laws.[2] The unity of will by which a multitude becomes a people is achieved by the authorization of power sufficient to make laws.

It is, however, universally agreed today that a unity of will cannot be achieved in this way. The communists, the Free World and those between find that unity of will must be achieved extra-legally, through a party or a party system. Apparently the varied wills of a multitude must be gathered together; they do not fall into a unity either by an immediate, enlightened understanding of the need for unity or by fear of a conqueror. This discovery has led to one understanding of party,[3] in the Free World, and especially in the United States, as the gathering of various wills or interests to make a unity. Party is the formation of a consensus to make a people from the varied wills of a multitude, so that the government can represent the people. Party is an instrument of government, but also prior to government because it makes the people which the government represents. In this view, the extra-legal character of party is an addition to its dignity; what it lacks in the majesty of law is more than made up by its closeness to the people, who are the source of law. From this standpoint, the virtue of party is compromise, meaning flexibility. The farther the party can stretch, the more interests it can gather; and the more it facilitates representative government.

But it has been noticed that such a party need stretch no more than to a majority, or to a majority with a comfortable margin, because the extra-legal party has, in a free constitution, the advantage of the legal requirement of a majority; it need stretch no farther. The legal stipulation is not merely an incidental detail of the party's environment. On the other hand, it may be harmful to try to form a consensus larger than a majority. Once the consensus extends past a comfortable majority, every new addition tends to weaken, not strengthen, the consensus. Every new interest is bought at the price of loosening the adhesion of interests already gathered. A sprawling party, larger than it needs to be, is vulnerable to an incisive attack—for example the Democratic party of the 1850s and the Tory party of the 1930s. That is one reason why elections are usually fairly close in free countries.

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* A revision of a lecture given at the University of Chicago, January 17, 1964.

[1] Thomas Copeland, ed. *The Correspondence of Edmund Burke* (4 vols. to date, Chicago, 1958–63), IV, 80.

[2] *Cf.* Hanna Pitkin, "Hobbes's Concept of Representation," this REVIEW, Vol. 58 (June and December, 1964), pp. 328–40 and 902–18.

[3] For the argument which follows see Harry V. Jaffa, "The Nature and Origin of the American Party System," *Political Parties, U.S.A.* (Chicago, 1964), pp. 60–3 and Arthur W. Macmahon, "Conflict, Consensus, Confirmed Trends and Open Choices," this REVIEW, Vol. 42 (Feb. 1948), pp. 1–15.

Yet if this thought is carried to its conclusion, we arrive at the other, opposite understanding of party. A consensus is not a consensus unless it is a lasting consensus; and a lasting consensus is impossible if every member comprising it feels free to renegotiate every item in the consensus at any time. A consensus can have permanence only if it is based on a principle—on an idea for which men would be willing, in some measure, to sacrifice their interests or at least their short-run interests. Consensus can be developed in this direction to mean compromise in a non-flexible sense, compromise based on principle. But a principle is the result and the source of a division; because a principle affirms something, it denies something else. So compromise based on principle requires a choice. From this standpoint the virtue of party is to present a choice to the people. Interests cannot be gathered if they are not held by a principle; and a principle cannot hold unless it is enforced. The party of principle must have discipline, and must make its way by zeal, instead of enticement. The Communist Party seems to be the extreme, or the perversion, of this kind of party, the programmatic party.

But how can the Communist Party, despite its claims, be understood as an instrument of representative government? The extreme programmatic party seems to be oblivious of the multitude of wills which is the original problem of representative government. It asks too much sacrifice of the wills or interests it claims to embody; and in its zeal to find new zealots for its program, it may entirely foreclose the choice of another party, which is a minimal recognition of variety. It is then contrary to common sense to conceive principle as a kind of compromise; and it is wrong to consider the programmatic party as an instrument of representative government.

In free countries, the advocates of the programmatic party recognize the force of this objection, and make concessions to the argument for the consensus party. They favor the party *system* of two or more parties, not just the programmatic party. They are partisans of the party system. As such, they do their best to support the program of their favorite party; and at the same time they hope mightily that this program will not entirely triumph. If there is a winning party, they conclude that the people have for the time being repudiated the losing party; but they would be disconcerted if the losing party were therefore to accept the whole program of the winning party. The duty of a losing party leader, if he believes in the programmatic party, is indeed unclear. Should he stick to his principles for the sake of the party system, or change them for the sake of his party? The party system requires that his party be healthy and yet that it not have the same principles as the winning party. The partisans of the party system have an awkward mental posture to maintain, since they must be loyal both to their party and to the party system. They must hug their enemies and hope for the defeat of their fondest desires.

Their predicament is illustrative of the problem of representative government, as it is often seen today. A program seems to be necessary for effective compromise, but respect for variety seems to be the essence of representation. The problem of representative government appears as the issue between representation and effective government: representation understood as respect for variety, and effective government understood as following a consistent program set forth by a strong leader. Free government must have both representation and effective government in varying proportions according to the season—representation is all right for slack times, but effective government is essential "when the times demand it."

It has been slyly remarked, however, that effective government is not precisely what is intended by those who demand it. "Effective government" does not usually include the program and leadership of Senator Goldwater; and when it does, it does not include the program and leadership of President Johnson. Effective government means government that gives effect to certain principles and should in candor be named by those principles. The generality of the issue between effective government and representation is also in doubt. Respect for variety really means toleration of stubbornness, which is the refusal to accept the principles of one's favorite program. It seems that the issue can be more forthrightly stated: the issue is between good and bad programs. If the program is good, it will be effective; and if it is bad, then how bad is it? If very bad, then it cannot be tolerated; but if it is only moderately bad, and at the same time very plausible and powerful, then let it be represented. From this standpoint, representative government is a high-sounding name for concessions to stupidity and recalcitrance.

But is there no way of saving the integrity of representative government? Is there no understanding of party government by which party is *more* than a shifting consensus of interests, yet *less* than an instrument for achieving one's favorite program? Is there no generality to the principles of party government? Is there no way that parties can be the instrument for gathering the varied interests of the people into a unity without imposing unity on those interests in the process of gathering them? If the merely legal representation of Hobbes cannot make an effective unity, representative government needs an extra-legal instrument in party government. But can party government make an effective unity which is still representative?

It is usual for the advocates of the programmatic party to consult the British experience and to extol the contemporary British party system. But the contemporary British experience seems to be ambiguous. Perhaps the British Labour government of 1945–50 is the best example of the theory of the programmatic party applied. Against every item in its 1945 program *Let Us Face the Future* can be set a piece of legislation passed by the Labour Government. On the other hand, the record of the Conservative party presents an opposite example. The Conservative Governments since 1951 have accepted almost every item in the program which the Conservative party so manfully opposed when it was first introduced. If the Labour party is programmatic *par excellence*, the Conservative party is *the* consensus party, very stern at the first conception of a new program, but ready and anxious to embrace every misbegotten production. Its very respect for tradition keeps its representation of British interests up to date, for it is eager to ensure that every interest has a stake in that tradition. It is true that the Tory party has a much stricter discipline than an American party has ordinarily. But this discipline only makes its habit of forming a new consensus more visible. Winston Churchill and Lord Salisbury have at different times been made to suffer by the Tory party for an excess and obsolete devotion to Tory imperial principles. Britain is noted for the most programmatic party system in the Free World, but also for its genius for compromise, meaning flexibility. One may recall Balfour's beautifully British dictum: "Our whole political machinery presupposes a people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker, and so sure of their own moderation that they are not dangerously disturbed by the never-ending din of political conflict."

II

If contemporary British experience yields no unambiguous solution to the problem of compromise and party government, there is reason to return to the Settlement of 1688. For that Settlement made party government possible in Britain. This is perhaps generally understood by historians, but it is not precisely understood. In 1770 Burke presented the first argument in Britain for party government, and the first argument anywhere since Machiavelli, in his *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents*. But at the beginning of this pamphlet he alluded to the welcome fact that "the great parties which formerly divided and agitated the kingdom are known to be in a manner entirely dissolved."[4] The "great" parties are the seventeenth-century parties, divided on the issues of the divine right of kings, and of papacy and episcopacy. Burke implies that the dissolution of the great parties was necessary to the respectability of parties. It could not be respectable to join a party, much less to join different parties, until the parties had resolved these mortal issues. In 1771, Jean DeLolme wrote that English statesmen "have discovered that they may very well be of opposite parties, and yet not hate and persecute one another."[5] Since this was not their seventeenth-century experience, the opposite parties must have changed their character in the eighteenth century. For Burke, respectable party government is by implication government by parties that are not great. His own party, the Rockingham party, was about the least grand in British history, remarkable at best for its steadiness and unzealous adherence to comfortable principles.

Three developments in the eighteenth century facilitated the respectability of party which Burke was the first to argue. All three developments are connected to the 1688 Settlement. The first was the prestige of the Whig party as the makers of that Settlement, and as the proprietors of the new regime. Britain was governed from 1715 to 1760 by men who eagerly claimed to be Whigs and who repelled opposition attacks by denouncing them as Tory-inspired. This almost undisturbed reign of avowed partisans helped to quiet the fear of partisanship as such, which events in the seventeenth century had done so much to raise. Of course, the Whigs tried to keep the great parties alive, at least in memory, in order to impress the King with their own indispensability. But the Whigs were indispensable to the extent that they were the makers of the Settlement which dissolved the great parties. So their attempts to raise fears of a Jacobite revival had in some measure the quality of a reassurance. They could cry up the danger to the constitution only by explaining its present security. Moreover, the second development was the gradual extinction of Jacobite sentiment, which was very durable. The Sacheverell trial in 1710 showed that the issues resolved in 1688 could be raised again, and that *if* they were raised, they would be as hot as ever. As Swift said, this trial "in effect, was a general muster of both parties."[6] It was a warning to both sides, and accepted as such. After repeated disappointments for the Jacobite cause, the last defeat of the Pretender occurred at Culloden in 1746, the date of the final destruction of the Stuart divine-right regime in Britain.

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[4] Burke, *Works* (8 vols., Bohn Library, London, 1854), I, 308. For the distinction between great and small parties, see also Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, H. Reeves trans. (2 vols., New York, 1945), I, 175.

[5] Jean DeLolme, *The Constitution of England* (new ed., London, 1800), pp. xi–xii, 514–16.

Meanwhile, a new Toryism, based on acceptance of the 1688 Settlement, had replaced Jacobitism, the third development to be mentioned. The founder of new Toryism was Bolingbroke, who announced his doctrine in political pamphlets written in the 1730s, well past the end of his political career. He called his doctrine not new Toryism, but patriotism; it rested on an elaborate historical proof that the real differences between the seventeenth-century parties no longer existed. Those differences, he said, were artificially maintained to keep the Whigs in office. Maintaining artificial distinctions is the general evil of aristocratic corruption. Aristocratic corruption uses the little arts of combination and misrepresentation in order to keep politics and the professions as a monopoly for the "great men" and the "great families." It must be opposed for the benefit of "men of talents," who for the advantage of society, should be allowed to rise from the lowest stations. And it must be opposed by the King and by the titled sponsors of talented men.

Bolingbroke decried parties for being instruments of aristocratic corruption no longer justified by the real differences of the seventeenth century. His anti-partisan doctrine was very powerful through the beginning of the nineteenth century, although almost unacknowledged. It inspired the politics of both the Elder and the Younger Pitt, and it is reflected in the slogan raised by the Elder Pitt, "not men but measures." It supplied the political ends of George III, the Grenvilles and Lord Mansfield. Bolingbroke's influence was unacknowledged because he made himself so forward an opponent of revealed religion in his posthumous publications. He opposed party government, and Burke favored it; but they shared the premise that the great parties had been dissolved in 1688. To speak briefly, the reason *for* the great success of Burke's argument *for* party government after 1770 was that it shared the premise of Bolingbroke's argument against party government, which premise was true.

Now, since the foundation of party government was the dissolution of the great parties, the origin of party government is not the same as the origin of the British parties. The parties of party government are small parties, in some sense; they are essentially different from the parties of pre-party government. It is misleading to write a history of the British parties, as if they developed from their conspiratorial beginnings to public respectability.[7] The names of Whig and Tory date from the conflict in 1680 and 1681 over the Exclusion Bill, a bill to exclude a Roman Catholic from the throne. In 1689 such a bill was voted as part of the Revolution Settlement which resolved the issues between the great parties; in 1680 and 1681 it would have been voted only as a partisan victory for the most eager Whigs, with Shaftesbury in the lead. In fact it was voted down, which was a victory for the King's party, not a resolution of the issue. On the other hand, we should consider the character of the so-called Whig connection which presided over the founding and the formative years of the new reign. Burke pointed to this connection as the most wholesome model of partisanship for his generation to imitate. But it was by no means a partisan Whig connection. It contained not one eager

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[6] Jonathan Swift, *Works*, W. Scott ed. (19 vols., Edinburgh, 1814), VI, 27.

[7] Keith Feiling makes the necessary distinction, *The Second Tory Party, 1714–1832* (London, 1951), ch. 1.

Whig of Shaftesbury's followers, and its members explicitly repudiated Shaftesbury's example, which appeared to them to smack of Pym and Cromwell.[8] In sum, the Whig and Tory distinction of 1680 led to party government no more inevitably than did the conflict of York and Lancaster.

It follows that party government is not a development from the religious disputes of the seventeenth century. Trevelyan and Macaulay have traced the distinction of Whig and Tory to the conflict of the Roundheads and Cavaliers in the 1640s. Guido de Ruggiero has argued that the idea of party government was born with the idea of religious toleration held by certain Puritan sects.[9] The sect, as opposed to the Church, is the ancestor of the party, according to this view. But the Settlement of 1688, as we shall see, resolved the religious issue by demoting it. The Settlement was secular—not, of course, completely so, but it pointed toward a separation of politics and religion which demoted the importance of religion. Party government required such a separation, because it was the operation of the religious issue in politics which caused the great parties. The "priesthood of all believers" does not supply the necessary secularism in politics. To abolish the rule of the clergy it is not enough to abolish the distinction between clergy and laity; for all believers in the sect may then rule in the manner of clergy, not of laity.

It may be left undecided how far the secularism requisite to party government must extend. But clearly this secularism cannot emerge from a religious doctrine. It can be *expressed* in religious terms, and it can be *forwarded* by one religious doctrine more than by another, surely more by certain Puritan doctrines of toleration. It cannot come from its opposite. Macaulay remarks that the divine right of Kings was inconsistent with limited monarchy; for how could Parliament enforce its complaints against God's anointed viceregent?[10] The same reasoning applies to the sect or congregation. If the sect exists by divine right, then there could be no limited democracy. The sect may have a resemblance to the modern party; but since it was thought to be commanded by God, it was the object of the same religious zeal which inspired the great parties.[11] Since it claims divine right, the sect is more like seventeenth-century parties than modern parties. It is easy to conclude that the disgust of the British for the civil war caused by religious disputes was the basis for the Settlement of 1688, and therefore the basis of party government. That disgust also prompted them to seek a blander religion, in many forms, in the eighteenth century. But that disgust was not religious; it was non-religious.[12] It was an overriding concern for peace in the earthly city. The Settlement of 1688 abolished all divine right as the ruling principle of England, not merely the divine right of kings. The conclusion is that the great parties of the seventeenth century did not father the small parties of the eighteenth century. Without the intervention of some outside principle, the great parties would have reproduced themselves full-sized in the eighteenth century, not small enough to serve as factors in the competition of party government.

William of Orange was secretly and circumspectly invited to take the throne of England on June 30, 1688 by a group of seven moderate Whig and Tory leaders, acting in concert. He replied in a public Declaration, signed on October 10, listing the violations of law of James II's reign, and explaining the failure of all ordinary remedies. He promised to come to England to ensure effectual remedies, and in particular to preserve the Church of England and the established religion; and he called for a free Parliament lawfully chosen. On November 5, he landed at Torbay with about 10,000 Dutch troops to make good his Declaration. The circumstances of the invitation and his acceptance show that there was a change of regime as well as a change of king. William was offered the throne informally under the practical though tacit assumption that there was no divine right of kings; and he accepted the throne by invitation from an aristocratic connection which he knew he could not dispense with. He was offered and he accepted a limited monarchy; and since it was limited, it could not exist by divine right. The documents of the Revolution Settlement date from 1689—the Resolution declaring the throne vacant, the Exclusion Act, the Declaration of Right, the Toleration Act. But they were all made possible by the political act of 1688 by which William informally took the throne; and they were all implied in the circumstances of that political act. The Revolution Settlement was therefore made in 1688.[13]

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[8] Burke, *Works*, I, 375; J. R. Jones, *The First Whigs: The Politics of the Exclusion Crisis, 1678–1683* (London, 1961), p. 216; I. Deane Jones, *The English Revolution* (London, 1931), p. 187.

[9] Ruggiero, *History of European Liberalism*, R. Collingwood, trans. (Boston, Mass., 1959), pp. 162–3.

[10] Macaulay, *The History of England from the Accession of James the Second* (10 vols., New York, 1908), IV, 391.

[11] G. P. Gooch asserts that "the principles of modern democracy, however distorted by a theocratic bias, advanced under the wing of the Reformation. . . ." *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century* (2d ed., Cambridge, 1954, p. 8). But it was just this "theocratic bias" which caused the great parties and prevented the rise of modern party government. *Cf.* John Millar, *An Historical View of the English Government* (4th ed., 4 vols., London, 1818), III, 144.

[12] *Cf.* George M. Trevelyan, *The English Revolution, 1688–1689* (London, 1938), pp. 9, 163.

Yet the meaning of that Settlement is by no means clear. It has been argued that the Settlement laid the foundation for party government; but what kind of foundation? Was it a consensus of existing political forces, or was it the victory of Whig principles, sullenly accepted by the Tories? Which theory of party properly describes the compromise which was the prerequisite for party government? Was it consensus compromise or a programmatic compromise? We may first turn to the historians for the answer they give.

III

It is proper to begin with Macaulay, who is celebrated as *the* Whig historian. His account of the Revolution culminates in a discussion of its "peculiar character," so that our concern is his theme. Macaulay calls the Settlement a compromise. With respect to the Resolution of Parliament declaring the throne vacant he delivers one of his characteristic lectures. That Resolution contained concessions to the Whigs, in its mention of original contract, and its conclusion that the throne is vacant; and to the Tories, in its assertion that James II had abdicated. "Such words," Macaulay says,

> are to be considered, not as words, but as deeds. If they effect that which they are intended to effect, they are rational, though they may be contradictory. If they fail of attaining their end, they are absurd, though they carry demonstration with them. Logic admits of no compromise. The essence of politics is compromise.[14]

Here it seems to be the excellence of the Revolution statesmen that they were smart enough to recognize this truth, so well explained to us by Macaulay, and to act on it. But when he comes to the "peculiar character of the English revolution," he implies the opposite. The peculiar character is bloodless compromise; and the cause of it is "sufficiently obvious." The later revolutions on the continent took place where "all trace of the limited monarchy of the Middle Ages had long been effaced." When these absolute monarchies were overthrown, they were destroyed, because the revolutionaries had long hated the regimes under which they had suffered. If the Stuarts had been more successful in their tyranny, if their schemes had settled a dark mood of revenge in the English people, they would not have escaped a Revolution, to be sure. But they would have fallen with a thunderous crash, and taken with them much good whose only fault was to be old. In other words, the peculiar character of the English revolution was an accident. The peculiar excellence of the makers of the Revolution was to be lucky. Macaulay says: "The highest eulogy which can be passed on the Revolution of 1688 is this, that it was our last revolution."[15] Macaulay pronounces a eulogy on the revolution, but not on the revolutionaries. It is clear that the hero of *the* Whig historian is no Whig, but William of Orange; and William's aim (according to Macaulay) was to defeat France, for which the English throne and the compromise of the Revolution Settlement were only necessary and important instruments.

But why was this "our last revolution?" If the Revolution was a consensus compromise, a compromise dictated by the accidental circumstances of the time, why is Macaulay so sure that it is the last? The reason is that it decided a question of principle:

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[13] For well reasoned opposition to the argument of this paragraph, see Lucile Pinkham, *William III and the Respectable Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pp. 19, 38, 66, 83, 178, 236–8. She says that the Revolution was merely a palace revolution, and yet turned over control to the landed aristocracy. The difference between unlimited monarchy by divine right and limited monarchy by consent of the aristocracy seems to be unimportant because both are undemocratic. That is why the Revolution, though respectable, is "an inadequate and irrelevant example from the past," and failed "to accomplish anything of lasting benefit." In reply one could say not only that Rome was not built in a day, but also that the system of divine right was a most formidable, if the earliest, enemy of liberal democracy. *Cf.* Sir Charles Firth, *A Commentary on Macaulay's History* (London, 1938), pp. 139–40.

[14] Macaulay, *History of England*, IV, 351; *cf.* Trevelyan, *The English Revolution*, p. 146; David Hume, *The History of England* (6 vols., Boston, 1854), VI, 358–9.

[15] Macaulay, *History of England*, IV, 387–397.

> It finally decided the great question whether the popular element which had, ever since the age of Fitzwalter and DeMontfort, been found in the English polity, should be destroyed by the monarchical element, or should be suffered to develop itself freely, and to become dominant.[16]

The compromise could not have endured if it had not finally decided this question. Yet Macaulay seems to say that the decision was by accident, although he allows that the words of the Resolution declaring the throne vacant were intended. The question decided was not so clear then as now. It was not remarked then that, having failed to destroy the popular element, the monarchical element would have to suffer it to become dominant. Since the popular element had an unknown potentiality, the decision in its favor could not be called intentional. According to Macaulay, then, the compromise of 1688 was in fact a compromise of principle, though intended as a compromise of consensus. It is hard to understand how the fundamental principle of British government could be adopted unwittingly, but Macaulay tries to make us see.

The same ambiguity can be found in the judgment of Trevelyan, a latter-day Whig historian, in his small volume, *The English Revolution, 1688–1689.* He says that the Toleration Act showed an "element of prudent compromise, preferring fact to theory in Church and State." But in the same place he also says that "it closed for ever the long chronicle of religious persecution and religious war."[17] The Settlement was "not the triumph of a party, but an agreement of the two chief parties to live and let live." "It was a victory of moderation, a victory not of Whig or Tory passions, but of the spirit and mentality of Halifax the Trimmer."[18] Thus Trevelyan says at the beginning of his Conclusion that "in the affair of the Revolution the element of chance, of sheer good luck, was dominant." England could have been saved from despotism or renewed civil war only by an apparently impossible reconciliation of Tory and Whig, Church and Dissent. The chance stupidity of James II gave the opportunity for reconciliation. Trevelyan seems to give no credit to those who were able to use the opportunity.[19] Yet in the last sentence of his book, he says that if we prefer government by discussion, "we must commend the choice that was made once for all at the English Revolution."[20] Just as for Macaulay, a choice was made in the passive voice.

Hume spoke against the earlier generation of Whig historians, those forgotten masters of "retrospective wisdom and historical patriotism," whose books, as Burke said, "serve admirably to reconcile the old quarrel between speculation and practice."[21] Having decided that Parliament had usually been the aggressor against the constitution, Hume opposed the official opinion held by the Whigs of the eighteenth century about the Whigs of the seventeenth century. But he opposed that opinion in order to give honor to the Revolution. He said:

> . . . to maintain that the [Stuart] administration was one continual encroachment of the *incontestable* rights of the people; is not giving due honor to that great event, which not only put a period to their hereditary succession, but made a new settlement of the whole constitution.[22]

Hume thought that the revolution formed "a new epoch in the constitution," but he withholds praise for the Whigs and for Whig principles. The lasting decisions in favor of liberty and popular principles resulted from the struggle between the parties, that is, from a compromise of consensus.[23]

The historians argue in common that the Settlement of 1688 did not come about by the settled intention of any man or group of men. They disagree with one another and within themselves on the character of the compromise. The most direct disagreement, however, is between Burke and Bolingbroke on the meaning of 1688. Bolingbroke's program of non-partisan patriotism rested entirely on his argument that the Revolution Settlement had decided every possible future issue on which parties could legitimately arise.[24] On the other hand, Burke made his famous *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs* a defense of the doctrine that revolution is justified only in a case of absolute necessity.[25] If the Revolution was made for the sake of a principle chosen, then by this doctrine it was made unjustifiably. So by Bolingbroke's new

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[16] *Ibid.*, IV, 394.

[17] Trevelyan, *The English Revolution*, pp. 153–4.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 173–4, 241.

[19] In contrast to W. E. H. Lecky, *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century* (12 vols., New York, 1878), I, 6, 13.

[20] *The English Revolution*, p. 245.

[21] Hume, *History of England*, VI, 365–6; Burke, *Works*, I, 311.

[22] Hume, *op. cit.*, VI, 363.

[23] Hume, *Essays Moral, Political and Literary* (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1817), Essay IX, "Of the Parties of Great Britain," I, 64.

[24] Bolingbroke, *Works* (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1841), II, 6, 27–8, 37, 75, 410–411.

[25] Burke, *Works*, III, 44–5.

Toryism, the Whig or semi-Whig connection of 1688 were great legislators, whereas by Burke's praise of the old Whigs, they were merely prudent adapters to necessity, the less prudent as the necessity was more obvious. This disagreement is much clearer than the variety of judgment in the historians, and no doubt both views are too extreme to explain the historical truth. But the appeal of Burke and Bolingbroke to opposite aspects of the Revolution Settlement serves to restate our problem. What does the foundation of party government teach us about the rival theories of party? We have learned that the foundation of party government in Britain, the Revolution Settlement, seems to be just as ambiguous as the contemporary practice of party government. For the solution we need more than a look at the facts, and more than an acquaintance with the authorities.

IV

The argument of this essay is that the element of principle or policy was dominant in the 1688 Settlement. The programmatic theory of party best explains the foundation of party government, which was the dissolution of the great parties. To the extent that this dissolution was effected by the leaders of the Revolution on the basis of a program, the foundation of party government was an act of founding. It was a founding in the nature of a party program to ensure the dissolution of the great parties.

It is first necessary to concede the importance of accident and of consensus in the Settlement. William is the hero of Macaulay's *History* and the crux of the Revolution; and his purpose was to defeat France. Shaftesbury, who had fought the Parliamentary election in 1681 on a party issue, with party slogans and a party organization, had no followers among the leaders of the Revolution. These leaders were not partisans in the great sense, like Shaftesbury. But they were not deflected from their intention by the aim of William. In the long run, they made William's aim and the victories of Marlborough serve the Revolution Settlement, rather than the reverse. Behind William's back, they made Britain into something more than an adopted home base against France. They did this with two policies, on religion and on public finance. These two policies were intended to develop—to relax the hold of religion, and to make commerce flourish. They were intended to make the hesitant consensus of 1688 develop into a lasting Settlement. To this end they were combined in a program which had a certain practical consistency.

To discuss these two policies without being tendentious is difficult; for they are at best complex and at worst various or contradictory. Moreover, the tendencies which were made dominant after 1688 were in being before 1688. Nevertheless we shall try to show that the measures taken in religion and in public finance constitute a program. Certainly they were more than the results of a consensus of existing forces.

Regarding religion, two things are to be noticed, the Toleration Act giving indulgence to Dissenters and the Latitudinarian movement within the Church of England. The Toleration Act was the first legal dispensation for Dissenters. It modestly provided an exception to the existing penal laws requiring all persons to attend services of the Church of England, and to refrain from other public worship. The exception was for those who swore their loyalty to the King and Queen in the oaths of allegiance and supremacy and to Protestantism by subscribing to the Declaration against Transubstantiation. Such persons could attend other public worship, and could serve as ministers in other public worship. There was also a provision for Quakers, who would not swear. The Act was introduced and managed in its passage by Nottingham, who was a Tory and the Revolution leader held in most esteem by the established clergy. It was passed after some controversy and much bargaining. It is the Act of which Macaulay was pleased to assert: "It will not bear to be tried by sound general principles. Nay, it will not bear to be tried by any principle, sound or unsound."[26]

Yet there was a principle in this compromise, stated in the preamble to the Act, where a principle ought to be. The preamble begins: "Forasmuch as some ease to scrupulous consciences in the exercise of religion may be an effectual means to unite their Majesties' protestant subjects in interest and affection . . . "[27] Here toleration is not mentioned; it is not mentioned at all in the Act. Indeed Catholics are here *excluded* from toleration. Catholics had been allowed public worship in the Declarations of Indulgence of James II, published in 1687 and 1688, and had been allowed worship in private houses in the Declaration of Indulgence of Charles II, published in 1672. The principle of toleration seems to have lost ground in the change from Stuart tyranny to a free constitution. But the Declarations of Charles II and James II were done by prerogative and done illegally, at least according to the Whig argument. They were also done contrary to the wish, against the inclination, or without the consent of Parliament. The indulgence thereby given to Dissenters was generally regarded as a cover for the true object, indulgence to Catholics; and indulgence to Catholics was regarded as a cover, no less easily penetrated, for the planned future domination of Catholicism.

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[26] Macaulay, *History of England,* V, 100.

[27] *Cf.* Trevelyan, *The English Revolution,* p. 155.

In his Declaration, James II admitted that the difficulty of reducing "this kingdom to an exact conformity in religion . . . is invincible," but he permitted himself the expression of his sovereign hope: "We cannot but heartily wish, as it will easily be believed, that all the people of our dominions were members of the Catholic Church."[28] Thus indulgence to Dissenters and the maintenance of the Church of England as established rested on the promise of a king who, as he spoke his "constant sense and opinion," simultaneously declared his speech to be "by virtue of our royal prerogative." James II did not even ask his subjects to believe that he loved Dissenters and the Church of England better than his own prerogative, not to mention his own Church. Having done his best to change the dominant religion of England by whatever means he thought consistent with his promise (for establishment was a matter of dominance, not of "exact conformity"), would he not choose to forsake his promise when it was no longer impossible to break it? So soon after the reign of James II, toleration for Catholics appeared to be—indeed, was bound to be—a partisan Catholic policy.

On the other hand, the Toleration Act as passed included a Test Act. The Test Act prohibited Dissenters from holding public office, including commissions in the army and navy. It is clear, then, that the Toleration Act, while yielding relief to Dissenters, was not a product of the religious beliefs of the Dissenters. It was not based on the belief that one Protestant is as good as another, let alone the belief that those are the best Protestants who believe that one Protestant is as good as another. The Toleration Act was not a partisan Dissenter policy. It only offered some ease to the scrupulous consciences for the purpose of uniting *all* Protestant subjects.

The sound principle of the Toleration Act was the widest practicable toleration. To achieve this end, the makers of the Act had to avoid such toleration as would appear to be partisan; they surely had to avoid mention of the *principle* of toleration, which was the principle of certain Dissenters. The purpose of the Act was to unite William's subjects in interest and affection. His subjects could be united only on the ground of their Protestantism, which is also to say, of their hatred for Catholicism. Maintaining and even exciting prejudice against the Catholics helped to make partisans of the Established Church more tolerant of Dissenters, and also helped to console the Dissenters for their status of half-privilege. It is possible that a general toleration is of necessity inspired by intolerance of the intolerant.[29] In sum, the purpose of the Act reflected no purely religious motive. Catholics were not excluded because they were heretics; Dissenters were not included because their beliefs were true. The purpose was a non-partisan toleration. Catholics and Dissenters would secure a greater toleration and an ultimate equality of status in the nineteenth century. They would have equality not when the principle of toleration was better understood; it was well enough understood in 1689 by leaders of the Revolution. They would have equality when the same political purpose for which they were denied equality in 1689 dictated that they should have equality.

Latitudinarianism was the same as the policy of the Toleration Act. It had been the hope of Charles II, against the temper of "the present jealousies," in his Worcester House Declaration of 1660.[30] It had been the recommendation of the Cambridge theologians in the reigns of Charles II and James II. But latitudinarianism was sponsored by William and by Nottingham and Bishop Burnet in the so-called Comprehension Bill of 1689, not in an ecumenical spirit of forgiveness, but for the sake of political union, regardless of the existing religious differences. This Bill would have required certain concessions from the Church of England in matters of faith, ritual and government in order to comprehend most Dissenters, and at least the Presbyterians, under the Church of England. "This conjunction in my service will tend to the better uniting you among yourselves and the strengthening of you against your common adversaries," said William in his proposal.[31] The Bill never passed, since it became involved in the question of what to do about the Tory clergy of the Church of England who refused to swear an oath of allegiance to William. Most Whigs were more eager to expel Tories from the Church than to comprehend Dissenters. They were still the Whigs of the "great parties." Meanwhile the Tory High Church party was more eager to exclude Dissenters from the Church than to protect the benefices of the non-juring Tory clergy. Later, when they had the opportunity in the reign of Queen Anne after the Sacheverell trial, the Tories succeeded in passing two Acts against non-conformity: the Occasional Conformity Act and the Schism Act. Both Acts struck at provisions of the Toleration Act, and would have upset the Revolution Settlement if Anne's death had not permitted their repeal. This too was partisan behavior in the manner of the "great parties."

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[28] Andrew Browning, ed., *English Historical Documents, 1660–1714* (London, 1953), pp. 395–6.

[29] The wisdom of excluding Catholics from toleration is best argued in Halifax's *Letter to a Dissenter* in W. Raleigh, ed., *The Complete Works of George Savile, First Marquess of Halifax* (Oxford, 1912), pp. 128–41.

[30] Browning, *op. cit.*, p. 366.

[31] Leopold von Ranke, *A History of England, Principally in the Seventeenth Century* (6 vols., Oxford, 1875), IV, 569.

In their policy of Comprehension, William, Burnet and Tillotson (leader of the commission appointed by William to revise the Prayer-book and the canons) were suspected of partisanship to the Presbyterian party by the High Church Tories. Burnet had been a Scottish Presbyterian. William was a Dutch Calvinist, and in 1690 he secured an act re-establishing the Presbyterian Church as the Church of Scotland. But Swift better perceived the drift of their policy, which he called by a splendid exaggeration, "the abolishing of Christianity in England":

> There is one advantage, greater than any of the foregoing, proposed by the abolishing of Christianity; that it will utterly extinguish parties among us, by removing those factious distinctions of high and low church, of whig and tory, presbyterian and church of England, which are now so many grievous clogs upon public proceedings. . . .[32]

Though Swift then denied that this policy was feasible, he correctly identified its chief purpose. William and Burnet were by no means eager Presbyterians, and the Presbyterian Church was re-established in Scotland for the same reason that it was tolerated in England.

Thus the religious policy of the Settlement was not a consensus compromise: it was an imposed policy. It was a policy which made concessions to both sides, but which was based on the premise of neither side. The *premise* was that unity of the subjects in interest and affection was more important than any particular religious belief. The *consequence* was that the unity of the subjects must not be attempted on the basis of religious belief; it must be achieved by relaxation of religious belief. William failed to secure passage of the Comprehension Bill; but Burnet was his first appointment to a bishopric. Though he represented the views of a tiny minority of the clergy, Burnet began the task of tempering the zeal of the Church with the authority of the new regime at his call.[33] How well he succeeded is notorious; the Church of England during the eighteenth century became an establishment of society, losing its pastoral fervor and even its skill in apologetics. It is too much to relate here the parallel developments among the Dissenters, and the growth of deism and different forms of natural religion among the educated. The crucial change was in the official policy of the state Church: all changes outside that church might have succeeded on their own, but only by upsetting the Revolution Settlement.

A non-partisan toleration is the use of religion for a political purpose, but for a *secular* political purpose, in order to reduce the importance of religion. The Toleration Act shows this purpose, as distinguished from the Declarations of Indulgence of Charles II and James II. Unlike those Declarations, it did not contain a lament that the nation could not be brought to an "exact conformity" in one religion. The Toleration Act did leave a strong advantage with the Church of England, and was of course accompanied by a Test Act to keep dissenters from civil and military office. Yet it is not mere hindsight to see that the toleration was more fundamental than the test. By the standard of what conduces to political union, and assuming a favorable experience, religious toleration could only be expanded; a religious test could only be contracted. If the toleration were successful, the test would be unnecessary. The Toleration Act thus raised the possibility that the religious disputes could be turned to the account, not of some dissenting sect, but of a free constitution. There was always the example of Holland to show how a nation might rise to power against the sea, the cold and foreign kings, by combining trade and religious liberty.[34]

Two other grand consequences of the Revolution, the irremovability of judges and the Licensing Act of 1694, were actually parts of the religious settlement. By William's policy, and by the Act of Settlement (1701), judges received tenure during good behavior, rather than at pleasure—a reform which Trevelyan praises for placing justice outside and above the sphere of politics. But one must remember that the politics above which judges were placed was religious politics, in which judges like Justice Jeffreys sought out the enemies of the King.[35] The Licensing Act of 1694, which provided for "full liberty of unlicensed printing," was held by Macaulay to be the most important reform resulting from the Revolution.[36] Authors and printers remained liable to subsequent restraint, however, under the common law of seditious libel. Comparison with the Licensing Act of 1662 shows that the new liberty of printing was chiefly in regard to heresy, or to sedition caused by heresy.[37] As any student of Milton or Spinoza knows, freedom of the press was first and foremost an aspect of religious liberty.

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[32] Swift, *Works,* VIII, 190.

[33] Macaulay, "Essay on Sir James Mackintosh," *Critical and Historical Essays* (6 vols., Boston, 1900), III, 411.

[34] Sir William Temple, *Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands* (1672), ch. 5.

V

In public finance the new regime departed noticeably from the Stuart regime. Under the Stuarts, short-term loans anticipating Parliamentary grants of supply were common. They were loans designed to cash in immediately on the grants, called tallies of pro or tallies of anticipation. Right after the vote in Parliament, Charles II used to summon the goldsmith bankers to dicker for terms. The terms were not favorable, and could hardly have been so; the bankers demanded interest of 10 to 20 per cent. Such borrowing was done not for the purpose of increasing the short-term liquidity of a government with fundamentally sound assets. It was done to ward off bankruptcy. With obligations falling due every day, the King had to liquefy a tax grant at once despite the substantial loss. The interest-bearing tallies were always in arrears, both in interest and principal, and in 1672 there occurred the notorious Stop of the Exchequer.[38] The picture is of a government ruling by fiscal postponement, borrowing in great stress, repaying unpunctually if ever, and continually floating fresh issues.

After the Revolution many modern techniques in public finance and fiscal policy were put into regular practice. Charles Montague, the Whig Lord of the Treasury, first made two attempts at long-term borrowing in 1693 and 1694. Then in 1694, following the proposal of a group of financiers, Montague guided through Parliament an Act establishing the Bank of England.[39] According to its original charter, the Bank was a company of state creditors who got steady interest for their loan and certain vaguely defined trading privileges—while the Crown received a loan of £1.2 m. The Act permitted the Bank to issue bills and notes as private loans up to the amount of the government debt; in addition, it authorized 8 per cent interest on the debt. But how was the government to pay the interest? In the late 1690s a number of excise duties were passed, whose receipts were anticipated in the old way with tallies, now called Exchequer Bills. These bills soon mixed with older tallies in a flood of overissue, damaging the credit of the government, which could afford to pay only the interest, and that only in fits of solvency.

Montague conferred and bargained with the Bank Directors, and in 1697 an Act was passed "ingrafting" the tallies to the capital of the Bank by public subscription. The government agreed to pay off the tallies by 1710 (which it did) and to pay 8 per cent interest meanwhile, guaranteed by the duty on tobacco pipes. The Bank accepted tallies from public subscribers, who received ingrafted stock in return at par value; the tallies became a Bank loan to the Crown. This operation restored the credit of the government, and encouraged it to squeeze further loans from the Bank and to transform the East India Company into a company of state creditors. In time, the Bank performed two other functions for the government. Beginning in 1707, it underwrote the circulation of Exchequer Bills, cashing them on demand, accepting them as deposits, making loans on their security, and paying dividends on them. The effect was to transfer the discount, or risk of discount, from holders of the bills to the Crown, so that the bills became a kind of government paper money. By 1710 the Bank began to manage the public debt in the capacity of agent in the sale of annuities, besides lending directly to the government. Indeed the amount of debt the Bank managed soon dwarfed its direct loan.

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[35] Trevelyan, *op, cit.*, pp. 166–8; *cf.* John Toland, *The Art of Governing by Partys* (London. 1701), p. 89.

[36] Macaulay, "Essay on Mackintosh," *op. cit.*, III, 409.

[37] Browning, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

[38] See W. A. Shaw, "The Beginnings of the National Debt," in T. F. Tout and J. Tait, eds., *Historical Essays* (London, 1902), p. 391.

[39] Eugen von Philippovich, *History of the Bank of England* (Washington, 1911); Sir John Clapham, *The Bank of England: A History* (2 vols., New York, 1945), I, 1–102; W. R. Scott, *The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720* (3 vols., Cambridge, 1912), III, 199–242.

As the last item in this survey, we may mention Walpole's Sinking Fund. Interest payments on the early loans were sustained with particular taxes. The Sinking Fund was a consolidation of tax revenues in a single fund for the payment of interest and the repayment of principal on the public debt. It generalized the government's credit. Although Walpole dipped into the Sinking Fund for current expenses, and once even got a loan on the security of the Sinking Fund, it was important that the principle of funded debt was established. In 1694, the government paid 8 per cent interest on its debt to the Bank; in 1750, after a series of conversions, it paid 3 per cent.

One must not exaggerate the novelty of Whig public finance. Some modern techniques were born as desperate expedients of the Stuarts. It is possible to consider the Stop of the Exchequer of 1672 as the beginning of the national debt, because Charles II began to pay interest when he had promised to pay principal. There were political economists in being before 1688, Sir William Petty and Charles Davenant. There was the Dutch example, as impressive in public finance as in religious liberty. But the change was made by the weight of government policy, to which again Swift can best testify in a famous passage from *The Examiner:*

> Let any man observe the equipages in this town, he shall find the greater number of those who make a figure, to be a species of men quite different from any that were known before the Revolution; consisting either of generals and colonels, or of those whose whole fortunes lie in funds and stocks; so that power, which according to the old maxim was used to follow land, is now gone over to money. . . .[40]

As Swift hints, the first result of such improvement in the pacific art of public finance was an enormous increase in Britain's ability to wage war. Britain easily carried its own expenses in the long war with France, and paid large subsidies to its Continental allies. The second result was the encouragement to commerce from stability in the public debt. The Bank of England accomplished indirectly what the Bank of Amsterdam did directly, in securing the circulation of money. A third result is indicated in a brief remark of Adam Smith regarding the Bank of Amsterdam: "Amidst all the revolutions which faction has ever occasioned in the government of Amsterdam, the prevailing party has at no time accused their predecessors of infidelity in the administration of the Bank."[41] So also in Britain, the improvement in public finance enlarged the non-partisan interests in the country, although Britain never attained the degree of non-partisanship which Adam Smith ascribes to Amsterdam. Public finance enlarged the money-lending interests, so that they became the financial establishment known as "the City." The more important they became, the less partisan British politics became; for it was the first task of a government to establish and secure its credit rating. The prime minister was to be the First Lord of the Treasury, and his right-hand man, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. A crowd of permanent clerks grew up in the Treasury, the nucleus of a non-partisan civil service. At the same time, the principal monied men made up to the Government of the day, hoping to have the trade in its loans; they often secured seats in Parliament, and offered their vote as an inducement.[42] As demanding and as complaisant as your banker, these monied men dallied with all parties on condition that all parties be serious about the Government's debt. The Tories grumbled at these Whig inventions, but the squires no less than the great lords were in need of loans to turn their land into cash. A commercial society was made in the eighteenth century, in which different sets of men had different, yet mutually dependent interests, like borrowers and lenders. Such commercial interests arouse neither great passions nor great issues; they prevent great divisions by introducing small divisions.[43]

VI

Although the two topics of religion and public finance have been greatly simplified, it is still necessary to find the connection between them. That connection is non-partisanship. The religious policy of the Settlement was designed to resolve or to dismiss the issues on which the great parties of the seventeenth century had divided. The fiscal policy of the new government was designed to promote commerce, and hence to ensure that the former partisans would be occupied with nearer matters. The connection between toleration and promotion of commerce marks the difference in principle between the Revolution program and earlier toleration and promotion of commerce. Earlier toleration was an "indulgence" from a ruling king and his ruling church to compose the differences of a passionate and jealous people. Earlier trade policy was designed to improve the power and self-sufficiency of Britain, ruled and formed as it was. Now toleration was for the building of a commercial society, and a commercial society was for keeping the people peaceful and tolerant. The former means to a healthy polity were the new ends of a busy society.

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[40] *Examiner*, No. 13, *Works*, III, 319–20; *cf.* Shaw, *loc. cit.*, p. 404.

[41] Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (Modern Library, New York, 1937), p. 453; *cf.* Clarendon, *Continuation of the Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon* (3 vols., Oxford, 1827), III, 12–13.

[42] Lucy Sutherland, "The City of London in Eighteenth-Century Politics," in R. Pares and A. J. P. Taylor, eds., *Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier* (London, 1956), pp. 49–53.

[43] *The Federalist* (Modern Library, New York, n.d.), No. 8, p. 44; No. 10, p. 56.

The truce between the King and Parliament was made permanent in 1688 because government itself was reduced to something like representation of the people. Britain became a limited monarchy in 1688 not merely because Parliament took power from the King, for example in the newly instituted Civil List.[44] If the King is considered as the Crown, and the King's ministers substituted for the King, the Crown has today lost very little to Parliament, in comparison to the Stuart tyrants. But both have lost power to the people. Britain became a limited monarchy in 1688 chiefly because she became a limited *government*. Representative government must be limited to ends which do not require a government *ruling* the people. Divine right, whether monarchical or democratic, is incompatible with representative government; for divine right requires a people educated to a uniform piety to its divinity, which education must be supported and enforced by the government. The policies of the Revolution lay deeper than its institutional settlement.

The Revolution program aimed at the dissolution of the great parties. Burke was the first in Britain to argue for party government in the modern sense; and he also saw that the foundation for party government was the dissolution of the great parties. The following passage from his *Thoughts and Details on Scarcity* shows that he supported the two policies designed to dissolve the great parties, and saw the connection between them:

> We, the people, ought to be made sensible, that it is not in breaking the laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God, that we are to place our hope of softening the Divine displeasure to remove any calamity under which we suffer, or which hangs over us.[45]

The laws of commerce are non-partisan; they are not the laws of any particular government, formed by any particular party; they are laws of nature. Being laws of nature, they are laws of God; and so the laws of God do not justify partisan action to remedy commercial distresses. In general, the laws of God are non-partisan. The general error of the great parties was their belief that the laws of God are partisan.

Burke's solemn warning reminds one of Locke's writings on the occasion of the recoinage of 1696, in which he shows such solicitude for the widows and orphans endangered by governmental interference with the natural laws of economics.[46] We have also seen that the Toleration Act was written in the spirit of Locke's *Letters Concerning Toleration*, rather than the spirit of Puritan toleration. These writings, more than the reference to "the Original Contract between King and people" in the Resolution declaring the throne vacant, constitute the Revolution program. By whatever manner of inspiration, Locke can be said to be the philosopher of the 1688 Revolution, if these writings are meant.[47] On the other hand, the Locke of the *Second Treatise* is surely the philosopher of the American Revolution. From 1688 to 1776 the English-speaking peoples advanced from Locke's policies to an awareness of the principles behind them.

Returning to the problem of this essay, one may conclude that the programmatic theory of party is truer than the consensus theory, but that both are necessary. The programmatic theory explains the nature of party better than the consensus theory, because the foundation of party government was a certain program. Party government in Britain began only after a certain program succeeded in dissolving the great parties of the seventeenth century. The Whig historians have the essential merit of recognizing that the Settlement of 1688 was the foundation, though not the realization, of modern Britain. Their fault was to exaggerate the illegality of the Stuart regime, and therefore to underrate the novelty of the 1688 Settlement. But the principle of the 1688 Settlement was non-partisanship, as we have seen in the two policies at the heart of the Revolutionaries' program. The foundation of party government is non-partisanship with respect to the great parties. The problem of representative government is how to unite the people without instructing or educating the people. They must be united; but if they are instructed, or educated, or socialized, then they are no longer represented merely. They are ruled. The problem of representative government is to find a non-partisan government which governs the people without imposing any opinions on them. Party government is so far from contradictory to representative government in this sense, that it is an extra-legal instrument for achieving non-partisan government. Party government tries to be non-partisan, when "partisan" is understood in the sense of the "great parties." Its essential aim is to represent the people by achieving a consensus. The consensus can be lasting only if it is based on a program. But the nature of the program is non-partisan and hence a kind of consensus: the program comprises those principles on which subjects are able to unite in interest and affection.

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[44] Macaulay, "Essay on Mackintosh," *op. cit.*, pp. 403–4.

[45] Burke, *Works*, V, 100.

[46] *Some Considerations of the Consequences of Lowering the Interest and Raising the Value of Money.*

[47] Gerald M. Straka, *Anglican Reaction to the Revolution of 1688* (Madison, Wis., 1962), pp. viii–ix.

THE ETHIOPIAN NO-PARTY STATE: A NOTE ON THE FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN DEVELOPING STATES

ROBERT L. HESS
Northwestern University

AND

GERHARD LOEWENBERG
Mount Holyoke College

The emergence of political parties performing important functions in the political system has characterized the recent history of much of the African continent.[1] The new party systems have taken various forms, including single parties with a narrow ruling elite, as in Liberia, or with mass support, as in Guinea; two-party systems where one mass party is dominant, as is the case in Kenya; and multi-party systems, as in Nigeria and Somalia. In two states, Libya and Sudan, once-flourishing political parties have been banned. Only in Ethiopia (Etritrea excluded) have there never been political parties. The Empire of the Conquering Lion of Judah can well be termed a no-party state. In Ethiopia today no organization exists that would or could describe itself as a political party.

Writing in 1951, Professor Duverger concluded that "a regime without parties is of necessity a conservative regime."[2] That only a handful of partyless political systems remain today is the consequence, apparently, of the rapid pace of political modernization in the past decade. In the "non-Western" world, wherever new states have been created out of former colonial territories, the movement driving for independence has itself provided the nucleus for at least one political party and, sometimes, for more in response to the first.[3] These parties have performed a variety of functions associated with both political and economic modernization: they have provided a communications network transcending parochial boundaries, have helped to organize and express the new interests, have recruited and established the new political elite, and have contributed to the legitimation of the new authorities.[4]

Political parties developed in association with economic and political modernization, not just in Asia and Africa, where parties were formed for the purpose of creating independent states, but also in Latin America, where parties grew in an independent situation. The correlation between political party development and economic modernization is not therefore limited to newly independent Africa. However, the evidence does not point to a general interdependence between the two processes.[5] In the earlier "Western" experience, in which there was a relatively slow transition to modern forms, there are notable examples of economic development without political parties. The political systems of the remaining no-party states, especially those showing signs of undergoing economic development, should therefore be viewed with special care by those interested in the relationship between economic and political change. The example of Ethiopia is particularly relevant because it is the case of a state facing the challenges of economic modernization within the framework of a traditional political system.[6]

The absence of political parties from the Ethiopian scene can be explained by the role of the Emperor and the lack of those historical factors that elsewhere stimulated the development of African political parties. Most African political parties arose as the result of the colonial situation; in Ethiopia the "colonial" period lasted only for the brief five years of the Italian military occupation. Elsewhere, economic development in the colonial period provided one of the bases for the educational development of the personnel which later participated in political organizations; in Ethiopia the noticeable lack of economic development until recently may very well have retarded such political development. For reasons of economic underdevelopment, the rise of an African middle class through detribalization is less evident in Ethiopia than elsewhere. Political parties in other countries were aided by the development of a modern communications network by the colonial power; Ethiopia until recently had one of the poorest such systems on the continent, and strict supervision by the Government ensured that it was not used for political purposes. Elesewhere the decline of chiefly power was the result of European intervention, and a new elite, itself the creation of the Europeans, was able to take advantage of the disruption of traditional society to develop as a potential political force; in Ethiopia, however, the destruction of chiefly power came about as the result of the Emperor's consolidation of his own power and his appropriation of the authority of other traditional elements.[7] No potentially independent elite was directly involved in the process, although the Emperor did and does provide for the Western education of a growing number of closely controlled bureaucrats recruited from the traditional aristocracy and from an aristocracy of talented young men from humble origins or from ethnic minorities like the Galla. Finally, in the isolated and conservative Ethiopian social context, remarkably little attention has been paid to Western organizational forms, like the mass party and modern bureaucracy, and, until very recently, to Western ideas like nationalism or democracy, while in other countries these forms and ideas have had a noticeable influence.

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[1] For a treatment of the development of political parties in Africa, see Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (New York, 1957) and *African Political Parties* (Penguin Books, 1961).

[2] *Political Parties* (London, 2d ed., 1959), p. 426.

[3] Gwendolen M. Carter, *African One-Party States* (Ithaca, 1962), pp. 1–10.

[4] The first three of these functions are specifically discussed by James S. Coleman in G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1960), pp. 331, 336, 351, 552–556.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 538–544.

[6] Because they are concerned with the development of competitive party systems, Almond and Coleman, *op. cit.*, pay scant attention to Ethiopia. But see pp. 575–576. The most complete treatment of Ethiopian political development is Robert L. Hess, "Ethiopia," in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States* (Ithaca, 1965).

The impetus to modernization in Ethiopia has come not from a new elite and its political parties but from the Emperor himself as a result of his contact with Western states over the past forty years and, more recently, from his association with the new states of Africa. The emphasis in Ethiopia has therefore been on economic and administrative, but not on political modernization. Through skillful diplomacy Haile Selassie was able, first, to preserve Ethiopia's independence except during the short period of Italian domination, and, second, to develop for Ethiopia an important role among the new African states. But these expanded relations with the world outside Ethiopia have brought his country into contact with Western technology, especially in the form of modern weapons, with Western entrepreneurs and technicians—most recently under the auspices of United States economic and military aid programs—and with Western political ideas and institutions, notably nationalism, law, and bureaucracy. Successes derived from his new international position have strengthened his domestic position, which was strong in any case because of his effective use of traditional myths of the Emperor's legitimacy. Because neither Africanization nor national independence was an issue, he faced no challenge from domestic political movements analogous to those of colonial Africa. His powerful situation permitted him to control the strongest traditional centers of authority, notably the church, the army, and the nobility, by making personal appointments within these institutional groups.

The effective transfer of authority to the Emperor was limited, however, to the regional and national level. It did not extend to the villages, where traditional authority patterns remain intact. It created no new elite structures. It left largely unchanged the linguistic, ethnic, and religious divisions of the nation. The Ethiopian economy remains the least developed in Africa. The five percent literacy rate is the lowest of any African state, and per capita income is also extremely low. Ninety percent of the population is still in the subsistence agricultural sector of the economy. The money economy is dependent on monoculture, since coffee accounts for 45 percent of the total value of exports. The economic development of the nation, which the Emperor seeks to promote through a series of five-year plans, is therefore taking off from a very low base and within a remarkably traditional political and social system. Whatever economic development there is may be attributed to the Emperor's initiative. But in Ethiopia there is a lack of the fervor, excitement, and enthusiasm for economic development that can be found wherever political parties in Africa have striven to mobilize the population for economic change. Although there is a sentimental attachment to the Emperor in almost all ethnic sectors of the country, it is doubtful whether the central authorities can succeed in winning the support of the rural population, which is still under the influence of traditional landlords and village heads. This raises the question of how the masses can be mobilized for economic change without political parties. More generally, how can the political functions nowadays performed by the parties in the process of economic change be performed by other structures, and with what consequences?

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[7] A distinction should be made between the power of chiefs over clans, tribes, and larger ethnic groups and that of the village head, who has often been erroneously called chief in the literature of African exploration.

The absence of political parties and the existence of a traditional pattern of government have not precluded at least some political change. A new constitution was promulgated by the Emperor in 1955. While it largely confirmed the concentration of powers in his hands, it did provide for an elected Chamber of Deputies in a bicameral Parliament which also included a Senate whose 101 members are all appointed by the Emperor.

The unusual phenomenon of contested elections in a state without political parties occurred in Ethiopia in 1957 and again in 1961. The country was divided into 100 electoral districts of approximately 200,000 inhabitants on the average. Each constituency elected two deputies. Those towns with 30,000 or more inhabitants (that is, Addis Ababa and four other municipalities) were given one representative plus an additional deputy for each 50,000 inhabitants above the base figure, some measure of urban overrepresentation. Under the old constitution there had been only 72 deputies, none of whom had been popularly elected.

According to the Central Board of Registration and Election, a government agency, 491 candidates qualified to stand for the 210 seats. Candidacy required wealth of 1000 Ethiopian dollars and property ownership of twice this amount, total holdings in U. S. terms of $1200. In a nation then having a per capita income of US$56, the Chamber of Deputies was bound to consist overwhelmingly of members of the traditional nobility. There is evidence that many of the candidates were self-nominated notables who commanded local respect. Others may very well have been sponsored by the Government. Despite the absence of political parties many individual candidates vigorously campaigned in competition with each other on the basis of their personal records and their positions in local society.

Of the 6,000,000 potential voters who had the necessary property qualifications in the nation of 19,000,000, slightly more than 3,000,000 registered, and apparently 80 per cent of registered voters cast their ballots in 1957. A process of selection in which over three million voters chose 210 deputies from over twice that number of candidates took place again in 1961 and will probably recur in 1965.[8] But the sole function of this elected Parliament has been that of legitimating the Emperor's acts.

A new elite group has not been recruited by elections. Rather it has developed among those members of traditionally privileged classes and among a new aristocracy of talent appointed by the Emperor which is participating in new or reorganized institutions created in the process of economic and administrative modernization. The establishment of the Haile Selassie I University in Addis Ababa, the legalization of the trade unions in 1962, the creation of a special palace military guard, the expansion of the bureaucracy and the judiciary, the training of army and air force officers, have all contributed to the growth, at least in the capital, of a new corps of leaders.

There has been much speculation about the aspirations of the youthful civil servants, bureaucrats, and university students who comprise a small but growing intelligentsia. In informal discussions they exhibit a general distaste for the *status quo* and often sharply criticize the distribution of political power. For them too much of Ethiopia is too far from modernization. Whether or not their impatience is a function of their age or an indication of real disaffection, they are not ardent nationalists or revolutionaries. Moreover, for westernized youths few opportunities exist other than those in government service. For them talk has been an adequate substitute for action, and the intelligentsia are noteworthy for their political ineffectiveness. Significantly, they played no major part in the 1960 coup, and it remains to be seen how they would behave during the uncertainty of a future crisis.

During the Emperor's absence from the country in 1960, an apparently haphazard collection of members drawn from these new elites engaged in an unsuccessful coup. It gave evidence of little planning and organization, the result, basically, of the failure of communication among its participants. But it also demonstrated the existence of demands for political change and briefly challenged the myths of the Emperor's legitimacy. Significantly, during the days of the rebellion the formation of political parties was promised by its leaders, some of whom had studied in the United States. Since 1960, the process of modernization has apparently again been under the

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[8] For reports on the 1957 elections, see *The New York Times*, February 19, 1957, p. 10; *ibid.*, November 2, 1957, p. 2; *Ethiopia, Facts and Figures* (Addis Ababa, 1960), pp. 10–11.

Emperor's control, and, in view of the severe penalties against free political expression, there has been no evidence of any moves to form new political organizations.

The educated elite is still very narrowly recruited. The use, primarily, of ascriptive criteria of selection preserves existing class lines and assures, if not complete loyalty to the Emperor, at least loyalty to the existing class structure. The absence of political organization has meant the lack of a ready-made communications network among the members of this elite, thus reducing its ability to take concerted political or economic action. The interests favoring change are therefore highly fragmented. If the Emperor's authority is in this way protected, it also leaves the vast majority of the population unaffected by economic change. Untouched by new political organizations, politically informed only by the government's communications monopoly and by the traditional local aristocracy, it is beyond the reach of political appeals from the new elites. But it remains also beyond the reach of economic and social changes. It is still illiterate, engaged in subsistence agriculture, governed by traditional village authorities, divided ethnically and religiously. The question of how it can be mobilized for economic purposes without being politically organized is still unanswered.

Another unanswered question concerns the chances of survival of the traditional political system when the Emperor's powers pass to a successor. Although the position of the present Emperor appears strong, it depends in part on his special international reputation, in part on the personal loyalty of his appointees, and in part on his highly personal use of legitimacy myths. Can these sources of power be transferred to a successor except through a new political organization?

Where African political parties have arisen in opposition to colonial regimes, they have developed as institutions parallel to the colonial administration, with judicial, administrative, police, education, and social welfare functions. They have provided a new set of values and given expression to new interests, in opposition to those of both the colonial regime and the traditional African milieu. They have been powerful agents for political agitation, education, and communications. In the process they have from time to time produced their cult of martyrs, their charismatic leaders, but above all they have created a new political elite. They have given Africans a new sense of solidarity, and have resolutely sought the modernization of African economies. They have given legitimacy to new political systems. In Ethiopia, however, all of these functions have been monopolized by the Emperor and an elite recruited largely by ascriptive criteria. This has placed special obstacles in the path of economic development and created prospects of ultimate political instability. The particular problems of modernization which Ethiopia faces because of the absence of political parties suggest the functions which parties usually perform in the political systems of developing states, and indicate the difficulty of finding suitable structures to substitute for them.

WORK LIFE AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES: A STUDY OF MANUAL WORKERS*

LEWIS LIPSITZ
University of North Carolina

For centuries men have speculated about the human consequences of work. Slowly, a considerable body of information has begun to accumulate concerning the relationships between people's jobs and other aspects of their lives. Investigators have pointed out the connections between certain types of jobs and certain personality disorders, job satisfaction, productivity, attitudes toward union and management, social relations on the job, leisure activities, and other things.[1] Extending such findings, this study concludes that a particular job situation can have important effects on a man's political outlook.

Political studies have long classified individuals according to occupation, yet there have been extremely few efforts to penetrate within specific occupational categories to discover the causal triggers of occupational attitude differences. Political scientists have, on the whole, been content to work with relatively large groupings such as "semi-skilled" manual workers, "unskilled" manual workers, etc. Several efforts have been made, however, in the direction this study takes; exploring specific job characteristics and their effects on political attitudes. Seymour Lipset cites a work that established a relation between size of factory and voting Communist or Nazi in pre-Hitler Germany. William Kornhauser observes the connection between the rate of expansion of a particular industry in the early stages of industrialization and the political ideology of the emerging labor movement.[2] In such findings, we move somewhat closer to establishing a causal relationship between something about a particular work situation and certain attitudes or behavior of the job holders.

But more specifically, concerning the problem of job satisfaction, Lipset, writing in 1960 observed that it was yet to be shown that "job satisfaction and creativity contribute independently to political behavior over and beyond differences in status and economic conditions. . . . "[3] The present study indicates that a particular work situation, that of the automobile assembly-line, affects the political and social attitudes of the automobile workers involved. The ways in which the concrete work situation affects the worker's political attitudes are determined by the technology and social setting of the job itself. Specifically, assembly-line workers are found to be more fatalistic, more punitive, and more politically radical than other workers of comparable salary and education who work in the same plant.

I

Before proceeding to the findings themselves, it may be helpful first to consider briefly the nature of assembly-line work, in comparison with other occupational types.

The social and psychological consequences of work have been much debated. The factory is a symbol of modern life, and the assembly-line in particular has often been thought to embody in extreme form the worst tendencies of industrial work. Other analysts have argued, to the contrary, that modern industrial societies offer more individuals more chances for genuine work satisfaction than any previous societies.[4] It would serve little purpose here to get involved in this controversy, for even if the issues raised remain unresolved, certain facts about modern work-life relevant to our inquiry are quite clear. First, manual workers generally indicate lower work satisfaction than non-manual workers. Second, within the manual group, satisfaction varies with skill: the higher the skill, other things being equal, the greater the satisfaction. The table below provides some frame of reference for dealing with the question of job satisfaction in manual and non-manual jobs.

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* I want to thank Charles Walker and Chris Argyris of Yale University, Robert Guest of Dartmouth, Edward Gray of the United Automobile Workers, and the officers and members of UAW Local 595 for their criticism and suggestions. A special debt is owed Robert Lane of Yale whose work helped stimulate this study and whose disagreements with the author aided considerably in the task of clarification.

[1] See in particular Georges Friedmann, *Industrial Society: The Emergence of the Human Problems of Automation*, trans. Harold L. Sheppard (Glencoe, 1955), p. 276; Robert Blauner, "Work Satisfaction and Industrial Trends in Modern Society," *Labor and Trade Unionism: an Interdisciplinary Reader*, ed. Walter Galenson and Seymour Martin Lipset (New York, 1960), pp. 339–360; E. L. Trist and K. W. Bamforth, "Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Longwall Method of Coal-getting," *Human Relations*, Vol. 4 (1951), pp. 3–38; Charles R. Walker and Robert Guest, *The Man on the Assembly Line* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952); Frank J. Jasinski, "Technological Delimitation of Reciprocal Relationships: A Study of Interaction Patterns in Industry," *Human Organization*, Vol. 15 (1956), pp. 24–28; David Armstrong, "Meaning in Work," *New Left Review*, No. 10 (July–August, 1961), pp. 16–23; and Georges Friedmann, *The Anatomy of Work—Labor, Leisure and the Implications of Automation*, trans. Wyatt Rawson (New York, 1961), p. 107.

[2] Lipset, "The Psychology of Voting," *Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. Gardner Lindzey (Cambridge, Addison-Wesley, 1954), II, 1139; Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, 1959), p. 154.

[3] *Political Man* (Garden City, N. Y., 1960), p. 237.

TABLE I. PROPORTION IN VARIOUS OCCUPATIONS WHO WOULD CHOOSE SAME KIND OF WORK IF BEGINNING CAREER AGAIN[5]

Professional Occupations	%	Working Class Occupations	%
Mathematicians	91	Skilled printers	52
Physicists	89	Paper workers	52
Biologists	89	Skilled automobile workers	41
Chemists	86	Skilled steelworkers	41
Lawyers	83	Textile workers	31
Journalists	82	Unskilled steelworkers	21
		Unskilled automobile workers	16

Beyond the question of how workers respond when asked if they are satisfied with their jobs, a more important question concerns the *effects* of work; what impact the job has on a man's life outside of the factory. Many writers and analysts have speculated about this. Much of the analysis of industrial work emphasizes its destructive or negative aspects and focuses attention on the elimination of skill and the increase of simple, repetitive, assembly-line style work. Yet, there have been only a few studies of assembly-line jobs.

The development of the assembly-line was part of what one observer has called the "second industrial revolution." Although overhead conveyors were employed from the 1870s on in the American packinghouse industry, they were not introduced on a large scale until 1914, when Ford's Highland Park, Michigan plant became conveyor equipped. After 1920, assembly-lines were rapidly adopted in many areas of heavy industry.

Charles Walker and Robert Guest, who made probably the most thorough study of assembly-line work, characterized the "pure" assembly-line job as involving the following six elements:[6]

1. Mechanical pacing of work
2. Repetitiveness
3. Minimum skill requirement
4. No choice in the use of tools or techniques
5. Minute subdivision of the product worked on
6. The need for constant surface attention.

The expectation that men would dislike assembly-line work is borne out by current research. Consistently, investigators have found that conveyor-paced jobs in mass production industries show lower levels of satisfaction than other manual and non-manual jobs. Blauner concludes that assembly-line work is more disliked than any other major type of work.[7] Within the automobile industry, which is the setting of this study, the position of the semi-skilled line worker is difficult. Possibilities of advancement within the ranks are extremely slim. Wage differentials between the highest and lowest paid production jobs are small.[8]

Automobile assembly-line workers have little control over the pacing of work. The average worker on the line performs no more than five operations, remains at his station at all times, and repeats the same operations about 40 times an hour. For most workers, the work cycle is between one and two minutes, regulated by the conveyor speed.

Characteristically, the assembly-line worker is alone on his job. The technology of the line increases the worker's sense of impersonality and presents barriers to group cohesiveness. Moreover, there appears to be no adjustment to the assembly-line as time passes. The longer a man has held an assembly-line job, the more likely he is to have an unfavorable attitude toward all aspects of work experience.[9]

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[4] Blauner, *loc. cit.*

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 343. The extent of satisfaction expressed is clearly in part a function of the particular question asked. For example, a group of American unskilled workers asked "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your present job?" showed 72% indicating they were satisfied. Exactly what satisfaction means in such a case is not at all clear. See Alex Inkeles, "Industrial Man: The Relation of Status to Experience, Perception and Value," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 66 (July, 1960), p. 6.

[6] Walker and Guest, *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

[7] Blauner, *loc. cit.*, pp. 346–347.

[8] Arthur N. Turner, "Impersonality and Group Membership: A Case Study of an Automobile Assembly Line" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1958), pp. 13–16.

What do we know about the effects of assembly-line work? Compared to other groups of manual workers, assembly-line workers show few grievances, little use of pressure tactics, and much internal disunity and evidence of suppressed discontent. They permit leadership to gravitate to aggressive individuals with a strong need to dominate. They accept certain elements of their work life as inevitable, and they lack self-confidence.[10]

When Walker and Guest compared workers holding "pure" assembly-line jobs with another group of workers whose jobs were more skilled, varied and autonomous, they found that absenteeism was much higher on repetitive, conveyor-paced jobs; repetitiveness was negatively correlated with interest in work; limitations on talking were a source of frustration to line workers; mass production methods tend to increase the worker's sense of anonymity.[11] My study indicates that the differences Sayles and Walker and Guest find between different groups of semi-skilled factory workers carry over into the area of political attitudes.

II

Three samples of workers were used here as the basis for comparisons:

1. assembly-line workers, or men with jobs approximating those of the assembly-line
2. repair, relief, and utility workers
3. skilled maintenance workers.

Repair, relief and utility workers were chosen as the semi-skilled group for purposes of comparison because their jobs provided them with greater autonomy and variety than the line workers had. Repair jobs, for example, could not be time-studied and were not completely repetitive. Individual judgment and some choice of tools were required. Relief and utility workers both performed as stand-ins for men along the assembly-line, but were competent to handle many kinds of line jobs within a given department of the shop. Their work was more varied and likely to lead to a stronger sense of pride and a deeper interest in the task.

The repair, relief and utility workers, like the assembly-line operatives, would normally be classified as semi-skilled in a social class or occupational breakdown.[12] Skilled workers were also included since they would furnish an important comparison with both semi-skilled groups and might exhibit in greater detail or more extensive development tendencies found in the other groups.

Names were selected at random from the files of the local union. Men willing to participate were interviewed in their homes. The interview questions were almost entirely open-ended. In addition to the interviews, each man completed a questionnaire which incorporated various attitude scales and other questions. All of the men interviewed were married, native-born, and white. The three groups were closely comparable in many respects. Educationally, all three groups averaged between nine and ten years of education completed. A majority of each group was Catholic. The mean age of each sample was between 40 and 50. Assembly-line workers interviewed had been on their present jobs an average of six years; repair workers, twelve years; and skilled workers, thirteen years. Pay rates in the two semi-skilled groups varied between $2.40 and $2.74 an hour, while in the skilled group the rates ranged from $2.96 to $3.39.

The assembly plant in which these men worked was located in Linden, New Jersey. At the time of these interviews, between 2900 and 3000 men were employed at the plant. The general effort was to study intensively the political orientations of a relatively small group of men, to gain some insights of general applicability that could then be tested on a larger sample, more systematically.

III

The three work groups showed attitude differences in five areas: the job; the union; a fatalistic view of social life; the extent of preoccupations with economic problems; and the extent of sympathy and tolerance.

The Job. Assembly-line workers view their jobs with a mixture of anger and resignation. Almost all of them complain bitterly of overwork, physical strain, and monotony. They feel subjected to undue pressures because of the excessive speed of the line, but they feel powerless to control this speed. Relationships with supervisors are marked by inequality and anxiety. These men feel expendable. They know there is nothing unique about their performances at work.

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[10] Leonard Sayles, *Behavior of Industrial Work Groups: Prediction and Control* (New York, 1958).

[11] Walker and Guest, *loc. cit.*

[12] See, for example, the classifications employed by Albert J. Reiss, Jr., in "Change in the Occupational Structure of the United States, 1910–1950." *Cities and Society, The Revised Reader in Urban Sociology*, ed. Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss (New York, 1957), pp. 424–431.

All the repair, relief and utility workers have ambivalent attitudes toward their jobs. Many complain of pressure and overwork, of physical and emotional strain. Yet they also note compensating factors: variety, skill, and the very important fact that the men on the assembly-line have much more unpleasant jobs than theirs.

The fifteen skilled workers present a picture of their jobs in extremely vivid contrast to those offered by the other two groups. Not a single man dislikes his job, and the degree of satisfaction is high in most cases. By and large, these men note as important the fact that they set their own pace of work; they are not closely supervised. They speak of pleasure in the creative use of their skills. They feel themselves in a position to perform useful and appreciated services for others. They have relatively good relations with supervisors. They show no sense of resignation to the inevitable; they know they can leave the corporation since they possess skills needed elsewhere. They have a certain self-confidence built on the knowledge that they have something valuable to sell.

The following tables will convey some notion of the differences in job attitudes among the three groups.

TABLE II. MAJOR COMPLAINTS ABOUT JOB

Occupation	Per cent citing					N
	Pressure or overwork	Physical or mental strain	No skill or monotony	Bad supervision	Exploitation	
Line	75	50	75	58	50	12
Repair	50	43	7	36	43	14
Skilled	13	13	0	20	7	15

TABLE III. MAJOR SOURCES OF JOB SATISFACTION

Occupation	Per cent citing					N
	Variety or skill	Good supervision	Autonomy on Job	Better than line	*Any* kind of satisfaction	
Line	0	0	0	0	42	12
Repair	78	28	0	57	78	14
Skilled	80	67	27	67	100	15

The Union. The twelve line workers show slightly favorable attitudes toward unions. Only four are altogether favorable. Five others are ambivalent, citing both good and bad features of unionism. Finally, three men are largely hostile toward unions.

TABLE IV. ATTITUDE TOWARD LEAVING PRESENT JOB

Occupation	% Who would leave if possible	% Who feel stuck	N
Line	91	75	12
Repair	71	64	14
Skilled	27	13	15

Those with anything good to say about unions note "protection" as the most important union function; indeed, it is the one positive union function the line workers cite. They see the union as the only force that blunts the exploiting bent of the company. Several of the men mention seniority as an especially important kind of protection. Those who criticize the union concentrate their attention on the idea that unions are not controlled by the workers but rather by a clique which serves its own interests. They assert unions are corrupt and uninterested in the rank-and-file. As a group, these men are not closely attached to their union. They give no indication of a sense of participation or solidarity.

The views of the repair, relief and utility workers resemble those of the line workers in several respects, but differ in several others. These workers show more favorable feelings toward unions generally and also toward their own union. Eight of the fourteen men have pro-union attitudes, while six are ambivalent. None is completely anti-union. Like the line workers, they stress the importance of "protection" as a union function, but four of the men also note union benefits such as vacations, company-paid insurance, etc. Within the repair group, only one man accuses unions of being oligarchical. Criticisms move in other directions and seem to be less intensely felt than among the line workers.

Much as might be expected, the skilled maintenance men also show relatively favorable attitudes toward unions. Seven are wholely pro-union, while the eight others are ambivalent. This group, too, emphasizes the "protection" the union offers, but stresses union benefits even more than the other groups. None of these skilled workers show the sense of abandonment found in the line sample. And none of them criticize unions as oligarchies.

Attitudes toward Walter Reuther, President of the United Auto Workers, are quite revealing. Both the line and repair workers are sharply critical of their union head. A majority in both groups condemns Reuther as a man out for himself, personally ambitious, and uninterested in the fate of the ordinary worker. Even men who praise the UAW as a whole, and unions generally, are wholly negative where Reuther is concerned. The skilled workers, by contrast, are overwhelmingly favorable toward Reuther; praise his skill and intelligence, as well as his honesty and dedication. In all, attitudes toward Reuther are more extreme (both positive and negative) than attitudes toward unions generally, or the UAW in particular. The line workers, who are most unhappy at work, are least happy with unions and with Reuther. The skilled workers, who are most satisfied on the job, are largely pleased with unions and with Reuther. The repair group occupies a middle position in both areas.

TABLE V. OVERALL ATTITUDE TOWARD UNIONS

	% Generally favorable	% Pro-UAW critical of others	% Ambivalent	% Generally unfavorable	N
Line	33	0	42	25	12
Repair	28.5	28.5	43	0	14
Skilled	46	0	54	0	15

TABLE VI. ATTITUDES TOWARD WALTER REUTHER

	% Favorable or ambivalent	% Unfavorable	N
Line	25	75	12
Repair	36	64	14
Skilled	86	14	15

Fatalistic Attitudes. It is sometimes argued that fatalistic attitudes do not characterize industrial man. Fatalism, it is held, is characteristic of the peasantry, lending support to rigid class distinctions and to the idea that the political order is not to be tampered with.[13]

No doubt citizens of industrial societies are not as fatalistic as their ancestors. Yet it is also clear that the social and technical structures of industrial societies themselves produce certain fatalistic orientations, and that these are related to the specific kinds of work men are engaged in. Those workers who are conscious of having the least control over their own lives at work show the most pronounced tendency to view the social and political worlds as unalterable.

To say the very least, it is difficult to determine the degree of fatalism comprised in an individual's outlook. In an effort to find an approximate means of measurement, individuals were scored on a fatalism scale composed of four open-ended interview questions. The table below indicates the results of this scoring.

TABLE VII. FATALISM SCORES BY JOB GROUPS*

Occupation	Number of Fatalistic Answers					Mean score
	None	One	Two	Three	Four	
Line	0	2	3	5	2	2.58
Repair	3	2	5	2	2	1.86
Skilled	3	6	3	3	0	1.40

* The four questions that made up the scale were:

1. Will men and nations always fight wars with one another?
2. Will there always be poverty in the world?
3. Do you think the ordinary man is helpless to change some aspect of government he doesn't like, or is there something he can do about it?
4. Some people say they can plan ahead for long-range goals and then carry out their plans. Others say, "Whatever's going to be is going to be and there's no sense planning." How do you feel about it?

The four questions form a Guttmann-type scale with a reproducibility coefficient of .91, and a minimal marginal reproducibility of .671.
Analysis of Variance significant at .05
t Test for Line and Repair significant at .15
t Test for Line and Skilled significant at .01

There are clear differences among the three work groups and these differences are in the expected direction. The assembly-line workers are the most strongly fatalistic. Though there is not space here to explore the types and nuances of fatalistic attitudes, a few important points need to be made. First, as a group, these men are most strongly fatalistic about the problem of war. The idea of the inevitability of aggression fits well with the picture these men have of human nature. Second, fatalistic attitudes are weakest in the area of the political potency of the ordinary citizen. These men retain the notion that a letter to one's congressman will change things. They hold to this idea despite the fact that on other questions they indicate their belief that public officials don't really care about the common person.[14]

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[13] See Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, 1958); and David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denny, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950).

[14] Generally speaking, these findings confirm previous ideas about working class political attitudes in the United States. For a discussion of the pessimism of working class attitudes on international affairs, see Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950), pp. 123–130.

The non-fatalistic workers in the sample stand out most strongly from their fatalistic fellows in two respects. First, they are indignant rather than merely sullen and resigned about conditions they find unacceptable. Second, the non-fatalists tend to blame themselves as well as others for social failures. They emphasize the possible triumph of justice, even if only in the distant future, and the possibility of humane and rational behavior, even though many of them consider such behavior unlikely.

Economic Preoccupations and Political Radicalism. The assembly-line group is more politically radical than the other two samples of workers. This manifests itself in favorable attitudes toward governmental economic controls and antagonisms toward private ownership and the privileged orders; it is closely related to a strong tendency among the line workers to emphasize economic problems and interpretations.

The distribution of attitudes along the liberal-conservative continuum is in the expected direction. The assembly-line workers are the most radical, the skilled workers the least. The patterns for the three groups bears a close resemblance to the scores for skilled, semi-skilled manual workers which Centers found in a nationwide sample in the late 1940's.

Symptomatic of their economic preoccupations, two contrasts emerge among the work groups in which the line workers attach a greater emphasis to economic considerations. First, they tend more strongly to view economic problems as the most important ones confronting America today. Fifty-eight per cent of the line group ranks economic problems most important as compared with 36 per cent of the repair group and 33 per cent of the skilled workers.

TABLE VIII. WORK GROUP SCORES ON LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM SCALE[15]

	% Ultra-conservative	% Conservative	% Indeterminate	% Radical	% Ultra-radical	N
Line	0	8	33	42	17	12
Repair	8	15	54	23	0	13
Skilled	13	33	27	20	7	15

X^2—.10

The kinds of economic problems mentioned by the different groups were also quite distinct. All of the men in the assembly-line group who mentioned economic problems at all concerned themselves either with unemployment or poor working conditions; both problems very close to home. In contrast, men in the other two groups raised questions about high taxes, foreign aid, welfare excesses, salary differentials, and the demise of free enterprise.

Second, the concern with economic difficulties shows itself in responses to a question that asks about the nature of the "chains" men feel. The question was phrased, "A man once said: 'Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains.' Does this mean anything to you?" Table IX arranges the responses according to whether the individual saw Rousseau's "chains" in economic terms.

TABLE IX. RESPONSES TO ROUSSEAU

	% Offering economic interpretation	% Offering non-economic interpretation	N*
Line	86	14	7
Repair	77	23	13
Skilled	27	73	11

* Percentages are based only on those who offered some interpretation and therefore exclude the "don't knows."

X^2 – .02

Table IX is significant not only because the line and repair workers tend to perceive "chains" in economic terms, but also because they tend to see these "chains" as oppressive. Remisik, a repairman, typifies much of the commentary: " . . . has to earn his bread. He's chained to a job of some sort, regardless of whether it's here or any other concern. . . . " The "chains" these men see range over bills, the regimentation of factory life, and the income tax. On the other hand, most of those who offer non-economic interpretations think of

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[15] The Liberalism-Conservatism Scale is taken from Richard Centers' book *The Psychology of Social Classes* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1949). The scale was part of the questionnaire administered with each interview. One man in the repair category never completed this questionnaire and so only 13, instead of 14 men are scored above. The Centers scale basically compares 19th century liberalism (conservative) with 20th century liberalism (radical—welfare state). The questions explore management versus labor identification; belief in the possibilities of economic opportunity; attitude toward government ownership and social insurance.

"chains" without the element of oppression. Harris, a maintenance painter, serves as a good example: "Yeah, everybody is born free, true—but then we acquire chains. It has to be. There's law, regulations that we have to abide by. . . . We're always in chains, but chains can get awfully heavy in some of these countries."

Sympathy and Tolerance. None of the questions in the interview schedule was designed directly to explore dimensions of sympathy or tolerance. Yet, several of the questions seemed to elicit punitive responses from some of the men but not from others. All of these questions touched on attitudes toward "out-groups." The four questions were:

1. Why are people poor?
2. What should our policy be toward Russia?
3. Do you think it was a good idea to drop atomic bombs on Japan in World War II?
4. How do you feel about capital punishment?

Though the evidence is very skimpy and impressionistic, it appears that the assembly-line group is less sympathetic and tolerant than the others. In all of the four cases, the line workers are slightly more punitive as a group. They tend more strongly to blame the poor themselves for poverty. They were more likely to approve the bombing of Japan without showing any sympathy for the Japanese, and to recommend a policy of toughenss toward Russia. Finally, they were somewhat more likely to favor the death penalty.

These findings are worth noting largely because they tend to confirm previous conclusions about authoritarianism and social class. Within this group of workers, punitive attitudes are associated with work frustration and lack of control over worklife. These facts points up the possible significance of everyday frustrations in conditioning attitudes toward out-groups.[16] The possibility that such frustrations might play an important role in shaping attitudes is one that psychoanalytic research has left open for the moment.[17]

IV

In two important areas the three groups show attitudes that are much alike but are important to describe nonetheless in order to give greater definition to the picture of working class views drawn thus far. First, a majority of the men in all three groups emphasize the manipulative nature of much of social life. They express concern about the exploiting and unfair practices of their corporation and of big business generally. Moreover, approximately half the men express concern about two-faced, deliberately deceptive tactics of the government and mass media which they see as closely related. Table X shows the distribution of such attitudes in the three work groups.

TABLE X. PER CENT PERCEIVING MANIPULATIVE PRACTICES BY BIG BUSINESS OR CORPORATION X, AND BY GOVERNMENT OR MASS MEDIA*

	See manip. by Corp. X or big business	See manip. by govt. or mass media	N
	(%)	(%)	
Line	92	50	12
Repair	79	43	14
Skilled	60	47	15

* The specific questions asked were:

1. How do you feel about big business?
2. How do you feel about Corporation X?
3. Do you feel there's much corruption in politics? Why?

Where big business is concerned, these workers see manipulative practices everywhere. A few believe big business or the rich run the United States. Others are not quite so explicit, but believe that big business is free of the restraints that bind ordinary mortals: businesses can initiate wars, bribe judges and representatives and manage to get the government to follow their dictates. In some of these men, hostile attitudes toward big business and especially toward their own corporation, attain a frenzied pitch and a deep bitterness.

Most of the men feel that the corporation acts as it does because its primary concern is profit-making. Some see businesses caught in a competitive rat-race in which it is do or die. The methods of the rich, as these workers describe them, are not subtle. These men simply affirm the idea that "money talks." Very few of them have any praise for big business. Most simply accept it as a fact of life, unable, like the line worker Tencio, to visualize a world without it: "Well, without big business, what could the working man do? He gotta work for big business."

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[16] Lipset points out that the unemployed, feeling resentful and alienated, are less tolerant of minority groups than are employed workers, a finding that seems related to the conclusions here about the assembly-line group. See S. M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, 1960), p. 114. For a discussion of the importance of attitudes toward out-groups, see T. W. Adorno and associates, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950), chs. 2–4.

[17] See Bjorn Christiansen, *Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality* (Oslo, Norway, Oslo University Press, 1959), p. 59.

It is not particularly surprising to learn that many of these working class men are critical of big business. But it is very much another thing to find that almost half of the 41 men are critical of manipulative and deceptive aspects of American government and the mass media. The chief theme of the critics is that the government is immune to popular pressures. The general picture is of a group of men who arrange to keep themselves in power and who don't care about the requests of the common people. The means of governmental manipulation are varied: nepotism, misleading propaganda, suppression of information, bribery, silencing of dissent. The credibility of the media is to some degree tied up with the credibility of the government. Several of the men feel that the radio, papers, television only convey what they are told to. They are tools, willing or unwilling, of the politicians. Five men criticize the media as manipulative in their own right. All who discuss the media do so in terms of their deceptive political content.

Some of the workers who are concerned about manipulations tend in the direction of a conspiracy theory of social control. Yet few of them actually express anything resembling a theory of a hidden oligarchy or oligarchies. At most, seven men give any clear indications of holding to such a picture of American society. In all seven cases, it is the "rich," or "big business" which is said to be the ruling elite.

The remaining two-thirds of the men who criticize various manipulative practices give no indication of adhering to a power-elite theory. They criticize business, government and media for attempting to manipulate the common man, but their criticism is specific and piecemeal. They do not have any clearly formulated picture of social life, nor any precise notions about who is to blame for the seamy side of things. They are critical of the excessive power of big business and yet do not believe that big business runs the country. They can believe that people in the government attempt to mislead the public without going sour on government as a whole.

Yet, behind their vagueness and their sense of their own ignorance, most of these men actually have developed an explanation for the practices they criticize. First, they see a society directed toward profit-making. Second, they are aware of wide disparities of power. Out of these elements, these men have constructed a suspicion of human nature. It is human nature and nothing less, they say, which leads to the malpractices of business and government. Thus, it is not a particular group of evil men who are to blame, but rather the selfishness supposedly inherent in almost all of us.[18]

These workers generally accept the profit-motive as a satisfactory explanation of business behavior. But this does not account for governmental behavior. Why these failures, large and small, in the democratic system?

A substantial majority of the men believe that politics, like most other aspects of our society, is basically a business. Three-quarters of the line workers, 57 per cent of the repair sample, and 60 per cent of the maintenance men see politicians as predominantly self-seeking. They see elections and platforms designed to fool the public; politicians seeking to perpetuate their own domination; stealing, nepotism, the wasting of public funds, etc. A government composed of such individuals could not possibly be very attentive to the kinds of problems these workers are concerned about. It is not surprising then that they see failures in the political system. The selfish nature of politicians springs from their unfortunate and seemingly indelible humanity.

The second important area of similarity among the three groups is political participation. Unexpectedly, all three groups were strikingly alike in regard to voting, discussion of politics, and interest in political affairs. A majority of the men in all three groups reported talking politics at least sometimes. Only one man indicated he was not interested in presidential elections. Only a handful felt that the outcome of the 1960 presidential election made no difference. All of the men said they had voted in 1960.

Only in two areas did any tentative difference appear among the three work groups. First, the skilled workers were more likely than the other groups to participate in political activities beyond voting. Two-thirds of the skilled group had contributed money, gone to party meetings or actively campaigned in recent years. In the repair group, the figure was 43 per cent, and in the line group, 36 per cent.

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[18] Thus, most of these men are not "cabalists" as that term is used by Robert E. Lane. Describing the cabalist frame of mind Lane notes: (1) There is some unofficial, quasi-conspiratorial group behind the scenes to manipulate and control public affairs; (2) each cabal group is responsible to no one but itself, and (3) the cabalist argument is protean; for the same person it will focus now upon the international banker and now upon the Communists. . . .

Lane argues that such a pattern of thought is rooted both in personality weaknesses and the social processes of modern society. He finds this frame of mind among men with anti-democratic tendencies. See his *Political Ideology*, ch. 7.

Second, the quality of partisan commitment varies considerably among these groups. Very crudely, there are two sorts of commitment: positive and negative—being in favor of, or being against. Most notably, the line workers phrase their political commitments in terms of their aversion for the Republican Party as well as their preference for the Democrats. Five of the twelve line worker speak of their ill-feeling toward the GOP. This ill-feeling runs the gamut from quiet discontent to raw bitterness. Dolski, a line worker, speaks with particular resentment on the subject of poverty: "Why do we have poor people in this state? I'll tell you: Republicans got in there. They kept everything for themselves. Now we got the poor in. . . . "

V

Much of the evidence set out in the preceding sections is impressionistic and statistically insignificant. Yet the weight of the evidence points in a single direction.

It is clear that the two groups of semi-skilled auto workers hold different views in various areas of life. First, the men who work on repetitive, assembly-line jobs dislike their work more and are more hostile toward and alienated from the union. Second, the assembly-line workers are more fatalistic, less sympathetic with and tolerant of others. The line workers are also more radical in their political views.

Recent investigations of Arthur Kornhauser tend to confirm these findings. In an as yet unpublished work and in a recent article, Kornhauser explores the relationships between skill level and various psychological and attitude variables. He finds that skill level in manual jobs is clearly related to mental health and also to certain political and social attitudes. He concludes that the higher the skill level of the job, the more likely that men will show high mental health, while mental health is lowest among workers with repetitive conveyor-paced jobs.[19]

Kornhauser's measures of mental health coincide, in part, with dimensions of attitudes also examined in this study. His indices include measures of: anxiety and tension; hostility *versus* trust in people; self-esteem *versus* negative self-feelings; sociability *versus* withdrawal; personal morale *versus* anomie or social alienation. He also found, consistent with the findings here, that workers in lower skill jobs were higher on economic "liberalism," but lower in liberal attitudes on race relations and international affairs. Kornhauser concludes that the workers at various skill levels differ most sharply in feelings of defeat, pessimism, personal inadequacy, futility, and distrust of others.[20]

Assembly-line workers, as we have seen, do not find their work interesting. They complain bitterly and consistently about monotony. In

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[19] Arthur Kornhauser, "The Mental Health of the Industrial Worker—A Detroit Study" (preliminary draft, August, 1962); "Mental Health of Factory Workers: A Detroit Study," *Human Organization*, Vol. 21 (1962), pp. 43–46. The following table, *ibid.*, p. 45), will indicate his findings:

MENTAL HEALTH OF FACTORY WORKERS

Men in 40s (age)	% With good mental health scores	N
Skilled	56	45
High Semi-Skilled	41	98
Ordinary SS	38	82
Repetitive SS	26	73
Repetitive machine-paced only (subdivision of preceding category)	16	32

These relationships held when the author controlled for education.

[20] Though I have spoken of a causal relationship between jobs and attitudes, I have not really "proven" such a relationship exists. The crucial problem is one of pre-selection. Perhaps men on assembly-line jobs differ from other semi-skilled workers because they were different before they ever took these jobs, rather than because they have been changed by their employment. Perhaps it is only men with a low sense of self-esteem and strong withdrawal tendencies who stay on the assembly-line. Kornhauser tries to handle this problem by exploring the life of his interviewees before they took their present jobs. He concludes that there is demonstrable evidence that jobs change attitudes, regardless of what those attitudes were before the job was taken. If so, then personality differences that exist before taking the job do not explain occupational group differences in mental health. See "Mental Health of Factory Workers," *loc. cit.*, p. 46.

many respects, automobile assembly-line work reflects the most unhealthy characteristics of industrial work. Line workers have a sense of futility. They are frustrated and at the same time are seeking to undo their sense of inadequacy. Their frustrations are clearly reflected in their alienation, *i.e.*, their feelings of powerlessness, and its attendant consequences. Their feelings of helplessness are reflected in their fatalistic acceptance of their lot and of the agonies of the great world. Their efforts to restore their self-esteem are reflected in their desires for economic improvement.[21]

What are the implications of these findings for our understanding of political life?

First, it seems reasonable to suppose that assembly-line workers and others whose jobs deprive them of control over their physical movements are more likely to sympathize with radical and mass agitations. Assembly-line workers are more isolated and more likely to feel disenfranchised than other industrial workers. Their feelings about politics are likely to be influenced by desires for relatively radical change, even if these feelings are partly suppressed.

Second, it seems clear that the job structure of industry is one factor that needs to be understood in grasping the impact of industrialization. Kornhauser has pointed out that it is not industrialization *per se*, but rather "discontinuities" in industrial development that have been the basis for antidemocratic movements.[22] Among these discontinuities are excessive rapidity of industrialization or the acute breakdown of the economy. Perhaps along with these factors we should also turn our attention to the job structure of emerging industries, focusing on the proportion of assembly-line type jobs.

Third, specific job groups may show a clearer relationship to political party allegiance in countries with multi-party systems than they seem to in America. The great majority of workers in all of the sample groups examined here were Democrats, yet the groups differed in the extent to which they favored liberal economic measures, and in the intensity of their antagonism to the Republicans. In a country where a greater variety of political choices is offered, such differences within the strata of manual workers may show up more sharply in party allegiances. And conversely, if most of the men in most circumstances vote Democratic anyway, regardless of differences in their feelings, party organizers here may well be content to get them to the polls and ignore their feelings.

Finally, how widely can these findings be generalized? If recent work in industrial psychology is any indication, a large percentage of manual and white collar workers are not interested in their work. It seems as yet an open question whether interest in work and control over work will increase or decrease with the spread of various forms of automation. At any rate, millions, if not tens of millions of Americans in the foreseeable future are likely to be working at uninteresting, repetitive jobs. Perhaps such workers, even if they are not manual workers, will internalize the tensions and dissatisfactions of their work.

I am not attempting to argue that a bored clerk in a department store, a dish-washer in a restaurant, an auto assembly worker, and an IBM card puncher are likely to respond to their jobs in the same manner. Their political and social attitudes are conditioned by the content and status of their jobs, as well as the circumstances and expectations they bring with them, and other factors. Yet it seems possible that at each status level, those with the most repetitive, least interesting or controllable jobs will be the most dissatisfied, alienated, and politically "radical."[23]

VI

Various political analysts have argued that there is a causal connection between industrialization and democracy. Among the most prominent of these probably is Lipset, who has shown correlations between stable democratic systems and various indices which provide a way of measuring the relative modernity of nations.[24] In his view, contradicting Marx, industrialization tends to produce the preconditions for political democracy because the class struggle is shaped in moderate directions. Relative wealth and increased education tend to preclude extremism in the lower classes. The absence of deep and stable class differences also makes it possible for the rich and privileged to acknowledge the poor as members of the same species.

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[21] Demands for justice and self-esteem can take many forms. For a discussion see Denis Butt, "Workers' Control," *New Left Review*, No. 10 (July–August 1961), pp. 24–33.

[22] Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, *op. cit.*

[23] There is an extreme divergence of views concerning the composition of the manual workforce. For example, compare the emphasis in the appendix to Friedmann's *Anatomy of Work—Labor, Leisure and the Implications of Automation*, trans. Wyatt Rawson (New York, 1961), with the notes to Blauner, *loc. cit.*

[24] "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," this REVIEW, Vol. 53 (March 1959), pp. 69–105; see also his *Political Man*, *op. cit.*, ch. 2.

Robert Lane has recently buttressed Lipset's argument from another direction. His research, in depth interviews, of the attitudes of a sample of "common men" in an Eastern city reveals that the work situation in which these men find themselves is conducive to the formation of democratic norms. Most of his sample have substantial independence at work, find satisfaction in their jobs, exercise some skill, are in a position to assert their competence and to exchange views with co-workers and superiors. Lane's findings also move in the direction of substantiating Blauner's hypothesis that modern industrial work provides wider opportunities for the exercise of skill than work in previous societies. Lane concludes that the data on industrial work substantiate Lipset's correlation between democracy and advanced industrial development.[25]

The findings reported here, as well as those of Kornhauser noted above, are not nearly so so optimistic as Lane's or Blauner's. It seems that at some lower skill levels work alienation is considerable, and has serious psychological and political consequences, some of which are not very healthy for a democratic polity. On the basis of the very incomplete knowledge we have about the effects of different types of work, skepticism about the overall consequences of industrial work is still in order.

The manual workers examined in this study are not extremists in the sense of favoring truly radical change, revolution, violence, or of lending support to undemocratic political movements. But it is not their jobs, at least in the case of the two groups of semi-skilled workers, that have made them supporters of the *status quo*, nor taught them very much about the nature of democratic social relationships. If these men are defenders of the political *status quo* it seems to be largely because of their status as consumers, not because of their work lives. If they have very much sense of personal adequacy, it is because of the control and judgment they are able to exercise outside their jobs. Though industrial work, for many reasons, may be more conducive to the development of democratic sentiments than the life of the peasant, it is quite another thing to argue that industrial work, at least of the repetitive variety, is generally healthy or enhances an individual's sense of worth.

Lipset's argument concerning the relationship between industrialization and democracy seems to run counter to the analyses of writers such as C. Wright Mills and Erich Fromm. Fromm and Mills emphasize the alienation and apathy characteristic of bureaucratized industrial societies.[26] They argue that democracy is far from being a reality in today's world. As they picture it, many ordinary citizens have become passive and alienated, feel unable to control their fates, and have lost sight of the significant issues of political life. Both Mills and Fromm relate these characteristics of industrial societies to the structure of work. Both argue that alienation and passivity at work breed alienation and passivity elsewhere. If they are right and industrialization creates many kinds of work situations which are not conducive to the development of democratic attitudes, then how can industrialization and democracy be related?

A great part of the difficulty in resolving this antithesis may lie in definitions and points of view. Lipset's definition of democracy is an arbitrary, operational one. He speaks of two characteristics: competitive parties and the absence of strong anti-democratic political groups.[27] It is a "democracy" fitting this definition which Lipset finds related to his indices of modernity. Both Fromm and Mills speak of democracy and democratic attitudes in a different sense. Both bring normative judgments to bear on present reality. So, it is possible to agree that Lipset's correlation is correct and important, and yet to agree with Mills and Fromm that present-day democracies are not as democratic as they might be.

Robert Lane has argued that ego strength is a crucial psychological correlate of democracy. Without having experienced an inner sense of mastery as well as a sense of mastery over the environment, men do not develop the requisite ego strength to pursue a consistent, long-term course, or to effect much social change. One of the most important, if unproven, implications of this study is that the work men do can have important consequences for their ego strength. Here the concerns of Fromm and Mills are significant. Men in a work environment they cannot control may be to some unknown degree damaged in their sense of mastery, and this damage may render them less capable of coping with and altering an environment they find unsatisfactory. To the extent that such damage occurs, men become victims rather than creators. To the extent that work life contributes to such incapacities, it needs improvement in modern societies. Industrial democracy may yet prove to be a prerequisite to political and social democracy.

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[25] *Political Ideology*, ch. 15.

[26] Mills' point of view is set out in *White Collar, The American Middle Classes* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1951); *The Power Elite* (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1959), and *The Causes of World War III* (New York, 1960). Fromm's views can be found, in part, in *The Sane Society* (New York, 1955).

[27] *Political Man*, p. 48.

A few final *caveats:* first, the severe dissatisfactions found among automobile assembly-line workers are probably not typical of the attitudes of most modern industrial workers. The nature of the assembly-line itself intensifies the problems of a mechanized job. These findings therefore represent only one segment of the working class. Their relevance to men in other types of jobs which are less intensely disliked remains to be seen.[28] Second, the findings presented in the tables above are for the most part based on a rather crude dichotomizing of attitudes as these attitudes appeared in the setting of open-ended interviews. Such findings, especially in view of the small size of the sample, are at best suggestive and exploratory. Most important, the question of the intensity with which various attitudes are held must remain moot in many of the areas this article has explored. For example, though many of the men criticize what they consider to be manipulative practices by political figures, most of them are not "alienated" from the political system. How deep their cynicism may go on occasion, is a question this study has not touched.[29]

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[28] For a comparison of "alienation" in several quite different industrial settings, see Robert Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom* (Chicago, 1964).

[29] Allen Schick provides a perceptive discussion of the need to deal realistically with the presence of ambivalent political attitudes in his paper, "Alienation and Politics," delivered at the 1964 American Political Science Association convention.

COMMUNICATIONS

ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF QUESTIONNAIRES

To the Editor:

There are a number of faulty items in the samples from a questionnaire presented by Professor Herbert McClosky in his article, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," in the June 1964 issue of the Review. While his findings are interesting, one must question their validity because the responses upon which the findings are based were in answer to questions or statements that, in my view, do not entirely measure what McClosky seems to say they measure.

One fault, it seems to me, stems from a lack of distinction between what he calls "general statements of free speech and opinion" (Table II) and those he states are "specific applications of free speech and procedural rights" (Table III). Respondents were asked, for example, to agree or disagree with the statement, "People who hate our way of life should still have a chance to talk and be heard." That, in McClosky's terminology, is an item expressing a general statement. From Table III comes the following item: "Freedom does not give anyone the right to teach foreign ideas in our schools." I find it impossible to distinguish any difference in the level of abstraction between the two statements. I find "freedom" just as abstract as "our way of life" and "a chance to talk and be heard" as general (or as specific, for that matter) as "the right to teach foreign ideas in our schools."

Another example from the same two tables illustrates the same problem. "I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be" is a "general" declaration. Its "specific application" counterpart is, "A man oughtn't to be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he's talking about." The two items deal with different issues, but they are on the same level of abstraction.

Ambiguity is a fault of some questions. Different people could easily answer the questions differently and take different meanings from them. An example of ambiguity is the following item from Table I: "It is all right to get around the law if you don't actually break it." The conception expressed in this assertion is both obscure and ambiguous. Does it mean that one might take all the deductions allowed when filing his income tax (obeying the law), or does it mean exaggerating charitable contributions (breaking the law)? It seems to me that one breaks the law or one doesn't. The existence of such things as income tax deductions in our society, however, might lead people to think that "getting around the law without actually breaking it" does mean something. The fact that it would mean different things to different people, however, makes the ambiguity apparent.

Another ambiguous item appears in the same table. The item reads, "If congressional committees stuck strictly to the rules and gave every witness his rights, they would never succeed in exposing the many dangerous subversives they have turned up." One might disagree with the statement, and thus presumably be classified as one who agrees with the "rules of the game," because he believes that congressional committees have not turned up many subversives. Or he might disagree with the implication that congressional committees have not "stuck strictly to the rules." Whose rules? Rules turning on standards of "fair play," or the rules of the House Committee on Un-American Activities? On the other hand, a respondent could agree with the statement, thus being classified as disagreeing with the "rules of the game," but believe that the prize of exposing subversives was not worth the cost of violating the "rules of the game."

In some questions there is an inconsistency between the item and what it purports to measure. Table V, for example, is labeled "responses to items expressing belief in equality." It seems to me that one can believe in both equality and the following statement, an item taken from Table V: "Few people really know what is in their own best interest in the long run." The item, it seems to me, has little relevance to the question of belief in equality; rather, it is a statement dealing with the conditions of prediction. It would be consistent with agreement with this item to believe that each individual knows his own interest better than anyone else does.

Another item from the same table includes a statement of ends and a statement of means. It is, "Every person should have a good house, even if the government has to build it for him." One could very well agree with the end (equality of housing) and disagree with the means (government action). Or one could disagree with both the end and the means. It would seem likely, therefore, that the number of respondents disagreeing with the item would be very substantial because of the nature of the question. Would it not give a more accurate measure if this item were made into two separate items?

The item stating, "Both major parties in this country are controlled by the wealthy and are run for their benefit," poses a similar problem. One could agree with the first part (most political contributions come from the wealthy; contributors exercise a large measure of control) while disagreeing with the second part.

Let me comment on one more example. Presumably the following statement indicates "a sense of political futility": "There doesn't seem to be much connection between what I want and what my representative does." Leaving aside the ambiguity of "representative," one would expect that most members of a minority party in a congressional district, say, would agree with the statement as regards their congressman. Because of the complexity of our governmental system with its channels of access to different levels of government and to different "representatives," they might very well not feel a sense of futility. Moreover, the answer most likely would vary with time, with party control, with the visible issues of the day, and perhaps other factors.

The items I have quoted do not appear to fulfill McClosky's promise that "each of these items can stand alone and be regarded in its own right as an indicator of a person's opinions or attitudes. . . . " Items need to be constructed with more care, and perhaps with a pre-test, to discover those which do not with clarity and precision convey to the respondent the idea that the scholar asking the question had in mind. One must doubt the validity of findings based upon responses to items of the quality herein cited.

Howard H. Lentner
Western Reserve University

RESPONSE TO LENTNER

In Lentner's opinion, some of the items presented in my article are not valid indicators of the attitudes being assessed. Certainly, however, he must know that the validity of a measure is not a matter of individual opinion (neither his *nor* mine) and cannot be resolved by individual inspection of its face content. Would that the matter were so simple!

All the items reported belong to scales that measure some aspect of the attitude dimensions to which the paper refers (*e.g.*, faith in democracy, faith in freedom, procedural rights, inequalitarianism, tolerance, ethnic equality, etc.). As such, they have been pretested, tested, and retested, in some cases not once but several times; not by a single investigator but by a group of investigators; not on a single small sample but on various samples drawn from different universes and totalling thousands of people. The scales and their respective items have been variously validated by item ratings using panels of judges, by reproducibility tests for unidimensionality, by comparison of the responses of criterion groups, etc. Most of these facts were reported in the paper itself (p. 364) and were available even to a casual reader.

That Lentner does not believe certain of the items to be valid is regrettable, but, in itself, of no particular importance. As anyone with knowledge of test construction can certify, unanimity in the rating of items is virtually impossible to achieve. No matter how clear and appropriate an item may seem to most judges, there are always dissenters who will rate it as irrelevant, ambiguous, or otherwise inadequate. Similarly (and adding difficulties beyond those suggested by Lentner's criticism), even if an item were to be rated as perfect by every judge, not all respondents who answer it in a given direction will do so for identical reasons. Some will respond for idiosyncratic reasons that have nothing to do with the "purpose" assigned to the item by the investigator. Some will score the item "correctly" (*i.e.*, according to prediction) but for the "wrong" reasons (*i.e.*, reasons different from those set forth in the investigator's theory or hypotheses). Some will also score it "incorrectly" for the wrong reasons. Every item in an attitude scale, in short, is in some degree inescapably "multiphasic."

These difficulties would be fatal to this type of attitude measurement if no means were available for overcoming them. Such means exist, however. One relies, for example, not on a single item but on a number of items, of varying intensities and shades of meaning; one selects items that, upon empirical testing, give evidence of belonging to the specified domain and that cluster, as predicted, with certain other items; and one observes and evaluates the "fit"—in terms of consistency, credibility, and predictability—between the responses to the item in question and the responses to the other variables in the study. (On the last point, see the classic paper by Cronbach and Meehl on "construct validity.") Even with these and other precautions, some respondents will still be misplaced or misrepresented by their responses. One attempts to reduce the effect of this, in part, by the use of appropriately large and varied samples.

It should also be observed that the items presented in the tables were only sample items, meant to be illustrative, and were so described in the text. Other items, reflecting the same basic attitudes, were omitted from the tables to conserve space. But the same general conclusions emerge no matter which items or scales we use. Equally important, they are also consistent, on the whole, with the findings reported by other investigators who have done research in this area, including Stouffer, Prothro and Grigg, Key, Dahl, Hyman and Sheatsley, and Agger *et al.*

HERBERT McCLOSKY
University of California, Berkeley

PSYCHOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

In his review (September 1964, p. 682) of Klineberg's "The Human Dimension in International Relations," Morton Kaplan correctly points out that general psychological principles cannot be successfully applied to specific instances of international behavior without adequate knowledge of all the variables involved, many of which lie outside psychology. To dismiss psychological analyses as marginally relevant, or useful for propagandistic purposes only, however, seems a bit cavalier.

International relations are conducted by persons and groups. Their positions of leadership do not exempt them from the operation of laws of individual and group psychology. For example, Woodrow Wilson's extreme inflexibility, probably partly due to his advancing cerebral arteriosclerosis, may well have been the crucial determinant of the votes of certain senators that kept the United States out of the League of Nations. Nor can Hitler's malign personality attributes—conceivably manifestations of a post-encephalitic state—be written off as of merely marginal influence on the hideous course of Nazism.

Psychological principles cannot be ignored in trying to analyze the interaction of stockpiling of nuclear weapons and conflicts of national interest to produce an ominous armaments-tension spiral. Strategic nuclear weapons are really psychological weapons since their actual use would be catastrophic. Today nations stake their survival on the implicit, and dubious, psychological assumption that the mere possession of these weapons will deter other nations from using them. Furthermore, national leaders are squandering huge sums in the effort to devise effective defense against nuclear weapons—demonstrably futile on both psychological and physical grounds—and on the equally vain attempt to increase national security through accumulating weapons that decrease it. (*Cf.* Wiesner and York, "National Security and the Nuclear Test Ban," *Scientific American*, October, 1964.) These activities are manifestations of the psychological principle that persons initially try to cope with an unfamiliar problem by assimilating it to the familiar—in this case by thinking of nuclear weapons as if they were merely bigger conventional ones.

As a final example, the political scientist R. C. North and his colleagues, by including psychological categories in their content analyses of documents, are demonstrating how the operation of psychological principles, such as the distorting effect of emotion on thinking and perception, contributed to the errors of judgment by national leaders that launched the first world war.

The determinants of international behavior are indeed complex and psychology still does not have much to offer toward the creation of a world safe for conflict. Unfortunately, neither does political science. The rate of progress toward this vital goal depends not only on advances in the many individual disciplines concerned but on their success in achieving fruitful collaboration. This is not promoted by narrow disciplinary parochialism.

JEROME D. FRANK, M.D.
Professor of Psychiatry
The Johns Hopkins Hospital

TO THE EDITOR:

To be accused of "narrow disciplinary parochialism" is one of the most interesting things that has happened to me recently.

One statement in my review relating to Dr. Frank's letter is:

> To the extent that psychological explanations apply—even if only marginally—to international politics, they will hinge on the psychological reactions of particular individuals with particular personalities in particular political roles in particular political circumstances. Thus the attempt to apply psychological generalizations in the abstract only produces that kind of stereotyped thinking against which Professor Klineberg protests in his book.

It is clear that I do not deny that the psychologies of individual persons play a role in political decisions. Instead, I deny that psychologists offer generalizations of an abstract nature which are useful for political analysis. Even though some particular events may be determined to a considerable extent by the psychological variable, it would be difficult to find a serious student of politics who believes that this variable is central to the study of politics. Good interdisciplinary work is to be desired but will require considerably greater sophistication and greater empirical knowledge on the part of psychologists than that profession has, in general, so far demonstrated when it has turned its attention to problems of politics.

Where I referred to the propagandistic use of psychology, I did so in the context of a discussion of the use psychologists make of the various psychological mechanisms in interpreting political behavior. Serious people know that it is impossible to make any kind of statement about such mechanisms in the absence of detailed knowledge of the context and that simple-minded interpretations of political reality which employ such mechanisms have no scientific value. They are at best propagandistic and they represent misuses of social science by people who should know better. Dr. Frank's discussion of the arms race is a case in instance. That his objectives may be worthy unfortunately does not compensate for the fact that he has ventured well beyond his depth and that he has caricatured the positions and motivation of those whose views he opposes.

Morton A. Kaplan
University of Chicago

MALAPPORTIONMENT REMEASURED

To the Editor:

In their article, "Measuring Malapportionment" (in the June issue, p. 302), Glendon Schubert and Charles Press have provided a scale for ranking the apportionment of American legislatures, accompanied by the results of their calculations of the mean, standard deviation, etc., for each legislative body. In pursuit of my research into the political effects of reapportionment, I acquired their raw data from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. A closer examination of the materials discloses that the "apportionment ideal" to which they compare each representational unit has been improperly calculated for a number of states. As a result, the rankings of all the states, and the individual results for those states that were incorrectly computed are called into question.

Schubert and Press lay down the correct procedure on p. 312, where they describe the calculation of the mean, M, elsewhere referred to as the "apportionment ideal":

X = the population of any representational unit;
N = the total number of representational units = the size of the chamber; and
M equals the mean, of $M = \sum X/N$

Representational units are created from multi-member districts by dividing the district population by the number of district representatives.

In Table II (pp. 320–22) the results of the calculation of the means by this procedure appear to be presented. But an attempt to repeat the calculations revealed that instead of the population means for representational units, we have the means for districts.

Where states have multi-member districts represented by a varying number of legislators, the district mean is an inaccurate measure of an "apportionment ideal" . . . Unless the authors clarify their results, in light of their own theoretical premises, their statistical rankings and patterns cannot be accepted.

John T. Elliff
Harvard University

To the Editor:

We wish to thank John T. Elliff of Harvard University for having called to our attention, and also to express to the Editor our appreciation for this opportunity to correct, a systematic coding error which affected the empirical findings of our article in the June issue of this Review (pp. 302–327). The corrected data are summarized below in revised Tables II and IV and Figure 2.

Glendon Schubert
Charles Press
Michigan State University

CORRECTED TABLE II. SCORES FOR AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS ON APPORTIONMENT INDICES OF CENTRAL TENDENCY, DISPERSION, VARIATION, SKEWNESS, AND KURTOSIS

State	Chamber	Mean	Standard Deviation	ICV	Skewness	Kurtosis
ALAB	S	93335	106513	.46	3.95	16.66
ALAB	H	30809	24608	.55	1.60	1.84
ALAS	S	9674	8744	.52	2.46	6.18
ALAS	H	4837	2362	.67	0.40	−1.20
ARIZ	S	46506	85034	.35	2.72	6.14
ARIZ	H	16272	8427	.65	0.64	−0.37
ARK	S	51045	11429	.81	1.44	1.46
ARK	H	17863	7500	.70	0.01	−1.06
CAL	S	392780	938308	.29	5.43	29.78
CAL	H	195478	79322	.71	0.88	0.19
COLO	S	50113	28359	.63	1.12	0.90
COLO	H	26984	13959	.65	1.07	0.75
CONN	S	70423	41320	.63	1.32	0.69
CONN	H	8622	13447	.39	3.47	13.73
DEL	S	26252	21308	.55	0.89	−0.84
DEL	H	12751	13497	.48	1.88	2.78
FLA	S	130302	176029	.42	2.79	9.15
FLA	H	52226	65222	.44	2.26	5.55
GA	S	73022	85985	.45	3.78	16.81
GA	H	19235	24673	.43	4.87	28.16
HAW	S	25306	21937	.53	0.83	−0.93
HAW	H	12407	5027	.71	1.15	−0.01
IDA	S	15163	17925	.45	2.46	6.72
IDA	H	11308	6389	.63	0.28	−0.79
ILL	S	173810	108724	.61	1.45	2.42
ILL	H	56872	18127	.75	1.74	3.09
IND	S	93250	34087	.73	0.57	−0.37
IND	H	46625	20214	.69	1.41	3.07
IOWA	S	55149	39820	.58	3.27	13.62
IOWA	H	25530	20624	.55	2.99	11.61
KAN	S	54446	57735	.48	3.54	13.61
KAN	H	17421	16710	.51	1.92	3.73
KY	S	80077	38727	.67	4.16	19.35
KY	H	30373	21456	.58	4.76	29.08
LA	S	83513	48447	.63	1.66	3.08
LA	H	32248	22903	.58	2.15	4.91
ME	S	29371	9706	.75	0.28	−1.11
ME	H	6373	2110	.75	1.06	1.74
MD	S	107030	119919	.47	1.71	2.12
MD	H	25234	20152	.55	1.40	1.00
MASS	S	127405	19780	.86	0.71	0.51
MASS	H	21339	6681	.76	1.16	2.14
MICH	S	230118	148635	.60	1.61	2.22
MICH	H	71127	31882	.69	1.42	2.25
MINN	S	51026	45355	.52	5.01	29.92
MINN	H	26097	26036	.50	5.14	35.55
MISS	S	44452	22468	.66	1.23	1.67
MISS	H	15558	12005	.56	2.45	6.11
MO	S	126559	45004	.73	1.85	3.31
MO	H	27400	22615	.54	2.01	6.21

TABLE II. (*Continued*)

State	Chamber	Mean	Standard Deviation	ICV	Skewness	Kurtosis
MONT	S	12049	15652	.43	2.81	8.09
MONT	H	7178	2842	.71	−0.47	−0.65
NEB	S	32822	15364	.68	2.38	6.94
NEV	S	16781	33489	.33	2.54	4.92
NEV	H	6070	5365	.53	1.20	0.18
N.H.	S	25285	7947	.76	0.53	0.17
N.H.	H	1450	599	.70	0.26	1.48
N.J.	S	288893	243806	.54	1.11	0.40
N.J.	H	101112	35058	.74	0.81	0.70
N.M.	S	29719	45502	.39	4.13	18.34
N.M.	H	14394	7762	.64	0.52	−0.65
N.Y.	S	280013	87676	.76	1.87	4.80
N.Y.	H	108272	49110	.68	0.78	1.74
N.C.	S	91131	44402	.67	2.34	6.19
N.C.	H	37969	20534	.64	0.04	−1.22
N.D.	S	12877	8016	.61	2.05	4.03
N.D.	H	5584	2905	.65	2.66	9.09
OHIO	S	255443	67749	.79	0.83	1.12
OHIO	H	69830	33978	.67	−0.18	−1.34
OKLA	S	52912	62707	.45	3.33	10.91
OKLA	H	19242	15040	.56	1.81	2.27
ORE	S	58949	17314	.77	−0.13	−1.07
ORE	H	29467	6664	.81	−0.32	−0.03
PENN	S	226380	119542	.65	1.24	0.84
PENN	H	53861	18548	.74	0.40	1.76
R.I.	S	19501	18234	.51	1.06	0.12
R.I.	H	8505	4958	.63	1.12	1.98
S.C.	S	51796	49646	.51	2.18	4.13
S.C.	H	19206	3560	.84	0.00	−0.22
S.D.	S	19443	9643	.66	2.60	6.68
S.D.	H	9073	2783	.76	0.26	−0.35
TENN	S	108094	66058	.62	0.75	−0.98
TENN	H	36031	22556	.61	0.73	−0.81
TEX	S	308725	241371	.56	2.51	5.88
TEX	H	63955	33339	.65	1.41	1.34
UTAH	S	35629	22965	.60	0.14	−1.78
UTAH	H	13900	6756	.67	−0.04	0.15
VT	S	12996	3452	.79	−0.57	0.99
VT	H	1585	3130	.33	6.55	58.73
VA	S	99162	44454	.69	2.19	5.82
VA	H	39675	20622	.65	2.90	10.63
WASH	S	57636	26563	.68	1.39	2.32
WASH	H	28527	10169	.73	0.88	0.15
W VA	S	58138	19536	.74	2.58	6.49
W VA	H	18600	5938	.75	0.10	0.87
WIS	S	119690	28859	.80	1.19	1.43
WIS	H	39528	12913	.75	1.68	3.16
WYO	S	12206	8217	.59	1.01	−0.33
WYO	H	5886	2407	.70	0.43	−1.34
U.S.	S	1780193	1845698	.48	1.90	3.43
U.S.	H	408601	134999	.75	1.40	2.62

TABLE IV. A SCALE OF THE APPORTIONMENT OF AMERICAN LEGISLATURES, WITH SUMMARY EVALUATION OF THE SKEWNESS, KURTOSIS, AND VARIABILITY IN THE CURVES FOR THEIR DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO THE POPULATION OF THEIR REPRESENTATIONAL UNITS

Rank	State	Senate: Skewness	Senate: Kurtosis	House: Skewness	House: Kurtosis	Joint Vari-ability*	Appor-tionment Score
1	Ohio	Normal	Considerable	Normal	Normal	A	90.3
2	Ore.	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	A	89.0
3	N.H.	Normal	Normal	Normal	Considerable	A	88.0
4	Neb.	Considerable	Considerable	NONE	NONE	A†	80.9
5	Mass.	Normal	Normal	Considerable	Considerable	A	80.4
6	Utah	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	C	73.4
7	Maine	Normal	Normal	Considerable	Considerable	A	73.2
8	Tenn.	Normal	Normal	Normal	Normal	B	71.8
9	Pa.	Considerable	Normal	Normal	Considerable	A	71.0
10	Ind.	Normal	Normal	Considerable	Considerable	A	69.8
11	N.Y.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Considerable	A	69.2
12	Ark.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	A	69.2
13	W.Va.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	A	67.2
14	S.D.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	A	62.7
15	Haw.	Normal	Normal	Considerable	Normal	C	62.6
16	Wash.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	A	62.6
17	Wyo.	Considerable	Normal	Normal	Normal	C	62.3
18	N.J.	Considerable	Normal	Normal	Normal	C	60.2
19	Wisc.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	A	58.5
20	N.C.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	B	58.3
21	S.C.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	C	56.4
22	Colo.	Considerable	Normal	Considerable	Normal	B/A	54.7
23	Del	Normal	Normal	Considerable	Considerable	D	50.6
24	Alas.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	C	50.4
25	Ill.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	A/C	47.2
26	Vt.	Normal	Normal	Extreme	Extreme	B	46.9
27	Mont.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	C	46.8
28	Mo.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	B	46.2
29	Idaho	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	D	45.1
30	Mich.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	C	44.1
31	Va.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Extreme	B	43.8
32	Miss.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	B	42.4
33	R.I.	Considerable	Normal	Considerable	Considerable	D	42.3
34	La.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	B	40.4
35	Tex.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	D	40.0
36	Ariz.	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	Normal	D	39.6
37	U.S.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	C	39.4
38	N.D.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Extreme	B	39.3
39	Md.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	D	30.5
40	Conn.	Considerable	Normal	Extreme	Extreme	B	27.4
41	Nev.	Considerable	Considerable	Considerable	Normal	D	25.3
42	N.M.	Extreme	Extreme	Normal	Normal	D	23.7

* The letters correspond to the quadrant designations in Figure 2.

† A maximal ICV score of +1.0 and a maximally positive G score of +0.3 were assigned to Nebraska's non-existent lower chamber.

Summary Indices for the Apportionment Score Distribution: Median = 46.9, Mean = 47.9, $\sigma = 23.3$, ICV = .67, $g_1 = -.24$ and $g_2 = -.64$.

TABLE IV. (*Continued*)

Rank	State	Senate: Skewness	Senate: Kurtosis	House: Skewness	House: Kurtosis	Joint Vari-ability*	Appor-tionment Score
43	Cal.	Extreme	Extreme	Normal	Normal	C	20.2
44	Fla.	Considerable	Extreme	Considerable	Considerable	D	17.3
45	Iowa	Extreme	Extreme	Considerable	Extreme	D	15.0
46	Ky.	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	B	13.9
47	Alab.	Extreme	Extreme	Considerable	Considerable	D	12.3
48	Okla.	Extreme	Extreme	Considerable	Extreme	D	11.9
49	Kans.	Extreme	Extreme	Considerable	Considerable	D	11.5
50	Minn.	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	D	1.8
51	Ga.	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	Extreme	D	−4.9



FIG. 2. The Apportionment of American Legislatures, as measured by variance in the population of representational units (as of March 26, 1962).

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Rulers and the Ruled—Political Power and Impotence in American Communities. By Robert A. Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964. Pp. vii, 789. $7.95.)

Some books are written to be read; others to be consulted; and still others to be studied. This research report of decision-making in four American communities, involving the scope of their governmental activities, requires intensive study. It deals with the emergence and resolution of diverse substantive issues that faced the four communities in the period between the end of the second World War and the termination of the research in 1961. It investigates the questions of how and why public issues were articulated as they were in the preferences, demands and expectations of both community leaders and ordinary citizens. It is equally concerned with the problem of how the decisions made were patterned by relatively stable, but also shifting, influence relations among ideologically and otherwise opposed sides, and by the prevailing as well as changing power structures and regimes of the four communities. Its central focus, therefore, is the problem of stability and change as functions of convergent and divergent tendencies in the political process.

Of course, this rather skeleton characterization of the book does not come close to describing its total content. No review of a few hundred words can satisfactorily describe or do critical justice to a research report of almost 800 pages. It can, at most, serve as a guide to a report that must be studied and cannot simply be read. Moreover, this is a book whose study requires an open mind. For it contains much with which one can readily quarrel. Nevertheless, I shall deny myself the privilege of dissent, for I feel that the virtues of the research far exceed the vices of the report.

An unbiased study of this research requires that one accept, at least initially and however tentatively, the set of conceptual formulations that direct the analysis. This is no easy assignment. For the authors, intent on giving empirically viable definitions to such traditionally ambiguous concepts as influence, power, status, regime, consensus and so on, make few concessions to conventional terminology. One is continuously challenged to avoid giving these terms one's own parataxic meanings.

First of all, this is a fresh contribution to the cumulative study of community politics. It is self-consciously geared, in both text and footnotes, to the debate about community power between those who, following Hunter, proceed from the assumptions of stratification theory and rely chiefly on sociometric methods, and those who, like Dahl and his associates, make pluralistic assumptions and stress concrete decision-making situations as objects of inquiry. I doubt that the warring camps will be happy with the theoretically often novel formulations and the methodologically quite eclectic procedures that Agger and his coworkers have adopted. But as the debate between stratification theorists and pluralists went on throughout the period during which their research was in various stages of development, it is quite clear that the authors profited from it. They succeeded in avoiding some of the difficulties and in harnessing some of the advantages of either approach. Indeed, though many problems remain, they demonstrate that rapprochement is not beyond the range of possibility, and that there need not be conflict between the analysis of the actual roles which actors take in decision-making situations and the analysis of their place in the social structure. Both types of analysis can be complementary, just as the reputational method of sociometry, if not overburdened by undue inferences, need not yield results that are at odds with the emphasis on events preferred by the pluralists.

Second, this is a study in comparative politics. From this perspective, of interest is not so much the comparison of the substantive politics that transpired in the four research locations, as is the use made of these locations for the purpose of testing the adequacy of certain typologies of political structure within which the political process takes place, and without which genuine comparison is impossible in the first place. Agger and associates developed two typologies—of "power structure" and "regime"—in order to come to comparative grips with the otherwise highly diverse-seeming political systems which they encountered in the four communities. The power structure is conceived as a function of two variables: (1) the extent of the distribution of political power among the citizenry, and (2) the degree of ideological convergence or divergence among the leadership. Dichotomization of the variables yields four types of power structure called Consensual Mass, Competitive Mass, Consensual Elite, and Competitive Elite. Political regime, on the other hand, is seen as a function of two other variables: (1) citizens' sense of electoral potency, and (2) the probability that efforts to shift or maintain the scope of government will be stymied by the use of illegitimate sanctions. Again, dichotomization of the variables results in four types of regime termed Developed Democracy, Underdeveloped Democracy, Guided Democracy, and Oligarchy. These typologies help to facilitate comparison of otherwise non-comparable political processes and to pinpoint the direction of political change. While these typologies serve the authors, their theoretical validity requires careful scrutiny and their utility calls for application in still other research arenas.

This is, third, a study of change through time. One of the well-known weaknesses of behavioral research has long been its synchronic character. While synchronic analysis need not be static, it is clearly unable to control the critical factor of time that is so important for the purpose of generalization. Agger and coworkers have developed an ingenious technique for coping with the problem of comparing the developmental stages of political change. Because the field research in the four communities was conducted at different points in time, yet because the political situation in each community at the time of field work was of particular interest, this period was characterized as "Time E to M"—i.e., the period between the occurrence of the Event at the researcher's focus of attention and the moment of Measurement. In the case of Farmdale this was 1950–52; in the case of Oretown 1952–53; and in the cases of Petropolis and Metroville it was 1957 and 1958. Another period, "Time M to M+1 or M+2" could then serve as the period in which "natural experiments" in the various locations were observed for the purpose of testing hypotheses suggested by previous observations conducted during Time E to M. The periods following this "experimental" stage, of varying length because the research had to be brought to a close (in Farmdale M+3 to M+9, in Metroville M+3 only, for instance), could be utilized as a further check on the validity of the observations made during E to M. Finally, the periods prior to E to M, in each case going back to 1946, could be characterized as E−1 and so on and could serve the purpose of systematically reviewing alternate community backgrounds. In other words, the research has a high degree of historical depth without being "historical," an accomplishment probably unmatched so far by behavioral inquiry in any other substantive area of investigation.

Last, but not least, this is a clear example of the possibility of exploiting data concerning the political behavior of individuals for global analysis. The book moves from formal to operational definitions; from the latter to observations and measurement of behavior; from there to both aggregated and group properties of the structures and processes that are described; and from such molar description to the testing of rather global hypotheses. Indeed, the hypotheses presented and tested in the last chapter constitute the high point of the entire enterprise. They deal with the emergence and existence of Developed Democracy, the relationship between regimes and power structures, the dynamics of power structure, the formation of political leadership groups, shifts in the scope of government, the impact of governmental structure on type of power structure, and so on. In testing relevant hypotheses, the authors could not only make use of the four communities as their units of analysis, but also of the four communities in different time periods—that is, they had four times fifteen or sixty units of analysis available for this purpose. For instance, with regard to the hypothesis—"a Competitive Mass type of power structure is sufficient but not necessary for the existence of a Developed Democratic type of regime"—it was found that, without exception, during 31 periods of Competitive Mass power structure the prevalent type of regime was Developed Democracy, but that during 29 periods of other types of power structure, fourteen were also characterized by Developed Democracy.

As I suggested, a brief review of this intensive research report is necessarily a troublesome affair. All I dared to do here, therefore, was to suggest some aspects of the book that interested me, that (I think) interested the authors, and that (I hope) will be of interest to political scientists. It is my conviction that Agger, Goldrich and Swanson are to be congratulated on *The Rulers and the Ruled.* That it is a major empirical undertaking in the field of community power structures is only one of its virtues. But it is also a sophisticated venture in modern political theory and, in its comparative aspects, an important contribution to the methodology of political science.

HEINZ EULAU

Institute for Advanced Studies
Vienna, Austria

The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. BY JAMES M. BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962. Pp. x, 361. $6.95.)

The search continues for theoretical frameworks which will give perspective and direction to the study of politics. The present work is of this genre, with the authors borrowing heavily from a sister discipline, economics, for their methodology, analytics and conceptual apparatus. The result of their efforts is likely to provide an important impetus for future research.

Although reminiscent of Dahl and Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare,* and Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory,* it has the most in common with Downs' *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* Whereas Downs is concerned with the behavior of political parties, the authors here focus on the individual—his interests and the calculus of choice which prevails when he and his fellow men organize society.

The individual is seen as a rational, utility-maximizing creature who will always choose "more" rather than "less." Upon this behavioral assumption the authors construct a model to describe the manner in which collective decisions are made and to extract value-free principles upon which students of politics should base these decisions.

Two types of decisions are distinguished, "constitutional" and "operational." The first is faced when a state is being organized. It includes the selection of rules governing the degree of consensus needed before collective action is to be taken and a determination of the areas to which such action is to be extended. During this stage, all who take part must agree upon the need for a state. Thus, the authors rely upon the assumptions of the social contractarians. Later, they adduce a more general rule of unanimity from the logic and language of their model. The second, or operational stage of rule-making follows the constitution's promulgation. The degree of collective action brought about in this period is directly related to the rules of consent agreed upon during the first phase. This is among the most important relationships the authors establish.

They help to demonstrate its ubiquity by distinguishing between two kinds of organizational costs, "external" and "decision-making." Together they form the costs of social interdependence. The first type is borne because of private action taken by others over which the individual has no control and which minimizes his utility. The second is a product of the bargaining which must take place before an agreement is reached. External costs rise as the degree of consent required for collective action falls. Decision-making costs rise as the required consensus approaches unanimity. While unanimity would be the "ideal" rule, these second costs make it prohibitive and man is inclined to settle on a majoritarian principle.

The rule frequently chosen is that of a simple majority. However, the authors seriously question the "efficiency" of simple majority voting. They assert that it is likely to increase collective action and generate additional costs which eventually outstrip the benefits brought about—collectivization producing external costs of its own. They devote a major share of their attention demonstrating this implication, introducing other variables, such as the degree of voter intensity and logrolling, in doing so. They also employ game theory and Paretian criteria for efficiency to provide both perspective and support to their conclusions. Finally, they apply their model and simple majority rule to the representative and pressure group features of a democracy. The primary implication of the analysis is that checks and balances, the federal system, the separation of powers and a qualified majority rule serve to mitigate and deter the harsher externalities resulting from simple majority rule.

Perhaps the most important contribution of this work is its extension of economic terminology and orientations to essential concepts of democratic political theory. The notion of economic or market-place exchange is applied convincingly to political organization, and voting is interpreted in terms of its economic value. The authors' methods for measuring utility and their distinction between consitutional and operational stages of rule-making are useful conceptual devices.

The book is not without its shortcomings, however. Occasionally the reader is unable to determine whether reference is being made to a model or to the authors' observations about the real world. A second difficulty arises in their inclusion of group decisions. At the outset, they maintain that the word "group" may be substituted for "individual" throughout the analysis. Yet, a simple model based upon a given set of assumptions about individual behavior and analyzing the purposes and results of collective choices made by individuals cannot, either logically or empirically, bear the added burden of examining choices based upon group behavior. It is suggested also that realistic implications somewhat different from those reached by the authors may be adduced by altering the degree of emphasis given to several of the variables. The study contains other sources for dispute, but none seriously undermine its considerable merit.

IRWIN N. GERTZOG
Yale University

In Congress Assembled: The Legislative Process in the National Government. By DANIEL M. BERMAN. (New York, N. Y.: Macmillan, 1964.) Pp. xv, 432. $8.75.

For political scientists studying Congress, these are the best of times, these are the worst of times. These are the best of times because increased numbers of political scientists have been observing Congress at close range, thus providing a new richness of data and insight. These are the worst of times because the sheer generation of data has proceeded so much faster than the generation of theory, that we are woefully short-handed for ways of relating one set of facts to another. Our potential for understanding Congress has been increased; but, bereft of theory adequate to the data, we cannot communicate our understanding in the language of generalization. This state of affairs in congressional research is reflected in the strengths and in the weaknesses of Daniel Berman's recent "effort to analyze the institution as a whole."

Professor Berman served as a Congressional Fellow of the American Political Science Association, and his book is filled with the excitement of first-hand discovery. It is enlivened by the knowledgeable discussion of seldom publicized aspects of congressional life. Berman is at his best when he brings an insider's perspective to bear on the selection and the discussion of topics that have not typically found their way into general studies of Congress. His discussions of such things as the uses of staff, the relationship between Congressmen and news correspondents, handling the mail in congressional offices, the Congressional Record, legislative patronage, and the strategic uses of various procedural devices are informed by perceptive observation. The emphasis which he gives to such topics will surely serve to add new items to the permanent agenda for congressional research.

The author does not, however, offer any unifying scheme of analysis. Nor does he adhere to any very rigorous standards of evidence in support of his generalizations. The reader must decide for himself how the various bits of data relate to one another and, especially, what relationships exist between each aspect discussed and overall Congressional performance. He must decide for himself whether the book's generalizations have any empirical evidence to support them—other than that randomly collected in the Kennedy years.

Chapter 4, for example, contains an insightful description of Larry O'Brien's congressional liasion operation and some informative material on administrative lobbying of Congress. It also contains the assertion that "President Kennedy fared particularly badly" with Congress. But this important conclusion about outcome is not supported by evidence, it is not explained and it is not related to the discussion of liaison work and administration lobbying which preceded it. Nor is there any discussion at all of executive-legislative relations in the Eisenhower or Truman periods, topics which might be expected to provide some evidence for generalization.

Chapter 6 contains a whole set of generalizations about the power of committee chairmen unsupported by other than single instances of activity by one or two chairmen. Much is made of the fact that 22 of the 36 committee chairmen come from southern districts, but no attempt is made to document the consequences of this fact for congressional output. The reader is encouraged, therefore, to equate Lister Hill with James Eastland and Carl Vinson with Howard Smith and then draw his own conclusions. Chapters 1 and 2 are filled with generalizations about congressional nominations, campaigns and elections without aggregate data to support them. From the first chapter to the last, the author stresses the weakness of party in Congress, but he does not present evidence from a single roll call in support of this crucial generalization—and in refutation of the counter-claim that party is, after all, the most important variable in determining congressional behavior.

There are, it appears to this reviewer, two reasons for these disappointing weaknesses of theory and of evidence. In the first place, the author has overly succumbed to that stress on the illuminating anecdote which suffuses and spices interpretation of events on Capitol Hill. Congressmen and staffers never tire of warning the political scientist that he cannot understand Congress until he understands "the personalities involved." And, of course, this is correct. But Congressmen, quite naturally, overemphasize the explanatory power of those things they understand best and which are least accessible to the scholar. The danger for the researcher is that when he has penetrated the veil and when he has become privy to the talk of insiders, he may, in the joy of initiation and discovery, mistake anecdote for explanation. He may regard the unique instance as adequate evidence for his generalizations and de-emphasize the political scientist's stress on the patient accumulation of evidence in depth and over time. And, carried along by the concrete, day to day, short range perspectives of Congressmen, the researcher may come less and less to organize his thinking about events in accordance with bodies of theory.

The weaknesses of the Berman book are traceable, also, to the author's adoption and use of the liberal posture as a kind of surrogate for theory and evidence. By implicitly adopting a normative theory of how Congress should operate (e.g. in such ways as will advance liberal causes), the author can more comfortably neglect empirical theory concerning how Congress does in fact operate. And by writing for others who share the liberal posture, the standards of evidence can be relaxed. "Everyone knows" that it is necessary to criticize and to discuss proposed changes in the seniority rule, the cloture rule, congressional investigations, congressional delaying devices, congressional party weakness, the weakness of presidential influences over Congress and the appropriations process. Where such agreement exists, a standard set of empirical generalizations concerning such matters will be freely accepted, individual instances will be taken as evidence and relationships among bits of data will be self-evident. Some readers will not be bothered by the imperceptible interlacing of normative theory and description which results. Senator Joseph Clark will, no doubt, read the book as a perfectly accurate, adequately documented description of how Congress does operate. But it is highly unlikely that Senators Richard Russell and Everett Dirksen would agree.

Professor Berman's book represents a step forward in the presentation of data and insight. But it has left to others the essential tasks of turning isolated facts into tested generalizations and of writing a description of Congress that conservative, as well as liberal members will recognize as reality.

Richard F. Fenno Jr.

University of Rochester

Political Power: USA/USSR. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington. (New York: The Viking Press, 1963. Pp. xiii, 461. $7.50.)

This is an original and imaginative book, but also a disappointing one. It is original and imaginative because the two authors have departed from ideological and formal models of the political systems of the two dominant powers of our era, and compared them according to their structure, process, and performance on the basis of empirical evidence and prudent speculation. It is disappointing because they chose a "straw man" theory (that of convergence) to dispute. This reviewer felt greatly let down by the anticlimactic conclusion, "It is too simple to assume that the complexity of the human condition is reducible to a single social-economic or political mold. The evolution of the two systems, but not their convergence, seems to be the undramatic pattern for the future."

The book begins bravely with the argument that students of Soviet and American politics have been little influenced by developments in the study of comparative politics. "Each group has tended to study its own system as an end in itself and, implicitly, as a system so *sui generis* as to forbid comparison with others. The esoteric cult of Kremlinology on the one hand has been matched by the worship of American uniqueness on the other." And yet when we are all through with this often illuminating and arresting study, we have to conclude that these two students of Soviet and American politics have still remained outside the developments in comparative politics.

The reasons for this are of interest. The developments in comparative politics to which the authors refer really represent a return to the classic tradition of political theory, a concern with the varieties of polity and their consequences for man and society, the conditions with which these varieties are associated, and the factors which affect their growth and transformation. Brzezinski and Huntington are less concerned with political theory, and perhaps rather more with political polemic. They refute an argument which few students of politics would advance with any seriousness: that the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. are becoming alike. In the course of presenting this argument, that *they are not becoming alike,* they lose track of the really interesting problem which is *what are they becoming like.* Thus in the concluding chapter we are told that the U.S.S.R. will not become a democracy, and the U. S. will not go Communist, but we are never treated to a full length and explicit conclusion about what is happening to these two political systems and why.

They discuss four factors which are affecting changes in the Soviet political system: the industrial culture, the organizational and operational implications of the industrial system, affluence, and international involvement. In each case they acknowledge that these forces will produce some change in the political system. For example, in discussing the effect of affluence on the Soviet system, they point out that continued economic development in the U.S.S.R. may mean that " . . . The political system will be characterized by greater rationality, less coercion, increased reliance on social self-control. The society will suffer less from the tensions originating in the lack of resources and, initially, from the absence of social consent for the new political system. A system combining self-sustaining popular control over social behavior, based on a highly collectivist affluence, with centralized managerial direction from above, will differ profoundly from the earlier Stalinist model but also from the existing Western affluent societies." This would be a dramatic change indeed! One might even argue that the developments in Soviet politics and society and the Communist international system to which they refer and which involve trends toward greater decentralization and pluralism, are already rather "dramatic" developments. Instead of pursuing interesting themes such as this, the authors quickly move back to the thesis of undramatic evolution, having forgotten that evolutionary theory includes the principle of mutation.

The body of the book contains fascinating material on Soviet and American ideological patterns, recruitment and circulation of elites, and the characteristics of the struggle for power and the policy-making process in the two countries. The authors provide us with four comparative case studies of politics and policy-making in the two countries. Surely these represent valuable additions to the literature. But much of the significance of these comparisons is lost because of the theoretical poverty of the treatment. Having rejected ideological models, they offer no analytical models to take their place. Thus the reader cannot judge the significance of the differences they bring out since only two political systems are being compared. It is surprising that in a decade marked by a proliferation of political typologies they use none of these and offer none of their own, not even types of mobilization and authoritarian regimes, and varieties of democratic systems, to provide dimensions and continua on which to locate the U. S. and U.S.S.R. in some orderly and systematic way.

GABRIEL A. ALMOND

Stanford University

The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. BY MORRIS JANOWITZ. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Pp. vii, 134. $4.50.)

Although the title of this book might lead the reader to expect an examination of the social-political causes and consequences of military intervention, the author's purpose is more limited. In his own words, it is "to sketch a variety of types of civil-military relations in new nations and to formulate a number of hypotheses about the political capacities of the military to rule and to modernize." In view of the prevailing prejudices and illusions about the political capacities of the military, this in itself is certainly worth exploring, and the author does so with the speculative originality we have come to expect.

The two main questions of the inquiry are "What characteristics of the military establishment of a new nation facilitate its involvement in domestic politics," and "what are the capacities of the military to supply effective leadership?"

Briefly, Janowitz finds that most military intervention is not the result of praetorian conspiracy, but a reaction to actual or presumed civilian incompetence. The physical power of the military, its national and public service identification and "the combination of managerial ability with heroic posture" make it relatively easy for the military to march into the political arena.

But once in power, the military find themselves unable to build the mass political support that they need to carry out a program of economic development. Although quite collegial among themselves, the military tend to deal with civilians in a repressive and authoritarian manner. Resistance results in a pattern of spiraling rebellion and coercion which the author has aptly termed the "cycle of distrust."

Janowitz is one of the first authors to detail the considerable economic costs of the military establishments in the new states. The armed forces consume from 10 to 40 percent of the national budget, and in some cases "because of the heavy expenditures for the military the rate of economic development has not been impressive. . . . " Further, the author finds that the direct and indirect economic contributions of the military are modest, and that, rather than being a natural instrument for economic development projects, the broader the economic task the less the competence of the armed forces to accomplish it.

Surveying civil-military relations in the new states, Janowitz suggests that the variations can be grouped into five categories: (1) authoritarian-personal control (2) authoritarian-mass party (3) democratic competitive and semi-competitive systems (4) civil-military coalition, and (5) military oligarchy. Because it emphasizes differences in the distribution of actual political power between civil and military elites the typology should be useful to other scholars interested in similar comparative studies.

Discussing the origin of the present armies, Janowitz concludes that except for national liberation armies, all of which were and have remained highly political, there seems to be no correlation between subsequent political behavior and the armies' institutional history. But, as demonstrated by events in the Near East, there is a correlation between past traditions of military intervention in political affairs and post-independence behavior. The underlying reasons for these findings remain of course to be explained.

The political goals and ideology of the military, are, in the author's view, very much influenced by social origins, which are "of greater consequence in the new nations than in contemporary western industrialized countries." Janowitz finds that the military is largely recruited from persons of the "middle class" and rural background, and that there is some measure of occupational inheritance with a heavy representation of sons of minor government officials. These and certain historical factors such as the absence of a feudal linkage between the military and the economic elites in the new states and a general shift to objective standards of recruitment, produce an insitution which has "a modernizing and collective orientation." Janowitz identifies four main elements of the military's ideology: nationalism; a puritanical outlook emphasizing "anti-corruption and anti-decadence; a preference for statist-bureaucratic means of promoting political, economic and social change; and, a pervasive rejection of politics."

The conclusions here summarized while interesting, are much too broad and general to be accepted as more than a rough approximation when referring to the military in any one of the fifty-one countries included in the study. This is an inevitable outcome of the central method of the analysis; at the outset, the author explicitly assumes organizational homogeneity and implicitly assumes functional uniformity in all of the armies discussed. Janowitz's reason for this approach is that "the military establishment regardless of its societal context—has a unique character because the threat of violence is a permanent reality to its leaders." Do we really know that the military leaders in Chad, or in Tunisia are in any way as concerned with the threat of violence as are those in India or South Vietnam? And wouldn't the *kind* of violence the military is faced with be a very important distinction—some, perhaps most, of the fifty-one armies face "threats" no more serious than unarmed strikers or peasants, others must deal with internal terrorism or political warfare and in some few cases there is a real threat of another state's armed forces. Aside from this, one suspects that the institution bearing the title "armed forces" often performs widely different functions in the fifty-one countries. We should have more information about the actual duties of the military establishments since in some cases tasks such as administration of remote areas or management of state-owned economic enterprises may be largely unconnected with the "management of violence" but conducive to the formation of political appetites and skills.

It would also have been interesting to have the author's judgments about ideological and ethical diversity in the military establishments of new nations. It seems difficult to believe that the armies of Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Liberia, for example, are any more akin in ideology than in their everyday activities. The statement, "the military has a strong sense of public service and this is reinforced by its sense of heroic leadership"—seems too naive as well as too sweeping. In fact one would suspect that sharp differences in the relative importance of public service versus "self-service" motivations exist within and between military organizations and that this is one of the variables which would be of great importance in determining political competence.

Had the purpose of the book been to compare the role of the military in the many different social and political contexts of the new states, it would have been sufficient for the author to have set up an "ideal-type" military institution. Although, if the author had wanted to emphasize uniformity he at least should have explicitly defined the organizational, functional and ideological characteristics of a military institution and then should have excluded from his analysis any which did not meet these. But since the book's purpose was to examine those aspects of the military institutions which determine their capacity to tackle political and social problems, the analysis should have emphasized at least those differences suggested as important by the author's own hypotheses and then made some effort to correlate these with actual political behavior.

Minor points of criticism include the author's repeated use of "modernization" without any effort to define this catch-all term. Also, a number of concepts and categories of analysis deriving from the author's excellent work on American military elites are used without clear enough indications of the limits of their applicability to the rather different context he is now exploring.

This book should not be read for thorough comparative analysis or detailed information.

But at the same time, Janowitz is a constantly original and exciting analyst. Full of valuable insights and observations, his book provides an excellent hypothetical framework for continued study, and a much needed challenge to widespread opinions about the possible role of the military in the new nations.

CONSTANTINE MENGES
The University of Wisconsin

Interest Groups in Italian Politics. BY JOSEPH LA PALOMBARA. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. Pp. xv, 452. $8.50.)

The revival of a major practical and theoretical interest in comparative politics owes much to the efforts of the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics, headed by Gabriel Almond. This book, produced by another member of the Committee, reflects both the theoretical orientations provided by Almond and a practical concern with the working operations of a political system, which can be obtained only by extensive field research.

Its virtues are many. The writing is straightforward and simple, with a minimum of technical and sociological jargon. At the same time the author is familiar with the theories about the group basis of politics developed in the United States from the time of Arthur Bentley to the recent work of David Truman and others. He is conversant with the analysis of bureaucratic behavior provided by Max Weber and his successors. A major aspect of this work is the testing of generalizations developed in American and Germanic contexts by reviewing their applicability to a somewhat different society. And an important conclusion is that the American and German theorists were, to an extent, culture-bound; their generalizations require modification before they can comprehend the realities of other societies.

For Mr. La Palombara is very much aware that both interest group and bureaucratic behavior, i.e. human behavior, must be understood within the whole socio-cultural-political context of the society. More than the first quarter of his book is devoted to a description and interpretation of that context; the values of Italians, their regional differences, the lopsided distribution of power and wealth, political party structures and operations, governmental forms, the legal and extra-legal positions of parliamentarians, party officials and public administrators, the generally but not completely oligarchic pattern of decision making to be found in all areas of Italian life.

He then proceeds to the central core of his study, the interaction between interest groups on the one hand, and parties and public administrators on the other. He has chosen two major groups for intensive study and analysis, *Confindustria* (the Confederation of Industry), and Catholic Action, a lay organization established under the authority and patronage of the Roman Catholic Church. Lesser attention is given to trade unions and agricultural organizations. He interviewed intensively the leaders of his two major groups as well as the polititicians and bureaucrats who deal with them. But he also went beyond his immediate participants to seek the images of the groups and their operations held by the larger, but still restricted, politically conscious intellectual class.

He finds two basic patterns of operation. The *"clientele"* pattern is represented by *Confindustria* in its relation to the public bureaucracy, especially the higher administrators of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce; and the *"parentele"* or "family" pattern is represented by the influence exercised by Catholic Action through its internal role in the predominant Christian Democratic party. He recognizes that these patterns of operation are not completely exclusive and that *Confindustria* has made efforts to insert itself into the party structure (most successfully into the Liberal party), while Catholic Action has also made efforts to establish *"clientele"* relations in important ministries. He feels that in the long run the *"clientele"* pattern is the more productive and stable, for the *"parentele"* is too dependent on the fortunes of a particular party.

Mr. La Palombara is properly cautious where his data require him to be, and he is reluctant to make large generalizations where they are difficult to substantiate. Yet I feel that the situation is even more complicated than his limited generalizations warrant. These are strictly questions of degree. He distinguishes between two broad behavior patterns, the traditional-ascriptive pattern of the South and the modern-rational pattern of the North. But he exaggerates the modernity of the North, while once or twice showing the North to be more paternalistic, family-bound and traditional than modern. His description of the political culture as basically fragmented, isolative and nonbargaining is true, but overdrawn. The groups in Italian society do not behave so extremely as their verbal and ideological claims and preferences would indicate. There is more compromise and bargaining across the large fractures between right and left, capitalist and proletarian, clerical and secularist, than is implied. Otherwise the society could not survive.

The somewhat static and monolithic characterization of the two groups, expecially Catholic Action, that is presented through most of the volume is remedied in an excellent final chapter in which the evolution of *Confindustria* and Catholic Action over a period of time is graphically described. And the monolithic unity of big business, or organized Catholicism, is shown to be as fictitious as the monolithic unity of the Communist world. Mr. La Palombara is well aware that the Catholic Church and the Christian Democratic party are divided among many points of view, but until that last chapter he had tended to describe Catholic Action as a monolithic whole, which it never was, subject as it is to the varying humors of the bishops in the local dioceses rather than to its national headquarters.

Norman Kogan
The University of Connecticut

Pride and Power: The Rationale of the Space Program. By Vernon Van Dyke. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 285. $6.50.)

The Moon-Doggle: Domestic and International Implications of the Space Race. By Amitai Etzioni. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1964. Pp. xv, 198. $4.50.)

In the past two years the American space program has become the subject of growing controversy. Polemical articles abound, and now book-length harangues are appearing. An up-to-date example of this genre is Amitai Etzioni's *The Moon-Doggle;* his title fully conveys the bias and tone of the book. On the other side equally flashy, opinionated, one-sided rehearsals of the arguments for the space program are available. But I confess that my own temperament leaves me doubting that knowledge or public policy are much advanced when scholars on either side resort to such exaggerated popularization, particularly on a problem as novel and complex as the conquest of space. Professor Etzioni is a Columbia sociologist; on space and, more generally, on the allocation of American scientific resources, he sounds like a rather frantically angry young man.

Entirely different in tone and purpose is Vernon Van Dyke's fine scholarly analysis of the American interests and values that have supported manned space flight in recent years. Van Dyke and Etzioni survey most of the same considerations, but Van Dyke's thorough marshalling of evidence pro and con, from documents and interviews, and especially his willingness to admit to indecision where known facts are inconclusive reveal a frame of mind that is far more truly respectful of basic scientific method than is Etzioni's, however often the latter may wave a bloody shirt to save American science from being somehow poured into a rocket and fired off into space.

Just take one example, comparatively moderate, from *The Moon-Doggle:* "The loss of a life in a test which could conceivably be done without a man would repulse the world more than could be offset by orbiting a whole football team"; later the same comparison reappears, except that the "football team" has become "the Yankee Stadium." But these rhetorical flourishes remain wholly unsubstantiated in Etzioni's book, even when the reader cooperates by discounting them heavily for style. Van Dyke, even if he shared the opinion, would always restrain himself from publishing it as fact.

The goals of the space program that Van Dyke and Etzioni both explore, in their very different ways, are military security; progress in science, technology, the economy (including special interests), and international cooperation; national prestige; and pride in achievement. The feature of Van Dyke's study that will most interest those political scientists whose concern for outer space as such happens to be limited is the emphasis he comes to place upon the motive of pride: "When I made up my own early list of the apparent motives of the space effort, it did not occur to me to include pride. But I found unexpected evidence on the point, crying to be recognized. . . . And, given the role of pride in this connection, I wonder whether it does not play a much more important role than has been recognized in other aspects of American political behavior, in both domestic and international affairs." Thus sputnik, like Pearl Harbor, was essentially a humiliation, crying for redress in kind, to restore Americans' self-esteem.

Etzioni doubts this central motivation, and insists that anyway there would be "something rather basically wrong with the education of a generation that derives more emotional charge from space exploration and mountain climbing than from a science seeking to aid the sick, the mentally disturbed, and the poor. We should not accept such a 'taste' and thus reinforce it." Instead he cries for much more rigorous and deliberate overall governmental coordination of priorities for Federally subsidized research, to reorient it toward welfare functions. The extensive prescription he sets forth may strike some students of American government as quixotic, or even procrustean. But at least one must in this regard give Etzioni credit for grappling with the principal issue that Van Dyke side-steps, the fear "that the emphasis on research relating to space will lead to a slighting of scientific work of other sorts. . . . I [Van Dyke] have not attempted to determine to what extent, if at all, this fear may be justified." Considering the care with which Van Dyke explores other issues, this conscious major omission is surprising.

He may also be criticized, I think, for attempting, even briefly, to present a psychological analysis of the evolution of principal motivations supporting the space program 1957–63. A psychological approach would seem to require a more microcosmic (not just macrocosmic) exploration of the history of the relevant decision-making than Van Dyke by his own avowal has undertaken.

He seeks also to generalize his results by suggesting some modifications of the emphasis Charles E. Lindblom has given to "incremental," contrasted with "rational-comprehensive" decision-making. Van Dyke notes that sometimes neither applies: "Of all the historical political movements and achievements that we regard as great, I wonder whether a high proportion were not based on a certain degree of abandon," in "pursuit of one goal, or a very restricted set of goals, almost regardless of the consequences in other respects." Lest this sound a trifle romantic, Van Dyke mutes the tone. But his chief discontent seems to be a different one, that Americans are typically inconstant; they do not adhere to the single-minded goals they sometimes rush to embrace. Van Dyke's apparent prescription, at least for "detached observers," is to remain steadfast, not shifting ground incrementally with Lindblom, nor expecting policy to be "rational-comprehensive" as Etzioni is inclined to do when he condemns incrementalism. I confess I find these conclusions obscure; they lack the cogent readable clarity of most of the book.

Van Dyke also includes a few chapters of descriptive analysis of the organizational and publicity arrangements of the space program in America, the Western alliance, and the UN. These chapters, though less imaginative than the rest of the book, are solid, and contribute to making *Pride and Power* a remarkably full interpretation of America's governmental problems in space. For such a new subject, Van Dyke's work has so few flaws that it should be considered a model of responsible political science.

H. BRADFORD WESTERFIELD
Yale University

On Dealing with the Communist World. BY GEORGE F. KENNAN. (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1964. Pp. ix, 57. $3.00. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations.)

A long-established, warm, and not exactly taciturn fan of George Frost Kennan, I find it difficult to write this review. And yet precisely because of my fondness for the man and admiration for his work, I cannot but say what I think must be said. *On Dealing with the Communist World* is a well-written and well-developed statement of personal creed and a rational manifesto of a responsible citizen, distinguished public official, and perceptive insider. But it is also a fair example of what is meant by "getting it out of one's system": while Mr. Kennan succeeded very well in unburdening himself of his argument, its objective was not fulfilled. The message reached the wrong audience at the wrong time. In 1960, Mr. Kennan would have been a prophetic voice sounding in the wilderness. In 1964, those reading the slender volume can only agree. Now, they feel, the argument is too flat, too stale, too simple. And those who *should* read the book, in order to sustain the author's purpose, unfortunately never will. To Mr. Kennan and his impassionate plea they are unreachable. They are the vigilant, obstinate supporters of such well-maintained clichés as "communist tactics change but goals do not"; or "the Sino-Soviet split is just a smoke-screen designed to destroy us"; or "all communists are alike."

Mr. Kennan's systematic exhortation rests on a pivot which is the crux of his matter: "I think there could be no more useful innovation in the discussion, public and governmental, of the affairs of the 'communist' " orbit, he warns, "than a law which forbade all of us, including myself, to use the word 'communist' at all, and forced us to treat the regimes and peoples of each of these countries specifically, for what they are—which is something much more highly differentiated, as among themselves, and something much less differentiated from what exists elsewhere, than we commonly suppose." Indeed, the state of uncertain flux characteristic of the communist system challenges simple policies based on the "tight bipolar" world system we were accustomed to. The nice, simple, homogeneous focus of our attention has been replaced by a confusing web of complexities. The multilateral, multidimensional schism in the formerly monolithic communist system calls for fresh, inventive, imaginative, resourceful, and thoughtful proliferation of considerations. But having made such a statement and having done so as late as 1964, Mr. Kennan rests his plea.

For this reason I consider *On Dealing with the Communist World* a too-little-too-late proposition—a far cry from the powerful, moving, and incisive *Foreign Affairs* article of 1947, signed "X", in which Mr. Kennan built the theory of containment, which, adopted as policy by the U. S. government, proved to be perhaps the most successful American stance towards the communist world to date. To understand the dramatic political and social changes taking place in the communist system, let alone suggest a policy which would properly cope with them, we need tools and analytical procedures which would clarify both the properties and the propensities of these changes—especially those which condition motion, function, and behavior. Without them, exhortations to differentiate are of limited usefulness.

JAN F. TRISKA

Stanford University

BOOK NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Madame de Staël on Politics, Literature and National Character. TRANSLATED, EDITED, AND WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY MORROE BERGER. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1964. Pp. viii, 371. $5.50.)

Largely ignored by contemporary American students of political and social thought, Madame de Staël has attracted a certain amount of attention in recent years as a commentator and as a specific influence on the development of modern thinking in these areas. In a recent book she has been credited with the wisdom and prescience requisite for being proffered as the prophetess of Atlantic Union (Roberta J. Fosberg and H. C. Nixon, *Madame de Staël and Freedom Today,* New York, 1963). In an earlier popular study she was put forward as the *Mistress to An Age* (J. Christopher Herold, Indianapolis, 1958), though the important question was left unanswered there as to whether our own era has anything to do with the age she supposedly helped so much to bring from idea to fact. These suggestions of Madame de Staël's central role in the development of 19th Century European liberal institutions, or of a special importance in the specification of modern constitutional thought have not always gone unchallenged, as the review of Mr. Herold's book by Anthony West in the *New Yorker* of December 6, 1958 (pp. 222 ff.) testifies. Why there should be a new interest in Madame de Staël on the part of American students of politics and society is not really clear, though there may be some clue in the recent reinforcement of the perennial American interest in Alexis de Tocqueville.

At any rate, Professor Berger has undertaken the difficult task of selecting and working together passages from Madame de Staël's voluminous writings that will make available to the English-reading general public a panorama of her views not only on politics and "national character" but on the relationship between literary and social forms. The translation is done with grace and accuracy. Given his design to represent his subject's thinking in less than 300 pages, the editing is also competently done, though one can always quibble over which elements of the argument's development should have been retained and which bracketed. A long introduction precedes the texts, and it is marked by a sympathy for Madame de Staël and her role in 19th Century continental life and for the quality of her thinking which reminds one of the respect accorded her at the beginning of this century by such French critics as Paul Gautier and Albert Sorel, though perhaps Sorel's measure of the limits of her influence in the 19th Century is the more realistic.

Whether Madame de Staël should be associated, even tangentially as Mr. Berger associates her, with such thinkers of influence on Western institutions as Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, Montesquieu, Marx and others (p. 14) seems doubtful to me. Her writing, however felicitous, possesses little of the disciplined and complex sweep of these writers, moves out onto no such unmapped territories as they, and betrays no such profound grasp of metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology as their works. The intuitive judgments of the logic of contemporary political and social institutions made by de Tocqueville are more multi-faceted and, in so far as they are scientific, seem a much better link to Montesquieu than do Madame de Staël's. Certainly nothing in Mr. Berger's edition or in any of Madame de Staël's writings I have read elsewhere makes her worthy of consideration alongside Hegel, Kant, Rousseau, Mill or Acton as candidate for the title of Seminal Mind of the 19th Century. That she has anything to say today either to American political scientists or to Americans who are primary data in the most complex, human, and reasonable political process yet devised is most doubtful.

There are, too, some last questions. One of them is whether the concept of "national character" is anything more than a 19th Century operational model without much meaning in a world where the complexities of the individual psyche and their relevance to politics become more and more apparent. Another is whether any thinking that so emphasizes the phenomenon of progress as does Madame de Staël's can be categorized as anything but a period piece. Two world wars and a great deal of sound philosophy meaningful to our generations, and a considerable amount of competent political technology, have made all this sort of thinking seem superficial, while making possible a greater respect and justifying new looks at what seem increasingly far more enduring teachers, men like Mill, Hobbes, Aquinas, Aristotle, and Plato.—ALBERT A. MAVRINAC, *Colby College.*

The Morality of Law. By Lon L. Fuller. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 202, $5.00.)

This little book is based on Storrs lectures delivered at Yale by Harvard Professor Lon Fuller. While the whole has a legal atmosphere with numerous references to law and court decisions, the basic approach and, of course, the purpose is that of a philosophical discussion.

The author begins by distinguishing between the morality of aspiration and the morality of duty and he notes that whereas the former starts at the top of human achievement, the latter starts at the bottom. The former "has to do with our efforts to make the best use of our short lives." As for the latter, in a broad sense "there is a notion of reciprocity implicit in the very notion of duty." Fuller then goes on to note eight requirements in the creation of law. There must be a rule or ad hoc basis for decision. The rule or rules must be promulgated or publicized in some way since there can be no obedience without knowledge of what a person is expected to observe. As a corollary of this point, retroactive legislation must be avoided. There must be clarity, and thus there must not be the vice of vagueness. Contradictions in the law must be avoided, again a corollary of the previous point. The law cannot command the impossible or something beyond the powers of the affected party. There should not be too frequent changes in the law, a corollary of the point on retrospective legislation. Finally there must be congruence between the law or rule as announced and official administrative action or enforcement under the law. These rules are easy to state, but "to know how, under what circumstances, and in what balance these things should be achieved is no less an undertaking than being a lawgiver."

The argument implicit in this discussion of the distinction between the moralities of duty and of aspiration and between the internal and external moralities of law is that the internal morality of the law is not something added to, or imposed on, the power of law, but is an essential condition of that power itself. "Every departure from the principles of the law's inner morality is an affront to man's dignity as a responsible agent." The author then notes that the acceptance of the internal morality of law "is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for the realization of justice, that this morality is itself violated when an attempt is made to express blind hatreds through legal rules." He next notes that there are limits to what can be done in this legal way. He notes that "tasks of economic allocation cannot be effectively performed within the limits set by the internal morality of law. The attempt to accomplish such tasks through adjudicative forms is certain to result in inefficiency, hypocrisy, moral confusion, and frustration." And he hastens to add that "economic calculation is a pervasive part of our lives."

What this book points up, sometimes by indirection and at other times in a most pertinent manner, is a matter that we are prone to forget today. We have told ourselves and we have been told by others so often that life, modern life, that is, is complex, our own problems are complex, and so our solutions must be complex. We have thus forgotten that while life and its problems have become very complex, these are in the category of accidentals and the basic principles remain simple. We have become so engrossed with the superficial and the secondary that we have forgotten the basic and the primary. One of the most obvious manifestations of this in the academic field is the enormous emphasis placed on the matter of semantics. One cannot escape the conclusion that certain persons instead of endeavoring to communicate attempt to mystify. And here Professor Fuller's closing lines are most pertinent. "Open up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of the channels of communication by which men convey to one another what they perceive, feel, and desire. In this matter the morality of aspiration offers more than good counsel and the challenge of excellence. It here speaks with the imperious voice we are accustomed to hear from the morality of duty. And if men will listen, that voice, unlike that of the morality of duty, can be heard across the boundaries and through the barriers that now separate men from one another."—Paul C. Bartholomew, *University of Notre Dame.*

Equality in America: Religion, Race and The Urban Majority. By Alan P. Grimes. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. x, 136. $4.00; $1.50, text edition.)

In this tightly written book, Professor Grimes has advanced the thesis, "that there exists two constituencies behind American politics—one, essentially cosmopolitan and urban-oriented, which seeks to push forward the policy of equality; the other, essentially provincial and rural-oriented, seeks to maintain in religion, race, and politics its superiorities of the past. White, Protestant, rural America pulls in one direction; urban America, with its diversity of religions and races, pulls in the other. The differing compositions of the constituencies give rise to different values."

Professor Grimes suggests that the urbanization of America has resulted in the advance of equality, culminating in three major decisions of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren: *Brown* v. *Board of Education* (1954), which made segregated public schools unlawful; *Engel v. Vitale* (1962), which banned prayers in public schools; and *Baker v. Carr* (1962), which established a baseline for equality of representation between rural and urban legislative districts. He maintains that it is, "the close proximity of diverse people in cities (which) has necessitated the norm of religious and racial equality in these areas in the interest of domestic peace . . ." Inequality will not work in the cities, writes Grimes, because, when translated into policies, it produces antagonisms which impare the tranquility of the community.

His position is ostensibly plausible, but it is not adequately demonstrated in this book. In his own chapter on religious equality, Grimes shows that fundamental steps had been taken toward equality of worship by the late 18th century, long before the rise of giant cities and the arrival of what Boston's mayor, James Curley, used to call "the newer races." It was in 1787, that the Continental Congress, in passing the Northwest Ordinance for our sparsely inhabited territories, declared that, "no person . . . shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship, or religious sentiments in the said territory."

Grimes may be correct in asserting that, "the surest safeguard for the equal exercise of religious liberty has not rested in an appeal to religious principles, but in the diffusion of religious power"; but he should not ignore the argument advanced by de Tocqueville and others that Protestantism, by proclaiming "that all men are equally able to find the road to heaven," has been a major factor in advancing the principle of equality of religion in America. Nor should he avoid the evidence that in some overwhelmingly Catholic cities of the Northeast, Protestants and Jews complain bitterly about discrimination in public employment and public policies.

The principle of racial equality is undoubtedly on the march, and even if the Supreme Court desegregation decision of 1954 cannot be attributed to rising urban power (including Negro power), the passage of the Civil Rights bill by Congress probably can. But Professor Grimes has not shown that it is in the big cities that the principle of racial equality has been most widely accepted, or, as he puts it, that urbanism has resulted in a shift from the value of racial supremacy to the value of racial equality.

The country is certainly much less racist than it was at the turn of the century, but there is no doubt that racism was more in vogue at the time of Teddy Roosevelt than during the administrations of Ulysses S. Grant, despite urbanization in the intervening years; and it would be difficult to link egalitarianism with urbanism by studying the history of major cities, such as Boston, which is probably more racist than it was 150 years ago, or by looking at towns where the Negro populations are relatively small and stable and report less discrimination than they do in major cities.

That the rise of urban power is directly responsible for the Supreme Court decision in the re-apportionment case of *Baker v. Carr* is patently true. It was only a matter of time, as Professor Grimes deftly shows, until urban voters would rise up against the outrageous gerrymanding of state legislatures and congressional districts to assert their right to equality of representation. In doing so, they were bucking the Jeffersonian myth of rural virtue, as well as the reluctance of the Supreme Court to intervene in what had long been held to be a "political" question. In defending his own interest, the city dweller is helping to bring about equality of representation in our legislatures. But this does not mean he is more enamored of the idea of equality of representation than his cousin in the country. It will probably be a long time before a political leader from an important urban-industrial state advocates changing the present electoral college system to reduce the disproportionate power which it now gives to his constituents in choosing the President of the United States.

Professor Grimes has swiftly and accurately reviewed the relationship of urbanism to shifts in American politics and he has succinctly summarized recent advances made by egalitarian principles, but in trying to show that urbanism has accounted for those advances, he has been less successful. Important questions he never asked include: Where are Black Muslims strongest, in the cities or in the country? Who shows stronger adherence to egalitarian ideals in the cities, Protestants or Catholics? What accounts for the Jewish insistence on elimination of public worship from the schools, a religious conviction that prayers have no place in the schools or a keen awareness of the precarious minority position of Jews? Why is it that Catholic forces defend prayers in the public schools of the big cities, whereas they attacked them in the small towns of America 120 years ago? And most important of all, from the point of view of understanding the history of equality in American life, why did white, rural, Protestant America attempt to resist and limit the power of Negros, Catholics, Jews, and urban dwellers generally? Was it because the descendants of the farmers of Crevcouer's day no longer believed in an ideal of an egalitarian America, or did they see in the newer groups and in the rise of the cities fundamental threats to egalitarian principles? If Professor Grimes had grappled with such issues, he might have been able to develop his thesis more completely, and this good small book would have been a better larger one.—LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, *Brandeis University.*

Imperialism: The Story and Significance of a Political Word, 1840–1960. By Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1964. Pp. xxv, 432.)

Key political words are essentially ambiguous words: the meaning of "justice" is as politically unsettled today as it was when Socrates roguishly interrogated his contemporaries. Whether this resistance of political words to definitive clarification is a reflection of the nature of political life, or of the obstinate obtuseness of political philosophers and political scientists is a long question, and one which, fortunately, need not be settled here. But I raise it because it is relevant to the method and content of this book.

The late Professor Koebner died in 1958 leaving thousands of excerpts and notes for a study of the attitude of the British people toward their empire, and of the link of such attitudes to the contemporary use of the word "imperialism" as a political slogan. Koebner's former pupil and assistant, Helmut Schmidt, performed a labor of love by taking over the materials, supplementing them where necessary, and writing the book largely according to Koebner's original plan and method. The plan is to trace the use of the word "imperialism" from its earliest appearance to its present status as political curse word *par excellence* in the context of three world struggles: against capitalism, against Anglo-Saxon domination, and against white colonial power. To substantiate the importance of contemporary usage in these three contexts, Schmidt points to a frequency count done in 1960, which showed that in the press and radio of America, Europe, Asia and Africa, "imperialism" was used at least once in every ten political communications.

As for the method, it is that of the "semantic approach to history" (p. xv), the object of which is to "discover the manner in which human action and the words of a political vocabulary are interrelated" (p. xvi). It consists of proceeding from mere dictionary definitions to broad-scale contextual analyses of the changing political uses of key political words.

Applied to imperialism, this method produces the following thesis: *Imperialism* is widely used in twentieth-century scholarly treatments of history and politics to mean any "system of extended rule from the days of Nineveh down to the Soviet Union." Such usage gives the word the appearance and some of the prestige of a "definable category of political science" (p. xx). Consequently, even when the use of the word is for strictly partisan political purposes, as is the case most of the time today, the halo of "scientific" validity is retained. But this is, in effect, both a usurpation and an historical monstrosity: the word came into being as a political term; its various stages of development and changes in meaning all are reflections of essentially political conflicts; and its transmutation into various "theories" of imperialism was itself a political *tour de force.* In short, contemporary usage of the word, especially by politicians but also often by scholars, is unhistorical, unreflective, and uncritical. Politicians may be excused for this, but scholars may not—indeed, it is their responsibility to serve as critical commentators by constantly *reducing* the level of ambiguity in political words.

The evidence used to support the historical part of this thesis is impressively detailed and voluminous. Compressed to its bare elements, it is this: The word *imperialism* first appeared, in England, in the middle of the nineteenth century. It was used then to describe *not* the British Empire, but the Empire of Louis Napoleon, with deeply invidious connotations of despotism and militarism—in short, of things anathema to the British constitution. Only subsequently was the term applied to the British Empire, particularly as political leaders attempted to distinguish "good" from "bad" imperialism. For example, at the time of the international political crisis settled at the Congress of Berlin, Lord Carnavon made very explicit this contrast. "Bad" imperialism was Caesarism, militarism, large standing armies, and the reckless extension of political control over subject peoples. But "good," or British, imperialism was based on British political traditions; it rested primarily upon the link of the mother country with Anglo-Saxon settlers; and in reference to non-Anglo-Saxons, it was dedicated to "service": the keeping of the peace and other humanizing, civilizing activities.

This contest of "good" and "bad" conceptions took a decisive turn with the Boer War, and especially in the writings of John A. Hobson. For it was at this point that political combat took on the airs of the academy: the competition now was to produce world-encompassing "theories" of imperialism, and then to feed these theories back into the political combat. In particular, German scholars *cum* patriots seized Hobson's arguments to combat British pretensions; and at a later stage, men such as Lenin and others produced even more doctrinaire political-theoretical theses which are, today, the stock-in-trade of political attacks, but which also, in milder forms, are the slogans of scholars.

It is impossible here to give a detailed critical evaluation. On balance, I highly recommend the book as a careful and fascinating case study of how a political word has come to be what it is. I also have some real reservations. Most serious is the failure to inquire into the possible impact of earlier, systematic political theories on the process described. A second is that too much compression in the twentieth-century part results in rather hasty generalization. A third is the intrusion, at times, of uncritical admiration for the British Empire. Small faults in a sound structure.—RICHARD H. COX, *State University of New York at Buffalo.*

Equality in Political Philosophy. By SANFORD A. LAKOFF. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 270. $5.95.)

This work merits the serious attention of students of political philosophy because it goes a long way toward filling a significant gap in the literature dealing with the history and development of political ideas. Lakoff examines conceptions of equality from the earliest times indicating throughout his analysis those significant turns of thought that have contributed to the development of our modern conceptions of equality.

Lakoff notes that ancient and medieval thought concerning equality was, for the most part, marked by a "dualism": that is, notions of equality and inequality were "held together in the same systems of thought" in such a manner that they were fully compatible with one another. For instance, the equality motif could find expression in the myth of the Golden Age or in the eschatological promise of Apostolic Christianity, while, at the same time, there were efforts to justify and rationalize inequalities in the social and political order. The Reformation period and the theories of Luther, Müntzer and Calvin are, according to Lakoff, of critical importance in the development of modern notions of equality. Though still concerned with notions of equality in a theological context, their theories, on his showing, provide the bases for the subsequent secular doctrines of egalitarianism. The Levellers with their beliefs in the consent of the governed, greater political equality, and, among other things, free competition among individuals in the economic sphere represent the secular extension of Lutheran doctrines and also prepared "the way for the integral philosophy of Liberal equality." Similarly, Hobbes, working from a conception of human nature almost identical to that of Calvinism, emphasized the necessity for authority and obedience in the civil society and laid the foundations for the modern conservative posture toward equality. And, in turn, the "religious socialism" of Winstanley and his recognition of the "obstacles to the achievement of communism" provided a link between Müntzer and later socialist thought as expounded by the young Hegel and Marx.

Although the philosophers of the 18th century enlightenment were mainly concerned with denouncing egregious inequalities in the social order, three distinct views toward equality are, Lakoff contends, still plainly discernible. The liberal theme, with its emphasis upon popular government along with economic freedom, is to be found in the writings of Hooker, Locke, and Condorcet. Rousseau, in pointing out the dangers of authoritarianism inherent in a "mass society" can be considered a spokesman of the conservative point of view. Babeuf, by synthesizing and extending key elements of the theories of Morelly and Mably, anticipates much of the subsequent Marxian theory. There is, Lakoff observes, one development common to these three egalitarian conceptions during the 18th century: namely, they all come to rest upon completely "secular foundations."

At this point Lakoff devotes three chapters to exploring in depth the inherent difficulties associated with the more modern versions of these conceptions of equality. A comparison of the views of John Stuart Mill and Spencer point up the key dimensions of the "Liberal Crisis" which involve basic differences "over the areas in which [personal] liberty" is to be advanced as well as "the kind and degree of collective authority it [is] advisable to use on behalf of the individual." The conservative philosophers—Tocqueville, Kirkegaard, Stirner, Nietzche and Freud—all wrestle with the problem of how conservative principles, hierarchy and order, might be restored "in the context of egalitarian society." Lakoff argues that Freud, by denouncing equality "as an ideal of reform" but pressing it "into service as a myth of order," probably best expresses the nature of the modern "Conservative Paradox." The "Socialist Dilemma," evident in the writings of Hegel and Marx comes to this: "Once [individuals are] emancipated, would the essence of humanity prove to be a universal altruism, or would an unyielding shell of separate individuality remain to frustrate perfect communism? Would it be possible to reproduce this personal altruism in social institutions without raising a still more oppressive communal authority in place of a ruling class, without substituting for the coercion of circumstances a visible and invisible compulsion to conform?"

This is an impressive and provocative book. Those criticisms which are made of it will stem, no doubt, from the fact that Lakoff excludes from extended consideration those philosophers whose views on equality do not fit so easily into the development of his broad thesis. There are answers to this criticism which many, if not most, will find convincing in light of Lakoff's intent and approach as outlined in the preface and chapter one.

This book merits consideration for use in graduate political philosophy courses and perhaps even undergraduate honor seminars. It provides a meaningful structure for a better understanding of contemporary controversies surrounding equality and, in so doing, vividly illustrates the relevance of traditional political philosophy to our modern political discourse. Further, this book would not only serve to sharpen the students' analytical powers but would also better equip them to see important interrelationships between seemingly unrelated and distinct philosophical systems.—George W. Carey, *Georgetown University.*

The Conservative Papers. Introduced by Representative Melvin R. Laird. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. Pp. x, 268. $5.95. Also Anchor Books, $1.45.)

What Is Conservatism? Edited by Frank S. Meyer. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. Pp. x, 242. $4.95.)

These two collections of essays differ in character. The first, commissioned by a group of Republican Congressmen as a response to *The Liberal Papers* edited by James Roosevelt in 1962, contains fourteen arguments regarding current, or recent, issues of national policy written from various conservative points of view. The second, true to its title, deals with the nature and aims of conservatism itself as seen from the editorial position of William F. Buckley's *National Review.* With few exceptions, the essays have not appeared in print before. The notion that the struggle against Communism is the prime problem of our time underlies them and limits their perspectives.

Six of the *Conservative Papers* are on foreign policy, unfortunately led off by a cold war diatribe from Charles Malik. Henry A. Kissinger of Harvard examines NATO strategy and advocates "fostering a European nuclear identity growing out of the British and French programs." [35] Milorad M. Drachkovitch of the Hoover Institution analyzes national Communism in eastern Europe and recommends an "activist" policy of liberation by any means other than war and "irresponsible revolutionary instigation." [57] Criticizing the two Chinas idea, David N. Rowe of Yale comes to an "aggressive defense" policy for Asia, using U. S. military forces now. Edward C. Banfield of MIT and Harvard is sceptical of foreign economic aid, because, among other reasons, "it may not be a proper function for our government to do good for people who are not its citizens." [91] Karl Brandt of Stanford opposes land redistribution in underdeveloped nations and suggests instead "symbiosis between a plantation and a large number of small farmers." [99]

In domestic policy, John K. Galbraith's thesis of public penury amidst private plenty is contradicted by Roger A. Freeman of the Hoover Institution in an extended (and sometimes careless) statistical article favoring defense spending over welfare programs. Raymond J. Saulnier of Columbia provides an economic analysis of fiscal deficits, finding them inflationary, undemocratic, a source of centralized power and a threat to individual liberty. Milton Friedman of Chicago argues that a "controlled economy" can bring an increase in "aggregate physical output" but not in a "self-sustaining rise in the standard of life of the ordinary people," and therefore advocates the abolition of the ICC, tariffs, oil quotas, agricultural price supports, occupational licensure, etc. Gottfried Haberler of Harvard, seconded by his colleague Edward H. Chamberlin, attacks inflation, which he sees as caused almost exclusively by wage demands, and believes can be prevented by curbing union power. Edward Teller of California advocates continued atmospheric nuclear testing, blandly ignoring the problem of leukemia. In an interesting essay, Alfred de Grazia of NYU finds that "federalism" (his euphemism for state rather than national action) is justified as "resistance to majoritarianism," [247] without noticing that the "locally triumphant" minorities he advocates have included the Southern segregationists. And Harry V. Jaffa of Ohio State concludes the collection with a natural law argument that Communists have no right to the freedoms of the First Amendment.

All this was written between 1960 and 1963, but much of it seems attuned to the Stalin era and some of it to the presidential campaign of 1936. It suffers from a pervasive obliviousness to the counterarguments.

The editor of *What Is Conservatism?* has structured it as a search for consensus among "libertarian" conservatives who stress individual freedom and "traditionalist" conservatives for whom order is most important. His viewpoint, however, is reactionary. He writes of "thirty years of slow and insidious revolution at home," after which "restoration, not preservation, is the order of the day." [10] "Classical liberalism" stressed freedom against the state and contained much of value, he says, but it went astray in utilitarianism, which led to "collectivist liberalism," so the restoration of pre-Rooseveltian conditions is not enough: pre-Benthamite English Whiggism should be our aim.

The spokesmen for the anti-libertarian school of tradition and order are Russell Kirk and Willmoore Kendall. The latter, in an interesting and perverse essay, conceived as an attack on Mr. Justice Black's reading of the First Amendment, surveys and supplements the Federalist arguments against a bill of rights and insists that the

First Amendment was expected by Madison to be, and has been, a dead letter, unenforced by the courts against Congress. The libertarian conservatives are represented by M. Stanton Evans of the *Indianapolis News*, Wilhelm Röpke of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, and Friedrich A. Hayek whose essay is reprinted from his book, *The Constitution of Liberty* (1960). They see the market economy as the taproot of the tree of liberty, and its protection in the limitation and dispersion of governmental power.

Father Stanley Parry of Notre Dame then reexamines the relation of reason to conservatism and concludes that, reason being subjective, its findings are intersubjectively communicable only by means of tradition accepted on faith, and that, therefore, reason cannot cope with a cultural crisis, such as the present, in which there is no commonly accepted tradition. Stephen J. Tonsor of Michigan and Garry Wills of Johns Hopkins search for a middle way, the former in Acton and Tocqueville, and the latter in the "basic truth" that "the particular aim of the state is not to achieve justice, and certainly not to dispense it" [163], since such high aims lead to tyranny. From this point on the book degenerates, Stefan T. Possony of the Hoover Institution making a frontal attack on many aspects of public policy, and Buckley explaining the *National Review*'s relations with Max Eastman, Ayn Rand, Robert Welch, and other conservatives-in-error.

These books have more rational content than conservatives usually allow themselves. Nevertheless, the authors still shiver in the cold sweat of original sin, still fear the sin of pride in men's attempts to improve their conditions. They sit, shielded by their creature comforts, their status, and their religion against the problems of poverty, ignorance, disease, and unemployment that make others too uncomfortable to be conservative. They have not yet faced the question, asked long ago by Lester Ward, as to why, if individual effort be so efficacious as Spencer and Sumner said, collective effort must be so deleterious. Or the question how, if man be too sinful to be trusted with governmental power over others, he can be trusted with unrestrained economic power over others. Or why, in thus setting their ideas above the prevailing opinions of the past 30 years—or 200 years, they are not themselves guilty of *hubris*.—THORNTON ANDERSON, *University of Maryland.*

Mark Twain's Fable of Progress: Political and Economic Ideas in "A Connecticut Yankee." BY HENRY NASH SMITH. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1964. Pp. v, 111. $3.50.)

Mark Twain's Fable of Progress: Political and Economic Ideas in "A Connecticut Yankee" by Henry Nash Smith was the 1963 Brown and Haley lecture delivered at the University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, Washington. It maintains the high quality of that lectureship for originality, incisiveness and brevity. This is the sort of volume one may read in a single evening but not then to put down, for this reader returned again to admire the intricate and subtle way Mr. Smith demonstrates that though *A Connecticut Yankee* as a first rate novel is a failure, even that failure has much to say to the twentieth century. Mark Twain's inability to comprehend the tensions created by an America in transition from agrarianism to industrialization presages twentieth century existential insistence on the absurdity of the modern world.

The first of the three lectures establishes a framework for *A Connecticut Yankee* by examining two other novels published at the same time and dealing with the problems of values and industrialization; namely, Charles Dudley Warner's *A Little Journey in the World* and William Dean Howells' *A Hazard of New Fortunes*. In a rather thin plot Charles Warner defends the genteel New England tradition which "was now being shoved aside by the new 'democratic plutocracy'." Howells' view is more realistic but still limited for he perceives the metropolitan slums and poverty as somehow attendent upon schemers and entrepreneurs engaged in wicked maneuvers to enhance their wealth at the expense of the ordinary laborer. Whereas both Warner and Howells are hostile to industrialization because of what it does to traditional values and the people at the bottom, Mark Twain is sympathetic to technological change. Hank Morgan, tough-minded, practical, inventive, an engineer of the "modern" age, attempts to bring the fruits of industrialization to medieval England of the time of King Arthur. The contrast of 6th and 19th centuries is the vehicle in which Mark Twain may "set forth a theory of capitalism and an interpretation of the historical process that has brought it into being." He first records his idea in 1884 by an entry concerning the discomforts of wearing armor suggested by reading Malory's *Morte D'Arthur*. The book was written during the course of four years, 1886–1889, at a time when Mark Twain was undergoing severe personal problems and when his effective creative energy was already spent. The story starts off as a burlesque of the 6th century and in praise of the common sense republican ingeniousness of Hank Morgan who intends to revolutionize medieval England. But the theme is not carried through. Mark Twain shows little understanding of the 19th century technology or of the tensions of management and labor in industrialized society.

The story loses its way and ends with Hank Morgan and his small loyal band using Gatling guns and land mines to slaughter thirty-thousand knights. The crusade against political tyranny and the attempts at industrialization end in nightmare. The novel clearly ends in despair. Mark Twain is fed up with "the damned human race." Mr. Smith clearly demonstrates how a design for a great novel ends in failure. Mark Twain simply failed to grasp much of what industrialization was all about. And yet the very despair of the piece may talk to our age in a way in which a more trenchant analysis may not have done.

This type of study is highly useful for the student of social theory. It is not unusual for the novelist to delineate an age with more force and ahead of in terms of time than the social scientist. One learns a great deal about the Gilded Age by reading Warner and Howells and Mark Twain and even more by having such novelists put in context and subjected to analysis. This Henry Nash Smith has done for us. Political scientists are in his debt.—George A. Peek, Jr., *Arizona State University.*

The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume. By John B. Stewart. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. xii, 422. $7.50.)

This excellent book fills a long-felt need. Although Hume is generally known as one of the giants of modern philosophy, his stature as a political theorist is much less widely recognized. As Professor Stewart rightly observes, the fact that no one of his major writings is explicitly and exclusively devoted to political questions has contributed to the failure of political scientists to pay him due attention. Throughout the whole of his career, however, Hume's thought was largely motivated by political concerns. Even his epistemology was designed, in part at least, as a basis for his political philosophy. Although this philosophy is more or less briefly treated in most of the standard surveys of political thought, no large-scale study, up to now, has been devoted to it. For providing such a study, at long last, Professor Stewart deserves high praise.

The book is essentially expository in character. Believing that the immediate need is for a clear and comprehensive statement of Hume's own position, the author has deliberately excluded all references to the critical commentaries of others, and has refrained from putting forward critical ideas of his own. His purpose has been to let Hume speak for himself, using his own words as far as possible. Judiciously examining the whole body of Hume's writings, he has identified all the passages that would seem to bear, directly or indirectly, on the author's political and social ideas, and has shown that all together they form an admirably clear and self-consistent whole. The theory, as thus set forth, is most impressive, fully justifying Hume's reputation as one of the most rewarding exponents of the empirical tradition in modern political thought.

The obvious danger in any such work of reconstruction is that the expositor may force on his material a degree of systematic consistency that it cannot really bear. Professor Stewart is well aware of this danger, and deals with it most effectively. The crucial issue here has to do with the relationship between Hume's early masterpiece, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* and his later writings, the most important of which, for our present purposes, is *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.* Largely owing to the influence of Selby-Bigge, whose edition of the Enquiries still holds the field, there is a widespread belief that Hume's philosophic position changed substantially in the course of his life, and that any attempt to treat his work as a self-consistent whole is mistaken. Departing from his general principle of refusing to consider secondary sources, Professor Stewart, in a substantial appendix, devotes himself to the explicit task of refuting this position. While admitting that, in some minor matters, Hume's later views were increasingly conservative, he tries to show that the basic ideas, from first to last, were essentially the same, and that all apparent inconsistencies can be explained in terms of the specific purposes and audiences to which his works were variously addressed. So far as the present reviewer is concerned, this demonstration is wholly convincing.

The reviewer's only real, though minor, point of disagreement has to do with the question of Hume's conservatism. In his concluding chapter, Professor Stewart makes a strong and not unpersuasive case for the proposition that Hume is not a true conservative, but ought rather to be taken as a typical exponent of 18th-century liberalism. It is true that recent scholarship has taught us to beware of Carl Becker's oversimplifying view of the 18th-century enlightenment. Most liberals of the period were a good deal less revolutionary than their Jacobin successors. All this granted, it still would seem that Hume's attitude toward questions of political and social change was uncommonly cautious and restrictive. In his emphasis on the importance of habitual consensus in the maintenance of social institutions, and in his fear of excessive "enthusiasm" in the pursuit of innovations, his thought would seem, in many respects, to be closer to Burke than to Bentham. Classify him as one will, he was clearly a rationalist who, far more than most, recognized the limits of human reason. His enduring interest as a political theorist stems largely from this fact.—Frederick M. Watkins, *Yale University*.

Politics and Catholic Freedom. By Garry Wills. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964. Pp. 302. $5.95.)

The importance of this book is spelled out in its foreword which is written by no less a figure than Will Herberg, namely that it is a defense of freedom of thought and discussion by a Roman Catholic for Roman Catholics against those Roman Catholics who try to silence their opponents in the name of the Pope. The author is concerned about a tendency toward intolerance among his correligionists. He starts out by taking the example of the attacks in the Roman Catholic press against William F. Buckley, the editor of the *National Review*, for his criticism of the encyclical *Mater et Magistra*. The controversy raised the general issue of how far papal encyclicals are binding on Roman Catholic laymen and to what extent these laymen are free to criticize these pronouncements. When we consider the wide range of topics covered by encyclicals and the number and power of our fellow-citizens who are Roman Catholics, our interest is inevitably aroused. We are all the more interested when we think of Paul Blanshard's books which contend that Roman Catholicism and the American tradition of freedom are incompatible and John Courtenay Murray's *We Hold These Truths* which so eloquently argues the exact opposite.

The results of Mr. Wills' labor are disappointing. He begins with the proposition that the Pope is infallible only in matters of faith and morals, but that the Pope's authority extends beyond pronouncements made *ex cathedra* though not so far as other fields such as politics. We might conclude, therefore, that encyclicals leave a considerable margin of freedom to Roman Catholics in the fields of faith and morals, and total freedom in political and economic questions so long as these do not impinge on faith and morals. How much freedom does this conclusion leave? Actually very little. Mr. Wills, who is a professor of Classics, brings to bear on the encyclicals all his talents as a linguist and translator, and he invokes the canons of scholarly and juristic interpretation. The problem is not whether the Pope was right or wrong but what he meant in the light of the whole encyclical, the circumstances under which it was written, and the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church over the centuries. The standards of interpretation are sound enough, but the reader is left with the impression that the standards must always be applied in such a way that the Pope comes out "right." All mistakes are necessarily made by the interpreter and never by the author of an encyclical. While explicitly stating that the Pope is as fallible in politics as any other man, Mr. Wills finds not one single instance when the Pope made even so much as an error in political judgment.

Mr. Wills' concern with Roman Catholics who deliberately misinterpret encyclicals so as to wrap themselves up in the mantle of papal authority while reading their antagonists out of the Church arouses more sympathy in the reader. Even here, however, the reader is left with another impression which is that it is only the political liberals who thus misuse religion to castigate the political conservatives. Mr. Wills, of course, asserts no such thing, but the instances he chooses certainly do convey that impression.

The book as a whole is beautifully written, systematically developed, and well argued. Its cause, the cause of freedom, is attractive. And yet the reader—at least the reader who is not a Roman Catholic—is depressed. All the individual notes are right, but the music somehow is wrong. Perhaps the whole is more than the sum of its parts after all.—Rene de Visme Williamson, *Louisiana State University*.

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3. The University of Leeds, England
4. The University of London
5. Harvard University
6. University of Wisconsin
7. University of Southern California
8. Western Michigan University
9. Kent State University
10. University of California, Berkeley
11. Pennsylvania State University
12. University of Michigan
13. Institute, Pennsylvania Hospital, Philadelphia
14. Clark University
15. University of North Dakota
16. VA Hospital, Danville, Illinois
17. Kansas State University
19. University of Pittsburgh
20. University of Chicago
21. St. John College, Cleveland, Ohio
22. Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey
23. University of Massachusetts
27. University of Maryland
28. Radford College
29. San Francisco State College
31. University of Connecticut
32. University of Hawaii
33. Oklahoma State University
34. Eastern Michigan University
35. Institute for Defense Analyses, Washington, D. C.
36. Washington University
37. Southern Illinois University
38. Ohio State University
39. University of California, Los Angeles
40. University of Missouri
41. University of New England, New South Wales, Australia
42. Institute for Social Research, Oslo, Norway
43. University of Nevada
44. University of Nebraska
46. University of Kentucky
47. Cornell University

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The John Birch Society: Anatomy of A Protest. By J. Allen Broyles. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. Pp. 169. $4.50.)

On the dust jacket of this book are the following questions: Who are the members of the John Birch Society? Why do they join? How are they organized? What do they believe? What do they fear? Although the second and fifth questions are significant, they are not answered in this study. While reading this book I was constantly impressed by the struggle which Mr. Broyles had with himself over whether the scope of his study offered any chance of answering all of the questions which did interest him. Evidence of this struggle can be found in comparing Broyles' attempt to describe and analyze the ideological content of Birchism with his many comments that he is not actually dealing with ideas at all. After constructing the edifice of the John Birch Society—from the economic and social substucture to the theological steeple—Broyles stands back to view his work and concludes that anyone who would enter such a building is either confused, unstable, or both. For instance, on page 155 Broyles writes: "Most of the members I interviewed were . . . 'fringe' personalities within their communites due, partly, of course, to their outlandish views . . . " In another passage Broyles describes Robert Welch as a man who "as an almost fanatical belief in what he's doing." Throughout this study it is pointed out that the emotional experience of joining the John Birch Society is similar to that of suddenly being saved. One couple who had escaped injury in a serious auto accident claimed that God spared them so that they could fight Communism.

Broyles himself realizes that people do not join the John Birch Society solely to fight Communism nor is Communism their only fear. In a perceptive passage, Broyles shows that there is a very basic psychopathological dimension to many of the people in the John Birch Society. These people do not join the Society because it offers them a better brand of ideology. They join because they fear that they will be literally infected by the germs of Communism and Socialism if they don't. The Society offers them a kind of hot-house protection. It is as if they fear that exposure to this germ warfare may be fatal. By screening all outside information and interpretation through Robert Welch, they can avoid such fatal exposure.

The study is strengthened by the fact that it is one of the very few studies of recent American extremism in which the author has done research beyond that of armchair newspaper reading. Mr. Broyles has interviewed 6 of the 24 members of the Council of the John Birch Society and has talked with many of the co-ordinators of the organization. Broyles has interviewed a sufficient number of the members of the Society at all levels to establish a number of interesting patterns: the upper-ranks of the Society are not dominated by ex-Army officers who fly flags upside down but by industrialists and professional people who are often highly respected members of their communities; the rank-and-file of the Society are not old ladies in tennis shoes—although women do outnumber the men—but intense and dedicated young people. The organization itself is still dominated by its founder, Robert Welch, although Broyles claims that the center of authority is expanding. But for the moment Welch is not expected to renounce his principal that: "*The John Birch Society will operate under completely authoritative control at all levels.*" Those entering the Society are expected to learn and repeat the Gospel according to St. Robert. Welch himself is so candid about this that it seems strange that so many prominent people speak kindly of the Society while damning its leader.

The major weakness of this study lies in the failure to explain how the authoritarian personality moves from political apathy to political action. What is it, for instance, that prompts a housewife who previously displayed her dogmatism on interior decorating to suddenly become involved in purging libraries of politically dangerous books? Why do some terrified people become politically active while others do not? Since World War II psychologists have extensively explored some of the dimensions of authoritarianism. It is now time for political scientists to explain how the authoritarian personality and authoritarian societies channel their fears and their dogmatism and express them politically.—WILLIAM C. BAUM. *Creighton University.*

Public School Finance, Economics and Politics. BY JESSE BURKHEAD. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964. Pp. xii, 394. $8.75.)

Burkhead's book adds another to a rapidly growing list of studies of aspects of education by social scientists outside schools of education. Educators appear to be losing the near-monopoly in analysis of schools and education that they have exercised perhaps less by choice than by default of social scientists. Is this new interest of social scientists simply intellectual curiosity and new worlds to conquer? Is it a reflection of the ever-increasing financial demands of a sector of government in which most social scientists have a fairly immediate vested interest? Is it initiated or pushed forward by the availability of research funds in the U. S. Office of Education? All of these or none of these? Does it matter?

The finding of Janowitz and Delany (*Administrative Science Quarterly*, September, 1957) some time ago that in the Detroit area school administrators had less awareness of general citizen attitudes toward their function and were more detached from the adult community than administrators generally in government agencies exemplifies the isolation often extended and demanded by educators. The results have not necessarily benefited either the schools or analytical research in the educational function. In the area of economics of education, except for detail, there appears to be no lasting contribution apart from general economics literature. Politics in the educational realm could not be seriously studied, since most professional educators regularly chanted: "education and politics can not mix, must not mix, and do not mix." Recent internal organizational studies of education sometimes betray only a casual acquaintance with the mass of research in sociology, psychology, industrial relations, public administration, etc. Self examination may be a wise moral principle, but the individual frequently needs nudging from outside to look deeply inside. The "nudging" for a deeper look at education may have arrived.

Although the volume indicates Burkhead as the author, the preface and initial footnotes of chapters make clear that the larger part of the study was either written by others or is a summary of the work of others. Thus eleven of the fifteen chapters are summaries by Burkhead of volumes in the earlier paperback series published by the Syracuse University Press. (Burkhead himself was author of *State and Local Taxes for Public Education* in that series.) Two other chapters by Bertram M. Gross and Charles S. Benson were written specifically for this book. Despite the fact that the book adds only a little new to the previously published materials, it serves a worthwhile purpose in providing the accessibility of a single volume together with the author's general context statement of school finance economics and a single writing style with the exception of the Gross and Benson chapters. The coverage of the material is enormous (even though higher education is omitted) from schools and suburbs to more than one hundred pages devoted to a history and description of the role of the federal government and education at the elementary and secondary education. The theme generally is prescriptive (we need better schools, we can afford better schools, all levels of government must participate in providing better schools).

When historical summary and general description is supplanted with analysis, the quality of analysis varies from excellent to mediocre. Some of the failures, as well as the successes, of the earlier publications perhaps necessarily are reproduced. Much of the best of the analytical work is Burkhead's own in the tax area. The Gross chapter on school administration provides analyses and raises questions of significance for all interested in organization.—CLARA PENNIMAN, *The University of Wisconsin.*

The American Law of Treason: Revolutionary and Early National Origins. BY BRADLEY CHAPIN. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 172. $6.00.)

In a carefully documented narrative Professor Chapin has chronicled the development of the law of treason in the United States from its English origins through the trial of Aaron Burr. Although the book is a narrow slice of history in a very specialized area, it provides considerable insight into the American political character and the research may warrant even greater generalizations than the author makes.

Prior to the Revolutionary period, magistrates in the colonies applied the English law of treason on an *ad hoc* basis, innovating slightly in substance but not at all in procedure. The issue of treason in America was not raised in any meaningful way until after 1763 and the attempts to apply the English law "failed dismally." They failed, says Professor Chapin, because Americans were unwilling to participate in the proceedings necessary to obtaining a conviction and because the alternative of taking Americans to England for trial merely compounded the colonial grievances. Successful prosecution of the war required surveillance of those who remained loyal to England, and the resolve of the Congress of June 24, 1776 dealt with the problem by recommending that the individual colonies enact laws providing penalties for persons levying war against a colony or for giving aid and comfort to the king or to other enemies of the colonies. This formed the basis for every treason statute and prosecution during the Revolution. However, the new American states enacted a plethora of laws punishing Tory activities, most of which contained lesser punishments than death. As Professor Chapin points out, these ancillary laws exemplified what became a recurring pattern in American wartime legislation, namely, tough, punitive measures against interference with the war which always defined the unlawful actions as something less than treasonable. Furthermore, there was a tendency to alter the English rules surrounding treason so as to limit their effects to the person condemned and to prevent incidental punishment of relatives, and the horrendous English provisions for quartering, beheading, and disemboweling were changed to simple hanging. Although prosecutions were many, acquittals were frequent and pardons common. In Virginia, for example, not one traitor was hanged. Professor Chapin also carefully documents the proposition that procedural rights were well protected, and that special commissions of *oyer* and *terminer,* while legislatively authorized, were used rarely and reluctantly.

In agreement that the Constitution should define treason, the framers disagreed over the precise form. Substantively they retained the wording of the 14th century statute of Edward III, but at Franklin's insistence they took special pains to guarantee procedural protections against constructive treasons. Thus, the Constitution requires incontrovertible proof of an overt act attested to by two witnesses.

The initial federal treason statute of 1790 was applied but twice during the Federalist incumbency. As a result of the Whiskey Rebellion, twenty-four men were indicted for treason, two were convicted, and President Washington pardoned both. Only one man, John Fries, was convicted of treason for his role in the house tax rebellion of 1798, and he was pardoned by John Adams whose merciful act won him only the enmity of the Federalist oligarchy. Professor Chapin states flatly that the Burr trial added nothing new to the law of treason. It turned on a narrow procedural point—a faulty indictment. Burr was indicted for the overt act of having been a part of the assembly of men on Blennerhassett's Island. Since he had not been there, the government argued that he had been constructively present, that he was a part of a treasonable scheme. Chief Justice Marshall rejected that proposition and insisted upon proof of a specific overt act.

The author suggests that during America's formative years there was "a real reticence to execute persons for political crimes however heinous." This was true of the states during the Revolution and it has been true of the national government since its inception. Even during the Civil War prosecutions for treason were minimal, and more often than not, treason indictments were docketed from year to year and then dropped. Not until 1945 did the Supreme Court have an opportunity to review its first treason case, and then it construed the constitutional clause narrowly. In the United States we have defined many actions as criminal which are akin to but something less than treason, and such laws generally do not provide for the death penalty. This principal, the author contends, limited the law of treason during the Revolution, and, I would add, such has been the case ever since.

This is a competent study. Had the author dealt with treason as a concept and analysed its implications in depth, it would have been an exciting book.—ROBERT J. STEAMER, *Lake Forest College.*

Politics without Power, The National Party Committees. BY CORNELIUS P. COTTER AND BERNARD C. HENNESSY. (New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 246. $6.75.)

American political scientists have paid little empirical attention to the organizational apparatus of the major parties. If there is a defense for this neglect it is the assumption that their chairmen and their committees are not of much importance. The present book, whose authors were Faculty Fellows of the Republican and Democratic National Committees respectively, seeks to extend our knowledge of the national committees. But they do not disturb the prevailing view of their insignificance.

The authors have brought together much useful information. Following a brief history of the two committees they provide a systematic analysis of their recent membership, using such indices as occupation, religion, previous experience and the like. For most of the book, however, they deal with the activities of the national chairmen and the committees' staffs, rather than with the committee proper, the latter being described as "non-things." They describe the various roles of the chairmen, differentiating between those of the party in and out of control of the presidency. They describe the strained relations between the national committees and the parties' other organizations, particularly that of the presidential candidate. They give a good account of the attempts of the presidential wings to use the committees as a non-congressional focus when the national party is out of power.

The book also sheds some light on the peculiar relations which exist between American parties and the academic community. As Faculty Fellows the authors were clearly uneasy about their roles. They found that research ranks well below public relations in the party's scale of values. It would be well, too, for those who seek to foster greater faculty involvement in part activity to note that the most fruitful use the parties' have found for the Faculty Fellows has been as experts on the academic community, as counterparts of those staff men with expertise in dealing with groups such as labor, Catholics, Negroes and the like.

The book's major disappointment is the authors' failure to do much with the committee proper. The study of the committeemen and their characteristics is completely divorced from the rest of the work. It presents few findings, other than that members of the national committees exhibit much the same characteristics as the rest of the American political elite and that in the opinion of knowledgeables in each state the committeemen are among the more influential political leaders of the state. Given the authors' assumption that the committee itself is a "non-thing" and that its members are men primarily of state influence, we might have expected a closer analysis of their characteristics as they relate to their states.

Given the authors' inadequate treatment of the committee as such, it is difficult to accept their proposition that the committees are really meaningless. It seems highly unlikely that a group of men reputedly influential in their own states who meet regularly and with increasing frequency according to the authors, are an irrelevant group. We are told (page 11) that the committee members do not display "patterned regular interaction among persons . . . "; yet later the authors, in discussing their research problems, point out that some members are far better known to staffers than others, and that there is an effective political grapevine. The proposition of irrelevance also fails to ring true because of the authors' evidence of intensive efforts made by influential people to gain membership, and the concern over rules of procedure at committee meetings. Yet the authors never tell how many members usually attend, or if some attend more frequently than others, or indeed what goes on at meetings. It may well be that nothing of importance does take place when a hundred of the more influential people in American politics are brought together, but this book does not prove that proposition. It simply accepts it for the orthodoxy that it is.

The authors' proposals for reform of the national committees fall within the "responsible" parties tradition. They do not spell out the organizational or policy consequences of their reforms, although it is clear that they would like the committees to be the core of truly national party organizations. The state parties are to be fused to the national parties by having the national committees consist solely of state party chairmen. The authors would bring together the "presidential" and "congressional" parties by housing the national committees with the congressional campaign committees, a recommendation which reflects the assumption that the difficulties between the two have been primarily ones of communication. The authors' would give more substantive meaning to the out party's committee and to the "titular" leader by having the defeated presidential candidate or his choice become national chairman.

The assumption that the strengthening of the formal apparatus of the parties would work to the advantage of the "presidential" wings is an oddity of political science. The authors of this work are quite explicit about their recommendations. They expect that "supporters of the congressional party . . . will be especially critical. . . . " They "concede to a bias for the presidential party." (p. 236.) It is ironic, therefore, that Senator Goldwater, a nominee as far removed as possible from his party's traditional presidential wing, should be the first to follow the authors' advice, both in letter and spirit, by seeking to merge his own organization with that of the national committee, by giving prominence to national organization work in the selection of the national chairman as his running mate, and by calling together state party chairmen for a conference immediately after his nomination. He at least gives evidence of understanding that the viablility of that presidential wing which he seeks to destroy, has rested on its ability to transcend a committee which gives an equal voice to all states and to all state party chairmen.—JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER, *Michigan State University.*

1963: Religion and the Public Order: An Annual Review of Church and State and of Religion, Law, and Society. ED. BY DONALD A. GIANNELLA. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 338. $6.00.)

As Dean H. G. Renschlein of the Villanova School of Law points out in this tome's Foreword, his University's Institute of Church and State has since 1955 "sought to provide a forum where there could be a full and free exchange of views between sincere and knowledgeable men" (p. vii). Accordingly, the Institute has annually brought together a conference of scholars from a host of disciplines, backgrounds, and commitments to ponder the vexatious problems of church- and-state, and to study and report on "the many ramifications of the interrelation of religion, law, and society" (p. viii). It is anticipated that an annual issue of *Religion and the Public Order* will serve as the appropriate vehicle for that salutory purpose.

If the first issue is an indication of what may be expected in the future, the publication will be as welcome as it will be of high quality. Ably edited by the Institute's Executive Director and Editor Donald A. Giannella—whose own contribution to the compendium is a thorough and extremely useful summary essay, "The Year in Review, September 1962–September 1963"—it consists of eleven sizeable articles, written by as many students of the field, and brief comments by three of the eleven members of the Instiute's Board of Directors and Editorial Committee (Arthur Gilbert, Robert Gordis, and Paul Ramsey, all well known in the realm of church-state theory and practice). The authors of the articles and their topics range over such a delightful spectrum of diversity as Paul G. Kauper's "Schempp and Sherbert: Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation," through Harold Stahmer's "Defining Religion: Federal Aid and Academic Freedom," to Robert Burns' "The Crisis at St. John's: Religious Institutions and the Public Interest." The other contributors are Paul Ramsey, Franklin H. Littell, Milton R. Konvitz, Richard L. Rubenstein, Theodore L. Reller, Elwyn A. Smith, and Thomas J. O'Toole. The latter's selectively comprehensive bibliographical article, "Books on Religion, Law, and Society: September, 1962, to September, 1963," constitutes a genuine service to laymen as well as professionals. Although predictably of somewhat uneven quality, each of the various essays and articles makes an important contribution—occasionally as much to emotion and predisposition as to understanding, but it is generally a contribution based upon one of several thoughtful and intelligent themes, geared to each author's own particular interest.

One specific theme, however, understandably occupies a plurality of the authors—and it is, not oddly at all, one raised by a scholar who is *not* one of the contributors to the present volume (although a member of the Institute's Board): Philip B. Kurland of the University of Chicago School of Law. Professor Kurland, evidently bitten by the Herbert Wechsler bug of "Neutral Principles of Constitutonal Law"—which has resulted in such fascinating, if not always enlightening, controversy over a span of half a decade or more—has propounded his own theory "of neutral principles," applied specifically to the First Amendment religion clauses. At pain to point out that his theory is not designed to be a "mechanical answer" to the problems brought before the Supreme Court under that troublesome clause, and merely meant as a "starting point," Prof. Kurland nonetheless both tested and evaluated his principle in his *Religion and the Law: Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 1962*) against every important decision of the Court involving it. His "principle," which so strongly concerns and pre-occupies Professors Kauper, Konvitz, and Stahmer in their essays in the work under review, holds *"that the freedom and separation clauses should be read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden."* (Kurland, at p. 112. Italics supplied.) Thus, a.o., he rejects the Supreme Court decisions in *The Selective Draft Law Cases*, *West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette*, and *In re Summers*, while approving those in *Minersville School District v. Gobitis*, *Hamilton v. Regents of University of California*, *Everson v. Board of Education*, and the *Sunday Closing Cases*.

The Kurland test is categorically rejected—in descending order of vehemence—by Professors Konvitz, Kauper, and Stahmer, and quite appropriately so in the opinion of this reviewer who, admittedly, has never been able to accept either the philosophy or the applicability of the Wechsler formula. Since it "hedges" more, the Kurland theory is perhaps on even shakier ground. "Neutrality," as Professor Kauper wisely demonstrates (p. 39), is necessarily a value judgment, too—one that cries out for the collateral acceptance of such key concepts as "accommodation" and "involvement" in the First Amendment sphere. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Goldberg in The Bible Cases, there is no simple and clear measure which can be precisely applied to demark the "permissible" from the "impermissible." Perhaps it would be both lovely and just if we could find a yardstick—but only perhaps, and in any case, we will not readily find one! In the realm of constitutional law, in general, and in that of the religion clauses, in particular, "neutral principles," especially "simple ones" may well be, as Professor Konvitz opines, "a fine thing—for a judge or scholar to look for." But these cannot be inflexible, for they are justifiable only if they "help the mind reach results that contribute to well-being, happiness, security, and harmony" (p. 106). He concludes on the sagacious note that there is, indeed, "room for principles in the law, but not for principles that stand apart from facts and concreteness. Judicial and constitutional principles must be such as can inform the world about us and help us to shape our thought and action and values. They must help the intelligence rather than be a substitute for it" (pp. 114–15). This thoughtful admonition is a fitting capstone to the stimulating and valuable compendium of essays presented in *1963: Religion and the Public Order*.—HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *University of Pennsylvania*.

Political Parties, U. S. A. EDITED BY ROBERT A. GOLDWIN. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964. Pp. 158. NP.)

Debate on the merits of the American political parties and the desirability of reforming them has a peculiar fascination for political scientists. The present volume is a collection of essays on this hoary topic solicited by the Public Affairs Conference Center at the University of Chicago. By and large, the reader who is familiar with the extensive polemical literature spawned by the Committee on Political Parties report of a decade ago and the earlier writings summarized in Austin Ranney's *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government* will find little to surprise him here. Familiar arguments are brought forth, albeit with occasional novel nuances, and the claims pro and con are too imprecisely joined to admit of reasoned resolution.

The volume begins with a condensation of Stephen K. Bailey's Fund for the Republic Pamphlet, *The Condition of Our National Political Parties*, which reiterates the Committee on Parties' assertion that party decentralization impedes policy-making and engenders public cynicism toward politics. Like many other party reformers, Bailey feels that American politics has gradually evolved in the direction of progressive "nationalization" and centralization, and that the purpose of party reform should be to hasten this evolution. His proposals, which involve strenthening and coordinating the national committees, the President, and the Congressional party leadership have in some instances been watered down from the suggestions in the Fund for the Republic pamphlet—thus, he no longer recommends an Advisory Council for the party holding the presidency, or national committee intervention in primary elections.

Writing "In Defense of the American Party System," Edward C. Banfield takes the view that decentralized, non-ideological, patronage-oriented parties have worked well in the United States and are essential for maintaining a moderate, stable political system. Banfield's rather arch strictures against all planned institutional change ("to meddle with the structure and operation of a successful political system is . . . the greatest foolishness that men are capable of") meet with the derision of the third contributor, Walter Berns. (The editor does not make it clear why some but not all of the contributors seem to have had access to the papers of other contributors.) Berns, however, is generally at one with Banfield in opposing party reform. Greater central control of the parties, he asserts, might facilitate policy-making, but it would not insure the making of *good* policy. At any rate, why not devote the effort that reform would require to making the policies for which reform is thought to be desirable? And, if the President by appealing over Congress to "the people" is unable to obtain such policies, surely the fault is not with the parties, "but with the American people themselves."

Berns' preoccupation with the virtue of the electorate is echoed in Harry V. Jaffa's somewhat misleadingly titled essay "The Nature and Origin of the American Party System." Jaffa's argument is difficult to follow and does not admit of brief summary; the general thrust of his discussion is that consensus on fundamental principles is the basis of democracy. Much of his analysis is deductive, using as premises a close reading of the texts of the Founding Fathers. He argues that "proportional representation of opinion, as such, ought not, and cannot, be the ground of democratic procedure. Only those opinions in which the moral ingredient of the laws of Nature and of Nature's God is given due weight can have a role in creating legitimate government." A novel, if unconvincing, element in Jaffa's discussion is his claim that Darwinian evolutionary theory is inconsistent with the assertion in the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal" and that "the evolutionary hypothesis" has the malign consequence of justifying master race or class theories such as Nazism and Marxism.

After reading the disparate defenses of the status quo by Banfield, Berns, and Jaffa, it is disconcerting to turn full circle to Charles M. Hardin's "Emergent Defects in the American Constitutional System," a somewhat more old fashioned version of the critique presented by Bailey, emphasizing the need for Constitutional changes which quite explicitly ape the British system—elimination of calendar elections and provision for removing a President who lacks the confidence of his party. By this point the volume, like many other contributions to the debate over the parties, resembles nothing so much as Piaget's descriptions of "conversations" between preschool children consisting of parallel and unrelated monologues.

The penultimate contribution, by the late Morton Grodzins (like Bailey's, a revision of an earlier publication) returns to defense of the parties, but with a difference. Grodzins' essay is more analytic and more heavily documented than its predecessors. It deals in some detail with the mutually reinforcing relationship between the organization of the parties and such aspects of Washington politics as federal legislation favoring and strengthening local interests, Congressional "intervention" in the administrative process, and the status of bureaucrats as independent entrepreneurs. Much of the point of Herbert Storing's concluding essay on "Political Parties and the Bureaucracy" seems to be to stress the latter assertion—that bureaucrats have an independent influence—and to argue that this is a good thing, since the judicious advice of civil servants mutes the tendency of party politicians "to serve the people's inclinations rather than their interests."

It is difficult to draw anything positive from the foregoing mélange of views. Negatively, the volume suggests a number of reasons why the party-reform-party-defense literature has been so unrewarding: central issues are imprecisely stated; the protagonists argue past each other using different criteria of judgment; there is much easy off-hand moralizing; the debate is conducted on an all-or-nothing basis in terms of artificially reified conceptions of a unitary party "system"; both the defenders and the critics have become enmeshed in a framework of discourse which continues to be defined in terms of what the parties are *not* (*viz.*, hierarchical organizations on the British model), rather than what they are. If disgruntlement at the present level of debate were to lead to a rethinking of the criteria for analyzing and judging American parties, one might perhaps feel that volumes such as *Political Parties, U.S.A.* will not have been without benefit.—FRED I. GREENSTEIN, *Wesleyan University*.

American Intergovernmental Relations. BY W. BROOKE GRAVES. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964. Pp. xx, 984. $13.95.)

In some respects this is a curious book. It deals with a subject that does not fit exactly into any of the traditional rubrics of political science. Yet it is meant as a text. W. Brooke Graves claims to be the originator of the phrase "intergovernmental relations." This topic covers more than "federalism," for it includes state-local, inter-local, inter-state and federal-local relations as well as national-state relations. It also encompasses political and administrative as well as constitutional relations. But to do this adequately, it must consider the structure and processes of decision-making of each branch at each level of government. As the late Professor Grodzins demonstrated, any governmental activity in the United States, "from abattoirs to accounting, through zoning and zoo administration . . . is almost certain to involve the influence, if not the formal administration, of all three planes of the federal system." This being the case, we cannot examine any activity of government without considering the role of each plane; and we cannot understand that role if we do not consider the structure and processes of decision-making of each plane. This takes us into the traditional rubrics of American government; and, indeed, Graves does consider this in Parts I and II of his book. In this area alone, there is a voluminous amount of materials to analyze and digest. The material in these areas of American government generally include only a temporal dimension—the operation of political activities at single places (functions) over a period of time. But before an adequate theory of American government can be developed, we need to consider the *spatial* aspects of government; that is, the arrangement of the multiplicity of units of government scattered over a large geographical area determined for the most part by legal prescription.

The spatial aspects of government in the United States create a different order of analysis. The principal concern of the current colloquy in this area has been with the incongruence between spatial arrangements of people and activities determined by economic, demographic, cultural, technological and geographic variables, on the one hand, and that determined by legal, administrative and political variables on the other hand. The applied problem of bringing the two into congruence touches upon the ideological questions of local autonomy, individualism and the possible corruption of power. The standard frame of reference in this latter area has been the normative problem of whether the spatial order of government should follow the pull of economic, social and geographic power, or whether planning and law should be used to build communities fashioned upon classical philosophical models. There is also an empirical problem here, which has been receiving more attention recently, of determining which of the variables involved—political, economic, social, demographic, geographic—are dependent variables and which are independent. Of course, findings concerning the empirical problem have relevance for the normative problem, especially when they involve philosophic positions of determinism and ethical relativism.

Graves' book deals principally with the normative problem. His theoretical frame of reference is what Scott Greer calls "the conservative tradition of radical reform." Graves seems to think that governmental problems in the United States are mainly the result of the multiplicity of units in American government and the incongruence of these with economic and social units. He therefore argues that many governmental problems can be solved by rearranging governmental structures. For example, in regard to metropolitan areas, he recommends the creation of "organizational procedures that are capable of effective action on an area-wide basis." This recommendation discounts the possibility that the multiplicity of units in metropolitan areas may actually be functional (as Banfield argues), and the fact that many of the units of government in metropolitan areas prefer to avoid "effective action on an area-wide basis" (as Greer and others have shown). Similarly, in regard to state-local relations, Graves concludes that there must be "clear and unobstructed communications within the administrative hierarchy, with the legislature, and with officials of such other levels and units of government as may be concerned with the problems, and with the public." This glosses over the fact that communications' difficulties are merely symptomatic of deeper questions, some of which are rooted in social structure, some in economic relations, and some in psychological determinants.

His general conclusion, advanced with a great deal of eloquence, is that the "nation stands in urgent need of a national policy on intergovernmental relations, with appropriate agencies to implement such policy and make it effective." The policy he suggests refers mostly to reorganization of governmental structures, and it lacks empirical and political rationale. It is a regrettable shortcoming of Graves' otherwise well-written book that it stresses administration and, with the exception of one short chapter on political parties, underemphasizes intergovernmental political relations.

Graves demonstrates with this book that his scholarship is immense; it is an apt culmination of many years of work in the area. It also is useful as a text in intergovernmental relations, which he demonstrates will be receiving more and more attention by political scientists as they incorporate spatial considerations into political theory. The task he sets for himself, however, is most difficult. He indicates in the Foreword to the book that he plans to present intergovernmental relations in terms of "real history rather that than in terms of the cliches derived from the political myth-makers. . . . " Until such time as political science develops an adequate empirical *and* normative theory of politics, it is likely that "real history" will exist only in the minds of "political myth-makers" as an ideological weapon.—Dennis J. Palumbo, *Fels Institute of Local and State Government, The University of Pennsylvania.*

"City Bosses and Political Machines," Edited by Lee S. Greene. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 353, (May 1964), Pp. ix, 218. $2.00.

The concepts "boss" and "machine" are commonly used in the analysis of urban politics. Yet nowhere in the volumes written on this topic are there any carefully formulated definitions of these terms. The result is that the dominant figure in any city is often called a "boss" and the organization of which he is a part a "machine." At times this is grossly unfair since the image which these words conjure up derives from another era and is largely out of place today. The contributors to the present volume have done little to rectify this situation even though presented with the opportunity to do so.

The difficulty begins with the title which assumes that contemporary city politics can be discussed in terms of "machines" and "bosses." The essays by Fred I. Greenstein, Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., and William C. Havard, in contrast, draw heavily on historical materials in order to describe the "machine" as a political organization characterized by a tight hierarchy of authority, an exchange of votes for services between the party and the lower class immigrant masses, and illicit dealings with big business. These authors go on to point out how the "machine" has declined in recent years. Unfortunately none pushes ahead to redefine the term to fit today's conditions, except perhaps for Havard who may be touching on a useful formulation in characterizing deLesseps Morrison's New Orleans organization in terms of Merton's "cosmopolitan" dimension (p. 88ff).

The word "boss" fares little better although Gladys M. Kammerer and John M. DeGrove put into words the image implicit in the other essays:

> We conceive of a boss as the principal but not sole leader of a political clique, faction, or group at the top of a monolithic power structure in a community characterized by a monopolistic style of politics and made up largely of a working-class population with a low level of education. Normally, the boss is thought of as a party leader. . . . (p. 98)

The authors fail to substantiate this promising conception (and therefore to convince the reader of its viability) with empirical data gathered from their study of a number of Florida cities. Indeed, they admit that they have studied only "one boss-dominated town" (p. 99). The real worth of this piece derives more from the authors' enumeration of four alternatives to the "boss" as the source of leadership in a community: "(1) a clique or faction. (2) a popularly elected mayor, (3) a city manager, and (4) a political party" (p. 98). While they are successful in demonstrating the usefulness of this typology in a discussion of Florida cities (even though at times they are not careful enough in delineating *how* they conclude that city A, for instance, is actually run by a clique and not by the popularly elected mayor) its applicability in other areas, especially the large metropolitan areas in which "machines" once flourished, is not established.

What this volume of essays accomplishes, at bottom, is to convince the reader, on the one hand, of the existence of a myriad of local political systems and therefore of the need for what Greenstein terms a "census of local political parties" (p. 2), and, on the other, of the apparent inappropriateness of his contention that students of urban politics have "underestimated somewhat . . . [the] contemporary prevalence" of "tightly organized urban political parties" (p. 2). The studies by Francis M. Carney, Daniel R. Grant, Thomas J. Wood, and Stanley T. Gabis, of Los Angeles, Nashville, Dade County, and Kansas City, respectively, describe four largely different political environments or cultures which appear to share only one thing in common: the lack of any dominant political party, elite group, or individual and a concommitant diffusion of power. This impression is strengthened by the short sketches of Detroit, St. Louis, Houston, and New York drawn by Louis L. Friedland (pp. 47–50). On the other hand, James Riedel briefly considers a city (Albany, New York) which appears to be dominated by what may be called a "machine." He dwells primarily, however, on Schenectady, New York, where each of the parties is divided into several factions and politics revolves for the most part around the person of Congressman Samuel Stratton.

In sum, only the essays by Greenstein, Havard, and Kammerer and DeGrove cover new ground and thereby make rewarding reading. What is more, one comes away hoping that soon some political scientist will make a study of those cities thought to be machine-dominated to determine finally whether or not this political form exists today and to develop comprehensive definitions of the terms "boss" and "machine."—VERNON M. GOETCHEUS, *The University of Wisconsin.*

Federal Aid to Depressed Areas. BY SAR A. LEVITAN. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964. Pp. xv, 268. $6.95.)

Back in the late 'thirties when Harold Smith was attempting to get the new Bureau of the Budget afloat there was great enthusiasm in some quarters for lowering the boom on several of the recently established and more vulnerable agencies which were in trouble with their policies, programs and management. Smith was successful in staying the hands of his more ardent colleagues, and from this travail the Bureau developed a very sage iron law of abstinence—new agencies were not to be subjected to management surveys or other forms of harassment until they had completed their shakedown voyages. All this is by way of introduction to the only fundamental criticism that can be levied against Dr. Levitan's work. The book, which within its own terms is a superb exhibition of penetrating analysis and balanced scholarship, should not have been written for at least three more years.

The problem of the ecology of economic benefits has been with us since at least 1787, and several of the more interesting innovations of the Founding Fathers were directed to the issue. In a sense the tariff, internal improvements, shipping rates and a hundred other aspects of national policy were concerned directly or indirectly with the geographical distribution of material opportunity in the dribble-down era of welfare economics. It remained for a later generation, more conversant with the uses of political power in the general interest—and perhaps more morally and electorally mortified by the disgraceful persistence of pockets of poverty in what we are assured is an affluent society—to devise direct methods of attacking the problem.

Paul Douglas began his fight for the Area Redevelopment Administration in 1955, and was successful in securing Senate enactment of a bill in the Eighty-fourth Congress. It died in the House Rules Committee. In the Eighty-fifth Congress legislation passed both the Senate and the House. Eisenhower pocket-vetoed it. In the Eighty-sixth Congress Senator Douglas again secured Senate approval of a bill, and again Judge Smith bottled-up the House counterpart in the Rules Committee until it was brought before the House and passed under the Calendar Wednesday procedure. Eisenhower message-vetoed it this time. In the Eighty-seventh Congress Douglas again secured Senate approval of his bill, and with the enlarged Rules Committee Smith was powerless to stop him in the House. However, Kennedy sent down an Administration bill on depressed areas closely paralleling the Douglas measure except that the administration of the program was confided to the Department of Commerce, which Douglas regarded, with reason, as the legislation's natural enemy. Douglas capitulated on this point, and the bill was duly passed in the Senate and House and approved by the President.

In 1956 when the Douglas bill was originally drafted—and the 1961 Act was not substantially different from the earlier prototype—only 21 of the nation's 149 major labor-market areas averaged more than 6 per cent unemployment. In 1961 over two-thirds of the major labor-market areas averaged more than 6 per cent unemployment. A program designed to help a few score economically sick communities found itself charged with a problem multiplied by several hundred per cent, but without the resources required even for the original assignment.

The basic problem of any program of this nature is that of criteria for eligibility. The Act defines eligibility amongst major labor-market areas as: (1) unemployment averaging at least 6 per cent during the qualifying period; and (2a) 50 per cent above the national average for three of the four preceding calendar years, or (2b) 75 per cent above the national average for two of the three preceding calendar years, or (2c) 100 per cent above the national average for one of the two preceding calendar years. The Administrator was given discretionary authority to designate areas based on criteria in addition to the statutory prescriptions.

The Act actually established no eligibility criteria for rural and smaller urban areas. It merely instructs the Administrator to take into account (a) the number of low income farm families in the various rual areas, (b) the relationship of the income levels of the families in each such area to the general levels of income in the United States, (c) the availability of manpower in each such area for supplemental employment, (d) the extent of migration out of the area, and (e) the extent to which "rural development" projects have previously been located in such areas under programs administered by the Department of Agriculture. After a near-disastrous essay in designating rural and smaller urban areas on the basis of extrapolated 1949 farm family income data and blanketing-in all counties which had been selected by the Department of Agriculture for its own ill-fated rural development program, which brought the total to some 900 counties, the ARA tightened its belt somewhat. However, it still ended up 1962 with 129 major labor market areas and 657 rural and smaller urban areas, which contained a population of almost 33 millions, as depressed clients. If these designations are all legitimate, we have progressed since 1932 from "one third of a Nation" to something less than "one fifth of a Nation." It may be, of course, that our gastronomic, residential and sartorial standards have also increased.

Having identified the clients, the next step is to redevelop them. The Act provides for direct loans and guarantees for industrial and commercial purposes, for loans and grants for public facilities, for training and re-training the unemployed, and for assistance in community planning for over-all economic development. In addition a number of secondary resources are available, such as the channeling of Defense and General Service procurement into labor surplus areas where feasible, accelerated tax amortization for industries locating in labor surplus areas, and general Federal grants programs (highways, educational activities, hospital and airport construction, etc.). The Act does not provide relocation assistance.

ARA is not an operating agency. Secretary Hodges established its character as a coordinating and supervising instrumentality from the outset. Its program has been correspondingly vulnerable to the forces of bureaucratic imperialism on the one hand—as Herbert Emmerich once correctly observed, the Federal bureaucracy is the last refuge of free competition—and to the government stroke on the other. ARA makes no loans or grants, it merely sponsors loan and grant applications and reimburses operating agencies—Agriculture, Community Facilities, Small Business, etc.—for loans and grants made, or reimburses expenses incurred by Labor and HEW for manpower retraining or the Bureau of Indian Affairs for services to reservation Indians. Within this maze, ARA had by the end of 1963 committed a total of $215 millions for expenditure in designated areas: $111 millions for industrial and commercial loans, $82 millions for public facilities loans and grants, $14 millions for training, and $8 millions for technical assistance.

The future of the ARA turns mainly on what the Administration and Congress do about the Poverty Program. If Senator Goldwater, economic Darwinist and social Neanderthaloid, gets to the White House the future of ARA will create no problem; he has been against it from the beginning. If President Johnson continues at his Pennsylvania Avenue address, it is likely that a less diffuse, more vigorous, and more adequately financed attack on the uneven distribution of economic abundance will be mounted. In the latter case, we shall have cause to be grateful to Dr. Levitan for a revised edition in 1967.—ROWLAND EGGER, *Princeton University.*

Newsgathering in Washington: A Study in Political Communication. BY DAN D. NIMMO. (New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. 282. $6.95.)

An early brochure by the Atherton Press listed this book under its working title, *News Sources and News Channels.* Its new title, less accurate than the old, will no doubt have greater drawing-power among political scientists, for whom the press might be considered an "attractive nuisance." The attraction alone is good reason for paying close attention to Mr. Nimmo's work. But his book merits our attention for another reason, too: it is a co-winner of the 1962 Atherton Press Political Science Prize (selected by a committee of three, so says the dust jacket, "on behalf of the American Political Science Association"), and it is further described on the dust jacket as "an official publication of the American Political Science Association." One picks it up, then, with high hopes.

Mr. Nimmo wants to explore the government and the press as interacting social institutions. For this purpose he has interviewed 35 Washington newsmen ("news channels") and 38 public information officers ("news sources") in Executive departments and agencies; his selection procedures for these two samples are explained in an Appendix, where one can also find his interview schedules. Mr. Nimmo sets forth the role conceptions of these newsmen and information officers, which he finds to be basically political in character in both instances. He then differentiates three groups of information officers, on the basis of attitude patterns: the informers, the educators, and the promoters. A similar classification of the newsmen yields the recorders, the expositors, and the prescribers. The differences among these "role types," the patterns of interaction among them, and their implications are the major themes in the book. In subsequent chapters and in numerous tables, he relates these patterns to perceptions of "news values" and of professional performance; to attitudes toward the "tools of the trade;" and to attitudes toward some recurring issues of political communication, such as governmental secrecy and publicity, political objectivity, and definitions of news. In his final chapter, Mr. Nimmo assesses the implications of the various officer-reporter relationships for the level of tension between press and government; and he concludes with some thoughts on the unwillingness or incapacity of both information officers and newsmen to exercise any significant opinion leadership in the United States.

There are some interesting observations here. For instance: The perceptions that information officers and newsmen have of the usefulness of different techniques of information-dispensing and newsgathering for both sets of participants (p. 150) are remarkably revealing of the lack of insight on both sides, and of the inadequacy of the prevailing myths concerning how the participants assess these techniques. Equally revealing are the differences in the conception that newsmen and public information officers have of the measures that officials use to assess the state of "public opinion"; in particular, reporters substantially downgrade "story play" and "interest groups" as sources of public opinion for officials, in comparison with the judgments of information officers (p. 187).

Mr. Nimmo also removes the fig-leaf of sanctimony that covers the debate on governmental secrecy and news management: "Concern over the public's right to know or right to orderly government are used as justifications for specific positions in an interest conflict" (p. 196). And he cogently notes that, " . . . given a choice between the danger of being used by political officials for partisan purposes and being spared such danger by being shut out of policy matters, reporters consistently prefer the hazards of being manipulated" (p. 199).

But I hesitate to make too much of these points (as well as other points I take issue with) because their base is fragile and uncertain: There are important limitations in this book on the author's freedom to generalize broadly, and on his readers' ability to accept his generalizations with confidence. For one thing, the scope of the study is considerably narrower than the author obviously wishes and at times even believes. One can understand why Mr. Nimmo limited his consideration of the governmental side of the newsgathering equation to public information officers in Executive departments and agencies; such a group permits reasonably good sampling in a reasonable period of time. Nevertheless, the relationship between public information officers and reporters in Washington does not represent a large enough segment of the relations between reporters and government officials at all levels to support very many good generalizations about those relations, or even to support the title finally given to the book. Mr. Nimmo's data on this point are rather confusing, but they seem to belie his argument that the information offices are the place to look for, and at, press-government relations. They are confusing, because it is not clear whether he is talking about the news source *used* by reporters (Table 5, p. 83), the source *used most often* (Table 6, p. 87), or the source *used first* (the questionnaire item that must be the basis for these two tables, p. 257); he seems to be using these three phrases interchangeably. In any case, the newsmen's own responses suggest that a scale combining both frequency and importance of contact with news sources would place the information officer no better than midpoint among all sources. As for Mr. Nimmo's claim that information offices are "a major source of story ideas," his data indicate that the information office ranks fifth in importance on a list of eleven story sources (pp. 88–89). In other words, the information officer looms large on the Washington scene, but he is involved in probably less than half of all the "newsgathering in Washington."

If there are limits to the generalizations Mr. Nimmo can make, the reader of this book can have even less confidence in many of his narrower propositions. In the first place, many of his breakdowns are run on a subset of a dozen or fewer respondents, leading him on occasion to make general statements about preferences or behavior on the basis of one or two respondents (*e.g.*, p. 147). Secondly, his interpretations of the meaning of data are inconstant, so that he cites 4 per cent of a sample as meaningful in one instance (p. 166), and dismisses 40 per cent as relatively insignificant in another (p. 177). And thirdly, there are palpable errors, by internal evidence, in 11 of his 32 tables. Many of these errors are small, suggesting either a bent sliderule or hasty computations done in Mr. Nimmo's head. But where his N's are small, small errors seem large, and very careless. For instance, in Table 6 (p. 87), 43 per cent of 15 means 6½ persons; or, in Table 19 (p. 147), 11 per cent of 13 means 1½ persons. Equally unaccountably, his figures sometimes do not match: Table 5, for example, leads one to believe that 17 newsmen used the services of public information officers, whereas calculations from Table 6 put the figure at 13½ newsmen.

There is surely a need for greater rigor and precision in the study of political reporting. It is ironic that a study that attempts to provide those qualities should turn out to be an object lesson in "scope and method," and astonishing that it should be a prize-winning "official publication" of the APSA.—BERNARD C. COHEN, *The University of Wisconsin.*

Town Government in Vermont. BY ANDREW E. NUQUIST. (Burlington: Government Research Center, University of Vermont, 1964. Pp. xiv, 276. $5.25.)

This book is an analysis of state statutes relating to local government, enriched by trenchant commentary based upon the author's observation of local affairs, and participation therein, over a period of a quarter-century. It is a revision of a series of newspaper articles originally published in the 1940's. The volume, which includes a bibliography and an extensive index, is designed both as a handbook for local officers and as a source of information for the general reader; and in the opinion of this reviewer it should serve both purposes admirably.

Somewhat more than half of the book is devoted to town government. Following a discussion of the town meeting, individual town offices and boards are considered and their duties described. Attention is given also to such matters as taxation, budgeting, and town reports. Subsequent sections deal with special districts, the suffrage and representation, conservation problems such as land abandonment and population decline, and county government. Historical background is provided as an aid to the understanding of present-day institutions. Evaluations are made and suggestions for improvement are offered. Numerous anecdotes, and descriptions of practices which may be at variance with statutory provisions, lend local flavor and interest to the discourse and increase its usefulness.

In revising the original articles for publication in book form, the author was impressed by the large number of changes which had been effected during the intervening years. "In many ways," he observes, "this present study is a report on dying or departed practices, and may well be a swan song for the type of government it describes." (p. xiv) One striking development of recent decades has been the declining attendance at town meetings, until in some instances scarcely more persons attend than the officers who are required to be present. This widespread "abstinence from town affairs" has caused considerable apprehension regarding the future of the town system. One reason for waning interest in the town meeting appears to be the growing use of the Australian ballot, which curtails or eliminates the full discussion which traditionally preceded decisions of the meeting.

Town-meeting government has long been praised as the last remaining stronghold of direct democracy in the United States. "The question today is whether this form of pure democracy meets the needs of modern living." (p. 5) On the whole, Professor Nuquist appears to be reasonably optimistic concerning the future of the town system, provided it continues to adapt to changing conditions. Many of the ills of town government flow from the smallness of most of these units in area and population and their narrow tax base. One of the most promising avenues of improvement appears to lie in various forms of intertown consolidation or cooperation, but as yet towns have made little use of statutory authorizations in this direction. If town government is to be rejuvenated, tradition and sentiment must give way, to a greater degree than they have in the past, to considerations of efficient and economical service. "An emotional display concerning the sanctity of the old town borders will not show how to get the town out of debt. Pointing out the long history of the town will not give the children an adequate school, nor build a single foot of road; both of these enterprises require the outlay of cold cash. There are no Aladdin's lamps to bring a good genie to carry out modern governmental practices." (p. 232)

To the best of this reviewer's knowledge, Professor Nuquist's book is the most comprehensive account of town government in a New England state to appear during the past thirty years. Comparable volumes on other states would be welcome.—Clyde F. Snider, *University of Illinois.*

Freedom and Emergency Powers in the Cold War. By Robert S. Rankin and Winfried R. Dallmayr. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964. Pp. viii, 277. $2.75.)

This book is not a general treatise on the impact of the cold war on American democracy and constitutional rights. It does not raise the problem, which concerned Harold Lasswell a decade ago, as to whether a democratic society can meet the exigencies of a prolonged cold war without becoming dominated by and succumbing to the values of "the specialists of violence." This study is limited to a review of the growth of executive emergency powers during the postwar period in three areas: nonmilitary defense, industrial disputes, and race relations. The authors justify this limitation of subject matter on the traditional grounds that emergency executive powers tend to jeopardize the preservation of constitutional liberties.

The chapter on nonmilitary defense is primarily a description of the development of civil defense from the end of World War II to the present. Under the Civil Defense Act of 1950 as amended, the President and under him, the Civil Defense Administrator, is granted sweeping emergency powers which may be invoked by the President on his finding that "an attack upon the United States has occurred or is anticipated." Professors Rankin and Dallmayr found little fault with the Act itself but are highly critical of President Kennedy's executive order of 1961 which transferred virtually all civil defense functions from the Executive Office of the President to the Defense Department. Conceding that the fusion of civil and military defense functions under the Secretary of Defense enhances efficiency, it is in the opinion of the authors a potential threat to the maintenance of civil government and constitutional liberties.

The chapter on labor disputes is a rather long drawn out account of the implementation of the emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act during the postwar period and of the famous steel seizure episode of 1952. On the basis of the *Youngstown* decision, the writers reach the hardly startling conclusion that in the event of "extreme or catastrophic disaster," the President possesses inherent powers to act not withstanding possible conflict with existing statutes.

The treatment of executive emergency powers in the area of race relations, covering the gambit from *Brown* to Governor Wallace, is informative and discerning. The analysis is especially penetrating of the constitutional issues raised by the use of troops by Eisenhower and Kennedy to enforce court decrees. Rankin and Dallmayr hold that federal intervention is most in harmony with constitutionalism when primary reliance is placed upon United States marshals instead of troops to preserve the peace. The hitch in the argument, of course, is that adequate federal protection by either marshals or troops is hardly ever timely in protecting the constitutional rights and safety of those who initially attempt to exercise their rights against local laws and customs. For example, the action of Attorney General Kennedy in sending 400 marshals to protect Freedom Riders in Montgomery was indeed effective—as the authors point out—in preventing violence. However federal intervention was forthcoming only *after* mob violence had erupted against the Freedom Riders the day before. Clearly the concept of federalism tends to preclude federal protection of constitutional rights of the initiator in the area of civil rights.

This study is based upon the assumption that emergency powers are necessary to meet the needs of a society in a cold war era, but that these powers are inherently in conflict with the maintenance of constitutional liberties. As a general proposition, few would question its soundness, but certainly its validity is not equally compelling in all cases. For example, is there not a clear difference in the degree and kind of conflict between emergency powers and constitutional freedoms when the former are exercised to prevent strategic industrial paralysis and when these powers are invoked to protect First Amendment Freedoms? This study is a scholarly examination of an important subject, but it would have been considerably more meaningful if it had dealt with some of the theoretical questions implicit in the subject.—PETER BACHRACH, *Bryn Mawr College.*

The Truman Committee: A Study in Congressional Responsibility. BY DONALD H. RIDDLE. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1964. Pp. viii, 207. $6.00.)

From time to time a congressional investigating committee catches the public eye and serves both to inform the people of the nature of complex public issues and to set a standard of administrative performance which the government agencies are expected to meet. Such was the Truman Committee in the Second World War, whose studies and reports received general approval at the time and whose chairman was selected by the Democrats as their Vice-Presidential candidate in 1944. In reviewing this period, Mr. Riddle finds that the Truman Committee was "one of the most responsible investigating committees in recent history" and deserved the praise it received.

The committee made its reputation against the competition of several rivals, and initially it could claim but the reluctant support of the Senate majority. The response of Congress to the centralization of authority in the Executive in war-time was to create a retinue of committees to keep sharp watch on the bureaucrats. The committee activity was supplemented by other controls, such as legislation which soon expired, requiring the frequent attention of Congress, and provisions for repealing a law by a concurrent resolution. The investigating committees were superimposed upon the older structure of standing committees, some of which also carried on investigations, and the result was a legislative jumble only slightly less disorderly than the jerry-built structure of the war-time bureaucracy. A sizeable number of congressional committees were involved in the war effort, and when a topic such as rubber became a controversial issue, the administrative experts might be expected to appear before as many as a dozen congressional committees.

This procedure was certainly a waste of time for the busy administrator, particularly when the same testimony was repeated, but it provided a method by which many Congressmen could keep in touch with the important issues and give their implied consent to solutions. Among the more active committees were the Tolan Committee on Defense Migration; the House and Senate Small Business Committees; the Appropriations Committees, House and Senate; the Naval Affairs Committees, House and Senate and the Military Affairs Committee, House and Senate. The work of many of these committees, distinguished though it may have been at the time, has been largely forgotten.

The Truman Committee, however, made an extraordinary impression on the mind of the public, and Mr. Riddle makes much of the fact that it exercised a high degree of responsibility. In his subjective criteria for committee responsibility, Mr. Riddle includes the following: that it reflects some concept of the public interest; that its criticisms are constructive; that it emphasizes broad policy considerations rather than details; that it is honest in its use of facts; that it stays within the limits of its mission; that its methods are fair to those who come under its scrutiny; and that it is aware of the consequences of the use of its power. The committee receives good marks on this rigorous test, and it had the opportunity to be influential on a broad scale because it was the only committee which made "a systematic effort to survey the entire war program on a continuing basis."

In pursuing its task, the Truman Committee was able to reach an understanding with Donald M. Nelson, the Chairman of the War Production Board, and its influence was sufficiently respected for it to intervene effectively in squabbles over production programs. Its procedures enabled it to make articulate for the public, Congress, and the bureaucracy some of the important issues associated with war mobilization and production and their ramifications through the economy. Mr. Riddle takes us through some of the disputes of the day, including the early, sometimes halting, efforts to mobilize the economy and the conflict among production programs; he also examines in some detail the Canol Project and the Curtiss-Wright Inspection case.

The committee appeared to be fair, objective, and sincere; it did not seek partisan advantage; its work appeared to be necessary; and its chairman soon acquired a reputation for integrity and a zealous regard for the public interest. Senator Truman resigned as chairman in August, 1944, and, as the world knows, he was shortly translated to another place. The members of the committee were "mostly from small towns" who appeared "to epitomize middle-class values of their respective areas." Without Senator Truman's leadership, however, the committee failed to retain its former luster and prestige, and its later work was less impressive. Mr. Riddle concludes that the Truman Committee "enhanced the influence and prestige of Congress and set a high standard against which subsequent committees may be judged."—ROLAND YOUNG, *Northwestern University.*

Assuring Freedom to the Free: A Century of Emancipation in the USA. EDITED BY ARNOLD M. ROSE. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964. 314 pages, $6.95.)

Arnold Rose has collected a series of papers originally delivered as lectures during 1962–1963 at Wayne State University. During that academic year the University commemorated the one hundredth anniversary or the Emancipation Proclamation by holding several conferences and public seminars on the Negro in American society. Twelve lectures were chosen from that series for this book, all based on the general theme: "The Development of the American Negro and of a Free Society." Included as a preface is a speech by President Lyndon Johnson given to open the conference, and, as a postscript, a statement by the University's President Clarence B. Hilberry. The papers are short and superficial treatments of general topics, designed presumably for an undergraduate audience.

The collection is divided into three sections: one on the Negro in American history, one on the Negro in contemporary society, and another on social movements among American Negroes. Included are noteworthy essays by C. Eric Lincoln on the Black Muslims as a protest movement, a study of occupational changes affecting American Negroes by G. Franklin Edwards, and an examination by Arnold Rose of the distortions of the American historical record caused by racial myths and antagonism.

The paper of most direct interest to political scientists is James Q. Wilson's essay on the causes and consequences of militant Negro civic and political action. As a principal cause of Negro militancy Wilson points to the social pressures generated when the education of Negroes advances faster than their economic status, creating what he calls an "intellectual proletariat," the vanguard of the protest movement. He also questions whether many immediate economic benefits for Negroes can be achieved by the militant leaders. Wilson argues that significant gains in well being will come only as by-products of the general expansion of the American economy, and he wonders what social upheavals might result if militant leaders find that they cannot make headway against a lagging economy, no matter how ardent their demonstrations of protest.

Such a diverse collection of essays cannot be evaluated in detail in a short review. There is no central theme, although there is a repeated emphasis in several papers on the importance of increased job opportunities for all. Inevitably the quality of the essays varies considerably. Some are narrow in scope, dealing in one case with the history of Detroit during four decades of the nineteenth century, while others treat much larger questions or seek to identify broad historical developments. Many of the authors, moreover, have already made the same points more effectively in longer articles or monographs.

In creating this collection, Professor Rose was laboring under a severe handicap. He was not called upon to pick the twelve best existing articles on this subject, nor did he commission twelve original papers from leading authorities—two good justifications for a collection of essays. Instead, his choice was narrowed to papers delivered during one lecture series at one university. The resulting book amounts to an elaborate souvenir program of the conference at Wayne State.

None of this is meant to deprecate the conference itself; undoubtedly it was a good idea. The principal beneficiaries were those attending the lectures and seminars who were given the opportunity to meet and question the nation's foremost civil rights leaders. Personal contact and interchange of this kind is an invaluable educational experience. But judging from what is collected here, the lectures themselves were not fresh interpretations nor did they present any new data of great importance to serious students of this subject.—JACK L. WALKER, *University of Michigan.*

The American Federal Executive. BY W. LLOYD WARNER, PAUL P. VAN RIPER, NORMAN H. MARTIN, AND ORVIS F. COLLINS. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963. Pp. xvii, 405, $7.50; Pp. xvii, 255, $1.95, paper.)

It is a curious fact that we know less about the individuals who serve the American Government's executive branch today than we know about American businessmen or about the Stuarts' civil servants in 17th century England. Now, however, W. Lloyd Warner and his associates have undertaken to provide the kind of data on federal "executives" of 1959 that Warner and Abegglen gathered on big business leaders of 1952 (the latter in turn designedly comparable to data gathered by Taussig and Joslyn on business leaders of 1928). The results are displayed in over a hundred fascinating tables and a text describing the occupational, geographic, and national origins, the influence of family, the educational backgrounds, the career patterns, and the personalities, value orientations, self-images, and role conflicts of these top officials. The paperback edition omits an appendix on the study's theory and method and an appendix containing 82 of the 101 tables, omissions that are a serious loss to the scholarly reader.

The book is rich with valuable data about the large and important body of public servants its authors chose to study. On the whole, occupational mobility, measured by movement from fathers' and grandfathers' occupations and mediated by urban environments, educational opportunities, geographic movement, and public servants' own careers, successfully assures a "representative bureaucracy" even though room at the top is more easily found by the high-born. Readers may be surprised by some data and findings. A fourth of the civilian "executives" were foreign-born or their fathers were. A tenth of the civilian executives hold Ph.D.'s, and more proportionately are held by political and foreign-service executives than by career civil-service executives. Almost half of the four-year degrees held by career civil-service executives were in "applied fields" (33 per cent in engineering alone, a field that also supplied 22 per cent of *political* executives' four-year degrees!). Of the law degrees held by federal executives, 31 per cent were obtained from Washington, D. C., institutions (Southeastern University ranked fourth among all institutions—between Harvard and Columbia).

The final chapters, on "the private and public worlds of the federal executives," are highly interesting, even exciting. Digitally barren, they sensitively probe the personality and internal psychic life of 257 federal executives selected randomly for intensive interviews. The resulting characterization of our leading public servants is both a revelation and a tribute.

A pioneering quantitative study confronts difficult methodological problems, many of which are candidly set forth in an appendix. As the results depend upon the ways in which such problems are resolved, some *caveats* are in order.

The total population chosen for study numbered 18,620 persons, all of whom were mailed questionnaires, of which 12,929 (almost 70 per cent) were returned. These are the study's "executives" and ranged from Cabinet members, ambassadors, generals, and admirals down to Grade GS-14 civil servants, military colonels, and Navy captains. Excluded, regardless of status and salary level, were "professional, scientific, and technical personnel serving primarily in individual capacities as specialists rather than as administrative and supervisory personnel in an executive sense." A few categories of executives were not covered, e.g., the FBI, CIA, and the uniformed executives of the Public Health Service.

Whether the population of Federal executives is really of the order of 20,000 depends on who defines reality. Here a critical criterion was that the government men "be at levels of responsibility and authority comparable with the men studied in the 1952 business leader research" (p. 297); specifically, one reason for fixing GS-14 as the lower boundary "was to insure that sufficient men from lower levels were included in the federal population to be 'fair' to the business population" (p. 304). Of the civilian executives who returned questionnaires, 37 per cent were at the GS-14 or equivalent level (and 54 per cent of the military) and another 41 per cent were at the GS-15 level, bringing the total of these two lower ranks to 78 per cent of the sample of federal civilian "executives." Both groups, or the GS-14 group alone, may seriously skew the generalized findings about federal executives; one of the few breakdowns by grade shows 24 per cent of GS-14 civilian executives are sons of laborers, compared to 15 per cent at GS-16 to 18, and 11 per cent above GS-18.

Other studies have defined the population of federal executives more narrowly. The second Hoover Commission's Task Force on Personnel put at about 3,000 the number of posts appropriate for senior civil servants even though this count included regional directors and some division chiefs in bureaus. Its study of men in "top-management" posts (down to assistant bureau chiefs) found 1,300 in 40 agencies; of 386 non-military assistant bureau chiefs, only 45 were at GS-14 or lower. Ross Pollock's 1961 study of career development needs, for the Civil Service Commission, treated federal "career executives" variously as the GS-16 to GS-18, or the GS-15 to GS-18, group. If the Warner study had used a similarly restricted definition of "executive," its total civilian executives, instead of being 15,701, would have been 3,261 for GS-16 and up, or 9,428 for GS-15 and up.

Textual exposition of quantitative data is likely to be dull unless some precision of terminology is sacrificed. This may be a high cost to pay. The text's findings about the whole group covered refer to "federal executives," "federal leaders," "high-level public administrators," "the elite of all departments and agencies," and "the federal elites." The 25 per cent of federal employees at GS-15 or higher and the 70 per cent of those at GS-14 who, as non-executives, are excluded from the study, may take umbrage when the terms thus broaden. Generalizations about the whole group of executives merge career civil-service, foreign-service, political, and military executives, with the career civil servants constituting only 60 per cent of the total. More frequent are generalizations about civilian federal executives and each of their subgroups (career, foreign-service, and political). The reader must alertly distinguish federal executives, federal civilian executives, and federal civilian career executives. He must also have read an appendix to know that "the foreign service," "the foreign-service executives," and "foreign-service officers" include more than career officials and more than Foreign Service Officers. Finally, the overall category of federal executives is about equally composed of persons stationed in Washington and persons stationed in the field, both domestic and foreign. This recognition of executive roles in the field may be applauded if simultaneously one recalls that the text's generalizations cover much more than the leadership group at the capital and that participation in policy formulation is a role substantially confined to Washington-based executives.—JAMES W. FESLER, *Yale University.*

Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making. BY OLIVER P. WILLIAMS AND CHARLES R. ADRIAN. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963. Pp. 334. $6.00.)

This book makes two distinct contributions to political science. First, it provides descriptive data to fill an extant void dealing with the politics of middle-sized cities (in the 25,000 to 250,000 range, although the four cities chosen for analysis here cluster in the 50,000 to 70,000 range). Second, the authors make a pioneering attempt at comparative community analysis—something desperately needed.

The four cities faced similar problems yet they responded differently. Did they behave differently because of differences in local resources and wealth, in the ownership pattern of industry, in the composition of the population, or in political factors? These questions lead to the central focus of the study: to examine the relationship between policy, the policy process, and general community characteristics.

The policy process is examined to determine both who governs and what values prevail. Concerning who governs, the researchers investigate this question primarily in terms of aggregate analysis. Illustratively, nonpartisanship seemed less important than the mechanism for representation (at-large versus ward) in determining the social composition of the city council for "the economic dominants had the greatest propensity to guide the recruitment process under at-large elections." Nonpartisanship had not produced an insulation of local politics: where issues were drawn more sharply, the tendency toward party voting appeared more sharply; meanwhile nonpartisanship appeared as a structural device favoring the values of those high in socio-economic status. On referendum issues, so prevalent in municipal government and so important as a majority veto over any potential "power elite," higher SES areas of the cities gave greater support to council recommendations. The roles of Main-Street merchants, organized labor, and of neighborhoods are also investigated by means of case studies of policy.

As to which values prevail, the authors develop a four-fold typology of possible roles for local government: (1) promoting economic growth; (2) providing or securing life's amenities; (3) maintaining only traditional services; and (4) arbitrating among conflicting interests.

This typology may be prescriptive, referring to images of the desired role of government such as would be obtainable from a sample survey (not employed here), or it may be descriptive, referring to images of the actual role of government as determined by the analysis of prevailing policies by the investigators.

The cities were then arrayed along a continuum for each type of role. How the cities varied on this typology was related to variations in basic characteristics and in political processes. Thus, the city placing highest stress on both amenities and economic growth was the city having greatest economic stability and highest percentage of home-owned industries. Lack of divisive ethnic blocs also seemed related to high stress on "broad" community aims of growth and expanded amenities. Finally, variations in political processes—such as absence-presence of strong professional traditions in administration—were related to policy typology differences.

The cities are also examined with regard to differences in structure of politics, defined in terms of the degree to which there existed organized recruitment and campaigning for city council. In the two cities where such structure existed, the city council was predictable in policy decisions and exhibited individual and collective leadership. Where there was less structure, the leadership void was filled by professional administrators and interest groups.

A picture emerges that significantly qualifies the findings of both Hunter and Dahl. As to the former, *if* a power elite exists the authors show it is subject to important institutional controls (e.g., referenda). On the other hand, in no one of these four communities was there a viable two-party system approximating what Dahl found in New Haven.

If I were to find fault with this work, I would stress two omissions. First, there is no clear delineation of the variables employed and of their interdependencies. For example, "structure of politics" is relied upon as an important explainatory variable but it is unclear how it relates to such basic community characteristics as economic structure and social structure. Is it merely another way of looking at the same factors or does it constitute a separate, independent political variable? Second, there is the attitude-behavior problem: in discussing their typology of the possible roles of government, the authors have restricted analysis to behavior—yet these roles may be viewed as attitudinal components of ideology and we need further research on just this question of the relation, if any, between attitude and behavior.

But these are minor flaws. The book will be in use for some time to come.—HARRY M. SCOBLE, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

SELECTED ARTICLES AND DOCUMENTS ON
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

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FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT

Le Système Electoral Israëlien. By Arye Arazi. (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1963; Travaux de Droit, d'Economie et de Sociologie, No. 15. Pp. 209.)

This volume, obviously a doctoral dissertation, represents a useful source of information on the electoral system of Israel. To avoid misunderstandings, it should be clearly stated that the author does not deal with the actual working of that system. Readers interested in electoral behaviour, recruiting of candidates, basic attitudes and campaign tactics of political parties, or the influence of pressure groups, will have to look elsewhere for information on these aspects. The present study is confined to the description and analysis of the legal framework only, but this limited task is accomplished quite competently.

It is generally known among students of political science that the Israeli electoral system is one of the rigid proportional representation type, with the entire country forming a single 120-member constituency. The basic documents of this system are the Basic Law (the Knesset), (Laws of the State of Israel, authorized translation, vol. 12, 1957/58, pp. 85–90), and the Knesset Elections Law, 1959 (*ibid.*, vol. 13, 1958/59, pp. 121–141), as amended and supplemented by other statutes and regulations. What is less known are the technical intricacies of the system. These are well described in Dr. Arazi's study. He investigates the formal election process from beginning to end, from general principles to arrangements at the voting booth, apportionment of seats, and intervening litigation. For the first time are judicial decisions concerning electoral matters in Israel fully considered. Students of comparative electoral law will find in the volume a great deal of interesting material.

Less satisfactory are those sections of the book which attempt to stray from the path of formal analysis. In trying to explain the political background, Dr. Arazi gives a brief sketch of Israeli constitutional history, so sketchy that it hardly adds anything to what has been published many times before in greater detail. The topic is no longer unknown, and authors would be well advised in future to omit it and to proceed straight to their specific subject. He might have stressed, on the other hand, the parentage of the Israeli electoral system, inspired, of course, by the systems current in East-Central Europe in the 1920s and taken over from there into the Zionist movement. Nor has Dr. Arazi been too happy in inserting here and there comparisons with electoral systems abroad; these are so few and haphazard that they might have well be omitted. On the other hand, the chapter on immunities, privileges and duties of deputies in Israel, while not strictly germane to the issue, gives the foreign reader an insight into a topic of Israeli parliamentary law which we could hardly find elsewhere.

On p. 152ff., the author offers a scheme of his own for reforming the electoral system of Israel. He recommends the division of the country into 12 electoral districts, with 10 seats allotted to each and P.R. practiced within each district. He wants the delineation of the districts to be entrusted to a committee of Supreme Court judges and revised every 10 years. He wishes the rigidity of P.R. to be softened by *panachage*, voting to be compulsory, candidates to be drawn from district residents only, and inter-list agreements to be prohibited. The reviewer is inclined to agree with the first three proposals, but is doubtful concerning the three latter suggestions.—BENJAMIN AKZIN, *The Hebrew University, Jerusalem.*

Public Liberties in the New States. BY DAVID H. BAYLEY. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964. Pp. 152.)

The subject of this study is governmental infringements of personal liberties in the developing nations (not the "new states," as the author persists in saying throughout the book). The countries discussed cover all continents but do not include the Communist world. Four countries, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Ghana, receive most of the attention, accounting for about two-thirds of the discussion of specific infringements, and India alone accounts for as much discussion as the other three countries together. It is quite clear that Bayley is most familiar with the problems of freedom in India, and it appears that this special knowledge has colored his general analysis of the subject under study.

The restraints upon personal liberties that Bayley examines are preventive detention, controls over the press and political parties, linguistic and religious discrimination, and the regulation of private property. This examination is followed by a consideration of the role played by an independent judiciary and periodic free elections in maintaining personal liberties against executive and legislative incursions in the developing nations. The book cannot properly be judged as an empirical inquiry, although Bayley must take the blame if it is. He places great stress on the importance of an empirical approach to the problem of governmental restraints: "It is necessary first to answer a number of empirical questions" in order to clarify the issue of infringements of human rights (p. 4); "painstaking empirical analysis is required" in order to determine what kinds of controls upon government are most effective in protecting these rights (p. 17); and so on. Bayley's discussion of infringements in particular countries occupies about one-third of the book, and the only extensive discussion of a specific infringement is that of preventive detention in India and Ghana. For the most part his empirical data consist of short illustrations and references used to support general arguments and reasoning.

Bayley's central concern is with the problem of assessing governmental restraints upon personal liberties in the developing nations. He is interested in the standards by which the propriety of such restraints may be judged, and he passes numerous judgments on the restraints he chooses for illustration. I thought he dealt perceptively with the competing claims of the state and the individual. He is aware that freedom may easily lead to violence, place obstacles before economic progress, and jeopardize national survival itself in many of the developing nations, and that governmental restraints upon individuals and groups may be essential to assure the freedom of the many. These considerations apply to the more developed as well as to the less developed nations, of course, but the circumstances that support governmental infringements in the former are exceptional while in the latter they are more nearly the rule. Bayley does not stint in presenting the arguments for restricting personal liberties in the developing nations, and I thought that the argument for limiting competitive party politics was especially cogent.

Bayley is also interested in the prospects for democracy in the developing nations. Here again he appears hard-headed and receptive to the reasons that leaders of these nations give for curtailing personal liberties. He finds no relationship between military intervention in the political life of a developing nation and the status of human rights there (his supporting evidence is fragmentary), and he is prepared to accept autocratic regimes even where democratic ones have existed. We should not conclude that Bayley holds little hope for democratic and libertarian institutions in the developing nations, but rather that he is willing to defer the fulfillment of his hope in order that it may be more securely realized. He places a reluctant confidence in the leaders of these nations, "those who sincerely try to utilize a measure of autocracy to tutor in freedom," and who, he adds, "must realize that they must continually sow the seeds of their own demise." (p. 144)—Robert Scigliano, *Michigan State University.*

The Rise of the South African Reich. By Brian P. Bunting. (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1964. Pp. 332. $1.25.)

The son of the late S. P. Bunting, who was one of the founders of the South African Communist Party, and a former member of the Central Committee of that Communist Party, Brian P. Bunting has established a reputation as a militant left-wing journalist in "the beloved country." In addition to writing for *The Guardian* (the weekly newspaper of the South African Communist Party) and its successors, Bunting served shortly as an M.P. in the House of Assembly, where he represented the African electorate of the Cape Western constituency. He has been "named" and "banned" by the South African Government under the provisions of the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act. He now continues his profession as a journalist in London.

Considering the nature of his background, it is remarkable that *The Rise of the South African Reich* is not more polemical than it actually is. Marxian linguistics are almost entirely absent in this book, except for one reference to "socialist countries" (clearly meaning Communist in the context in which it is used) in his discussion of the control of ideas by the South African Government (p. 233). Indeed, his treatment of the economic power structure of the Republic (chapter 14) clearly avoids any suggestion of traditional Marxian analysis, intimating that Bunting has either been bridled by the editor of this Penguin series or that he has eschewed such modes of analysis in order to capture a wider audience or even that he has become disenchanted with "the God that failed."

The book is written in a lucid, urbane style and is reasonably well organized. His discussion centers on the historical development of the Nationalist Party in South Africa, the galaxy of Afrikaner organization that may be viewed as para-political in scope, South African education, mass media, the trade union movement, the distribution of affluence, and the legislative miasma of *apartheid.* His approach to the subject matter is both topical and chronological narrative, and he is especially skilled in utilizing primary source materials (many of which are very difficult to secure in the United States). Although he expressly denies that the Republic of South Africa is now a Nationalist Third Reich (p. 317), he certainly adumbrates throughout the book that such is the case. This he does in part by the use of parallelisms, e.g., references to *Mein Kampf* (at the beginning of chapters 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, as well as on p. 7) and the Nuremberg Laws (chapter 9).

To sustain such a thesis, though, requires far greater use of comparative techniques, more precise citation of sources (and here Bunting errs persistently and almost consistently), and the introduction of far more data from the Third Reich than Bunting has offered. He certainly would have fared far better had he mastered the acknowledged classics on National Socialism (such as those by Neumann, Bullock, and Bracher, for example) and then begun to formulate his hypothesis. That the Republic of South Africa is an oligarchy and an authoritarian state (in many ways) is a far easier proposition to demonstrate than the one which suggests that it is totalitarian and hence can be termed "the South African Reich." Indeed, the Republic does not meet all the criteria laid down, for example, by Friedrich and Brzezinski in their systematic study, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (1956). It lacks a single mass party, has no thoroughly integrated *Weltanschauung,* does not control the entire economy, and does not yet have a complete monopoly over the mass media. Moreover, the legislature and the judiciary are not wholly subservient to the executive, as is customarily the case in totalitarian states.

In addition to his somewhat faulty methodology, Bunting includes no bibliography or chronology in his work and neglects some rather crucial areas in his study. Certainly, if he can devote considerable attention to the *Broederbond* (as he did in chapter 3), the *éminence grise* of Afrikanerdom, then certainly he can be expected to delve more deeply into the Special Branch of the South African Police, which is just as important in the power constellation of the Republic. Furthermore, he almost totally neglects the famous Treason Trials (giving them only one paragraph on pp. 172–173) and treats the African National Congress, the Pan African Congress, Poqo, and *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (the Spear of the Nation)—the latter two being terrorist organizations—in far too summary a fashion.

Although the reader must treat this work with considerable caution, it nonetheless is a significant contribution to the rapidly growing literature on the government and politics of South Africa. Its usefulness and reliability could be greatly improved (in a second edition) by more careful and painstaking attention to documentation and by the addition of a rather complete bibliography.—Richard Dale, *Northern Illinois University.*

Local Government and Politics in Uganda. By Fred G. Burke (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964. Pp. xii, 274. $7.50.)

This is a welcome addition to the scanty literature on Uganda politics outside Buganda. The study plan is simple and up to a point clear. It compares three Districts of Uganda from the point of view of their experience of local government, and in particular their reaction to a rapidly evolving and far from unambiguous adaptation of the British local government model. The Districts selected are of very different types: an interlacustrine Bantu kingdom (Bunyoro); a tribally homogeneous but nilo-hamitic and segmentary system (Teso); and a multi-tribal area (Bukedi). Professor Burke is convinced that the nation itself is of diminishing importance as a focus of legitimacy, and that local government on the one hand, and the international order on the other, are the levels which give rise to the most significant problems in this regard.

Professor Burke's method consists basically of, first, an analysis of the indigenous political system from the point of view of both structural and cultural 'fit' with the evolving pattern of local administration imposed from the capital; and second, a consideration of the imposed pattern itself—its internal logic and its culture-bound imported characteristics. He shows without difficulty, for instance, that the unpopularity of the chiefs in Teso is of long-standing and that it is almost a sufficient explanation of this to consider the powerful independence of the clan leaders in the Teso social system. By contrast in Bunyoro (as in Buganda) chiefs were central to the traditional system of government and initially at least proved most efficient agents of indirect rule. Equally he is able to illustrate convincingly the heavy dependence of the efficiency of the British committee system of local administration as it works in Britain on democratic norms and shared administrative values among British local councillors. He also adduces several solid pieces of evidence illustrating the ambiguous role of the modern chief, with his legal and habitual responsibility to the D.C., and his financial and political responsibility to the elected council. Again, he is able to show how the vitality of any given level of local administration depends on the extent to which it corresponds with some non-administrative unit of social solidarity; thus while in Bunyoro and Teso political activity is mainly at the District level, in Bukedi, where each county more or less corresponds to a different tribe, it is at the county level that political activity mainly occurs. These generalizations, and several less familiar ones which are also important, are not so well established by comparative research that this solid corroboration is unnecessary. Professor Burke has dug deep into District files and has been able to bring these fundamentals to life in a way which is still rare. There is also a robust and clear preliminary chapter on the evolution of the Uganda system of local government which (with a few reservations) can be expected to stand as a standard introduction to this tortuous subject.

The book suffers, however, from certain weaknesses, two of which are serious and call for comment here. The worst is due to an outrageous delay in publication, which can obviously not be the fault of the author. Professor Burke has succeeded in updating the contextual material but this does not compensate for the fact that the bulk of the work was done in 1955/7, which in African politics is a very long time ago. In Uganda, it almost pre-dates party activity in the modern sense; consequently as a picture of local government today, when even the Kingdoms have UPC-controlled councils (whatever that may mean, indeed), it is to some extent Hamlet without the Prince. A vivid and memorable portrait of the 1956 Bunyoro Rukurato in session, for instance, is an *aperitif* for a meal which is never served. Again, there is a convincing account of the declining authority of parish and sub-county chiefs in Bunyoro, which confirms Southwold's findings (in L. A. Fallers (ed) *The Kings Men*) for Buganda, and in both cases it seems to be due to the emergence of what one may crudely call a local landed party-bourgeoisie, who are increasingly wealthier and more influential than the chiefs themselves. This has, of course, major implications for the effectiveness of government where it perhaps matters most—in the countryside. And for example Professor Burke observes, in passing, that tax collection (from peasants) has 'fallen off drastically since independence.' But the study does not provide any evidence on recent tax collection figures nor, inevitably, systematic recent evidence of any other kind which bears on this vital issue.

A second major defect seems to me to be a lack of clarity about the hypotheses. In his conclusions, Professor Burke postulates a relationship between the 'problems' inherent in a local situation, and the ability of the local government structure to solve them. However what the book primarily compares are two *structures*—the traditional and the modern—rather than the relation between the problems of each area studied, on the one hand, and the structure for solving problems (the old, the new, and their interaction) on the other. Illustrations of particular problems are given, generally based on the evidence brought to light by official enquiries when something has gone badly wrong; but there is no systematic attempt to define any one or more problems of a policy-nature for one or all of the districts, so as to assess the capacity of the structures to handle them. This aspect of the study is highlighted by the case of the breakdown of Teso district administration in 1957–8, which is cited for its interest in connexion with the system of appointing local government officials; nothing in the preceding analysis of Teso refers to the profound social cleavages which led to a breakdown on this structural issue (a north/south, Protestant /Catholic, UPC/DP complex). At the same time there is a great deal of material, distributed throughout the three district case studies, *illustrating* a large range of problems; this is clearly relevant. The result of its unintegrated presentation, however, is to tend to diminish the general explanatory force of the study as a whole.

These are serious criticisms which do not, however, alter the fact that it is a solid and capable work which no scholar in this field will ignore.—COLIN LEYS, *Makerere University College.*

New Zealand Politics in Action: The 1960 General Election. BY R. M. CHAPMAN, W. K. JACKSON, AND A. V. MITCHELL. (London: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. vi, 303. $5.60.)

Few small countries can boast so extensive a literature in the social sciences as New Zealand. Ever since the radical experiments of the eighteen-nineties first attracted attention to the young country, New Zealanders have been the subject both of investigation by visiting scholars and of self-analysis from within. This book is one of the most recent additions to the second category. Written by three New Zealand Faculty members, who pay proper homage to the psephological experts of Michigan and Nuffield, this study presents the results of a careful inquiry into the general election of 1960.

New Zealand's politics nowadays are dull because major questions were settled by the turn of the century, since when only the depression of the nineteen-thirties has caused a strident controversy. Though New Zealanders themselves are conscious of internal differences, to an outsider they appear homogeneous to a rare degree. In the absence of deep and stirring issues, their politicians must magnify the minor irritants and find great principles in small events. For the most part, therefore, elections revolve around strictly bread-and-butter questions of a specific character.

These generalizations are confirmed by the present work, which explains how the Labour Party came into office through a small swing of the votes in 1957, only to leave it by a similarly small swing three years later. Inheriting a balance-of-payments crisis, Labour responded with controls and with a Budget which alienated enough marginal groups for them to lose seven seats.

The best of the chapters come from Mr. Chapman, who writes with a clear historical sense, social insight, and a literary flair. He traces the two axes on which politics turn in New Zealand: the urban-rural split and the division between wealthier and poorer. In a country where a general equalitarianism prevails, the political balance is tilted by a few medium-sized towns and by intermediate socio-economic groups in the four larger cities. As these areas go, so goes the New Zealand government.

Mr. Mitchell contributes informative chapters on party organization, the campaign, the press and the candidates, and Mr. Jackson describes the electoral system and the influence of broadcasting.

All in all, this volume makes a useful contribution to the growing collection of voting studies and shows how far the study of politics has advanced in the South Pacific.—LESLIE LIPSON, *University of California, Berkeley.*

Capital Punishment and British Politics. BY JAMES B. CHRISTOPH. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Pp. 202. $4.00.)

Professor Christoph has made an interesting addition to the rapidly growing volume of specific case studies of decision-making in Britain. Because his story involves one in which the leadership groups of the two major parties attempt, however unsuccessfully, to avoid commitments and responsibility, Christoph almost finds himself out of the mainstream of British politics. This does not detract from the interest in the story of the long battle for elimination of capital punishment; it merely makes even more difficult the job of going from the micro to the macro.

Christoph tells his story well, giving a good historical synopsis, and then recounting in detail the events of the postwar years, particularly during the Labour Government's passage of the Criminal Justice Bill of 1947–48, and the Conservative Government's Homicide Bill of 1956. He has talked extensively with all the participants available, explored the files of relevant pressure groups and put his narrative together with economy.

Yet one cannot help but feel that the unconscious emphasis, in the basic research as well as in the relating of the story, is with the proponents of change rather than with the retentionists, or those favoring the status quo. In part this is the way things happened: the proponents were far more active, had single-issue pressure groups concentrating on the issues concerned, and so with far greater activity receive necessarily more attention. And a portion of the opponent's iceberg must be forever hidden: that which is behind the closed doors of the Home Office.

Even so, one finds little to indicate the fullness of the story of the opponents. Any case study must have a focus, and almost inevitably that focus remains on those demanding change. And with as colorful a personality as Mr. Sidney Silverman leading the abolitionists, Professor Christoph had a good beginning!

This same focus shows up in other ways. Christoph concludes, for example, that the controversy over capital punishment "strained the parliamentary process greatly on many occasions and brought into play constitutional and procedural difficulties that defied easy solution." In part this was so because the proponents had such difficulty raising the issue when denied ministerial favor and because they had problems getting their legislation passed. Indeed, they never have achieved their goal of total abolition of capital punishment in Britain. Needless to say, Christoph is also concerned with questions of whether the party leaderships ought to be concerned with such emotional questions as capital punishment, and the effects of their attempts to remain uncommitted on the issue.

This tendency to discuss legislative systems from the point of view of those desiring change, natural with so many of us, does illustrate the principal problem of the use of case studies: that of going from the specific to the general. Christoph does not discuss his methodological problems, although there is every indication that he is aware of them. Especially this is true with an atypical situation. Perhaps one can learn from this what the more usual is like.

For the narrative does illustrate the degree to which the British structure is adjusted to ministerial leadership and, as Christoph quite properly points out, difficulties arise, both for the proponents of change as well as for the ministers themselves, when responsibility is temporarily refused. A role for amateur leadership and the unusual situation of the House of Lords who appeared to reflect the majority in this case could happen only in the absence of normal leadership controls.

Christoph discusses other conclusions as well, such as pressure group tactics and the role of such organized groups as the Howard League for Penal Reform, and slays the silly theory of "pressure groups" as all causal. He raises some interesting suggestions about the relationships of organized group representatives with civil servants, pointing out that in the case of the Howard League, a close relationship with the Home Office restricted the League's ability to campaign for abolition of capital punishment.

So an unusual and highly atypical case is a useful illustration of generalizations concerning the British political system. Christoph has made a contribution to what one hopes will be a growing variety of case studies. But his work also illustrates some of the methodological problems in the use of case studies. This does not detract from his work; it merely illustrates a generalization about the nature of Political Science in its present state.—JOHN H. MILLETT, *University of Wichita.*

The Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism. BY STEWART C. EASTON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964. Pp. ix, 402. $7.50 Cloth, $2.95 paper.)

Publishers have recently come forward with a stream of new books about the non-Western world. They should be congratulated for their effort to capture a growing market—and incidentally for filling a glaring gap in the public knowledge of the world. Some of these works have obviously been put together in a great hurry, but they can still serve a useful purpose. It would be unfair to hold them to a scholarly standard, demanding new research or new interpretation.

It is, however, fair to hold them to their own claims. The publisher's jacket blurb says that S. C. Easton's contribution is "the first full-scale study of all nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western colonial systems." It is no such thing. More than half of the text is devoted to the period since World War II, leaving 151 pages for everything that came before. The regional emphasis is also curious. Africa receives about 44 per cent of the total space while India is given only 5 per cent. The non-Spanish-speaking Caribbean gets 7 per cent, while all of Southeast Asia together gets only 12 per cent. The Spanish Empire in America, which survived well into the nineteenth century, is only mentioned in passing. The reader might assume that Easton simply has his own assessment of the importance to be placed on various parts of the modern world, but this would be a mistake. It happens that he published another book recently, which dealt with the colonial world as of 1959. Since India, Indonesia, and Latin America were independent at that time, they were left out. His emphasis is still that of the earlier work, presumably because it is easier to rewrite one's old books than it is write new ones.

In spite of the jacket blurb, Easton takes his title quite literally. He deals with the rise of colonialism, and with the fall of colonialism, but not with the colonial period that came between. The long African section, for example, begins with a narrative of the partition of Africa. European diplomacy, the establishment of colonial frontiers, and the petty wars for empire are all discussed. But then Easton stops short at about 1900, just when the European powers were beginning to administer their new territories. He takes up the narrative again after World War II, with fullest detail only after 1955. The colonial period is brushed off with a few stray paragraphs.

Every author is entitled to occasional errors of fact, but Easton's imprecision in the early chapters passes beyond allowable limits. To take only the two middle paragraphs from page 7, the Portuguese monopoly of the slave trade did not last for "centuries." It was never sold to the British, nor did Britain ever enjoy a monopoloy of the trade. Not all companies trading in products other than slaves were financial failures. In the light of recent events it is hard to know what a "permanent British colony" in sub-Saharan Africa might be, but the first one was certainly not Cape Colony. Senegambia was the first Crown Colony, and Sierra Leone was the first place where people went from England to settle. Nor was Cape Colony "populated largely by white men" at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Europeans were outnumbered by their own slaves, and there was also a sizeable population of free non-whites.

This high incidence of error is not maintained throughout the book, but it is enough to disqualify the work for use as a text. On the other hand, Easton writes clearly, and his book should find an audience among members of the broader public with an interest in world affairs. The most charitable course is to call a pot-boiler a pot-boiler and refer readers to Easton's own *Twilight of European Colonialism*. This, however, can hardly excuse Praeger for putting this book in print.—PHILIP D. CURTIN, *The University of Wisconsin.*

Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform. BY CHARLES H. HEIMSATH. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 379. $8.50.)

The book's title suggests a major theme of this historical analysis: " . . . Hindus and Muslims in 19th century India formed 'two distinct communities' . . . in social and cultural matters they 'lived in two water-tight compartments as it were.' The Muslim social reform movement is a separate subject for discussion, and it had almost nothing to do with the movement among Hindus, which is the theme of the present study." This revised viewpoint of the author may damn him and his work among those who have glibly rejected the basic differences in Hindu and Muslim cultural traditions and attempted to ignore communal realities in India by making premature assumptions as to an integrated Indian society. But the book's approach is historically and politically sound. And despite Mr. Heimsath's modest declaimer in the preface ("Apart from an effort to reinterpret the political nationalist movement largely on the basis of published works, I make no claim to have contributed to the study of Indian political developments in the 19th century.") the study is also of major importance to the political scientist.

We have, then, an attempt to present a detailed account of Hindu social reform movements from the pioneer efforts of Rammohun Roy in the early nineteenth century to Gandhi in the twentieth. Developments are considered, not simply on a generalized national level, but province by province. Even local trends are followed in Bombay, Madras, Bengal and Northern India. Primary reliance has been placed upon the writings of the chief reformers and much ephemeral pamphlet material has been used. The result is an admirable account of the intellectual history of Hindu social reform which provides most of the data needed for an understanding of the Indian reform movement as a whole. Muslims were relatively slow to accept European ideas and consequently played a minor role in the national ferment.

In opposition to the view once held by Mrs. Besant and others in India that reform and nationalism were opposing elements in the revolutionary leadership. Heimsath rightly adopts the position that they actually supported each other. There can be little doubt of this relationship in traditional communities in general. In India, the friction between the forces of revolutionary nationalism and progressive social reform was quite real in the case of Tilak and his opponents. But this was in part a matter of priority of emphasis and no doubt also a result of ignorance on the part of some Indian leaders as to the organic connection of the two goals. Aurobindo Ghose, long ago, in his *Spirit and Form of Indian Polity* showed clearly the relationship of political decentralization to Indian civilization. The setting up of any goal of "swaraj" in the form of a unified Indian nation was bound to weaken the traditional structure of society and strengthen the forces of reform. The chapter on "The Emergence of Nationalism" is packed with historical insights and the author makes use of much of the literature on the phenomenon of nationalism from Kohn to Morganthau. Considering the towering presence of traditional and reformed Hinduism, a further opportunity suggests itself for research here: the use of the impressive body of work by Tillich and other existentialist thinkers on the integral relationship of Religious values and modern nationalism seen in terms of "vocation."

While the writing lacks the drama of Wolpert's brilliantly conceived *Tilak and Gokhale, Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India*, it consistently reveals the almost unbelievable complexity of the causes, origins, support and course of the reform. It is regrettable that a carelessly constructed bibliography reflects upon an otherwise scholarly work: e.g. Sitaramayya's basic *History of the Indian National Congress* omitted; Shay's *Legacy of the Lokamanya* included under biographies and again, under its full title, as a general work; other publications inaccurately or inconsistently listed. But Dr. Heimsath has written an historical study which deserves high praise. It clearly represents an enormous amount of difficult research and competent scholarship and offers a sound and convincing explanation of the tangled relationships between reform, religion and politics in Modern Hindu India.—D. MACKENZIE BROWN, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

The Forming of the Communist International. BY JAMES W. HULSE. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. vii, 275. $6.50.)

For too long specialists in the study of Communism have kept away from the Comintern as a research focus—perhaps because it was felt that information was too difficult to come by, or because the study was too complex, involving sources in widely separated places in many different languages and cultures. Or perhaps, in the Stalin era, there was the feeling that the Comintern had little independent significance—that there was nothing new or different to be found here. Whether it be one or another or a combination of these or still some other reasons, we are now seeing increased scholarly interest in the study of the Comintern spurred on no doubt by the onset of the era of "Communisms" and, as Bernard Morris has recently suggested, "boredom" with the old subjects.

In his book, Mr. Hulse, who is Assistant Professor of History at the University of New Mexico, covers the development of the Comintern between its First (March, 1919) and Second (July, 1920) Congresses. He indicates that this period, often disregarded as having little significance for the future development of the Comintern, actually witnessed a radical change in its purposes and operation. In early 1919, the Bolsheviks both feared and hoped greatly: They feared that the end of World War I would lead to an anti-Bolshevik crusade; they hoped that European social and economic chaos would ignite the revolution, first in Germany and England and France—and then throughout Europe. The role of the Comintern was to fan the revolutionary sparks. For the Bolsheviks it was not at the time a question of who was going to control the Comintern. (They never created an instrumentality that they did not intend to control.) The immediate task was to bring the European revolution to realization.

Within fifteen months, however, the entire concept of the Comintern had changed. In Moscow-Petrograd, it was rapidly being grasped that there would be no successful revolution beyond Russia's truncated frontiers; the concept of "Socialism in a Single Country" was beginning to emerge. The Soviet leadership now came to see the Comintern primarily as a means for imposing its own control over the international movement. It became interested in laying down "uniform methods of action," in insisting upon the universal validity of the Russian experience. The primary criterion in determining which of several working class leaders would receive support was not who had the greatest following among the proletariat, but who was most willing unquestioningly to carry out the organizational and operational tactics prescribed by the Comintern and its agents. The pattern for the remaining twenty-three years of the Comintern's existence was thus set.

It is clear in Mr. Hulse's treatment that a principal souce of opposition to Moscow's leadership in 1919–1920, even as today in the international movement, was that it was *external* leadership. Many European socialists were powerfully attracted by the Bolshevik success, but they were clearly not willing to accept Bolshevik guidance, especially so once they recognized the naiveté of Moscow's perceptions of their own particular situations.

Mr. Hulse again and again points up the lack of information from outside the Soviet base reaching the Kremlin and Smolny during this period. Communications from abroad were almost entirely in the hands of infrequent couriers. News of significant "revolutionary" events would take months to reach Moscow-Petrograd. Similarly it might be half-a-year before an important Soviet document would come to the hands of the radical movement in Central and Western Europe. Of course, even when accurate information was available the Bolshevik chiefs often chose to disregard it in favor of their own preconceptions. But in most instances they had no choice except to rely upon these preconceptions and the judgements of a few usually unreliable foreign nationals or returned Russian emigrés who had been cast in the role of "specialists" on the country from which they had come.

Mr. Hulse's book is a valuable one. All who have a scholarly interest in the international Communist movement will undoubtedly have occasion to refer to it again and again. One might hope for more frequent and detailed analysis of the problems raised, but it is carefully researched in the best tradition of work for the doctorate, which it was. Also, in the tradition of doctoral work, it is very tediously written. Professor Hulse unfortunately succeeds in reducing a wonderfully exciting period to what approaches factual paralysis. In these pages the drama is muted. There are only small hints of the force of the struggle, of the intensity of the epochal confrontations. The human factor in the material seemingly has little attraction for Mr. Hulse. More's the pity.—DAN N. JACOBS, *Miami University (Ohio)*.

German Social Democracy 1918–1933. BY RICHARD N. HUNT. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xviii, 292. $7.50.)

The Social Democratic Party of Germany. BY DOUGLAS A. CHALMERS. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xiv, 258. $6.50.)

Beginning with Robert Michels' *Political Parties* (1911), the SPD, grandfather of all socialist parties, has been continental Europe's most intensively studied democratic party. The pre-Weimar period has been admirably treated in Carl Schorske's *German Social Democracy 1905–1917* (1955) and A. Joseph Berlau's *The German Social Democratic Party 1914–1921* (1949). Now we also have thorough and highly commendable works by Hunt on the Weimar period and by Chalmers on the party in the Bonn Republic. The Hunt and Chalmers studies complement one another particularly well in that each traces one of the two stages of the party's now complete ideological shift away from Marxist socialism and concentrates upon analyzing the consequences for the party's organization.

Hunt's analysis is both historical and sociological. The analytical framework, reminiscent of that of Michels, is cast largely in terms of three variables: tendencies toward oligarchy, ossification, and bourgeoisification. The two opening chapters provide overviews of the evolution of the party organization, the second of them elaborating upon the causes of the oligarchic tendency: the splitting away of the left wing in 1917 permitted the leaders of the conservative wing to gain complete mastery of the organization; participation in the government increased their authority; the adaptation of local units to proportional representation's larger districts removed leaders from contacts with the grass roots; the country's monetary instability resulted in reduced frequency of party congresses and thus in longer terms, weaker accountability, and greater power for the party executive. An aging, cautious, and self-perpetuating group led a party which assumed a defensive posture in Weimar politics and lost its vitality when the Republic required that it be strong and vital.

Chapters 3 and 4 describe the executive in terms of tenure and increasing control over other organs and over parliamentary candidacies. Also, they treat the leadership, membership, and voters in terms of demographic variables and objective and subjective bourgeoisification. Hunt provides ecological analyses of the voting base and discusses the stagnation of the popular vote, the failure to attract the younger generation, and the conscious effort to shift from class party to *Volkspartei*. Chapter 5 treats party-trade union relations historically as well as in terms of both relative influence in cases of conflict and the interlocking of memberships and leaderships. In Hunt's analysis the trade unions were more powerful than the party and constituted a conservative influence. In Chapter 6, "The Rebellion against the Organization," Hunt reviews relations with the the left wing, particularly the enduring conflict with the leftist Saxon SPD. The concluding chapter, a summary, relates the findings to those of Michels and F. A. Hermens.

The SPD's developmental tendencies of the Weimar years continued into the Bonn Republic, but through the 1950's the demand for revitalization became intensified. If the party were to challenge the CDU successfully, it would have to expand beyond its class base, to respond to increasing pluralization in German society by redefining its representational role, and to respond to changes in the political culture by playing down its socialist ideology. At Bad Godesberg in 1959 the SPD adopted a program without an ideology, a program which repudiated traditional doctrine in expressing acceptance of the church, military defense, and private property.

Chalmers gives us a history of this transformation from an ideologically-oriented to a problem-oriented party, reviewing carefully the choices facing the SPD and the changes in the role of its social theory in policy decisions, in ensuring party unity, and in mobilizing public support. Thereafter he focuses, in four chapters, on the implications of the new approach for: 1) policy-making; 2) leadership recruitment; 3) party organization; and 4) public relations. The consequences of attempting to broaden appeal include the fragmenting of policy-making channels as communications are established with a wide range of groups and the passing over of organization men of the Kurt Schumacher or Erich Ollenhauer type in selecting as leader the more widely popular Willy Brandt.

Because "As an idea, a philosophy, and a social movement, socialism in Germany is no longer represented by a political party" (p. 228), the SPD is vastly changed in character. Its transformation is away from the pattern of responsiveness noted by Michels and Hunt and away from the defining characteristics of Duverger's "mass party"; though its public image has not yet greatly changed, it is gaining the flexibility and the style of the "electoral party."—SVEN GROENNINGS, *Indiana University*.

Bureaucracy and Political Development. EDITED BY JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. Pp. xiv, 487. $8.50.)

This is the second volume in a seven-volume series "Studies in Political Development" sponsored by the Comparative Politics Committee of the Social Science Research Council. Richard Fagin, reviewing the first volume of this series (this REVIEW, Vol. 57 (September, 1963), pp. 676–77), has already paid tribute to the work of the Committee; I can only add my expression of gratitude to his.

There are several standard ploys open to the reviewer of a book of essays by many authors, none very satisfying either to the reviewer or to the reader. These include: (1) fastening onto the reviewer's favorite essays and dismissing the rest; (2) listing all the essays by title and author and condemming any collection of essays as an abomination; (3) listing the essays as above but declaring bravely that they all aid in pushing back the frontier—preferably without specifying the nature of the frontier and in what direction it is being pushed; and (4) copying the editor's introductory remarks in which he summarizes the various essays—an exercise considerably more respectable than copying dust jacket blurbs. However, the present volume is too important to be given such shoddy treatment; it deserves the respectful attention of reviewer and reader, even though the sum total of its contribution is not as significant as one would wish, considering the excellent credentials of all the contributors.

The eleven chapters following the two opening chapters by the editor can be grouped as follows: (1) general theoretical considerations—the chapters by S. N. Eisenstadt ("Bureaucracy and Political Development"), Fred W. Riggs ("Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View"), and Fritz Morstein Marx ("The Higher Civil Service as an Action Group in Political Development"). The latter by examining the political role of the bureaucracy in developed polities throws considerable light on a major aspect of bureaucracy in developing societies. (2) Bureaucracy and economic development—chapters by Bert F. Hoselitz ("Levels of Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures") and Joseph J. Spengler ("Bureaucracy and Economic Development"). The former by marshalling historic European data and the latter by examining current conditions suggest concrete ways in which public bureaucracies are related to and are crucial for economic development. (3) A number of case studies of national bureaucracies by Merle Fainsod ("Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case"), Carl Beck ("Bureaucracy and Political Development in Eastern Europe"), J. Donald Kingsley ("Bureaucracy and Political Development, with Particular Reference to Nigeria"), John T. Dorsey ("The Bureaucracy and Political Development in South Viet Nam"), Ralph Braibanti ("Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan"), and a report on the role of international civil services by Walter R. Sharp ("International Bureaucracies and Political Development"). It would be difficult indeed to single out any one chapter from this last group. Each in its own way illuminates the nature and setting of a national bureaucracy, and each enriches our understanding of the role of bureaucracy in social change. The same can also be said for Professor Sharp's study of international bureaucracies.

Why is it then, that though each of the chapters has something important to say, the volume as a whole does not really fulfill the expectations of those concerned with problems of political development? Two reasons can be suggested. First, there is the question of the editor's ability to take the products of a group of specialists, draw them together, and present their findings in a systematic manner, noting similarities, uniformities, differences, etc. Either the editor is unable to do this because the contributions are too disparate, or he simply does not perform this most important function. In the present case such an analysis and synthesis would have been possible, but the editor has failed both his contributors and his readers. Professor LaPalombara's two opening chapters are repetitive and diffuse. He raises a number of interesting questions and issues but never comes to grips with the central problem of the volume, the nature of political development, except to suggest that we stop talking about it (p. 35). At least two contributors, Eisenstadt and Riggs, do propose working definitions of political development which could have been used as bench marks for a systematic examination of the totality of the contributions. However, most of the other contributors never stopped to ask what this volume was to be all about and thus confronted the editor with a difficult task indeed.

It is this fuzziness concerning one of the basic notions with which the contributors were asked to deal that suggests the second reason for finding *Bureaucracy and Political Development* less than satisfactory. It might well be that it is impossible to go much further at the present time and that our understanding of political development is still in a primitive state. But the unwillingness to face this issue only serves to postpone the making of any significant advances until some other scholars or groups of scholars are prepared to tackle the issue systematically.

Actually, the theoretical essays by Eisenstadt, Riggs, and Marx, together with the case studies and the chapters on economic development supply much of the theoretical equipment and empirical data for a systematic statement about the nature of bureaucracy in developing polities. Eisenstadt's conceptualization of development as the increasing ability of systems to meet demands and Riggs' definition of development as differentiation provide the base points. The following major aspects of bureaucracy in developing polities emerge from the several country studies. (1) The consequences of the mixed character of the institutions and processes of transitional societies is well illustrated by Braibanti's study of Pakistan and Kingsley's examination of Nigeria. (2) The power position of the bureaucracy vis-à-vis the political elites which characterizes many Asian societies is fully explored by Dorsey's chapter on South Viet Nam. (3) The role of the mass party in the mobilization-type regime common to the communist bloc and many new states and its relation to the bureaucracy are explored by Kingsley, Fainsod, and Beck. (4) Though there are no non-Western cases to illustrate directly the problems raised by the co-existence of several bureaucracies in a society—traditional, semi-modern, modern, etc.—the chapters by Fainsod and Beck, by examining the interaction of party and administration in communist states, do in fact provide much insight into this problem. Had all these theoretical and empirical building blocks been put to proper use by editor and contributors we would be much further along in our understanding of modernization and would have now some greatly improved tools for the comparative study of bureaucracy.—ALFRED DIAMANT, *Haverford College.*

The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany. BY GUENTER LEWY. (New York and Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964. Pp. xv, 416. $7.50.)

The substance of this book has been reviewed in many popular and religious publications. I agree with the judgment of the author of a good earlier study of an aspect of the same topic. Gordon C. Zahn calls Guenter Lewy's book "undoubtedly the best . . . treatment of this general theme."

> It is unlikely that its pre-eminence will be challenged until (even if then?) the Vatican archives for this tragic period are finally made available to scholars for free and independent research. *The Commonweal*, vol. LXXX, no. 15 (July 3, 1964), pp. 445–8.

Professor Zahn is a sociologist and a Catholic, and his and other reviews, as Professor Lewy's preface, refer to the controversy most recently rekindled by Rolf Hochhuth's *The Deputy*. Rather than make my own contribution to that interesting and important debate here, I shall discuss some problems of method raised by this political study.

Symptomatic of these problems are two widespread and related practices of political scientists and our colleagues in sister disciplines: periodization of history, and use of the concept *totalitarianism*. With respect to the Roman Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, these two practices are obviously related. Recent German history is often "broken down" into virtually discontinuous periods: the Wilhelmine Reich, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and postwar Germany (further divided vertically between the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic).

The Third Reich is sometimes described and analyzed as a totalitarian system and, indeed, as one of two prototypical totalitarianisms, the other being the Soviet Union under Stalin. No one, of course, could assert complete discontinuity, since Hitler's rule did arise out of and did follow the Weimar Republic, just as the two contemporary German political systems followed Hitler's regime (with military governments intervening).

However, periodization and the conceptual focus of totalitarianism lead to peculiar results. For example, the behavior of Germany's Roman Catholic hierarchy under Hitler has been studied as though the bishops' previous attitudes and actions—on such issues as the stab-in-the-back legend, the democratic party system, and anti-Semitism—had not foreshadowed their failure to encourage or at least to permit resistance to Hitler.

One great merit of Lewy's work is his deliberate avoidance of this temporally narrow focus, the dangers of which are brought out in a related context by Professor George K. Romoser in "The Politics of Uncertainty: The German Resistance Movement" (*Social Research*, vol. 31, no. 1 (Spring 1964), pp. 73–93).

Definitionalist use of the concept *totalitarianism* usually prejudges the question of the feasibility of resistance, since totalitarianism is virtually defined as that type of regime which makes successful resistance impossible. Hence the frequent refusal to express judgments about the majority of prominent Germans who made no effort to resist. Their collaborationism (where such it was) is ascribed not to their previous history, i.e., it is not interpreted as one link in the continuous chain of German history. Rather it is explained in terms of the "essence" of totalitarianism, the historically unprecedented and somehow alien system to which they were subjected.

Use of the concept in this sense obstructs the search for answers to questions like the following: Why did the German hierarchy react so differently from other hierarchies when confronted with similar problems? Why did it support Hitler's war effort so enthusiastically? Why were its members' attitudes toward the question of "resistance to the tyrant" so legalistic? Sometimes even such questions seem foreclosed by the totalitarian "explanation."

Lewy's work demonstrates again that one cannot find any "inherent laws" that govern the development of "totalitarian" systems. It suggests that the concept of totalitarianism cannot be used reasonably in attempts at apologetic revisionism for the Nazi phase in German history, as, e.g., in Klaus Epstein's review of William Shirer's *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (*The Review of Politics*, vol. 23, no. 2, (April 1961), pp. 230–245, especially pp. 241f).

Beyond this, and more in keeping with the author's intentions, it provides an excellent analysis of the relevance or irrelevance of doctrine to action, and a fine, meticulously unravelled, well told chronicle of an aspect of German history that casts new light upon contemporary German institutions including, among others, the governing party of the Bonn Republic.—HERBERT J. SPIRO, *Amherst College.*

Southeast Asia: Illusion and Reality in Politics and Economics. BY LENNOX A. MILLS. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1964. Pp. x, 365. $6.50.)

This is part of a welcome spate of recent books on Southeast Asia. The past few years have brought a number of national studies such as those of Fall, Feith and Wilson along with more general commentaries on the whole area such as the recent works of Butwell, Brecher and Rose. Professor Mills' book falls into the latter category. In fact, it is really two books, both of which present highly pessimistic views of two facets of Southeast Asian life, the political and economic.

The first half of the volume deals with the domestic and international problems of the area with special attention to the difficulties of establishing Western democracies in the highly unstable systems of the region. He makes a strong case that historical experience, economic dislocations, political and social divisions, communism and a variety of other factors have risen from the Pandora's Box of independence to challenge those championing democracy. He emphasizes that the governments of Southeast Asia are not democracies and that the people are more interested in economics than politics. Within the chapters he gives thumbnail sketches of the political pattern of each country, stressing the undemocratic character of each regime and the obstacles to democratic government.

The second, and better, half of the book more carefully analyzes the economic difficulties which besiege predominately agricultural and primary product oriented Southeast Asia. There is a good summary of private investment and foreign aid efforts and problems. Recognizing the problems presented by unreliable or incomplete statistical data the author updates and interprets the statistics that are available. He is rather despairing about the continuing role of foreign investment in the region and displays a strong free enterprise bias. This is underlined in his concluding remarks where he recommends a general agreement to cut aid to countries confiscating foreign enterprises unjustly. Again, there are national studies of the economic climate, foreign investments, economic development plans, foreign aid and continuing financial problems in each country. The sections on Indonesia and Malaya are the most complete and best documented. He ends by pointing to the major block to further economic development in the area presented by rising population.

Professor Mills has written a book, which with some exceptions in the parts on economics, is primarily for the neophyte in Southeast Asian studies. However, the reader should be careful with regard to the at times overly general statements in the book and the obvious biases of the author. For example, although this reviewer is not a strong admirer of President Sukarno of Indonesia, he finds the statement (p. 80) that "Sukarno's habit of mind has been purely destructive," is somewhat strong, particularly when followed by other less than complimentary remarks. There are also some organizational difficulties which make the book run less smoothly. Finally, one misses a feeling of empathy for the manner in which Southeast Asians see their problems; the sincere belief on the part of many that they have their own rationale for actions which to the West may seem unreasonable or foolish. These criticisms are primarily directed at the first chapters of the book and may be explained by the need to cover a large body of material in a relatively few pages. The sections on economic problems are a real contribution and, to this reader at least, give a generally reasonable and properly pessimistic survey of the major questions.—FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN, *The University of Wisconsin.*

Leadership in a New Nation. BY LESTER G. SELIGMAN. (New York: Atherton Press, 1964. Pp. xv, 141. $5.50.)

Professor Seligman's broad concern, in this brief volume, is with the recruitment of political élites, which he regards as an index of political development. His specific interest is in changing recruitment patterns in Israel, as these are reflected in interviews with 93 of 120 members of Israel's Fourth Knesset (parliament). The linkage between recruitment and development is convincingly presented in the last two chapters of the book, which include as well an extremely perceptive analysis of the probable future direction of political change in Israel. That analysis is, without any question, the best treatment of political trends and tendencies in Israel to have appeared.

Unhappily, *Leadership in a New Nation* also provides an example of one of the less welcome aspects of the "new political science." The heady wine of empiricism has diverse effects. Some who taste of it, no matter how wise they be, become inhibited, reluctant to speak out unless surrounded by elegant arrays of statistics, charts, tables, or even simply numbers. Once reinforced with these scientific trappings, however, these scholars, as if to compensate for their erstwhile diffidence, soar upward, leaving data far behind. Yet surely enough has by now been written and said about these matters so that we ought to be able to distinguish between the nature of insightful observation and the character and requirements of responsible empirical research. The first need not be attended by embarrassment and apology, nor ought minimal investment in the second be treated as providing unlimited license to say whate'er we will and call it science.

Much of Professor Seligman's book is devoted to the development of a new typology of political parties, according to which parties are differentiated from one another on the basis of the number and diversity of the groups their members represent. Those parties whose parliamentary elites represent many diverse groups are "pluralist"; those tied to one specific group are "sectarian"; those representing no groups are "populist."

It may be that this typological innovation has some utility. Unhappily, Professor Seligman's evidence is totally inadequate as a test. Indeed, there is so much confusion and there are so many errors in all but the final chapters that it is impossible to determine whether his evidence supports any inferences at all, let alone the one he derives.

Thus, in one table alone (p. 47), there are no less than seven errors, including the presentation of data for 106 respondents, where only 93 were interviewed, and of data for 10 members of religious parties, where only six members of these two parties were serving in the Knesset at the time. In another table (p. 46), there are a total of 50 cells, of which 25 are completely empty, 14 contain only one or two cases, and six more have but three cases each. Data for members of sectarian parties (p. 44) show that 56 per cent prefer that investment capital be raised from public rather than from private sources; data for the same group on the same variable (p. 75) show that 67 per cent prefer private to public sources. In several other instances as well, the discrepancies between data reported on one page and those reported on another are so massive as to make interpretation virtually impossible.

There are several important errors in the text as well as in the tables. It is not the case, as Seligman asserts (p. 36), that over half of the support for Israel's Communist Party comes from Arabs; while data are difficult to obtain, they are available, and show that the figure is at most 40, and more probably about 30, per cent. At one point (p. 60), we are informed that the Mafdal party has been in all coalitions since the founding of Israel; at another (p. 63), that it has been a member of all but one. (The first is correct.) In a discussion of political mobility (p. 66), a whole paragraph is devoted to a description of M.K.s "characterized by rapid mobility." On the same page, we are told that "only one instance of high mobility was found." Or again, Seligman says, in describing one of Israel's minor parties that "the bulk of . . . (its support) . . . comes from its small number of kibbutzim" (p. 60). This is both overstated and understated, since the "small number of kibbutzim" is in fact two, and the total votes for the party in question from these kibbutzim in the election to the Fourth Knesset was 185.

These, unfortunately, are by no means all the cases of misstatement and confusion which are to be found in Professor Seligman's work, nor are they the most serious. In applying his basic typology to Israel's parties, Seligman lists all parties according to the proportion of M.K.s in each who claim to represent groups. Much of the subsequent discussion depends on this ordering, and some of the results will surely surprise those familiar with Israeli politics. Yet nowhere in the book are we provided with the figures that go with the ranking. It is, therefore, impossible to determine the distance between the party which is ranked first and that which is ranked last, or, still worse, between the party which is ranked first and that which is ranked second. Does the one have twice as many representatives of groups as the other, ten times as many, or only one more? In the absence of this information, the reader is simply unable to make an independent assessment of the central argument of the book. Since the appropriate data were collected by Professor Seligman, it is difficult to understand why they were omitted.

There are other aspects of this book, both substantive and methodological, which deserve discussion. Are interviews with parliamentary élites alone sufficient to a discussion of political élites in general? Does the conventional left-right spectrum fit Israeli politics, or must one or two new dimensions be added? Was the old pre-State ideology, which Seligman sees as waning, ever as firmly embedded as the folk-lore would have it? Is recruitment so sensitive an index of political development as Seligman contends? These are all serious issues; had they been presented together with reliable data, or in purely theoretical terms, they would have received their due. Tied as they are to data so carelessly organized and presented, they will come to the attention of only the most patient and forgiving reader. More's the pity, since the latter part of the book deserves to be read.—LEONARD J. FEIN, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

The Mossi of the Upper Volta: The Political Development of a Sudanese People. BY ELLIOTT P. SKINNER. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. Pp. 236. $6.50.)

If American coverage of events in English-speaking Africa is often sketchy, its coverage of affairs in French-speaking Africa is practically non-existent. University courses and their supporting literature tend to concentrate on the political process in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, and Southern Rhodesia; Senegal, Gabon, Mali, and the Upper Volta receive relatively little attention. This focus leads students of African politics to view such far-reaching questions as the impact of colonialism, the interaction of traditionalism and modernism, and interterritorial integration in a geographically limited way. As of late, however, a marked change in emphasis can be observed. Now leading Africanists speak of an urgent need to fill the gaps in our knowledge about French-speaking Africa. Also the rate at which scholarly works on this area have been published in the last year has quickened noticeably. A healthy wind of change blows over Africanists as well as their area of study!

In view of the rising interest in French-speaking Africa, Professor Skinner's volume on the Mossi of the Upper Volta could hardly have come at a more timely juncture. And over and above the time factor is the high quality of the publication itself. Delightfully free of unnecessary jargon, Skinner's ably written book gives a brief but comprehensive picture of the transition of Mossi society from the past to the present.

The book's most significant contribution for the political scientist would seem to lie in its analysis of the impact of French rule upon Mossi beliefs and institutions. Prior to the European conquest in 1897, Mossi political organization was loose and decentralized. The Mossi rulers of Ouagadougou, Yatenga, Tenkodogo, and Fada-N'Gourma acted within the strict limits imposed by a weak economic base and by an often uncertain military hegemony. The rulers' relationships with their sons, the central ministers, and the provincial, district and village chiefs as well as their relationships among themselves were exceedingly complex. Clearly each authority wielded considerable influence in his own right. The Mossi were welded together by a variety of ritual and supernatural factors; yet Mossi cohesiveness did not preclude a wide decentralization of power.

The European advent rapidly undermined the traditional roles and relationships of the Mossi. Skinner does an admirable job of showing just how thoroughgoing the process was in this instance. French rule weakened the structure of the Mossi political organization by interfering in the selection of rulers, reorganizing the provincial administration, altering the economy, increasing taxes, introducing Western education, recruiting men for labor and military service, reducing the chiefs' judical power, and, in 1933, dismembering thê colony of the Upper Volta altogether. In 1947, the Mossi chiefs were to see the lands of the Upper Volta reintegrated, but their power was gone forever. The modern political system completed the process begun by colonial rule by further depriving the traditional authorities of an important political role. "The chiefs were operating in one power structure," Skinner concludes, "the politicians in another and more important one."

There are some who contend that the only vice of colonialism lay in its Achilles heel of racial arrogance. These people point to the buildings, roads, and transportation systems left behind after decolonization; they fail to grasp the extent of the European impact on all aspects of indigenous life. For them and for all observers interested in the political and social effects of the European interlude, an examination of Skinner's book on the Mossi would prove a worthwhile experience.—DONALD ROTHCHILD, *Colby College.*

Freedom, the Individual and the Law. BY HARRY STREET. (Penguin Books, 1963. Pp. 316. $1.45.)

English scholars have given so little attention to the subject of civil liberties in their country that there is the danger that foreign observers—and even domestic observers—may come to think that there are no civil liberties problems in Britain. To be sure, Great Britain is an orderly country endowed with a superb civil service and police system which command widespread public confidence. Even so, it is wholly misleading to jump to the conclusion that Britain has no civil liberties problems to speak of, and Professor Street's fine book will disabuse the mind of anyone who takes this view.

Harry Street is a well-known professor of law at the University of Manchester. This is, to my knowledge, the first serious, book-length study of English civil liberties ever to be published. It is not at all surprising that it was written by a law professor, since, so far as my knowledge goes, English political scientists have shown no interest in this subject. Thus, Professor Street's book is a pioneering effort, and fills a significant gap in English legal scholarship.

That branch of the law of civil liberties which relates to the rights of persons accused of crime, which is treated in the first chapter, is relatively less important in Britain than in the United States. English law is very strict on such matters as arrest and search by the police, and Street's account does not suggest that in this area practice lags seriously behind preachment. Of special interest to American readers is the discussion of police questioning, and of the famous Judges' Rules which deal with this important subject. The Rules prescribe a fastidious standard, but whether the standard is in fact observed is a matter of widespread concern. Another unresolved question is that of wiretapping by servants of the Crown. The following chapter is concerned with the law relating to the holding of public meetings, and the most noteworthy generalization which emerges is that "the right of public meeting . . . is dependent almost entirely on the police exercising their discretion in a reasonable manner."

Four chapters are devoted to freedom of expression, including (1) the theatre, cinema, radio and television, (2) advertising, (3) obscenity and defamation, and (4) contempt of court and of Parliament. There is a great deal of censorship of the theatre and the cinema through the Lord Chamberlain, local licensing authorities and industry associations. In fact, in the whole area of freedom of expression, one is impressed by the tremendous scope of administrative discretion, and by the amount of self-regulation through such bodies as the British Board of Film Censors, the General Council of the Press, and the Newspaper Proprietors' Association. Radio and television are managed by statute, by internal controls and by external pressures. So far as advertising is concerned, to which much attention is devoted, Professor Street concludes that the scales are heavily weighted against the consumer and in favor of the advertiser. The law relating to defamation, obscenity and contempt is stated fully and with great clarity.

The remaining chapters deal with religious freedom, security problems, the right to work, protection against private power, freedom of movement, and racial discrimination. In respect to security matters the English procedures are not much better than our own. As for discrimination, while Britain has no laws which discriminate directly against persons on account of their race or color, there is no law which forbids racial discrimination in housing or in places of public accommodation. Such discrimination is by no means unknown, and Parliament has refused to adopt legislation dealing with the problem.

The American reader of this book is occasionally startled to find the author making comparisons between American and English practices in which the American practice is described as the more desirable. In fact, on occasion the author gives us more credit than is our due. Thus, he rightly criticizes the enormous sweep of discretionary power exercised by English administrative officials who are concerned with the admission of aliens into the country. But he then goes on to say that in contrast, in the United States, "the alien is entitled to a fair hearing before he is refused permission to land, and to a review by the Courts of any decision to refuse it." Of course this is simply not true.

Professor Sweet concludes that the people of Britain are more complacent about their system than they ought to be. The law on English civil liberties is a curious patchwork, he argues, and judicial review of administrative interference with civil liberties he believes to be inadequate. Lawyers and scholars have shown little interest in the subject. Judges are unwilling to get involved in large problems of public policy. The author concludes with a recommendation for the creation of a Civil Rights Commission, which would review the law and practice relating to civil liberty, hear grievances, and keep an eye on the departments of governments.

Students of British government, of comparative government, and of civil liberties, will read this excellent book with great profit and interest. One may even hope that it may induce some English political scientists to take a serious interest in this important branch of their public law.—DAVID FELLMAN, *The University of Wisconsin.*

Development Administration: Concepts and Problems. ED. BY IRVING SWERDLOW. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963. Pp. 162. $3.95.)

This small book contains a series of eight papers on the newly popular subject of development administration by Merle Fainsod, Lucian Pye, Jay Westcott, Agehananda Bharati, Paul Meadows, Everett Hogan, Albert Waterston, and, of course, the editor himself. Three of these are political scientists, three are economists, one is a sociologist, and one an anthropologist, illustrating the increasing (and laudable) tendency to involve a variety of disciplines in the approach to this truly difficult problem. Originally, each of the eight was invited to participate in a faculty seminar at Syracuse University, from which the idea of the book emerged.

The major difficulty with a collection of papers of this kind, as its editor readily admits, is that of focus and integration. Contributions, for example, are to be found here to such broad subject areas as the cultural hurdles to development and to such specifics as O and M improvement in India and Pakistan.

Several of the papers make notable "ideal" contributions, which, if for no other reason, justifies their being shared beyond the ivy of any particular university. Two of the most thoughtful chapters are clearly those of Pye, with his concern for broadening the base of development to include the "non-bureaucratic components" of the society, and Meadows, a sociologist, who sees development administration as essentially "an act of imagination which attracts, fires, holds, and elaborates the loyalties of human beings engaged in goal-directed change." Bharati makes a useful contribution also by calling attention to the "multiple configuration expectancy principles" which explain how local people view the change agent who has come among them. Finally, Swerdlow himself should be mentioned for some rather pointed comments on the "mis-identities" which have too often fuzed the idea of national development with economic growth.—David S. Brown, *The George Washington University.*

Explosive Forces in Latin America. John J. Tepaske and Sydney N. Fisher, eds. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964. Pp. 196. $4.75.)

This is a collection of essays, prepared for a 1962 conference of the Graduate Institute for World Affairs of the Ohio State University. Like most collections of this sort, it is uneven, and the essays do not really develop any consistent argument or explore any well-defined problem. However, this particular book does have a unique quality, for it is something of a "sampler" of the thought of some of the more stimulating and well-known students of contemporary Latin America.

Herein, Oscar Lewis provides a sensitive and introspective summary of his approach to the sub-culture of poverty. Extensive quotations from *The Children of Sanchez* illustrate his technique of letting an impoverished Mexican family develop and describe its own world view. Edwin Lieuwin's essay on the political role of the military contains the core of his argument in *Arms and Politics in Latin America.* John J. Kennedy presents a capsule version of his more extended discussion of the role of the Church. Thomas Carroll reiterates his message of the explosive threat of agrarian revolution in Latin America, and the imperative need for land reform.

David Burks presents an essay based on his continuing interest in Soviet influence in Cuba. George Blanksten's paper on the Alliance for Progress hints at some of the questions of the political consequences of economic development that are the author's current research concern. John Harrison provides a somewhat distinctive interpretation of the role of the intellectual and the university. Arnold Schaefer contributes an interesting study of nutritional problems in Latin America.

For those who have followed the work of the authors included here, nothing that is said will come as any great surprise. The best of these papers are essentially synopses of ideas and approaches more fully developed elsewhere. However, as a collection, they provide an interesting commentary on the state of Latin American social science scholarship in the United States. One notes the characteristic interdisciplinary quality of the effort. Economists, anthropologists, political scientists, and historians address themselves to similar problems, within a similar frame of reference. One observes the heterogeneity of moods within which current commentary on the problems of change in Latin America is cast, from Carroll's almost impassioned militancy to the objective detachment of Kennedy. And although much has been said in recent years about the paucity of academic talent devoted to the analysis of Latin American problems, this book reveals the presence of at least a few star performers, and a number of craftsmen of considerable ability.—Charles W. Anderson, *The University of Wisconsin.*

Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Studies in Political Development 3). Edited by Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 502. $8.75.)

The Comparative Politics Committee of the S.S.R.C. herewith produces the third of its seven projected volumes on different aspects of political development. It is the only one to apply the case method rather than a strictly functional approach. Japan and Turkey, two Asian states with widely varying backgrounds and rates of modernization, were both late-developing polities whose past experiences may provide lessons to the host of developing states today.

The seventeen experts on Japan and Turkey whose papers at a 1962 conference make up the bulk of this work examine in turn eight aspects in each nation's development. The result is an extremely provocative comparison of Asia's most advanced state with one of the least advanced. It should be valuable to all students of comparative modernization, and to those specialists concerned with the two nations covered. Like most products of foundation collaboration, *Political Modernization of Japan and Turkey* suffers from uneven quality, variation in writing style, and the problem of overall integration. The two editors provide a brief introduction and a longer, excellently-written, concluding chapter to the eight pairs of essays (on traditional society, environmental and foreign contributions, economic growth, education, mass media, civil bureaucracy, the military role, and party leadership). Readers would do well to delve into the superb concluding chapter both before and after reading the individual papers.

Few of the chapters on the two nations make explicit comparisons, but few readers will be equally interested in or informed about both Japan and Turkey. Would not Germany or China have been a better comparison with Japan? The editor's choice of Turkey was debatable, as some contributors imply by citing other national experiences. Ward and Rustow, however, posit two sets of variables which apply to the case studies and all other developing nations: (a) the relatively fixed givens of geographic, past cultural, and external forces, and (b) factors more amenable to leadership choice, including the nature of elite recruitment, economic policy choices, and social manipulation. Japan was more favored than Turkey on almost all these points, but its example cannot be followed blindly by Asian, African, or Latin American states today. The given factors, and contemporary world conditions lead the authors to abjure any simplistic model theory.

The writers on Turkey have the more difficult task, due both to Turkey's lag behind Japan (40 years by some measures; 75 by others) and relative paucity of data. Roderic Davison and coeditor Rustow, however, overcome these handicaps in discussing Turkish foreign influences and persistent military dominance. The strongest papers on Japan are by Robert Scalapino, William Lockwood, and Ronald Dore. They took a broader approach in time and subject, whereas most other contributors stressed their given topic historically. The chapter on Japanese military influence by Roger Hackett was especially disappointing to this Japan scholar. While few of the four native contributors did as well as expected, Masamichi Inoki's essay on Japan's civil bureaucracy is commendable.

Most papers concentrate on the take-off period of economic and political modernization before 1945, but it seems generally agreed that political maturation takes longer. Professor Ike, for example, states on p. 410 that "Japan has not yet attained a full measure of political modernization," but he devotes most of his essay to the Meiji period of early party growth. Naturally, the problem of deciding priorities on time period and narrow/broad interpretation was a serious one within the limited space of each paper. To the average academic or lay reader, however, those taking the broader and more contemporary approach will be more satisfactory.

In their concluding essay, the editors raise the question of the uniqueness of national experience. Each nation is indeed unique in all its fixed and many of its malleable factors. Timing is of the essence; elitism seems inevitable during early stages at least; and state direction of the economy may be necessary for a longer time. Stress on primary mass education appears better (Japan) than beginning with higher education of elites (Turkey). When all is weighed, the factors of external security, internal docility, and elite proficiency emerge as perhaps the critical ones for successful overall modernization. Studies of individual national experiences might profit us more at this point, but the urgent cries of newly-emergent states for proven techniques of speedy modernization justify this type of comparative approach. Japan may be the better model, despite its fortuitous circumstances not available now, and Turkey may be the horrible example of relative failure. This work provides rich data and insights into those two national cases. Its greatest service, however, is in clarifying the nature of the modernization process, showing how two states tried to solve problems along the way, and suggesting further avenues of research.—DOUGLAS H. MENDEL, JR., *The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.*

One Party Government in the Ivory Coast. BY ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG. (Princeton, N. J. Princeton University Press, 1964. Pp. 360 $7.50.).

African Studies programs have now produced a second generation of specialists. Zolberg's contribution in the political science field justifies the pioneer labors of his mentors and the support accorded by the Ford and other Foundations. A high level of technical skill is displayed in the ordering and presentation of material accessible for the most part only to the field worker. The saving grace of relevance and narrative continuity has reduced a turmoil of contemporary events to a pattern understandable to readers outside the area specialty.

Two thirds of the study are devoted to the growth and transformation of Houphouet-Boigny's *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (P.D.I.C.) before the achievement of independence. In Zolberg's view "the Ivory Coast was a reluctant nation" with its sixty-two tribal groupings necessitating extraordinary political methods to establish a national consciousness. The interaction of French colonial policies, the African freedom movement and Houphouet-Boigny's charismatic personality is traced in definitive detail. This section has the attributes of a well written area monograph, valuable to the specialist if somewhat overloaded with historical material for general perusal.

In the final one third of the book Zolberg attempts to establish a meaningful pattern for the one party system of the Ivory Coast that might be projected into the analysis of other African states. It is on the resolution of this point that the significance of Zolberg's book outside specific area limits should be judged. His viewpoint that the African mass party—at least as exemplified in the Ivory Coast—is neither within the scope of political democracy or totalitarianism suggests that political scientists may have to adopt a limited environmental approach to achieve pragmatic understanding of the African situation. Generalizations stemming from Western experience constitute treacherous assumptions. Consensual government, under African conditions, lacks characteristics of political democracy because hidden foundations of commonly accepted law, on which Western civilization rest, are absent. Though Zolberg does not stress the point, law in our institutional form, may be regarded throughout tropical Africa as a colonial import, bearing tenuous connection to the bedrock of African custom. Accordingly the nature of the African consensus differs materially from that known among Western peoples, revolving generally around leadership concepts, group representation, unanimity in action after preliminary discussion, and ideas concerning the nature and end of man as yet imperfectly understood beyond African shores.

Zolberg's approach in terms of Western political analysis remains inadequate to answer the questions raised because of the weight of environmental factors outside the scope of his enquiry and within the disciplines of anthropology, political geography, sociology and economics. However the strictly political approach was essential for the purpose of clearing the ground and providing material needed for enquiries in greater depth. It amounts to an advance in knowledge to realize that the African one party system is *sui generis* and not subject to interpretation in terms of concepts drawn from study of Western political institutions, which they may resemble superficially.

Zolberg concludes "that the direction of change remains undetermined," though he appears to foresee tendencies towards totalitarianism or increased oligarchic control. A reasonable conclusion in light of the evidence presented. However even on the academic level pressures are likely to arise for more specific answers to questions relating to African political development. The growth of African Studies programs throughout American Universities within the last twenty years has been furthered by some unusual factors. The abrupt termination of colonial responsibility threw an unexpected burden on United States governmental and business leadership to participate in African affairs. A framework of experience and accumulated knowledge, equivalent to that acquired by European countries administering the area over many decades was almost wholly lacking. University scholarship summoned to fill the gap discovered the infra structure of primary information—such as the District books, a colonial equivalent of Domesday Book—available only through tapping the experience of former European administrators. The significance of academic African studies accordingly transcends theory, being conditioned by an urgent need for pragmatic understanding of contemporary African conditions for operational purposes. Under these circumstances an interdisciplinary approach based on an areal or environmental thesis appears a desirable contribution of American scholarship to our national predicament. Zolberg has clarified the question of apparent resemblances to Western political experience within an area of tropical Africa, demonstrating that future developments cannot be foreseen through formal political analysis. Anticipation of the course of events, however, remains vital to proper formation of American policy, presenting a challenge to the capacity of scholarly disciplines to unite for pragmatic ends.—THOMAS R. ADAM, *New York University.*

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

National Security: Political, Military, and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead. ED. BY DAVID M. ABSHIRE AND RICHARD V. ALLEN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1963. Pp. 1039. $10.00.)

This book contains the proceedings of a symposium held to inaugurate the Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies. It contains 35 essays under the general headings of "Sino-Soviet Strategy," "Political Requirements for U. S. Strategy," "U. S. Military Strategies," "U. S. Economic Strategies," and "Meeting Strategy Requirements in the Free Economy." To some readers the distribution of attitudes will seem rather skewed to the right, with the Kintner-Possony-Strausz-Hupé school over-represented. Nevertheless scrupulous attempts to provide "equal time" seldom produce good conferences, and in non-textbooks a certain skewness is not a serious fault.

The following insightful essays will bear attention. In Part I Herbert Dinerstein provides a useful retrospect and prospect of Soviet foreign policy. George Taylor gives a penetrating account of the uses to which the Russians and Chinese can turn the adversity of their split. "Peking stresses its role in the overthrow of imperialism and brooks no compromises. . . . The Soviet Union keeps alive the horrors of nuclear war, emphasizes its technological achievements and economic might, and tries to neutralize the West while Peking carries out Lenin's objective of denying to the Western Powers access to the resources of the former colonial world." On the latter point Taylor also notes the relation between Communist economic penetration of the underdeveloped countries and Lenin's conviction that capitalism could be destroyed by depriving it of its colonies.

Non-economists should find much of value in the economic sections. Edward S. Mason's paper on economic growth is excellent and is complemented by James Schlesinger on aid and trade, Gottfried Haberler on monetary and fiscal policies, and by Norman Ture on tax policies and economic development (in which he suggests that the growth-stimulating potential of tax changes is over-rated). Also helpful are the projections by Otto Eckstein, Murray Weidenbaum, and Henry Briefs and Joseph Tryon. Still, the non-specialist must be wary of W. Glenn Campbell's evidence that over the past decade military spending has been tightly restrained at the expense partly of private consumption, but mostly in favor of a burgeoning civilian public sector. Campbell's calculations rest on some rather unusual assumptions discussed by Eckstein on pp. 1011–12.

In the military section Herman Kahn brings out an escalation ladder with no less than 37 rungs. Now Kahn does not intend this "aid to thought" to be employed rigidly, and it can be very helpful. Nevertheless it is time someone did the necessary empirical work. What rungs really do belong above others; under what circumstances is movement continuous and when may it involve spectacular jumps; are there really "thresholds"? These are not easy questions, but there is material—past crises, pronouncements, known military preparations—which could be applied. Even Thomas Schelling's paper, which will not hurt his reputation as perhaps our most brilliant analyst in the field, could have been improved by more reference to the theoretical and empirical literature on arms races. In fact, except for some of the economic papers the whole book is notable for the absence of rigorous theory or empirical analysis.

But this is of course a fault to which all symposia, and especially policy-oriented ones, are subject. It is also a prime fault in the national-security field, where opinion pieces predominate. The new Georgetown Center could perform a great service by helping redress the balance.

It never seems quite fair to berate an author for what was not discussed, but in a 1000 page book it may be less unfair than usual. Everything is seen from a Cold War perspective; the underdeveloped states, and even Western Europe, are primarily pawns to be manipulated, not independent actors. We have predictions about *whether* the Sino-Soviet alliance will break down but few contingency statements about what to do *if* it actually does. Obviously the Cold War *is* the primary fact of international life, and smaller powers' maneuverability *is* sharply limited, but that is not the end of the story. The bipolar model is becoming increasingly less adequate as a description of world politics. It might be foolhardy to predict what the emerging international system will be like (though I doubt the Cold War will pass), but it would be appropriate to examine how some of the possible changes would constrain the United States or offer opportunities. This volume is, after all, addressed to "strategies in the decade ahead." Much of it, however, is conceived in a static framework at a time of change.—BRUCE M. RUSSETT, *Yale University*.

State and Nation. BY BENJAMIN AKZIN. (London: Hutchinson; and New York: Hillary House, 1964. Pp. 214. $3.00.)

" . . . probably for a good many centuries to come, nations are here to stay. Rather than dream about their disappearance, it is better to learn how to live with them." (p. 207) These words conclude, and in a measure summarize, this little book by the Herbert Samuel Professor of Political Science and Constitutional Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Mr. Akzin makes clear that his personal preference would be to witness the disappearance of the sovereign state and of dissident nationalities throughout the world. However, since this is patently most unlikely, he directs his attention to the problems of the relationships "between the political phenomenon of the State and the ethnic phenomenon of the nation," (p. 7) and to the great number of interethnic tensions which exist around the world, both in the established and in the developing nations.

The author's use of terms will be bothersome to some readers, although he is careful to define his usages. He applies the word "state" to a good many political entities whose sovereignty is less than complete, which seems quite acceptable in this context. He defines "nation" as an ethnic group, which will temporarily confuse some readers until it is made clear that he is referring not to racial, but rather to cultural groups which are united by the commonly-accepted ingredients of nationalism: language, religion, tradition, and so on.

His method is to examine the position of ethnic groups or nations and the tensions with which they are confronted or which they generate under a variety of circumstances: for instance, a situation like that in England, where there is only one substantial ethnic group with a corresponding lack of conflict; or that in which there are several groups but with one dominant; that in which several co-exist on a basis of equality; and that in which secession or partition is the method chosen to remove or lessen the tension between political state and ethnic group. The description is usually illustrated by a sentence on this situation or a paragraph on that one, so that in sum the book often seems to represent a catalogue of brief references to past or present national tension, but without a great deal of theoretical or practical advice as to how to go about removing those tensions.

It is hard to determine the utility of the book. It will be of minimal use to the specialist, for anyone passably familiar with the literature on nationalism will find little that is novel. On the other hand the casual or general reader, for whom the book is presumably intended, is likely to be repelled by verbosity and turgidity of style. For example: "We speak of the partition of a State or a political unit when the alienation of its territory in the interest of more than one beneficiary has been either complete or has been carried out on so large a scale, affecting so much of the territory and population, that one is no longer justified in regarding the operation as a merely peripheral phenomenon which leaves the structure in question substantially surviving with only some of its outlying possessions amputated." (p. 165) Such prose, especially when compounded into page-long paragraphs, makes for forbidding reading. But what is more fundamental is the fact that when one has burned away the dross he is often left with the feeling that the pure metal is something that was already part of his store of knowledge.—HOLLIS W. BARBER, *University of Illinois* (*Chicago*).

Economic Policy and War Potential. BY MAX E. FIESER. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964. Pp. 136, $4.50.)

Though it is prudent to look ahead and plan or take action to meet repugnant possibilities, especially in a changing and imperfect world, most Americans are unlikely to interest themselves in peacetime with the problems of developing an effective economic base for mobilization in event of war. Max Fieser has done this in *Economic Policy and War Potential,* showing an awareness of the complexities and variables which make accurate estimates of needs extremely difficult. Moderation is his virtue; extremism, not his vice. His book should provide broad but useful guidelines to government officials concerned with preparation for possible mobilization.

The book's subject is important, because technological developments in weapons systems since World War II have in all likelihood altered both the nature of any future war in which the United States might become involved and the economic or other requirements essential to the support of such a conflict. In an unlimited war with thermonuclear weapons, Dr. Fieser believes the decisive blows would be struck in the first few days or hours, preventing meaningful mobilization of resources, and making the mobilization base irrelevant once the war comes. Limited war is more probable, he concludes, and any expansion of such a war would be by slow and cautious steps, with the mobilization required rapid but considerably less massive than that for World War II.

Having examined the nature of the mobilization most likely should war come, he emphasizes the importance of developing optimum procurement schedules which will take into account both military requirements and economic capabilities, noting the potential as well as the limitation of interindustry analysis for determining total industrial requirements with useful accuracy. In considering the output capacity of any industry for military use, it is obvious that curtailment of imports would place additional demands upon domestic productive capacity. In future limited wars, he reasons, interdiction of sealanes would probably be restricted closely to the area of actual combat—so that the other side would not mistake broader actions as the prelude to general attack or abandonment of all limitations. He argues against maintaining U. S. domestic capacity for production solely through fear of isolation from import sources in time of war. Overreliance upon self or upon a limited number of foreign suppliers, he feels, might concentrate sources of supply and make them more vulnerable to military action.

Dr. Fieser points out rightly that reducing civilian consumption does not automatically increase military production, and that measurements of military gains to be achieved through rationing or production controls is not a simple calculation. He assumes that productive capacity related to strategic-nuclear capability would probably not be released to other production to support a limited war. What is "essential" to the mobilization base is a relative matter, he asserts, noting the many substitutes used by the Germans in World War II. Calling for flexibility in meeting problems, he says that management which has had to face adjustments in processes and products in peacetime is more likely to be able to adjust to rapid mobilization.

Though he does not directly advocate American development assistance to underdeveloped countries, Dr. Fieser believes that access to needed raw materials might be gained there more rapidly with present technical equipment than if the United States were to attempt to develop the more complex technical equipment required to use deposits of lower quality available in the United States. He denies that import restrictions to sustain domestic raw material or manufacturing producers are the best means of furthering national security. He suggests that stockpiling, federal exploration for minerals, subsidies—direct or indirect, and the development of chemically-synthesized substitutes offer viable alternatives to reliance upon import restrictions alone.

His general philosophy is one of interdependence and cooperation rather than isolation and attempted economic independence. To those who accept the importance of the functional approach to international peace and order, pursuit of economic policies such as Dr. Fieser advocates would appear helpful in building a web of international relationships. In the long run, these might tend to make "irrelevant" the economic mobilization base for war with which the author is presently concerned.

It was not the purpose of this book to discuss the Office of Emergency Planning or the means by which considerations related to the state of the economic mobilization base are taken into account in American foreign policy formulation or execution. Faced with the problems and alternative means of meeting needs discussed in *Economic Policy and War Potential,* the lay reader can wish—without being critical—that the author had also dealt with the organization and operations of the Office of Emergency Planning, and with its relationship to American foreign policy.—Robert E. Elder, *Colgate University.*

International Conflict and Behavioral Science. Edited by Roger Fisher. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963. Pp. 290. $6.50.)

For five weeks during the summer of 1962 four psychologists, a mathematical psychologist, two psychiatrists, a sociologist, an anthropologist, a political scientist, an economist, a historian, and an international lawyer intensively discussed "alternatives to the use of force as a means of settling international problems." The resulting book tends to leave the reader with a mixture of interest and impatience.

A number of the articles are of considerable value. Kenneth Boulding continues to use his skill as an economist to work toward a formal theory of international relations along the lines familiar to readers of his *Conflict and Defense.* Arthur Waskow displays appreciable ingenuity in the insightful use of historical materials. One wishes this essay were longer, drawing more heavily on his study of race riots. In Morton Deutsch's "Producing Change in an Adversary" we have some very careful and sensible observations. Amitai Etzioni's piece is a valuable addition to the theory of international integration, stressing the importance of political and social bonds within regions of the word and the value of regional integration not as an alternative to the creation of worldwide political institutions but as a basic building block to take advantage of the higher level of consensus that may exist within more restricted and homogeneous areas. It also makes some pertinent policy-points about overemphasis on *Atlantic* integration.

Anatol Rapoport presents two challenging essays of substantial interest. In the first he maintains that the ideological component of the Cold War is based on serious misconceptions on both sides, that the differences in national myths are far less serious than imagined and that the values held in common receive far too little attention. His second article is a frontal attack on the assumptions of American strategic analysts. From his background as a mathematician he asserts that the widespread use of utility-probability models depends upon some very dubious and unexamined assumptions. Most readers will find the arguments rather overdrawn, but they cannot simply be discarded. His critique of strategic thinking is penetrating and ought to compel some serious reconsiderations. Both are drawn from his newly published *Strategy and Conscience.* In the volume under review here he states his views in a way to make them somewhat more accessible to non-specialists, but it would be regrettable if those most involved considered these two essays a substitute for grappling with Rapoport's own book. His central concern is with the prevailing conception of world politics in *strategic* terms which make impossible any escape from the "prisoner's dilemma"; i.e., a situation where a cooperative strategy would be best for both participants *if* they could trust each other, but since they do not trust each other, they must settle for a much worse outcome. He maintains that only the conscious introduction of ethical considerations into policy can bring us to cooperative solutions. Thinking about world politics in purely strategic terms creates the prisoner's dilemma, and he demands a transformation in our thought.

Many American strategic analysts have declared that when the Russians come to think in sophisticated probability-utility terms the world will be far more safe and stable, and there is evidence in recent Soviet writings that this change is occurring. Urie Bronfenbrenner's article nevertheless suggests, on the basis of interviews in Russia, that most Russians, even among the near-élite, view with repugnance any kind of "cold-blooded" calculation about "peace." Though this might temporarily please Rapoport, Bronfenbrenner's report on their overwhelming belief in Western hostility surely must not.

Nevertheless an overall evaluation of the book finds me rather dissatisfied, the way I often feel on leaving a peace research conference. Some fascinating ideas, some not so good. The interplay in preparing these papers may well have been more valuable to the participants than the immediate product will be to their readers. A number of extremely brilliant people contributed, but the results are not always worthy of the men whose work we know from elsewhere.

In this instance part of the trouble may stem from a somewhat narrow application of the term "behavioral science." Though other disciplines are represented, the majority of the contributors are psychologists or psychiatrists, a field which so far has made relatively few notable contributions to the theory of international relations. But maybe that is just the trouble with the theory, and one cannot necessarily criticize the psychologists. More important, I think, is the absence of the key element in behavioral science—hypothesis testing. Not one of these articles reports on systematic empirical study. Fisher of course recognizes this in his introduction, but recognition does not fill the void. The closest thing to rigorous *constructive* empirical study is William Gamson's research design for evaluating beliefs about the causes of international behavior. But application of the research design is reserved for elsewhere; anyway it may too readily assume that Soviet action is, in whatever direction, a short-term response to Western conduct. Several of the articles are hardly more than opinion-pieces—written by behavioral scientists to be sure, but not properly called science in either its experimental or deductive sense.

What to do about it? Certainly the attempt to promote interdisciplinary discussion is not to be blamed or abandoned. But perhaps what is needed at this stage is more interdisciplinary *research.* When bringing fifteen such distinguished and varied people together, be sure to put them to work, with adequate assistance and facilities, on a particular, more narrowly defined, topic of research. Then we might really move.—Bruce M. Russett, *Yale University*.

Essays on Intervention. By Roger Fisher, Richard A. Falk, Michael H. Cardozo and William T. Burke, edited by Roland J. Stanger. (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 125. $4.00.)

This is a stimulating collection of four essays, published by the Mershon Committee on Education in National Security at Ohio State University. The first three essays were originally presented at a Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law at Ohio State University in April, 1962.

As all the essays indicate, the subject of intervention needs much clarification today. With the dangers of nuclear war hovering ominously in the background of such cases as Viet Nam, Cyprus, Cuba, and perhaps even the Congo, Angola, South Africa and Yemen, it is exceedingly important, as the essays urge, to distinguish between permissible and impermissible acts of intervention and to strengthen the hands of the law and the international community in restricting the impermissible types. Although intervention by individual states to redress wrongs recognized under international law is permissible, the legal standards relating to such intervention are often ambiguous, inadequate or outdated. The term "intervention" itself, is used, for example, to refer to a wide range of actions from major military attack to the withholding of diplomatic recognition. The same term may also be used to describe lawful actions to enforce international rights or unlawful interference in domestic affairs. Moreover, such terms as "reprisals," "measures short of war," and "pacific blockade" are used from time to time to designate actions which might also be referred to as "intervention." William T. Burke, Associate Professor of Law at Ohio State University, in the fourth essay points out many of these confusions and suggests a frame of reference for clarifying them.

The League of Nations brought wide recognition to the principle of collective intervention. Yet the ambiguity surrounding unilateral intervention was not cleared up inasmuch as the Covenant, while obliging members not to "resort to war" under certain circumstances, did not establish clear standards regarding the use of measures short of war or other traditional forms of intervention.

The United Nations Charter avoided some of the difficulties of its predecessor by deliberately refraining from prescribing specific measures of coercion and leaving such determination to the political decisions of the Security Council or the General Assembly. Yet the United Nations is frequently confronted with the dilemma of whether actions desired by its majorities are compatible with the principle of non-intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state (Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter). Moreover, there is considerable disagreement over whether the Charter obligation (Article 2, paragraph 4) to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state forbids all unilateral acts of coercion or only the more extreme forms.

An increasingly used form of intervention today is seen in the various programs of foreign economic aid which frequently carry "strings" or "conditions" amounting to a degree of coercion of the recipients by the donors. Some of these conditions may relate directly to the achievement of economic or social improvements to increase productivity and efficiency (e.g. curbing inflation or instituting tax reform). Others may seem to serve primarily the political or economic interests of the donor states—as the requirement in the United States legislation known as the Battle Act that all forms of American aid would be cut off if a recipient nation sent certain kinds of goods behind the Iron Curtain. The third essay in this volume, by Michael H. Cardozo, Professor of Law at Cornell University, is devoted exclusively to this question of intervention through "benefaction."

The contributors to this volume agree that the legal principles relating to intervention need to be clarified and strengthened, and that governments should be urged to bring their national policies into line with such principles. The danger that competing unilateral interventions in civil conflicts like those in Vietnam, Cyprus or the Congo may escalate into major nuclear war makes this obviously urgent.

The authors, each in his respective way, suggest that community action, normally through the United Nations, should be used more extensively to clear up the current ambiguities in the principles relating to intervention, and to deal with the pressures for change in the new countries of the world without running the risks of unilateral interventions. Roger Fisher, Professor of Law at Harvard University, argues in the first essay, that "all the rules about intervention are meaningless if every nation can decide for itself which governments are legitimate and how to characterize particular limited conflict." He urges that governments agree instead to accept the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly as to what governments are legitimate and as to whether conflicts should be characterized as domestic revolution, internal lawlessness or foreign attack.

In a similar vein, Richard A. Falk, Professor of

International Law at Princeton University, suggests in the second essay that the United Nations be authorized to engage in "legislative intervention" to coerce domestic social changes whenever civil strife threatens world peace or whenever gross abuse of human rights exists. Although these proposals may seem unlikely to be accepted by many governments today, they constitute the kind of imaginative and far-reaching analysis which deserves careful consideration by all who are seeking to strengthen the role of the United Nations and the rule of law in world affairs.—ELTON ATWATER, *The Pennsylvania State University.*

The Scientific Revolution and World Politics. BY CARYL P. HASKINS. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964. Pp. 115. $3.50.)

In Dr. Haskins' words, the scientific revolution during the years from Galileo to Newton "brought to the West, and can now be expected to bring to others in the future, a world view so radically new that it may well be transforming to the peoples who experience it. Second . . . it brought for the first time, and may now bring again elsewhere, the real conviction that not only can significant aspects of the laws of nature be understood by man, but they can be effectively used for man's practical gain. [Third,] a society so committed [to the scientific method and the search for truth] is compelled for that very reason to set a high value upon, and to give protection to, the independent and original mind whatever its characteristics." Drawing upon the experience of Europe, he is convinced that as the emerging nations adopt Western science their whole societies will undergo "a transformation more profound than any that wars or drastic political changes might have wrought." And he considers these changes to be, on balance, beneficent.

Much of the book is a plea for assisting the new states to build an indigenous, living science. The West must help them to transmit, use, and adapt existing technological advances; we must not expect them to build a broad-based scientific establishment capable of original work over a wide field. In hindsight he regards the Atoms for Peace program as a great disservice to the new nations—most of its applications are largely irrelevant to their most pressing needs, and they lack the industrial and technical base to support it anyway. But since science (as contrasted with mere technology) will have great and good effects on social attitudes, we must help them to build a scientific establishment suited to their requirements and capabilities. The education of indigenous scientists is so pressing a need that "radical measures should probably be taken in this direction by governments of new states even, when necessary, at the cost of short-term sacrifices in education at both primary and university levels, and even at the cost of some delay in attaining the alluring and undoubtedly important goal of universal literacy in the nation."

His argument applies first to the emerging nations—he thinks that once the scientific revolution has established itself the new nations' independence will not easily be subverted by totalitarian ideologies. But he means it also to apply to the Soviet Union. He hopes, and though not unaware of the problem's complexities seems also to believe, that science will force the liberalization of political and social life in Eastern Europe.

Dr. Haskins is a research biologist, administrator of scientific programs and, since 1956, President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington. The book stems from his Elihu Root lectures to the Council on Foreign Relations in 1961. It is short, the argument is sometimes annoyingly general, and Dr. Haskins is a bit more certain of the impact of science on society than a social scientist perhaps would be. The comment about giving priority to advanced science in emerging nations, even over other kinds of education and raising basic literacy rates, is dependent upon a host of hypotheses whose implications may not have been thought through, let alone tested. I wished for a great deal more specificity about the nature, the consequences, and the contingencies of the alleged impact which is central to his argument. Yet it is probably not very fair to make this demand in view of the kind of book he deliberately chose to write, its insight, and the paucity of social scientists' actual research on the questions he raises. Even if only partially correct, what he says is very far from trivial and demands intensive examination.

There are two specific points in this book which may not raise the spirits of observers of international politics. Dr. Haskins notes *increasing* Soviet efforts to devote science to matters of direct military application rather than to what we would call basic research. If correct, this adds force to the fears of those who contend that the Soviets have, since Cuba, given up hope of achieving military superiority over the West in the near future but are hoping, over a period of years, for a technological breakthrough. Also, he presents a valuable commentary on Communist China's scientific progress, and he seems impressed. He lends specific evidence to Derek deSolla Price's conclusion, based on the European, American, and Russian experiences, that late-comers to the science race will develop their capabilities much more rapidly than their predecessors. Price suggests that China's scientific establishment may double every three years, as compared with every ten and seven years, respectively, for America and

Russia at comparable stages of development.—BRUCE M. RUSSETT, *Yale University.*

Europe Ascendant: The International Politics of Unification. BY GEORGE LISKA. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1964. Pp. 182. $4.50.)

The subject of *Europe Ascendant* is the re-emergence of Western Europe as a world power. The approach is theoretical and much use is made of historical comparisons. Thus the essay contains virtually no factual material on the Common Market, and while the names of Paul Henri Spaak, Robert Schuman, Alcide De Gasperi, and Ludwig Erhard do not appear in the index and no American President or Secretary of State is present there, there are references to Richelieu, Vergennes, Louis XIV, Louis XV, Napoleon I, Napoleon III, Cavour, Briand, Borgia, Bismarck, Frederick II, De Grasse, Nehru, and Mohammed V of Morocco. Six living persons are mentioned: Adenauer and Nkrumah once each, Churchill, Jean Monnet and Nasser twice, and De Gaulle twenty-four times. Professor Liska's conclusion is that present "developments ought to promote a progressive convergence of updated traditional foreign-policy options of progressive partners in Western European unity" and "ought to do so at a rate that will make the convergence coincide with and profit by the revival of classic diplomacy and the development of a new multipolar order in which the leading powers would work out the modalities of reciprocal access to areas adjoining the several heartlands."

The author appears to admire Machiavelli and in some respects this book resembles *Il principe.* Professor Liska reflects in his writing the hard-hitting dogmatism, the exaggeration, and above all the sense of urgency that characterized the style of the great Florentine. Machiavelli, however, was a superb stylist, while Professor Liska is not.

Europe Ascendant, in fact, could benefit from careful editing. Professor Liska has a great deal to say in the 170 pages of his essay. As a result the book seems hurried and the style is both laconic and repetitious. There is little time or space for supporting arguments, for explanation, or for careful logical reasoning. In the brief final chapter, for instance, the following sentences appear on consecutive pages: "Unity in Western Europe . . . has become a global event even before it has been consummated as a regional reality." (p. 167). "The new power of Western Europe, like her unity, is perceived and even feared outside before it has been realized within" (p. 168). "Western Europe now faces the more pressing task of acting as a unity toward the outside, even before she constitutes an integrated unity within" (p. 169). I find no explanation in the book as to how an unconsummated reality can be an event, and I see no evidence that it is more important to Europe in either the short run or the long to have a united foreign policy than to create an integrated federation.

Driven perhaps by a desire to convey overmuch, Professor Liska runs the risk of conveying far less than he intends. Instead of being convincing he appears only convinced; instead of elucidating the material for the reader he apostrophizes him. Thus the book has value and interest primarily for the expert who can fill in the lacunae, test the conclusions by his own factual knowledge, and generally benefit by Professor Liska's stimulating ideas.—JOHN CLARKE ADAMS, *Syracuse University.*

Law and Public Order in Space. BY MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL, AND IVAN A. VLASIC. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963. Pp. xxvi+1147. $15.00.)

The title and mass of this volume by themselves would be sufficient to convey to the reader the Gargantuan technological strides of our age and the vastness of its social and political potential. A world barely accustomed to the fictional intergalactic probings of its H. G. and Orson Wellses, C. S. Lewises, and Ray Bradburys must now confront the astro-political and legal evaluations of three stellar but down-to-earth lawyer-social scientists.

Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal, while skilled in the formalities of the law, have long eschewed the intellectual encumbrances legal formalism can impose and sought out instead the policy-oriented essences of interaction among legal, social, and political systems. Their major collaborator, Ivan Vlasic, now professor at McGill University's Institute of Air and Space Law, began his significant contribution to the volume as a graduate student of theirs at Yale Law School; and the thoughts and research of a dozen other of their associates and graduate students are graciously acknowledged and prominently represented.

The authors' purposes are to identify the recurring types of problems affecting public order in space; to examine the available data on each kind of problem, extracting and evaluating for this purpose relevant materials from law, political science, sociology, psychology, history, anthropology, philosophy, economics, engineering, and physics; to probe community processes for decision with respect to particular types of claims like access and competence in outer space, establishing the nationality of spacecraft, inclusive enjoyment versus exclusive appropriation in the acquisition of resources, establishment of enterprisory activities and potential interactions with cultures of inferior and superior science and technology; and to assess methodological and substantive alternatives for securing and implementing community goals.

The volume is divided into four major parts: community context and emerging problems; clarification of basic community policies; probable trends in decision and conditioning factors; and appraisal and recommendations for a comprehensive public order of space. In each of these the authors' overriding concerns appear to be the development of mechanisms of conflict avoidance and resolution and the enhancement of human dignity.

Whether discussing technical items such as international standards for airworthiness of spacecraft or historical items such as the collapse of the Inca empire before Francisco Pizarro's 130 foot soldiers and 40 cavalry, and the alleged lessons of the event for present day policy makers, Lasswell, McDougal, and Vlasic have performed their researchers' and analysts' roles with zest as well as precision. The data are impressive not only for their breadth and scope but also for their compliance with a sophisticated analytical framework.

Although much of the book focusses on means for realizing man's desires for a space ecology sympathetic to creativity and order in the future, the authors' critique of the processes by which decisions have been and are being made in matters of space policy calls for careful consideration in the here and now. The authors suggest that the realities of decision-making today often stray from any rational model. Official intelligence reports on space policy, for example, have been prepared and distributed or withheld at times in response to multiple "calculations and pressures." Although "rivalries of interest inside the scientific community have been sufficient to keep alive a considerable stream of objection to space outlays and therefore to defeat attempts to censor adverse statements," we still do not have "full accounts" of the planning and execution of outer space programs.

The authors point queasily to our lack of knowledge about key domains of decisional rationality, such as whether legislators' votes on outer space programs were conditioned by awareness of scientific, technological, military or other considerations. "How many commitments were reached on casual impression, or as an explicit or tacit bargaining tool to obtain support on other issues?" They would like also to see further research undertaken on whether, once space programs have been initiated, they have been administered as envisaged by those who planned them and whether deviations have been attributable to ignorance of the initiators, to weight of established bureaucratic routine, or to rapid obsolescence of technology. Their concerns with the intricacies of the decisional process in space matters represent more than the interests of technicians in new machines. They feel that "as scholars, teachers, and advisors, we are particularly, responsible for the future, since it is our task in society to provide a map of goal, of policy alternative, and of probable outcome."

The authors conclude on notes partly optimistic and partly somber. They maintain that statesmen of the contemporary air-space community have an unprecedented opportunity for impact on history. "They can take the risks involved in peaceful transition to an inclusive system of minimum public order, and thus smooth the way to an optimum order of undreamed-of abundance and benevolence. In default, they can fail to take the risks required: by their timidities and their mistakes they can end history—as man records it."

All political scientists should find aspects of this comprehensive work valuable in their own research and teaching. Even those who may find its idealism cloying and its reactions to pressure politics naive, cannot fail to be impressed by the range of data systematically probed and interpreted. But to the reviewer, at least, the major contribution of the book is its combination of practicality and idealism as it emphasizes how today's revolution in technology can be used not to automate man but limitlessly to enhance human rationality, creativity, and dignity.—Victor G. Rosenblum, *Northwestern University.*

The U.S.S.R. and Africa. By David Morison. (London: Institute of Race Relations and Central Asian Research Centre, Oxford University Press, 1964. Pp. 124. $2.25.)

The arrival of a Russian film star in East Africa, free gifts of hospitals and polytechnical institutes, loans and grants all underline the increasing interest and influence of the U.S.S.R. in this part of Africa. The little book at hand becomes useful and fascinating.

The text itself is divided into three sections relating to 1) Soviet aims, 2) Soviet attitudes and 3) the state of African studies in Russia. Since the text is only 73 pages long, of necessity each of these three sections is small. Each relies heavily on direct quotations from official Soviet speeches, journals and documents, carefully selected. An Appendix of 50 additional pages gives contemporary and official Soviet evaluations of the political parties and leading personalities of 50 African governments and territories. It relies heavily upon the 1962 Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia but even includes official comment on the *coup* of January, 1964 in Zanzibar.

The book properly reminds us that applied

Soviet interest in Africa is of very recent origin, becoming visible only as late as 1955. More important, it underlines the difficulties of Soviet policy as it has had to face a succession of African political, social and economic developments which are not easily squared with scientific Marxism-Leninism as developed since 1953. The list of these awkward facts is long, and includes: the peaceful transfer of power by colonial regimes to the leaders of nationalist movements; the insistence of the new leaders that traditional African societies had no exploiting classes; the presence of both indigenous and imported, deeply rooted, religious beliefs; the development of a sense of African unity coupled with the possibility that it might become directed against *all* whites; the growth of nationalism; the careful mixing of *private* and public economic institutions in the new economies and the growth of a positive neutralism which threatens to treat *all* alliance systems as equally potentially dangerous to Africa's newly won independence. All of these developments, plus others, pose genuine problems for the Soviet Union as it mounts its campaign to widen its influence in the continent.

However, the Russian response to these issues emphasizes its flexibility in choice of attitude. Thus, for example, Mr. Nkrumah in 1954 'had not justified the people's confidence' but was found by 1961 Russian scholarship to do so. Mr. Azikiwe's philosophy was described at first as 'a colonial edition of the reactionary American philosophy of pragmatism' yet he is now thoroughly acceptable. The adjustment of scientific Marxism-Leninism to the early-labelled 'fictitious' 'formal' or 'illusory' independence of the new African states is outlined for us. The half-way houses of these states, now seen as on their way to truly democratic societies, is given approval. Governments not so long ago described as being composed of 'leaders divorced from their own people' are now the recipients of the 'creative development' of Marxism-Leninism steming from Moscow. Having stated this, the author reminds us that even though Russian scholarship, as always centrally coordinated, is producing support and arguments for these adjustments, it would be unwise for the West to underestimate it.

From the book one does not learn much of the contrasting policies and attitudes of China—perhaps it is a bit early to use events on Zanzibar as examples of the tussle between the two powers in Africa. There is no index and at times there is a heavy editorial attitude displayed in the choice of adjectives describing the policies under discussion. These defects, if such they be, do not seriously mar an excellent account of the appeals and strength of the U.S.S.R. in Africa. The ability to reinterpret Marxism-Leninism and to apply that reinterpretation successfully is impressive. Both students and practitioners of foreign affairs have been given in this book, a useful tool.—Channing B. Richardson, *Kenya Institute of Administration.*

Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy. By Harold L. Nieburg. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964. Pp. 255. $6.00.)

This intense, provocative study hammers away at "nuclear exclusion," holding it to have a disastrous effect on American foreign policy. Before 1953, secrecy served the cause, however futile, of checking Soviet atomic power. Since then the admitted purpose has been to keep others, primarily our allies, from joining the "club." The book concentrates on the Eisenhower years, though it does treat the Truman and Kennedy approaches to atomic diplomacy. The author does not try to present the best possible case for the policy of secrecy before criticizing it, but his attack effectively demonstrates the difficulties it has caused—in coalition diplomacy, strategic doctrine, civil defense and the problem of fallout, the propaganda struggle with the Soviet Union over peaceful uses of the atom, efforts to contain French rearmament, and the periodic crises with our "fellow Anglo-Saxons," Britain and Canada.

Congressional ambitions and the policy process receive almost equal emphasis, with diplomatic-strategic objectives as a cause for our secretiveness. Mr. Nieburg observes that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has used a new power—watchdog of atomic secrets—to augment Congressional authority in foreign policy and even usurp executive powers. Only Lewis Strauss (1953–57) receives credit for a serious executive counter-effort, which ended in a complete disaster: a legislative veto in the 1958 law, giving the Congress and the JCAE the power to reject within sixty days agreements with foreign powers regarding nuclear military cooperation.

The author takes exception to the JCAE claim of furthering technology and protecting public power interests, liberalizing security laws or preserving the national interest (as in thwarting a move to give France a nuclear-powered submarine). Thus, he considers this stand against France a blunder, and argues that Mr. Strauss was more committed to a liberal information policy. Congressional leaders generally receive harsh treatment and, again, a rounded presentation of their perspective of the national interest does not come through, though the institutional and party aspects of the policy process and struggle are quite vividly portrayed. The study, it appears, comes closer to the heart of the problem when it notes the Executive's desire for flexible legislative authority to yield secrets, while still having the power to withhold information that would help create new centers of nuclear power. Executive use of Congressional intransigence came at a high price—crippling reduction of true flexibility.

Eventually all roads lead to NATO and the climactic dilemma of our policy regarding the historic European powers. Mr. Nieburg rightly stresses their pride, unprecedented economic modernization, and desire to have greater control over their own fate. Here, he holds, nuclear inequality and secrecy, especially in favoring Britain, can be the central cause in a shattering of the alliance. But is this true? Here the case rests on a series of assertions—that all Western Europe really desires "independence," *potential* unity even in the form of a "confederation of fatherlands" signifies a meaningful change in the continent's political system, or that France would somehow be more amenable if it received nuclear assistance without strings. One could in all honesty argue the opposite on all these vital points. Konrad Adenauer may have been correct in holding that Europe could not act effectively to benefit mankind as long as its fate lay in American hands. But can Europe gain respect, or make today's precarious military alignments and political balances more secure—the author's devout aspiration—without a real confederal effort and massive military sacrifices? (Strategic deterrence alone costs us $15 billion annually.) How do European refusals to recognize that the deterrent is not an all-purpose tool, that conventional forces are essential, and finally that independent national deterrents offer little physical security, serve these higher purposes? Could even a United Western Europe protect itself, and would its emergence necessarily signify a more stable global power system?

This is not to say that secrecy has not hamstrung our diplomacy or hampered the execution of useful projects. But other explanations deserve (and at times receive) equal weight—high costs in the development of atomic power for electricity, the intractable problems of devising an adequate military strategy for nuclear power, and the strident appeal of nationalism. We can concur with Mr. Nieburg's view that "we should be able to use our nuclear secrets to help shape events, while putting aside the dangerous illusions that we can wholly mold them to our liking." But does that mean abandoning a vital interest, like checking proliferation? On this point, as in the discussion of the Congress and American efforts to modify its NATO nuclear arrangement. The reader must look elsewhere for an opposing view. This is a well-presented case but, like a lawyer's brief, advocates but one position in a most complex debate.—Fred Greene, *Williams College.*

Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle, Free France and the Allies. By Dorothy Shipley White. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963. Pp. 471. $7.50.)

Mrs. White's scholarly study of de Gaulle's relations with Britain and America covers the years 1940–1942, and thus completes the picture which Arthur Funk's *De Gaulle: the Crucial Years* (dealing with the period 1942–1944) had begun to paint, and which William Langer's earlier *Our Vichy Gamble* had rather debatably outlined. Mrs. White has consulted all available documents, studies, and memoirs. It cannot be said that her own volume adds much to our knowledge, but it is a good synthesis. Its two principal drawbacks are, first, a general mildness of tone which robs her analysis and her discussions of personalities of the bite and incisiveness one could have wished for, and secondly a tendency to give too much importance to the "storm" whipped up by the Gaullist seizure of Saint Pierre and Miquelon. Of course, as she points out, the incident was blown out of proportion by the State Department, but this was no sufficient reason for doing the same here. As a result, there is much more about de Gaulle's difficulties with the U. S. than about his clashes with Britain.

Those drawbacks, however, do not deprive the book of interest and value. Mrs. White's mildness never amounts to a refusal to pass judgment. The terms she uses are not harsh, but the verdict is clear: America's policy toward de Gaulle was neither successful nor intelligent. To be sure, there were good reasons for U. S. officials to be suspicious of de Gaulle: the fiasco of the Dakar expedition in Sept. 1940 damaged his reputation, and for a while much could be said in favor of the "Vichy gamble." But after America's entry into the war, and even more after Laval's return to power in April 1942, U. S. policy toward de Gaulle becomes hard to justify. It can certainly be explained by a combination of rather petty resentments (resulting largely from the Saint Pierre affair) and huge misconceptions both about de Gaulle's character and, even more, about French opinion, misconceptions the British did not share. The United States never stopped hoping that some of the cherished figures of the Third Republic, like Herriot, would pick up the leadership of Free France—without realizing both their ineptitude and their unpopularity. As Mrs. White points out, the advice given by Admiral Leahy, Alexis Léger (i.e., Saint John Perse, the diplomat and poet) and Camille Chautemps was wrong, and America's policy of dealing with French "local authorities" only became untenable.

Next to her description of the discord between de Gaulle and the Allies, Mrs. White's book contains some useful information about the growth of Free France in America and about the perennial and often murky squabbles that plagued the Free French Movement and re-enforced official American misgivings about de Gaulle. She throws no more light on some of those affairs than we had already—which is to say that much remains to be discovered. On the whole, her account of Free France and of Allied diplomacy toward it builds up an impressive case for de Gaulle. Mrs. White does not deny his faults, but his qualities as a leader are squarely demonstrated throughout the volume, although she could have made an even more forceful case if she had analyzed systematically his techniques of leadership. Her admiration of his "unyielding courage, integrity of purpose, and fierce resolution" gives warmth to what would otherwise be a rather dry narrative. She is right in seeing in de Gaulle's wartime experiences the seeds of present-day Franco-American or Franco-British divergences: De Gaulle's tactics and aspirations have not changed, Britain's option in favor of solidarity with the U. S. above all has not been reversed, and America's treatment of France has again been marked by a mixture of impatience and illusions. As she says in her conclusion, "sadness" may well be the essential meaning of the story.—STANLEY HOFFMANN, *Harvard University.*

Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy. (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press. 1963. Pp. xiv, 273, $6.75.)

United States intervention in the lingering crises in Vietnam and Laos underlines the need for a serious reappraisal of our policy in all Southeast Asia. As a step toward this end, The Asia Society and The Southeast Asia Committee of the Association for Asian Studies recently sponsored a conference to reappraise United States policy in this critical area. The present volume consists of ten papers prepared for the conference, plus a penetrating, concluding essay in which William Henderson reviews past American policies and formulates the main precepts of a new diplomacy toward the region. The contributors—all experienced American specialists on Southeast Asian affairs—reach no consensus and do not "agree among themselves on various important points of Southeast Asian history, politics, and economics or on many aspects of United States policy toward the region" (p. +ii).

Henderson begins his essay by disagreeing with those (including contributors to the symposium) who argue that "we really do not have a policy but rather a sad melange of improvisions and stopgap measures, often working at cross purposes and serving no clear objectives." To the contrary, he asserts, "we have had a fairly clear Southeast Asian policy for a good many years. The concept . . . is to safeguard the independence of Southeast Asian countries against the menace of Communist aggression and subversion, first and foremost by strengthening their military security, and secondly, by encouraging their political, economic, and social development in freedom behind the secure barrier of containment." The main weakness, as Henderson sees it, is not one of concept but rather one of resolving that our interests in Southeast Asia are really *vital* interests and of elaborating specific, supporting measures.

To put an end to the "doubt and ambiguity" in the present Southeast Asian policy Henderson proposes a "constructive, manipulative diplomacy" that is "frankly interventionist," saying: "To pretend that the new diplomacy is less than interventionist, is not only hypocritical but imposes a psychological inhibition that may prove disastrous to the elaboration of successful policy." (pp. 261–262). He argues that "Once we frankly accept the role we have cast for ourselves, we can throw off one of the great millstones of United States policy in Southeast Asia since the end of World War II, namely, that it is narrowly and negatively anti-communist in content. Instead we may take on the more positive goals of nation building for modernity." Henderson does not detail the ways and means by which United States governmental institutions and processes, and public opinion, may be accommodated to meet the tasks of the new diplomacy. However, he is on the right track when he acknowledges that our human resources are "pitifully inadequate" for the job ahead and urges that we "enlarge the body of expertise and the corps of specialists, both in government and in the academic community, without whom we can never hope to conduct a resourceful diplomacy in the region." (p. 262).

In other essays, John F. Cady unearths the historical factors which "have already vitiated and will continue to render ineffective any American policy based exclusively on the dichotomy resulting from cold war psychology." (p. 25). Charles Wolf, Jr. concerns himself with the development of an analytical framework for considering the value of the region, or a country within it, to the United States. Clifford Geertz discusses the social-cultural context of United States policy in Southeast Asia and finds that a great deal of our policy suffers from an unconscious assumption "derived from the diplomatic history of nineteenth—and twentieth—century Europe—an assumption which is radically inappropriate to that mélange of languages, cultures, religions, and races crammed in between India, China, and the Pacific." (p. 46). He argues that "we need powers in Southeast Asia, not satellites" and counsels that American diplomacy concentrate on the construction of workable multi-ethnic states." (p. 70). David Wurfel reviews the evolution of the foreign policies of several Southeast Asian states and comments on their implications for United States policy. Roger M. Smith with the assistance of Lionel Landry identifies some of the attitudes that leaders in Southeast Asia have toward the United States and our foreign policy. The remaining essays discuss United States diplomacy in the area (John M. Allison); United States aid programs (Amos A. Jordon); the United States Information Service (Paul M. A. and Genevieve C. Linebarger); Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty Organization (Russell H. Fifield); and Communist Expansion (Frank N. Trager).—ROY JUMPER.

American Military Forces Abroad: Their Impact on the Western State System. BY GEORGE STAMBUK. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, and the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, 1963. Pp. ix, 252. $6.75.)

The title of this book is somewhat misleading. Its primary thesis is the obsolescence of the sovereign territorial state. The author chooses to focus upon the *status* of American armed forces in foreign territories in order to prove his point. The book is concerned, therefore, not with the "impact," *per se*, of American armed forces on the Western state system, but with the incipient "deterritorialization" of the state that is suggested by the ubiquitous presence of United States troops in allied countries around the globe. As evidence of deterritorialization, Professor Stambuk examines in some detail the legal arrangements that condition the access of American military forces to foreign territories and with the status of those forces once admitted.

The Westphalian model of the territorial state serves as a point of departure. According to this classical conception, the two most salient attributes of the state are territorial exclusiveness and absolute sovereignty. Territoriality and sovereignty appear to be synonymous because you cannot have one without the other; yet, as Stambuk shows by contrasting the Westphalian model with contemporary reality, these conceptions are not only separable, they are obsolete.

The author contends that the institution of the territorial state is in crisis. He ascribes to this crisis the same basic cause as is alleged to have contributed to the break down of the feudal political structure of the middle ages—the old system is unable to offer protection against the new war technology because the individual political units have become "penetrable." This "hard shell" conception of the basic function of the state (i.e., protection of the political unit from penetration from without) owes intellectual debt to John Herz' *International Politics in the Atomic Age,*[1] and while that interpretation of the state system can be challenged on several grounds, it does nevertheless provide a useful perspective for understanding the relationship between American military forces abroad and the apparent weakening of the institution of the territorial state.

According to the Westphalian model, the introduction of foreign troops to one's territory meant belligerent occupation or war. But conditions have been so radically altered that security today may very well be enhanced, rather than threatened, by the presence of alien military forces. Stambuk concludes, on the basis of his examination of the arrangements that permit the presence of American military power abroad, that "the traditional identification of security with territorial exclusiveness" (p. 163) is yielding to complementary arrangements in which the host governments give access to territory at the price of shared jurisdiction over the military personnel (the so-called "status-of-forces agreements"). In practice, local jurisdiction is often waived at the request of American military authorities. Stambuk concludes that the United States has gained "disproportionate influence" because, although rights have been yielded on both sides, "the host state has yielded the most," (p. 164).

The "price" that the United States pays for the opportunity to deploy military forces in strategically critical regions of the world is not, strictly speaking, limited to relinquishing (nominally or otherwise) certain traditional prerogatives over American military personnel. The host government usually demands (and gets) military and economic aid. Additional leverage is attained by threatening to commit the United States, by implication, to actions with which the American government would be embarrassed to be associated, or to insist upon changes in or the withdrawal of American forces under unfavorable circumstances. Stambuk ignores this larger political dimension by concentrating upon the narrower legal aspects of deployed forces abroad. Herein lies the weakness of the book. It is largely a study of the legal implications of status-of-forces agreements encased by an introductory and a concluding chapter in which larger issues of international law and politics are discussed.

Thus when the author argues that "the survival of the actual states of the world depends upon the speed with which the state as an institution can be stripped of some of its legal prerogatives" (p. 177), in particular those prerogatives which flow from the "myths" of territorial exclusiveness and absolute sovereignty, one wonders how instructive the discussion of status-of-forces agreements has been in reaching this broad conclusion. Stambuk argues that federative integration of NATO may well be a requisite for the survival of the Western alliance and, perhaps, of the Western state system. Again, the question of relevance of specific subject matter to broad conclusion might well be asked.

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[1] New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

In short, this book really consists of two elements: the first is an insightful essay on the changing character of the Western state system as measures have been sought to meet transterritorial threats by transterritorial means; the second consists of a detailed account of the jurisdictional relationships of American armed forces abroad to their host governments. As a contribution to international political theory the book says little that has not been said better elsewhere (by Herz in particular); but for those interested in the phenomenon of American forces stationed abroad, Stambuk provides a useful and thorough analysis of the legal arrangements necessitated by larger strategic issues.—David W. Tarr, *The University of Wisconsin.*

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Richard L. Merritt
Yale University

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NEWS AND NOTES

NOMINATIONS

The Association's Committee on Nominations invites all members to propose candidates for the elective offices of the Association, to wit: President Elect, three Vice Presidents, Secretary, Treasurer, and eight members for two-year terms on the Council.

Suggestions and supporting statements may be sent to any member of the Committee: James W. Prothro, University of North Carolina, Chairman; Bernard C. Cohen, University of Wisconsin; Alfred Diamant, Haverford College; Robert Horn, Stanford University; Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University; and Ruth G. Weintraub, Hunter College.

The sooner suggestions are received the better; to be considered at all they must arrive by March 15, 1965.

WASHINGTON OFFICE NEWSLETTER

About 2,000 persons attended the 60th Annual Meeting, held in Chicago September 9–12. Some 100 research papers were prepared for the 55 panel discussions scheduled during the week. Among highlights of the meeting, held in the Pick-Congress Hotel, was the presentation of the following awards:

Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award to Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis Anthony Dexter for their book, *American Business and Public Policy,* published by Atherton Press.

Edward S. Corwin Award to David F. Hughes, Centre College of Kentucky.

Pi Sigma Alpha Award to James G. March, University of California, Irvine. Both the Pi Sigma Alpha Award, for the best paper presented at the last Annual Meeting, and the Edward S. Corwin Award, for the best doctoral dissertation within the general field of public law, were presented for the first time at the 1964 meeting. Neither the Atherton Press Prize nor the Leonard D. White Award committees recommended winners for 1964.

The following awards will be presented at the Association's 1965 Annual Meeting, September 8–11, Sheraton-Park Hotel, Washington, D. C.

Leonard D. White Award: This award is for the best doctoral dissertation within the general field of public administration, including broadly related problems of policy formation and administrative history. The dissertation must have been completed and accepted before the end of the calendar year 1964. Departments are requested to submit to the Association's national office not more than one dissertation per department for consideration for the award. Dissertations should be submitted as soon as possible and no later than APRIL 1, 1965.

Edward S. Corwin Award: This award is for the best doctoral dissertation in the field of public law, broadly defined to include the judicial process, judicial biography, judicial behavior, courts, law, legal systems, the American constitutional system, civil liberties or any other substantive area, or any work which deals in a significant fashion with a topic related to or having substantial impact on the United States Constitution. The dissertation must have been completed and accepted before the end of the calendar year 1964. Departments are requested to submit to the Association's national office not more than one dissertation per department for consideration for the award. Dissertations should be submitted as soon as possible and no later than APRIL 1, 1965.

Pi Sigma Alpha Award: This award is for the best paper presented at the last annual meeting. Established in cooperation with the political science honorary fraternity, the award carries an honorarium of $250. Nominations for the award are submitted by the annual meeting program section chairmen.

Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award: The Association would be pleased to receive recommendations for this award, for the best book published in 1964 on government, politics, or international affairs. Suggestions should be conveyed to the national office prior to FEBRUARY 1, 1965.

Placement Service. The Chicago Placement Office of the Illinois Employment Service, in cooperation with the U. S. Employment Service, operated a placement service at the annual meeting in Chicago. This is the fourth consecutive year the USES has conducted a placement service for the Association at its annual meeting through the local or state agency of USES.

The service is designed to provide a liaison between potential employers and employees who want their availability known but choose to keep their names and/or institutions confidential. A number system devised bythe USES provides a means whereby job descriptions and application forms can be viewed by the interested parties and then messages can be sent to those "numbers" which appear desirable *via* the USES. The follow-up for interviews, etc. is entirely in the hands of the applicants and employers. A total of 360 persons seeking employment registered with the service, while 104 employers from 32 states and one foreign country registered 189 openings with the service. This represents an increase of approximately 10 per cent in application registration, a 73 per cent increase in employer registration, and a 52 per cent increase in total openings listed. Nearly 75 per cent of the openings were teaching positions with the balance in research, administrative, etc. This year a pre-convention mailing was made and as a result, 223 applicants and 41 employers pre-registered.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of The American Political Science Association met at 9:00 A.M., September 8, 1964, in the Belmont Room of the Pick-Congress Hotel in Chicago, with President C. Herman Pritchett presiding. The following members of the Council, nominees for election in 1964, and former presidents of the Association were present: Joseph La Palombara, Charles B. Hagan, Frederic N. Cleaveland, Charles D. Farris, James L. McCamy Emmette S. Redford, Malcolm E. Jewell, John Wahlke, David B. Truman, Warren E. Miller, David Easton, Lucian W. Pye, James S. Coleman, Gwendolen M. Carter, William Anderson, Franklin L. Burdette, Robert McCloskey, Karl W. Deutsch, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Joseph Tanenhaus, Samuel Beer, Marian Irish, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Harvey C. Mansfield, Robert E. Lane, Gabriel A. Almond, Leon D. Epstein, Peter Odegard, Pendleton Herring.

Prior to the meeting, the Executive Director had mailed to each Council member an agenda book which included the reports of the Executive Director, the Editor of THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, the Treasurer, and the Auditor, as well as the minutes of the Executive Committee meetings during the past year. These reports were the basis of Council discussion and are available to Association members. The Executive Director distributed copies of a statement by the National Science Foundation in support of political science on the same basis that programs of NSF are open to other social sciences. Also distributed were announcements calling the attention of those present to the Special Panel Meeting on Political Science and the Work of UNESCO to be held Wednesday at 10:00 A.M.

The President opened the meeting and thanked the Executive Director for his efforts in opening the NSF programs in political science. He called attention to the fact that the Sixtieth Annual Meeting marked Evron M. Kirkpatrick's tenth year of service as Executive Director and pointed out the great progress the Association has made during that time. He announced the new Chairman of the Joint Commission on Political Science and Administrative Law, Victor Rosenblum, who replaces James Fesler.

The President expressed the appreciation of the officers, council and members of the Association for the many contributions Morton Grodzins made to our Association, our profession and our discipline and expressed the sympathy of all of us to Mrs. Grodzins on Morton's death. The Council unanimously endorsed the statement of the President.

The Editor of the REVIEW, Harvey Mansfield, requested and received unanimous approval of the appointment of Roland Pennock to replace John Lewis on the REVIEW Editorial Board. The Editor mentioned that the flow of manuscripts to the REVIEW was about 225 to 250 per year and that an increasing number of manuscripts were in the field of international affairs. He noted that many members had expressed the desire to see the service features of the REVIEW increased. The first cumulative index to the REVIEW since 1926 has been published using KWIC indexing, thanks to the work of Kenneth Janda and the Northwestern University Press. It was also reported that a new Biographical Directory of the Association would be brought out next year. The Executive Director explained that new techniques were being explored which would allow more frequent publishing of the Directory.

Leon Epstein, the Program Chairman, reported on the Sixtieth Annual Meeting Panels. Of the 100 major papers, 65 Universities were represented; geographically they were drawn 40 to 45 East and 27 Middle West. He also recommended that a certain portion of future papers be selected on a competitive basis instead of by invitation only. The Chairman thanked Mrs. Jean Walen of the APSA staff for her invaluable assistance on the program arrangements.

In his report, the Executive Director mentioned the steady growth of the Association membership which is increasing at slightly over 100 per month.

A significant development this year is the recognition accorded political science through inclusion in the NSF programs. The Council appreciatively recognized the great benefit of this inclusion to political science. A new program started by the Association in February 1964, was a comprehensive study of Congress made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation, under the direction of Ralph K. Huitt. It will be carried on by autonomous individuals commissioned by the Director.

Continuing programs of the Association include the Congressional Staff Fellowship Program, supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation, under which nine appointments were made for 1964–65 by a bipartisan House-Senate Advisory Committee. About 100 applications were considered. The Congressional Fellowship Program continues to be highly regarded by members of Congress. The Association had received requests for Fellows from 33 members of the Senate and from more than 150 members of the House of Representatives by mid-November. The second Annual Senate Youth Program, organized in collaboration with the William Randolph Hearst Foundation and unanimously approved by Senate resolution, will again bring high school student leaders to Washington for a week's study of governmental operations. In cooperation with the Office of Career Development, U. S. Civil Service Commission, the Association is arranging Seminars to further understanding of the executive-legislative processes. Attending the two Seminars held in 1964 were 37 high level civil servants and 22 individuals representing 10 Executive departments and agencies. The Association is continuing the Seminar for Freshman Congressmen conducted for the first time in January 1963. This project has brought forth many expressions of appreciation and has led to the preparation of a Handbook for Legislative Service by the Association to be used in conjunction with the Seminars. The Association, by its programs and activities, has been of considerable benefit to political, science, furthered good relations with Congress, and greatly assisted members of the Association.

The Executive Director also announced that the Association will be asked to be represented, as it has been in the past, on the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO when this organization holds its meetings in December.

The President announced that the term of Arnold Rogow, one of the APSA representatives on the National Research Council, has expired. Evron M. Kirkpatrick has been appointed to fill this vacancy.

In the absence of the Treasurer, the Executive Director reported on the financial good health of the Association. On the motion of the President, seconded by Harvey Mansfield, the proposed budget for July 1, 1964, to June 30, 1965, was unanimously approved.

The Council considered a proposal by Albert Lepawsky that the Association should study the problem of effective exercise of the franchise. That the problem of disfranchisement exists was unanimously agreed upon. However, lively discussion centered on whether the problem needed more documentation and research. A motion was made by Joseph La Palombara and seconded by Karl Deutsch that the proposal be referred to the Executive Committee. The motion was carried 13 aye to 7 nay.

Gwendolen Carter made a request that questionnaires be sent to the membership in order to discover their willingness to work overseas and this information be placed on file for reference. The request was referred to the Executive Committee.

President Pritchett expressed appreciation to the officers and members of the Council of the Association for their cooperation during his term as President.

The Council adjourned at 5:45 P.M.

DONALD G. TACHERON, Associate Director
(on behalf of the Secretary)

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The annual Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association was called to order by President C. Herman Pritchett in the Great Hall of the Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, at 4:30 P.M., September 9, 1964.

President Pritchett noted that this is the sixtieth Annual Meeting of the Association and the tenth year of Evron Kirkpatrick's service as Executive Director. He mentioned the growth of the Association's membership during the past ten years and attributed this growth, as well as the expansion of the Association's activities, in large part to the efforts of the Executive Director; thanked the officers and all members who had accepted committee assignments during the past year; and announced that the officers' reports were available to all members.

Harvey Mansfield, Editor of the REVIEW, summarized in brief his written report. He called attention to the print order of 11,000 for the last issue and the flow of manuscripts which seems to have remained constant, about 225 to 250 per year. He noted the recent marked upsurge in the number of articles dealing with foreign governments and politics, and international relations. The appointment of Roland J. Pennock to replace John D. Lewis on the REVIEW Editorial Board was announced. He thanked Austin Ranney for his service in the Book Review department and the many colleagues who have read and appraised manuscripts for the REVIEW. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Editor's report be accepted.

The Executive Director, Evron Kirkpatrick, briefly outlined the activities and programs of the Association. He noted that a full written report was available to members, and touched on some of the important developments of the past year: the opening of the National Science Foundation programs to political science; the Study of Congress, sponsored by the APSA under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation and under the direction of Ralph K. Huitt; the Presidential Campaign Debate Report; and the Legislative Operations Seminars conducted in cooperation with the U. S. Civil Service Commission. He commented on the continuing success of the Congressional Staff Fellowships, Congressional Fellowships, charter flights to Europe and the insurance program which now includes graduate students. His report, by summarizing the scope of activities of the Association, pointed up the service and contribution of the Association to the discipline, to the profession, and to its members. The Executive Director in the absence of the Secretary, John Schaar, reported briefly on the Council Meeting of September 8, 1964, and noted that minutes of the meeting will be printed in the December 1964 issue of the REVIEW. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the report of the Executive Director be accepted.

The Treasurer, Max Kampelman, reported on the good financial health of the Association, discussed the Operating Reserve Fund, the General Endowment and Trust Fund, and the proposed budget for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965. He thanked all those who had made grants and gifts during the past year and noted that for the first time, due to the length of the list, he could not thank each contributor individually. He also called attention to the historical table in his written report which charts the financial growth of the Association from 1904 to 1964. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the Treasurer's report be accepted.

Austin Ranney, Chairman of the Nominating Committee, announced that the committee, after considering all suggestions, had recommended the following slate of officers for 1964–65, and Council members for the two-year term 1964–65:

President-Elect: Gabriel Almond (Stanford University)

Vice Presidents: Samuel Beer (Harvard University); Marian Irish (Florida State University); James McCamy (University of Wisconsin)

Secretary: Malcolm Jewell (University of Kentucky)

Treasurer: Max M. Kampelman (Washington, D. C.)

Members of the Council for two years: Marver Bernstein (Princeton University); James Coleman (University of California); David Easton (University of Chicago); Charles Farris (University of Florida); Ernst Haas (University of California); Warren Miller (University of Michigan); Joseph Tanenhaus (New York University); John Wahlke (State University of New York)

Mr. Ranney moved approval and the motion was seconded and passed unanimously. The Nominating Committee, in addition to Austin Ranney, consisted of: Rupert Emerson (Harvard University); Robert Scalapino (University of California), Avery Leiserson (Vanderbilt University); James W. Prothro (University of North Carolina); and Ruth G. Weintraub (Hunter College).

President Pritchett expressed his appreciation to the Association for giving him the opportunity to serve and his gratitude to the members for their assistance in the past year. He turned the gavel over to the incoming President, David B. Truman, who thanked President Pritchett for his generous efforts on behalf of the Association.

President Truman declared the meeting adjourned at 5:45.

MAX M. KAMPELMAN, Treasurer
(on behalf of the Secretary)

The International Political Science Association held its Sixth World Congress in Geneva, Switzerland, September 21–25, 1964. Nearly 500 political scientists from over 40 countries were in attendance. The Swiss Association of Political Science was host to the meeting.

Sessions were held and papers presented on Political Leadership; Youth in Politics; New Trends in the Theory and Practice of Federalism; International Organization; Decentralization: Political, Administrative and Economic; and the Concept of Human Rights in Political Theory. In addition, a series of specialist meetings were held on Electoral Research; Finance and Politics; Research in Interest Groups; Political Conjecture; The Use of Quantitative Data; and Research on Hobbes and Locke.

New officers of IPSA were elected for the years 1964–67: President, Jacques Freymond (Switzerland); Vice Presidents, Stanislaw Ehrlich

(Poland), Carl J. Friedrich (United States), and Georges Lavau (France); Executive Committee: Yavuz Abadan (Turkey), D. N. Chester (United Kingdom), S. A. H. Haqqi (India); J. E. Hodgetts (Canada), A. I. Lepeshkine (U.S.S.R.), Kaoru Matsumoto (Japan), W. H. Morris-Jones (United Kingdom), Andre Philippart (Belgium), Stein Rokkan (Norway), Alberto A. Spota (Argentina), Dolf Sternberger (Germany); Secretary General, Serge Hurtig (France).

The International Studies Association, an organization composed of political scientists and others with a professional interest in the study of international relations, held its fifth annual convention on March 19, 1964 in Salt Lake City.

Officers elected for 1964–65 were John Gange of the University of Oregon, president; Major John S. Pustay, assistant dean of the faculty at the U. S. Air Force Academy, first vice-president; Ward Morehouse of the University of the State of New York, second vice-president; Charles McClelland of the University of Southern California, treasurer and editor of the ISA quarterly magazine, *Background*; and Vincent Davis of the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver, secretary.

In May the ISA formed its first regional affiliate, designated the ISA Midwest Division. Officers named to head this group during its first year of operation were: president, Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Ohio State University; first vice-president, Maurice Waters, Wayne State University; vice-presidents, George J. Stolnitz of Indiana University, Chadwick Alger of Northwestern University, Michael J. Flack of the University of Pittsburgh, and Ross Stagner of Wayne State University; secretary, Jacqueline E. Timm of Bowling Green State University; and treasurer, Jerome Slater of Ohio State University.

The Round Table meeting of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences in Warsaw, Poland, June 23–27, 1864, was attended by one hundred persons, representing forty countries. The delegates discussed preliminary reports on three topics: public relations in administration, new techniques of budget preparation and management, and administrative management of public enterprises. Final reports on these topics will be presented at the next congress to be held at UNESCO House in Paris, July 25–31, 1965. A special session of representatives of schools and institutes engaged in training for public administration discussed, *inter alia*, the problems of training aspects of development administration. The Executive Committee approved the appointment of Ferrel Heady, University of Michigan, as a member of its scientific committee, and of Dwight Waldo, University of California, as a member of the editorial board of the International Review of Administrative Sciences. Other U. S. participants in the round table were Herbert Emmerich, University of Virginia and president of IIAS; Walter Gellhorn, Columbia Law School; G. W. Lawson, AID; Henry Reining, Jr., University of Southern California; Harold Seidman, U. S. Bureau of the Budget; and Edward Weidner, East-West Center, University of Hawaii.

The Northern California Political Science Association held its sixteenth annual meeting at San Francisco State College on May 2, 1964. Topics for panel discussion were the U. S. and Red China, and constitutional and political aspects of a civil rights initiative on the California ballot. Officers elected for 1964–65 were: president, Jack F. Leach, Monterey Peninsula College; vice-president, Eugene Lee, University of California (Berkeley); secretary-treasurer, John M. Selig, City College of San Francisco. Elected to the council were Richard Fagan, Stanford University; Otto Freitag, Alameda County State College; Clyde Jacobs, University of California (Davis); Charles Kunsman, San Jose State College; Harry L. Morrison, St. Marys College; Paul Murray, Sacramento State College; Ray Stafansson, Chabot College.

The International Organization Research Program of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University sponsored its first institute on the Administration of United Nations Affairs, August 23–28. The organization is directed by Gerard J. Mangone of Syracuse University.

The department of political science at the University of North Carolina sponsored a research conference on race and politics, June 7–13, 1964. Directors of the conference were James W. Prothro and Donald R. Matthews, both of North Carolina.

Faculty members from 22 countries participated in the Eastern Regional Conference for Visiting Scholars held at the University of Pennsylvania, June 3–6, 1964. The conference was under the joint auspices of the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils and the University of Pennsylvania.

The fourth annual American-Yugoslav educational exchange seminar was held at Indiana from May 20–26 on the topic of "Local Government."

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association is to be held March 18–20, 1965 in the Empress Hotel at Victoria, British Columbia.

The Social Science Research Council announces a new program of Grants for Intensive Study of Computer Simulation Programs, to be administered by its Committee on Simulation of Psychological and Social Processes. This program, for which funds have been provided by the International Business Machines Corporation, is offered to assist social scientists whose current research involves use of a computer model of human behavior, but who cannot obtain adequate instruction in its use at their own institutions. Grants to such persons who have received the Ph.D. degree, or have completed all requirements for it except the dissertation, will provide for spending up to 15 days at a computer installation where an arrangement for intensive study of a simulation program and supervised training in its use has been made with a particular investigator.

An applicant must show that his research will be advanced by such a period of personal consultation and practice, and that his proposed visit has been approved by the host institution and investigator.

The grant will provide an allowance equivalent to round-trip tourist air travel and a per diem allowance of $16 for living expenses while at the host institution for not more than 15 days.

Applications, on forms supplied by the Council may be submitted up to May 1, 1965, but since funds are limited, applicants are advised to apply as early as possible. Decisions will be announced within about 6 weeks after receipt of applications and payments may be made immediately thereafter. Inquiries should be addressed to Social Science Research Council Fellowships and Grants, 230 Park Ave., New York, N. Y. 10017.

The departments of political science and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia were consolidated on July 1, 1964 to form the Woodrow Wilson department of government and foreign affairs.

The name of the Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia, has been changed to Institute of Government, effective July 1, 1964. The change in title does not affect the responsibilities or organization of the Institute.

Henry J. Abraham, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania was visiting professor of political science in the 1964 summer session of the University of Colorado.

Akazawa, professor of industrial relations at Kao Keio University, Tokyo, is spending some months in Berkeley as a visiting scholar associated with the political science department at the University of California, Berkeley.

Henry S. Albinski, assistant professor of political science, Pennsylvania State University, has resumed his duties following a year's research and writing in Australia where he served as a visiting fellow and a Rockefeller travel scholar in the department of international relations, Australian National University, Canberra.

Thornton H. Anderson is on leave for the academic year 1964–65 from the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland.

Vernon V. Aspaturian, professor of political science, Pennsylvania State University, is on leave with the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, during the academic year 1964–65.

Frank Bane, chairman, Advisory Commission on Inter-Governmental Relations, will be in residence at the University of California, Berkeley, as regents professor for the fall semester, 1964.

Paul C. Bartholomew, professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, served as an assistant to the parliamentarian at the Republican national convention in San Francisco, July 13–16.

Eliot S. Berkley, dean of the college, Kansas City Art Institute, has been appointed chairman of the Faculty Grants Committee of the Kansas City Regional Council for Higher Education, an association of 16 colleges and universities in eastern Kansas and western Missouri.

William W. Boyer, who has been on leave since 1963 as professor-advisor in the department of political science, University of the Punjab with the University of Southern California public administration project, has resumed his position as associate professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

Phillip Bradley, who retired from the U. S. Information Service on September 30, 1964, is teaching political science at Grinnell College for the year 1964–65. His last post in USIS was as Consul and Chief Cultural Affairs Officer in Bombay, India.

Thomas H. Brose, doctoral candidate at the

University of Washington, has been awarded a Fulbright grant for study in Mexico.

David S. Brown, professor of public administration at The George Washington University, is on sabbatical leave for 1964–65.

George Carey, Georgetown University, has been appointed visiting associate professor at Indiana University.

John W. Chapman has resumed his position as associate professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh. While on leave in 1963–64 he served as visiting professor of American political institutions at the University of Bombay and later as a visiting fellow at Australian National University.

Edward Chaszar is serving as visiting professor of political science at the School of Sociology and Politics in Sao Paulo, Brazil.

Taylor Cole and Allan Sindler of Duke University were among the American participants in the Sixth World Conference of the International Political Science Association on "New Tendencies in Federal Theory and Practice," held in Geneva, Switzerland on September 21–25.

Cecil Crabb is on leave from his position in the department of political science at Vassar College for the academic year, 1964–65.

Mosche Czudnowski of Israel is a visiting professor at the University of Wisconsin.

Shen Yu Dai, associate professor of political science at Colorado State University has been granted a year's leave of absence to lecture and do research at the Civil Service Academy in Lahore, Pakistan, under a Fulbright award.

David Daube of All Soul's College, Oxford University, has accepted appointment as Ford rotating professor of governmental affairs at the University of California, Berkeley, for 1964–65.

Paul T. David was appointed chairman of the Woodrow Wilson department of government and foreign affairs, University of Virginia, effective July 1, 1964. He will continue to serve as chairman of the board, University Press of Virginia.

Morris Davis, associate professor of political science, Tulane University, has been awarded a Public Health research grant to study community decision making affecting public health issues.

David R. Deener will serve a term as university chairman of political science at Tulane University.

David Derge, associate professor, Indiana University, has received the distinguished teaching award at the University.

Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, formerly of Catholic University, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, has joined the faculty of the University of Virginia as a visiting professor of foreign affairs for the 1964–65 academic session.

Roland Ebel, assistant professor of political science at Western Michigan University, will serve as visiting assistant professor, Newcomb College, Tulane University, 1964–65.

Lewis Edinger is on leave from Washington University and is working as a senior research associate on Yale University's arms control project. He has also been in Germany on a Fulbright travel grant.

Herbert Emmerich, professor of political science at the University of Virginia and president of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences was in Europe during the summer to participate in a meeting of the Institute in Warsaw, a U. N. conference in Paris on the administrative aspects of national development planning, and an Anglo-American conference on the problems of technical assistance, held in England.

Donald L. Fairchild, assistant professor of political science, The Citadel, has returned from UCLA after a two-year leave of absence.

Maria Falco is on leave for the academic year 1964–65 from her position in the department of political science at Washington College (Maryland). She is the recipient of an NCEP faculty fellowship in state and local government.

Edwin H. Fedder, department of politics at Hollins College, served as a visiting lecturer during the spring and summer, 1964, at the University of Illinois. He is serving as chairman of the department of politics at Hollins during 1964–65.

E. C. Flowers, assistant professor of political science, The Citadel, has received a faculty grant and a leave of absence.

Keener C. Frazer, of the University of North Carolina, took leave of absence to attend the International Political Science Association Congress in Geneva, Switzerland.

Felix V. Gagliano, doctoral candidate at the University of Illinois, will spend the year 1964–65 in Malaysia under a Fulbright grant.

Robert T. Golembiewski, Yale University, served as a summer intern in applied social sciences at the National Training Laboratories.

S. K. Gove is acting director of the institute of government and politics at the University of Illinois.

Sven Groennings, Indiana University, was awarded an NCEP Republican national convention fellowship. He was also chosen the most popular teacher at the University.

Arcadius R. L. Gurland of Darmstadt, Germany, will be visiting professor of government at Columbia University during the 1965 spring semester.

Donald E. Habbe of the University of South Dakota will be visiting professor in the department of international relations at the University of Denver during the 1964–65 year.

John H. Hallowell, chairman of the department of political science at Duke University, served as visiting professor of political science at the University of Illinois during the summer term, 1964.

Howard D. Hamilton, Indiana State College, has been appointed visiting professor at Indiana University.

Robert J. Harris, dean of the faculty of arts and sciences, University of Virginia, is teaching in the Woodrow Wilson department of government and foreign affairs during the 1964–65 academic session.

Harold Herman, formerly of the Fels institute, University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed chief, Metropolitan Health Section, Division of Community Health Services, Public Health Service in Washington.

Claude H. Heyer has been appointed visiting instructor in political science for the academic year 1964–65, replacing William O. Lewis. Mr. Heyer has been directing a project for the State of Oklahoma and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Nathaniel Howell, Jr. has been appointed half-time instructor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia for the academic session 1964–65.

Chun-tu Hsueh has joined the State University of New York at Plattsburgh as a visiting associate professor of social science for 1964–65.

Mahmud Husain of the University of Karachi is a visiting professor in the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

I-kua Chou is on leave for 1964–65 from William and Mary and is teaching at Southern Illinois University.

Malcolm E. Jewell has returned to the University of Kentucky after a year's leave as visiting professor at Duke University.

Bernard K. Johnpoll, associate professor of political science at Hartwick College, is managing editor of a new quarterly journal, *New York State Political Review.*

Victor Jones will serve as research professor of the legislative process at the University of California, Berkeley, for 1964–65. He will have responsibility for the California legislative intern program.

Earl O. Kline, chairman of political science department, The Citadel, has received an appointment as visiting professor of political science at Duke University.

Merle Kling is on leave for the academic year 1964–65 from the department of political science at Washington University, to teach at the center for international studies at Princeton University.

Edward A. Kolodziej, assistant professor of political science, University of Virginia, is on leave of absence for the 1964–65 academic session to serve as a Mershon fellow at the Ohio State University.

Paul F. Kress is serving as an instructor in the department of political science at Northwestern University during the academic year 1964–65.

Ladis K. D. Kristof, Temple University, presented a paper at the Twentieth International Congress of Geography in England. He is spending the current academic year at the Hoover Institution.

Robert S. Lancaster, dean of the college of arts and sciences and professor of political science at the University of the South, is on leave for the 1964–65 academic year. He will be at the University of Seoul, Korea, on a Fulbright lectureship.

Leslie Laszlo is a visiting professor of foreign affairs, University of Virginia, 1964–65.

Edward G. Lewis of the department of political science, University of Illinois, is acting as the director of the center for Russian language and area studies and secretary for the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies during 1964–65 in the place of Ralph Fisher while the latter is on sabbatical leave.

Shao-chuan Leng of the University of Virginia was appointed a research associate of the world rule of law center, Duke Law School, for the summer of 1964.

ROBERT LESTER, JR. has been appointed half-time instructor of political science at the University of Virginia for the academic session 1964–65.

THEODORE J. LOWI has returned to Cornell University, department of government, after a year in Washington on a Social Science Research Council fellowship. During his year in Washington he was also a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution.

DUNCAN MACRAE, professor of political science, University of Chicago, is in residence as a visiting scholar at Berkeley for the 1964–65 academic year.

CHARLES MCKINLEY, professor emeritus, Reed College, was honored by associates and city officials recently upon retirement from the Portland city planning commission after service ranging over a period of 30 years.

JOSEPH D. MCGOLDRICK, chairman of the department of political science at Queens College, is on leave, serving as secretary of the New York City Temporary Commission on Finance.

MAX MANWARING, doctoral candidate at the University of Illinois, is spending the year in Brazil under an NDEA fellowship.

NICHOLAS A. MASTERS, Pennsylvania State University, has been on research leave during the fall term under a Citizens Research Foundation award.

DONALD R. MATHEWS, of the University of North Carolina, is on leave of absence to attend the center for advanced study in the behavioral sciences, at Palo Alto, California.

PETER MAYER has a visiting appointment for 1964–65 at Wichita State University.

RALPH C. MEYER, recently returned from two years of field work in India, has been appointed instructor in the department of government and law at Lafayette College for 1964–65.

JOHN H. MILLETT of the University of Wichita, Kansas, is a visiting professor for 1964–65 in the department of political science at Washington University.

MALCOLM C. MOOS is a visiting professor of government at Columbia University for the 1964–65 year.

JAMES W. MORLEY, associate professor of government, has been named director of the East Asian institute at Columbia University.

WYNDRAETH H. MORRIS-JONES of the University of Durham, England, is spending the current academic year at Berkeley in place of Ralph Retzloff who is doing research in India.

ROBERT J. MOWITZ is a visiting professor in the department of political science at Pennsylvania State University for the academic year 1964–65.

STUART NAGEL, assistant professor at the University of Illinois, has been granted a year's leave of absence. He will spend eight months at the center for advanced study in the behavioral sciences in Palo Alto, California and four months in the East-West Center in Hawaii.

WALTER J. NICGORSKI has been appointed as an instructor in the department of government and international studies at the University of Notre Dame for 1964–65.

JOSE NUN, of the faculty of the University of Buenos Aires, will serve as lecturer in political science and as assistant research political scientist in the institute of international studies at the University of California, Berkeley, for the year.

PETER ODEGARD, on leave from the University of California at Berkeley for the academic year taught at Boston College in the fall; will initiate the Maurice and Laura Falk professorship in politics at the University of Pittsburgh in the early spring; and will continue on to Germany as Fulbright fellow at the University of Hamburg.

GIUSEPPE DI PALMA has been appointed acting assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, for the academic year, 1964–65.

CHARLES E. PARRISH, assistant professor of government at the University of Texas, has a Fulbright research fellowship in Chile, 1964–65.

JULIUS PAUL has resigned from Wayne State University and is serving as a political science research specialist in the department of clinical and social psychology at Walter Reed Army Medical Center's Institute of Research.

GEORGE M. PLATT, assistant professor of government, has returned to the University of South Dakota after being on leave to serve as a Ford Foundation consultant to the government of East Pakistan during the 1963–64 year.

GERAINT PORRY of the University of Manchester, England, is a visiting lecturer in the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin, during the current academic year.

Robert Presthus, professor of public administration and editor of the *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Cornell University, lectured on community power structure and comparative administration at the University of Amsterdam and the Institute of Social Studies, the Hague, in March 1964.

Kenneth Prewitt, on leave from Washington University, is a visiting assistant professor at Stanford University and is working on a project sponsored by the National Science Foundation.

J. Harris Procter of the department of poltical science at Duke University is on sabbatical leave during the 1964–65 academic year and is serving as visiting professor at the University of East Africa, Nairobi, Kenya.

James W. Prothro, University of North Carolina, is serving as acting chairman of the department of political science.

C. Neale Ronning, associate professor of political science, Newcomb College, Tulane University, is on leave for the 1964–65 academic year. He will conduct research in South America and participate in a study sponsored by the Mershon center for study in national security at Ohio State University.

Joseph S. Roucek, chairman of the department of political science and sociology at the University of Bridgeport, has been appointed American editor for *Il Politico* (University of Pavia, Italy), the Indian Sociological Bulletin, and the Indian Journal of Social Research.

Tadao Sakuma, professor of constitutional law at Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan, will spend some weeks as visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, during the year 1964–65.

John Schaar is the recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship and will spend the 1964–65 academic year on leave from the University of California, Berkeley.

Warner R. Schilling, associate professor of government at Columbia University, will be on leave in 1964–65 on a Guggenheim grant for research in England.

Henry G. Schwarz is on leave for the academic year 1964–65 from the department of political science at Marquette University to be a Fulbright lecturer at the University of the Philippines.

Robert E. Scott has returned to the University of Illinois after a year's leave of absence during which he was associated with the Brookings Institution. He spent part of the year in Peru and Mexico.

Paul Seabury, professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley was awarded the Bancroft Prize in American Diplomacy and International Relations.

Otis H. Shao of Florida Presbyterian College has been appointed to the Committee on Education in World Affairs of the Council of Protestant Colleges and Universities.

George W. Shephard, Jr., associate professor of international relations at the University of Denver, is a visiting lecturer at the University of Khartoum during 1964–65. He is also conducting research there under a Rockefeller Foundation grant.

Paul Shoup, assistant professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia, is on leave of absence for the 1964–65 academic session, and is doing research in Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Frank R. Sibert has been appointed half-time instructor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia for the academic session 1964–65.

William J. Siffin, associate professor at Indiana University, will serve as visiting senior specialist at the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii during the 1964–65 academic year.

Allan Sindler has returned to the department of political science at Duke University from a year as a fellow in the center for advanced study in the behavioral sciences.

Donald E. Smith, associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, directed a seminar on religion and politics in South Asia, held in Colombo, Ceylon, July 1–5. The seminar was sponsored by the Council on Religion and International Affairs and financed by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation. Fifteen participants from India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the United States presented papers which are now being edited for publication in book form.

Richard C. Snyder has returned to his position as chairman of the department of political science at Northwestern University after a year's leave of absence.

Edward Sofen, professor of government at Miami University (Coral Gables), is spending the academic year 1964–65 as political aide to the mayor of San Diego, California, under a grant from the NCEP.

ALBERT SOMIT, graduate school of public administration of New York University, is on sabbatical leave during 1964–65.

HENRY J. SPIRO, associate professor of political science at Amherst College, became chairman of the Non-Western studies committee of the inter-university Asian and African studies program in Massachusetts on July 1, 1964.

G. Y. STEINER, director of the institute of government and public affairs, University of Illinois, is a visiting professor of political science at the University of California at Berkeley for the academic year 1964–65.

CARL F. STOVER, senior political scientist at the Stanford research institute, became executive director of the National Institute of Public Affairs on September 1.

GILBERT WARE has resigned from Fels institute of local and state government at the University of Pennsylvania and has accepted an appointment with the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights.

TROY R. WESTMEYER, professor of public administration at New York University, has been appointed assistant dean of the graduate school of public administration.

JOHN P. WHEELER, JR. of Hollins College is a visiting professor in the departments of political science and public administration at the University of West Indies, in Trinidad.

MATT WINN WILLIAMSON has been appointed half-time instructor of political science at the University of Virginia for the academic session 1964–65.

FRANCIS G. WILSON has returned to his post in the department of political science at the University of Illinois after a sabbatical leave of absence.

JAMES H. WOLE, department of international studies, University of South Carolina, will spend the academic year 1964–65 in West Germany at the University of Munich on a Humbolt Fellowship.

SHELDON WOLIN is on sabbatical leave of absence for the academic year 1964–65 at the University of California, Berkeley.

BRYCE WOOD, of the Social Science Research Council, is a visiting professor of government at Columbia University during 1964–65.

QUINCY WRIGHT has returned to Charlottesville and is serving as a consultant to the department of government and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.

ROLAND A. YOUNG is on leave from his position in the department of political science at Northwestern University for the academic year, 1964–65, during which he will be a fellow in law and political science at Harvard law school.

APPOINTMENTS AND STAFF CHANGES

THORNTON H. ANDERSON, department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, has been promoted to the rank of professor.

JAMES H. ANDREWS has been appointed research associate on the staff of the institute of government and public affairs at the University of Illinois during 1964–65.

HAROLD M. ANGELL, lecturer at Sir George Williams University, Montreal, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor of political science.

SHELDON APPLETON of the department of political science at Oakland University has been promoted to be associate professor.

SALVATORE ARCILESI, formerly of the Department of Commerce, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at The Citadel.

NANCY RITA ARNONE has been appointed lecturer in the department of political science at Queens College.

HOYT B. BALLARD has joined the department of government at California State College as an associate professor.

SAMUEL H. BARNES has been promoted to be associate professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

A. DOAK BARNETT was promoted to be professor of government at Columbia University.

Kurt Beermann has been promoted to the rank of professor at Gallaudet College.

Dennis C. Beller has joined the department of government, Miami University (Ohio) for 1964–65 as an instructor.

Paul Bernstein has joined the department of political science at Temple University as an instructor.

Goberdhan Bhagat, formerly associated with the Indian delegation at the United Nations, has been appointed to the faculty of the University of Mississippi as assistant professor of political science.

Thomas C. Blaisdell, emeritus professor, has been reappointed to the political science faculty of the University of California at Berkeley for 1964–65.

S. Cole Blasier, formerly of the *Universidad del Valle*, Cali, Colombia, has been appointed director of the Latin American area studies program and associate professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

David Booth has joined the department of political science at the University of Kentucky as an associate professor.

James R. Brown resigned his post as chairman of the department of history and political science at St. Joseph's College to become professor and chairman of the department of public administration at the University of Hartford, Hartford, Conn.

W. Dean Burnham, formerly of Kenyon College, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at Haverford College.

Richard Butwell, department of political science at the University of Illinois, has been promoted to the rank of professor.

Elbert M. Byrd, Jr., department of government and politics at the University of Maryland, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

William R. Caspary has joined the faculty of the department of political science at Washington University with a rank of assistant professor.

Gerhard Casper of Freiburg, Germany, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley.

Alphonso A. Castagno has been appointed acting chairman of the department of political science at Queens College. He will become associate director of the African studies center of Boston University in February, 1965. In July, 1965 he assumes the directorship of the center.

Vincent Chen, formerly associate professor and chairman, department of political science, Albertus Magnus College, has accepted an appointment as associate professor of political science at the graduate school, St. John's University, New York.

Yong Hyo Cho, doctoral candidate at the Maxwell graduate school of citizenship, Syracuse University, has been appointed instructor of political science at the University of Nevada—Las Vegas.

Richard Pierre Claude, formerly of Vassar College, has joined the faculty of William and Mary as an assistant professor of government.

Charles J. Cooper has resigned from Bryn Mawr College and has been appointed lecturer in the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

H. Roberts Coward, doctoral candidate at M.I.T., has been appointed instructor of political science at the Ohio State University.

James Davis has become an assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin.

Morris Davis, college of arts and sciences, Tulane University, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

Richard Dekmejian, who has been a graduate student at Columbia University, will become acting assistant professor of political science at Harpur College.

Martha Derthick has been appointed an instructor of government at Harvard University.

Nicholas DeWitt has accepted an appointment in the department of government and economics at Indiana University with the rank of associate professor.

Alfred Dunker has been named an assistant professor at Hartwick College, Oneota, New York.

Joseph Dunner has resigned from Grinnell College to accept an appointment as David Petegorsky professor of political science at Yeshiva University.

William D. Eaton has been appointed instructor at the University of California at Berkeley for 1964–65.

SCOTT EDWARDS, formerly of the University of California at Riverside, joined the staff of the University of Nevada—Las Vegas, as an assistant professor of political science after completion of his doctoral work in June, 1964, for Claremont graduate school.

SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD has been appointed chairman of the department of political science at the University of Michigan.

LYNN W. ELEY has been appointed dean of the University College at Washington University in St. Louis, and associate professor of political science, effective September 1964. He was formerly at the University of Michigan.

JOHN W. ELLSWORTH has resigned his position at Colorado State University to accept an appointment as assistant professor in the department of political science at California State College at Hayward.

ROBERT ENGLER, formerly at Sarah Lawrence, has been appointed professor of political science at Queens College, New York.

DAVID J. FINLAY of Stanford University joined the department of political science at Duke University as assistant professor, September, 1964.

FRANCINE FRANKEL, doctoral candidate at the University of Chicago, has been appointed lecturer in the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

RICHARD B. FRIEDMAN has been promoted to be assistant professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

ROBERT S. FRIEDMAN has been appointed associate chairman of the department of political science at the University of Michigan.

SHELDON GELLAR has joined the department of government at Indiana University with the rank of lecturer.

BETTY GLAD has accepted an appointment in the department of political science at the University of Illinois with the rank of assistant professor.

MAURICE M. GOLDSMITH recently completed his doctoral work at Columbia University and has been promoted to be assistant professor of government at Columbia.

ROBERT KENT GOOCH became professor emeritus at the University of Virginia effective July 1, 1964. During his forty years of service he was chairman of the department of political science, 1925–1957. He will continue to live in Charlottesville and is teaching at Sweet Briar College during the 1964–65 session.

GEORGE L. GRASSMUCK has been promoted to be professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

SVEN GROENNINGS, department of government at Indiana University, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

FRANCIS J. GROGAN, S. J., formerly at Fordham University, is now assistant professor of political philosophy at St. Peter's College, Jersey City, N. J.

RODNEY A. GRUNES has been appointed assistant professor of political science at The Citadel

EDMUND GULLION, former U. S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo (1961–64), has been named dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He succeeds Robert B. Stewart who retired after twenty years in that post.

HARLAN HAHN has been appointed assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Michigan.

JOHN H. HALLOWELL assumed the chairmanship of the department of political science at Duke University on July 1, 1964, replacing Robert S. Rankin.

PAUL Y. HAMMOND, after two years as a research associate of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, has joined the social science department of the RAND Corporation.

ILYA F. HARIK has joined the department of government at Indiana University with the rank of assistant professor.

MARTIN HEISLER, JR. has joined the faculty of the department of political science at the University of Illinois.

KEITH HENDERSON of the American University in Beirut has been named associate professor in the graduate school of public administration at New York University.

LAURIN L. HENRY, formerly of the Brookings Institution, joined the faculty of the University of Virginia as a professor of political science in September, 1964.

ROGER HILSMAN, formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, has been appointed professor of government at Columbia University.

WILEY E. HODGES, professor of political science, has been appointed acting chairman of political science department, The Citadel.

Benjamin Hourani has been appointed lecturer in the department of political science of Queens College, New York.

Barbara Howard, department of government at Indiana University, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

L. Vaughan Howard has resigned as university chairman of political science at Tulane University and as head of the department, college of arts and sciences. He will continue teaching courses in the department.

Warren Ilchman of Williams College has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, to take effect spring semester, 1965.

Herbert Jacob was promoted to be assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin.

George P. Jan has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of government at the University of South Dakota.

Valentine Jobst III, professor of political science at the University of Illinois, retired on September 1, 1964.

Bernard K. Johnpoll has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the department of political science at Hartwick College.

M. Glen Johnson, formerly of the department of political science at the University of Kentucky, has joined the faculty of Vassar College.

Robert S. Jordan has been promoted to associate professor of international affairs and political science at George Washington University.

Lloyd Keeton has been appointed assistant professor of political science at The Citadel.

Robert N. Kelson has resigned from the University of Western Ontario to accept appointment as Fred Morgan Kirby professor of civil rights and head of the department of government and law at Lafayette College.

John J. Kennedy, formerly of the University of Virginia, has been named head of the department of government and international studies and director of the program on Latin American studies at Notre Dame.

Chonghan Kim, formerly with the Korean Foreign Service, has joined the faculty at William and Mary as assistant professor to serve during the absence of I-Kua Chou.

Richard C. C. Kim, associate professor of political science and head of the department of political science at Hardin-Simmons University, has been appointed a full professor beginning September 1, 1964.

Charles M. Kneier, professor of political science at the University of Illinois, retired on September 1, 1964.

Daniel C. Kramer has joined the faculty of the department of political science at the University of Illinois with the rank of assistant professor.

Wladyslaw W. Kulski has been appointed James B. Duke professor of Russian affairs at Duke University.

Antonio E. Lapitan, doctoral candidate at the University of Oregon, has been appointed an assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Nevada, Southern Regional Division.

Shao-chuan Leng has been advanced to the rank of professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.

Ralph Lerner has been promoted to the rank of associate professor in the College of the University of Chicago.

Paul F. de Lespinassi has joined the department of political science of Adrian College as an instructor.

J. Gus Liebenow, chairman of the African studies program at Indiana University, has been promoted to the rank of professor.

John P. Lovell, department of government at Indiana University, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

Thomas McEnroe, who was recently promoted to be associate professor in the department of government at California State College at Los Angeles, has been appointed chairman of the department.

Sidney Mailick has been promoted to professor of public administration in the graduate school of public administration at New York University.

Stanislaw Makielski, Jr. joined the faculty of the University of Virginia and the staff of its institute of government as an assistant professor in September 1964.

Ray Stephen Marshall, formerly of Vanderbilt University, has been appointed instructor in political science at Hardin-Simmons University.

ROGER MARZ, formerly of Harpur College, has been appointed an assistant professor in the department of political science of Oakland University in Michigan.

HENRY L. MASON has been appointed head of the political science department, college of arts and sciences, at Tulane University.

NICHOLAS A. MASTERS has been promoted to the rank of professor in the department of political science at Pennsylvania State University.

CONSTANTINE MENGES of Columbia University has been appointed instructor in the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin.

PETER H. MERKL has been promoted to the rank of associate professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

ROBERT F. MILLER has joined the department of political science at Washington University as an assistant professor.

BENJAMIN H. MIN has been appointed assistant professor in the social studies department of the State University College at Buffalo, New York.

THOMAS MONGAR, formerly at the University of Washington, has been appointed lecturer of political science at Queens College.

RAYMOND A. MOORE, JR., department of international studies at University of South Carolina, has been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

LARRY MORELAND has been appointed assistant professor of political science at The Citadel.

FRANK JAY MORENO has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor in the department of government and international relations at New York University.

RONALD C. NAIRN who received his Ph.D. degree from Yale University has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

DICK NETZER has been promoted to professor of public finance in the graduate school of public administration at New York University.

FRANK W. NEUBER, professor of political science at Parsons College, Fairfax, Iowa, was named chairman of the department in February 1964.

JOSEPH S. NYE has been appointed as an instructor of government at Harvard University.

MORRIS S. OGUL has been promoted to associate professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

JOHN ORBELL, of the University of North Carolina, has joined the staff of Ohio State University, Columbus, as instructor.

ROBERT OSBORN has accepted an assistant professorship in the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

VINCENT A. OSTROM, research associate, Resources for the Future, has been appointed professor at Indiana University.

RICHARD L. PARK, formerly of the University of Michigan and representative for India, the Asia Foundation, has been appointed dean of the division of the social sciences and professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh.

REVEREND STANLEY J. PARRY, C. S. C., was promoted to associate professor in the department of government and international studies at the University of Notre Dame.

J. W. PELTASON, professor of political science and dean at Illinois, resigned on July 1, 1964 to take up his duties on the new Irvine campus of the University of California.

PHYLLIS PETERSON, department of government at Indiana University, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

LAWRENCE K. PETTIT was appointed assistant professor of political science, Pennsylvania State University, effective September 1964.

ROBERT PFALTZGRAFF has joined the faculty of the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania with the rank of assistant professor.

ROY PIERCE has been promoted to professor of political science at the University of Michigan.

HANNA PITKIN has accepted an assistant professorship in the department of political science at the University of Wisconsin.

SIDNEY I. PLOSS has resigned from Princeton University and has accepted an assistant professorship in the department of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

ROBERT PUCKETT, formerly of Mary Washington College, joined the faculty of the University of Virginia as assistant professor of foreign affairs in September 1964.

JEFFREY L. RADELL has resigned from Niagara University and is now associate professor of political science at Wisconsin State College at Oshkosh. He has been given the task of building a program of area specialization in Soviet and East European affairs.

ROUHOLLAH K. RAMAZANI has been advanced to the rank of professor of foreign affairs at the University of Virginia.

MOSTAFA REJAI has joined the department of government, Miami University (Ohio) for 1964–65 as an assistant professor.

JAMES A. ROBINSON, formerly of Northwestern University, has joined the Ohio State University as professor of political science. The appointment took effect in September, 1964.

JAMES M. ROHERTY continues at William and Mary as an associate professor after being a visiting associate professor there last year.

PETER R. SAVAGE has joined the department of government at Indiana University with the rank of lecturer.

ALAN H. SCHECHTER, department of political science at Wellesley College, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

DONALD E. SMITH, formerly of the University of Rhode Island, has joined the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania as an associate professor.

GEORGE P. SMITH, who received his doctorate from Claremont graduate school in 1964, has been appointed assistant professor of government at California State College at Los Angeles.

ROBERTO SOCAS, formerly of the College of the City of New York, has been appointed to the faculty of Fordham University.

A. DON SORENSEN has joined the department of government at Indiana University with the rank of assistant professor.

HAROLD J. SPAETH has been appointed associate professor of political science at Michigan State University.

MURRAY S. STEDMAN, JR. has accepted an appointment as professor of government and chairman of the department at Trinity College, Hartford, Conn.

ARTHUR B. STEIN was appointed assistant professor of political science for the academic year 1964–65 at Pennsylvania State University.

WILLIAM STESLICKE has joined the faculty of the department of political science at the University of Illinois.

PHILIP D. STEWART, doctoral candidate at Indiana University, has been appointed assistant professor of political science at the Ohio State University.

NEWELL STULTZ has been appointed to an assistant professorship in the department of political science at Northwestern University for the 1964–65 academic year.

HARRY P. STUMPF has joined the department of government at University of New Mexico as an assistant professor.

RAYMOND TANTER has joined the faculty of the department of political science at Northwestern University with the rank of assistant professor.

ROBERT G. THOBABEN has accepted an instructorship in the department of government at the Dayton Academic Center, Miami-Ohio State University.

CARL VANN, formerly of Wayne State University, has been appointed an assistant professor of political science at Oakland University, Michigan.

A. J. WANN has resigned from the University of Illinois institute of labor and industrial relations to accept an appointment at Ohio State University as the director of the labor and research service and adjunct professor in the college of commerce and administration.

DONALD E. WEATHERBEE has joined the department of international studies at the University of South Carolina as an assistant professor.

WILLIAM A. WELSH has accepted an appointment in the department of political science at University of Georgia with the rank of assistant professor.

JOHN P. WHEELER, JR., chairman of the department of politics, Hollins College, resigned as dean of the faculty in June. He has resumed full-time teaching.

ORION WHITE, who recently completed his doctoral degree at Indiana University, has accepted an appointment as assistant professor of government at the University of Texas.

YORK T. WILLBERN, professor and director of the institute of public administration at Indiana University, has been promoted to the rank of university professor.

OLIVER P. WILLIAMS, associate professor at the University of Pennsylvania has joined the political science department there and will no longer be associated with the Fels institute of local and state government.

DIANA HEIDA WOLF has joined the faculty of the department of political science at Vassar College.

JAMES S. YOUNG recently received his Ph.D. from Columbia University, where he has been promoted to an assistant professorship.

JAMES V. YOUNG has joined the faculty of the department of political science at St. Olaf College with the rank of assistant professor.

JOSEPH ZIKMUND will serve as an instructor in the department of political science at Duke University during the 1964–65 academic year.

DINA ZINNES, department of government at Indiana University, has been promoted to the rank of assistant professor.

SUPPORT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE BY THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

The success of the National Science Foundation in advancing basic research and education in the sciences requires clear communication and understanding with the individual scientists and groups that it supports. Recent questions by political scientists as to support of their field have resulted in a careful review by the staff of the Foundation and by the National Science Board of policies affecting support for the field of political science. The cooperation of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW is welcomed in distributing to members of the political science community this statement on National Science Foundation support for their field.

Basic Research

The Foundation is the only agency of the Federal Government that supports basic research in all the sciences. The lines among areas of research—conveniently grouped as basic, applied, and developmental—cannot always be sharply drawn. The Foundation, however, must establish policies on which to base its decisions of support to basic research and must work for an understanding of these by the individuals and groups with which we are cooperating to achieve our purpose. The Foundation does not itself conduct research or carry out educational projects.

The most important aspect of the Foundation's support of basic research is the awarding of funds for the work of individual investigators or groups of investigators on fundamental problems in all areas of science—the support of basic research projects. Facilities needed by the institutions at which the research is being conducted are another aspect of our basic research support. These include facilities and equipment of a specialized nature, required by particular fields, and facilities used for basic research and graduate education in all areas of the sciences. Another aspect of the Foundation's support of basic research is the dissemination of scientific information. In all these areas the Foundation's main consideration is whether the work that it supports contributes to the promotion of basic research.

Basic research in political science and other social sciences is interpreted as meaning research on problems that can be studied by methods that will yield independently verifiable results and that will produce results with general implications, rather than findings relevant principally to a particular time, place, or event. The Foundation will support research designed to elicit the scientific understanding of social processes and behavioral phenomena, but not studies designed to endorse particular social policies or to promulgate solutions of specific social problems.

The merit of research proposals is not judged by their promise of quick answers or of the immediate applicability of their results. The investigator is left free to concentrate on questions of scientific importance, irrespective of whether these be questions that require new data, the development or improvement of method, or the formation of theoretical models as a guide to empirical inquiry. Decisions on eligibility of proposals in the social sciences are governed by the desire to strengthen the social sciences as scientific disciplines, rather than by any proposed practical importance of the question chosen for study, or the immediate significance of results for political policy.

It is therefore clear that some research topics that may interest social scientists are not given research support by the National Science Foundation. Efforts to evaluate the merits of competing ideologies, political parties, interest groups, and other organizations are inappropriate for submission to the Foundation. In particular, the Foundation is not interested in polemics, doctrinaire pronouncements, or statements about public policy or controversial issues.

Research proposals in political science are handled by the National Science Foundation's Division of Social Sciences. The primary areas of social science support are cultural and physical anthropology, archaeology, demography, economics, geography, linguistics, political science, psychology, sociology, and the history and philosophy of science. In all instances the Division judges eligibility of proposals primarily in terms of one criterion: the potential contribution of the research to basic science. Within such limitations, investigators choose their own topics for research; proposals are not solicited and no particular research topics are given preferential review. The investigator is free to choose any methods of investigation, including quantitative, experimental, and other techniques, as long as they are scientific and appropriate to the projected study. The disciplinary identification of the proposer is irrelevant. Preliminary inquiries on the eligibility of a proposed research topic are invited. Details on application procedures are contained in a guide entitled "Grants for Scientific Research," which is available upon request from the National Science Foundation, Washington, D. C. 20550.

Proposals for the construction or remodeling of specialized facilities for research in political science or the acquisition of specialized research materials and equipment needed in this field are also handled by the Division of Social Sciences. Such examples might include, *but are not limited to*, specialized data repositories, field stations, specialized laboratories, and other forms of unique research space. Support of such facilities may include the purchase of equipment, the construction, conversion, renovation, or improvement of buildings, and the development of new means or devices for research.

The National Science Foundation's Division of Institutional Programs provides assistance for the renovation and construction of graduate science facilities in all the basic sciences, including political science. Proposals for support of facilities for basic research and research training may be submitted to the Division by institutions of higher education and related nonprofit research institutions. Funds are granted for such facilities as research and graduate training laboratories, supporting areas, animal buildings, and science libraries as part of science buildings. These facilities may house more than one scientific discipline, and have ranged from a grant to support the construction of a child development laboratory to a large high-rise building that will house a number of social science departments.

Science information activities which support basic research are administered by the NSF Office of Science Information Service and are directed toward developing new and/or improved methods for collecting, analyzing, controlling, storing, and disseminating scientific information and improving existing scientific information systems.

Science Education

National Science Foundation programs for education in the sciences are mainly at the graduate level where basic research is intimately involved in the education and training of first-class scientists and engineers. NSF educational support is offered through graduate fellowships, teacher-training institutes, the improvement of course content related to science teaching, and research participation opportunities.

Political scientists are eligible for support in the nine fellowship programs of the Foundation, which encompass all levels of study from graduate through senior postdoctoral, as follows:

Postdoctoral Fellowships primarily for individuals who have recently received a doctoral degree.

Senior Postdoctoral Fellowships primarily intended for recognized senior scientists.

Science Faculty Fellowships for junior college, college, and university teachers.

Summer Fellowships for Secondary School Teachers for the support of graduate level study in the field.

Senior Foreign Scientist Fellowships for nationals of foreign countries to engage in appropriate scientific programs at participating U. S. universities.

NATO Postdoctoral Fellowships in Science, which each NATO country administers for its own nationals. On behalf of the Department of State, the National Science Foundation is responsible for administration of the program for the United States, including the selection of fellows.

Graduate Fellowships for students studying for a master's or a more advanced degree.

Cooperative Graduate Fellowships similar to graduate fellowships except that individuals apply through and are initially evaluated by the U. S. participating institutions which they expect to attend as fellows.

Summer Fellowships for Graduate Teaching Assistants for support of summer study in advanced degree programs.

It is hoped that the offer of NSF fellowship support will encourage applications at the postdoctoral level which reflect quantitative, objective, and verifiable approaches to the many areas encompassed in political science and its broad spectrum of sub-fields. The Foundation has adopted the following guidelines for political science (and all other supportable fields) in this year's fellowship programs:

In the postdoctoral and teacher-oriented programs, the Foundation will examine each application to determine the suitability of proposed programs of study and/or research in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the several program announcements.

In fellowship programs for graduate students—Graduate, Cooperative Graduate, and Graduate Teaching Assistants—the Foundation will accept the graduate-level study program required by the degree-granting institution in fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree in political science. The Foundation recognizes that not all Graduate Schools have Departments of Political Science but nonetheless may offer advanced degrees in political science. It may therefore be necessary for the Foundation to make an individual determination of the acceptability of some degree programs for fellowship support.

In addition to its fellowship programs, the National Science Foundation supports a number of educational programs designed to provide instruction or experience in science to individuals ranging from secondary school students to senior scientists. Among these programs are institutes for the further training of school or college teachers, science course content improvement efforts, and participation in research by students and teachers. Proposals requesting support for such projects in political science will be accepted when the subject matter is to be treated scientifically, and here the same general principles will be applied as are set forth in the above discussion of basic research support. As in the case of research grants, science education grants and fellowships are made on the basis of merit without specific quotas for any field of science, institution, or geographic area. Further detailed information is available upon request from the Division of Scientific Personnel and Education, National Science Foundation.

LELAND J. HAWORTH
Director

National Science Foundation
Washington, D. C. 20550
August 26, 1964

IN MEMORIAM

William R. Frasca, professor of political science at Fordham University since 1936, and chairman of the department of political philosophy and government from 1953 to 1962, died suddenly on August 8, 1964.

Edgar Lane, associate professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, died at his home on July 29, 1964, after a brief illness. Born in Rochester, New York, on December 12, 1923, he did his undergraduate work at Syracuse University; served in the United States Army as a combat infantryman and returned to Syracuse University where he received his M.A. in 1946. He obtained his Ph.D. at the University of Michigan in 1949.

His first teaching appointment was at Princeton. There he served also as managing editor and associate editor of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, and as consultant to the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities (the Buchanan Committee) of the 81st Congress. He wrote the Committee's *Report* (1950), which has been partially reprinted in several anthologies, in addition to journal articles.

After an extended interval in a family business, he accepted a position in 1960 as assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and was promoted to an associate professorship in 1964. His book, *Lobbying and the Law*, was published by the University of California Press in the spring of 1964; it deals with state regulation of lobbying and is a model of fine prose style. In addition to this and recent articles and reviews, he left behind a first draft of a more ambitious manuscript on federal regulation of lobbying, tentatively entitled "The Politics of Disclosure."—Gordon E. Baker and William Ebenstein

Alton Dean Kidd, associate professor of political science at Allegheny College, died following a severe heart attack in August, 1964.

Marek S. Korowicz, for ten years a research professor of international law in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, died suddenly in Williamstown, Mass., on October 7, 1964.

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(*a*) *Alphabetical Section*

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(*b*) *Classified Section**

Here entries concerning the same or related topics are grouped together, or near to each other, to encourage "suggestive browsing" and refer you to the *subject matter* of Articles, Reviews, Notes, and Bibliographies.

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

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

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